A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement

Bracco, Emanuele (2017) A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement. Working Paper. Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

[img]
Preview
PDF (LancasterWP2017_033)
LancasterWP2017_033.pdf

Download (286kB)

Abstract

With data from 1998 to 2015, we find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This provides evidence that mayors strategically use both tax setting and collection to affect elections.

Item Type:
Monograph (Working Paper)
Subjects:
ID Code:
89107
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
08 Dec 2017 16:40
Refereed?:
No
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
17 Sep 2020 23:51