Secure multicast communications with private jammers

Cumanan, Kanapathippillai and Ding, Zhiguo and Xu, Mai and Poor, H. Vincent (2016) Secure multicast communications with private jammers. In: 2016 IEEE 17th International Workshop on Processing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC). IEEE. ISBN 9781509017508

[img]
Preview
PDF (1570246297)
1570246297.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (108kB)

Abstract

This paper investigates secrecy rate optimization for a multicasting network, in which a transmitter broadcasts the same information to multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In order to improve the achievable secrecy rates, private jammers are employed to generate interference to confuse the eavesdroppers. These private jammers charge the legitimate transmitter for their jamming services based on the amount of interference received at the eavesdroppers. Therefore, this secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game, in which the private jammers and the transmitter are the leaders and the follower of the game, respectively. A fixed interference price scenario is considered first, in which a closed-form solution is derived for the optimal amount of interference generated by the jammers to maximize the revenue of the legitimate transmitter. Based on this solution, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, at which both legitimate transmitter and the private jammers achieve their maximum revenues, is then derived. Simulation results are also provided to validate these theoretical derivations.

Item Type:
Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings
Additional Information:
©2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
ID Code:
85893
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
22 May 2017 12:02
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
06 Aug 2020 07:11