Matros, Alexander and Armanios, Daniel (2009) Tullock’s contest with reimbursements. Public Choice, 141 (1-2). pp. 49-63. ISSN 1573-7101
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Abstract
We consider Tullock’s contest with reimbursements. It turns out that the winner-reimbursed contest maximizes net total spending while the loser-reimbursed contest minimizes net total spending. We investigate properties of contests with reimbursements and compare them with Tullock’s classic contest. Applications for R&D, government contracts, and elections are discussed.
Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Public Choice
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
?? contestsreimbursement d72d74economics and econometricssociology and political science ??
Departments:
ID Code:
61399
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
03 Jan 2013 14:46
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
21 Oct 2024 23:40