Political behavior does not (always) undermine strategic decision making : Theory and evidence

Shepherd, Neil Gareth and Hodgkinson, Gerard P. and Mooi, Erik A. and Elbanna, Said and Rudd, John Maynard (2020) Political behavior does not (always) undermine strategic decision making : Theory and evidence. Long Range Planning, 53 (5): 101943. ISSN 0024-6301

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Abstract

Political behavior pervades strategic decision-making, often damaging decision quality and undermining organizational performance. However, little is currently known about how top management teams (TMTs) cope with such behavior. To address this shortfall, we draw on the upper echelons literature to advance a contingent account of the factors that differentiate well-functioning and dysfunctional TMTs. Focusing on the psychological context surrounding the TMT, we theorize that cognitive consensus, power decentralization, and behavioral integration are key generative mechanisms that enable TMTs to countermand the potentially deleterious consequences of political behavior. We corroborate our theorizing using a field study of 117 strategic decisions, drawn from multiple TMT informants and secondary databases. Confirming the majority of our hypotheses, our findings indicate that behaviorally integrated and decentralized TMTs are better equipped to attenuate the potentially damaging effects of organizational politics, thereby safeguarding the quality of their decision processes.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Long Range Planning
Additional Information:
Publisher Copyright: © 2019 Elsevier Ltd
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3305
Subjects:
?? behavioral strategycognitionpolitical behaviorstrategic decision-makingtop management teamsupper echelonsgeography, planning and developmentfinancestrategy and management ??
ID Code:
219059
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
30 Apr 2024 14:25
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
17 Sep 2024 09:43