Push or Pull?:Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information

Rietzke, David and Chen, Yu (2020) Push or Pull?:Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information. RAND Journal of Economics, 51 (1). pp. 301-317. ISSN 0741-6261

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Abstract

We study a principal‐agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade‐offs between high‐ and low‐powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
RAND Journal of Economics
Additional Information:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Rietzke, D. and Chen, Y. (2020), Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information. The RAND Journal of Economics. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12314 which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1756-2171.12314 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
ID Code:
136186
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
19 Aug 2019 10:35
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
06 Jul 2020 01:21