Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games:An Experimental Study

Duffy, John and Matros, Alexander (2017) Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games:An Experimental Study. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 139. pp. 88-105. ISSN 0167-2681

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Abstract

We consider a model where two players compete for n items having different common values in a Blotto game. Players must decide how to allocate their common budgets across all n items. The winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism which yields a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. We analyze behavior under two competing payoff objectives found in the Blotto games literature that have not been previously compared: (i) players aim to maximize their total expected payoff and (ii) players maximize the probability of winning a majority value of all n items. We report results from an experiment where subjects face both payoff objectives and we find support for the differing theoretical predictions.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Additional Information:
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 139, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.005
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
ID Code:
86298
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
13 May 2017 02:35
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
01 Dec 2020 04:39