Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets

Matros, Alexander (2012) Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets. Economics Letters, 115 (3). pp. 500-503. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.

Item Type:

Journal Article

Journal or Publication Title:

Economics Letters

Uncontrolled Keywords:

/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2003

Subjects:

?? asymmetric informationadverse selection winner’s curse takeover gamefinanceeconomics and econometrics ??

Departments:

Lancaster University Management School > Economics

ID Code:

61397

Deposited By:

ep_importer_pure

Deposited On:

02 Jan 2013 11:20

Refereed?:

Yes

Published?:

Published

Last Modified:

15 Jul 2024 13:31

URI:

https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/61397