Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets

Matros, Alexander (2012) Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets. Economics Letters, 115 (3). pp. 500-503. ISSN 0165-1765

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Economics Letters
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
ID Code:
61397
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
02 Jan 2013 11:20
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
01 Jan 2020 08:16