Push or Pull? : Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information

Rietzke, David and Chen, Yu (2020) Push or Pull? : Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information. RAND Journal of Economics, 51 (1). pp. 301-317. ISSN 0741-6261

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We study a principal‐agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade‐offs between high‐ and low‐powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
RAND Journal of Economics
Additional Information:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Rietzke, D. and Chen, Y. (2020), Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information. The RAND Journal of Economics. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12314 which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1756-2171.12314 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Uncontrolled Keywords:
?? pay for performancemoral hazardadverse selectionobservable actionprincipal-agent problemeconomics and econometricsd82d86o31 ??
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Deposited On:
19 Aug 2019 10:35
Last Modified:
23 Apr 2024 00:35