A fine collection:The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement

Bracco, Emanuele (2018) A fine collection:The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement. Economics Letters, 164. pp. 117-120. ISSN 0165-1765

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

Abstract

We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.

Item Type:

Journal Article

Journal or Publication Title:

Economics Letters

Additional Information:

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 164, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

Uncontrolled Keywords:

/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002

Subjects:

Departments:

Lancaster University Management School > Economics

ID Code:

90150

Deposited By:

ep_importer_pure

Deposited On:

05 Feb 2018 09:26

Refereed?: