Foucart, Renaud and Tan, Jonathan H.W. (2023) A test of loyalty. Theory and Decision. ISSN 0040-5833
Text (Par-2023-06-26-c)
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Text (Par-2023-06-26-c)
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Abstract
We propose and test a model of loyalty in games. Players can mutually maintain loyalty by working towards a common goal that is pareto-superior to any Nash equilibrium without it. Loyalty imposes a psychological cost on defecting in an ongoing cooperation, which is thus sustained. We distinguish loyalty from reciprocity and explain how it complements guilt aversion with two dynamic games from a field experiment conducted in a Pakistani factory. The evidence supports the validity of loyalty, which has a stronger effect within than between groups.
Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Theory and Decision
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1800
Subjects:
?? cooperationfield experimentloyaltyreciprocitytrustdecision sciences(all)developmental and educational psychologyarts and humanities (miscellaneous)applied psychologysocial sciences(all)economics, econometrics and finance(all)computer science applications ??
Departments:
ID Code:
212800
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
12 Jan 2024 10:50
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
07 Feb 2024 01:06