Matros, Alexander (2012) Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets. Economics Letters, 115 (3). pp. 500-503. ISSN 0165-1765
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128
Abstract
This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.
Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Economics Letters
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
?? ASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONADVERSE SELECTION WINNER’S CURSE TAKEOVER GAMEFINANCEECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS ??
Departments:
ID Code:
61397
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
02 Jan 2013 11:20
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
18 Sep 2023 00:37