Adjusting Inferential Thresholds to Reflect Nonepistemic Values

Kaivanto, Kim Kaleva and Steel, Daniel (2019) Adjusting Inferential Thresholds to Reflect Nonepistemic Values. Philosophy of Science, 86 (2). pp. 255-285. ISSN 0031-8248

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Many philosophers have challenged the ideal of value-free science on the grounds that social or moral values are relevant to inferential thresholds. But given this view, how precisely and to what extent should scientists adjust their inferential thresholds in light of nonepistemic values? We suggest that signal detection theory provides a useful framework for addressing this question. Moreover, this approach opens up further avenues for philosophical inquiry and has important implications for philosophical debates concerning inductive risk. For example, the signal detection theory framework entails that considerations of inductive risk and inferential-threshold placement cannot be conducted in isolation from base-rate information.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Philosophy of Science
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Copyright 2019 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
Uncontrolled Keywords:
?? inductive risknon-epistemic valuesinferential thresholdsstatistical decision functionssignal detection theoryhistory and philosophy of sciencehistoryphilosophyd81 ??
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Deposited On:
09 Apr 2019 14:10
Last Modified:
24 Nov 2023 00:27