A fine collection : The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement

Bracco, Emanuele (2018) A fine collection : The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement. Economics Letters, 164. pp. 117-120. ISSN 0165-1765

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We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Economics Letters
Additional Information:
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 164, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011
Uncontrolled Keywords:
?? political budget cycleparking ticketstax collectionfinanceeconomics and econometricsd72h26h71 ??
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Deposited On:
05 Feb 2018 09:26
Last Modified:
23 Jun 2024 01:01