Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification : A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages

Farrell, Marie and Bradbury, Matthew and Fisher, Michael and Dennis, Louise A. and Dixon, Clare and Yuan, Hu and Maple, Carsten (2019) Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification : A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages. In: Software Engineering and Formal Methods : 17th International Conference, SEFM 2019, Oslo, Norway, September 18–20, 2019, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science . Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp. 471-490. ISBN 9783030304454

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Abstract

Autonomous robotic systems such as Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV) systems are both safety-and security-critical, since a breach in system security may impact safety. Generally, safety and security concerns for such systems are treated separately during the development process. In this paper, we consider an algorithm for sending Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) between vehicles in a CAV system and the use of CAMs in preventing vehicle collisions. We employ threat analysis techniques that are commonly used in the cyber security domain to guide our formal verification. This allows us to focus our formal methods on those security properties that are particularly important and to consider both safety and security in tandem. Our analysis centres on identifying STRIDE security properties and we illustrate how these can be formalised, and subsequently verified, using a combination of formal tools for distinct aspects, namely Promela/SPIN and Dafny.

Item Type:
Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings
ID Code:
154185
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
27 Apr 2021 08:50
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
16 Jul 2024 05:02