Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game

Dokka, Trivikram and Moulin, Hervé and Ray, Indrajit and SenGupta, Sonali (2023) Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game. Review of Economic Design, 27 (2). pp. 419-438. ISSN 1434-4742

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse correlated equilibria, using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Review of Economic Design
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000
Subjects:
?? QUADRATIC GAMECOARSE CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUMABATEMENT LEVELEFFICIENCY GAINECONOMICS, ECONOMETRICS AND FINANCE(ALL) ??
ID Code:
168829
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
13 Apr 2022 10:15
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
17 Sep 2023 03:13