Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game

Moulin, Herve and Ray, Indrajit and Sen Gupta, Sonali (2014) Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game. Working Paper. Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

[img]
Preview
PDF (CoarseCorrelatedEquilibria)
CoarseCorrelatedEquilibria.pdf - Submitted Version

Download (314kB)

Abstract

We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria — CCE — (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the efficiency gain in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.

Item Type:
Monograph (Working Paper)
Subjects:
ID Code:
71642
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
07 Nov 2014 09:13
Refereed?:
No
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
11 Jul 2020 02:45