Does Better Access to Disclosure Curb CEO Pay? : Evidence from a Modern Information Technology Improvement

Babenko, Ilona and Bennett, Benjamin and Wang, Zexi (2025) Does Better Access to Disclosure Curb CEO Pay? : Evidence from a Modern Information Technology Improvement. Journal of Finance. ISSN 0022-1082 (In Press)

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Abstract

We provide evidence that better access to disclosure curbs CEO pay. Using difference-indifferences estimation around the implementation of the SEC EDGAR platform from 1993 to 1996, we find that total CEO pay grows 7-15% less following EDGAR implementation relative to control firms. This effect is more pronounced for highly-paid CEOs, equity-based pay, and firms with unions or those in left-leaning states. Media coverage of executive pay increases following EDGAR adoption, particularly around proxy filing dates. Additionally, we find higher voluntary CEO turnover post-EDGAR, with the market showing a more negative response to turnover announcements, suggesting negative implications for firm value.