Critical Language Analysis of Palestinian and Israeli Online Newspapers

and News Websites during the 2014 Gaza War

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Declaration

I declare that the thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.

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October 2016

Abstract

It is widely accepted that the struggle over media representation within the Palestinian-Israeli struggle is no less important than the struggle on the ground (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Although the role of the media in this struggle has been a focal interest for researchers, the vast majority of studies are based on content analyses (see Kempf & Shinar, 2014). They mostly adopt top-down approaches with macro-level tools of analysis which lead to a dichotomous positive 'Self' and negative 'Other' representation. This study, in contrast, is a qualitative language-based analysis of three Israeli and three Palestinian online newspapers and news websites during the 2014 Gaza war. The study analyses a limited number of news articles from newspapers and news websites that are indicative of the media landscape on each side. The choice of these outlets is intended to present a range of possible views. The study adds to the effort which approaches media discourse to detect fissures and dissonances rather than identifying stabilities and symmetries.

To achieve its aims, the study adopts Critical Discourse Analysis as a general framework and adheres to the dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough, 1995a, b, 2000, 2003) as an overarching approach. It takes account of transitivity (Halliday, 1985; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004), the social actor model (van Leeuwen, 2008) and referential strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) to conduct its bottom-up analysis.

The results of this study reveal that marginal ideologies at both ends of the ideological spectrum in Israel compete with a hegemonic Zionist discourse. The study also shows that Palestinian news websites subtly exploit representations of actions and actors in their struggle for power, representativeness and legitimacy. More interestingly, the study reveals some similarities between hegemonic ideologies on the one hand and marginal ideologies on the other, in both societies. While the former

depend on common public knowledge, thus backgrounding much contextual

information, the latter mainly function via the extensive contextualization of events.

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to the millions of Palestinians who live under unbearable circumstances. To the souls torn by fences, walls, barriers, and military violence. To the children of Gaza, to Gaza. To Palestine.

To my father and my mother, the best teachers and the greatest moral school. To their suffering and endurance of the hardship they had to undergo all through their lives.

To my brothers and sisters, my hope and motivation.

To my soulmate Khalid Darawsheh.

To Fatemeh Takhtkeshian.

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

This study is concerned with press representations during violent conflicts. More particularly, it is interested in how different ideological and political trends in Palestine and Israel construct different *realities* while representing actors and actions in news discourse. The study goes beyond the assumption that people on each side of the conflict share the same socio-political stances and agree on the same historical narratives. This assumption leaves many of the contradictions, fissures and fractions in the structures of both communities hidden. Therefore, this study addresses the issue of representation from a critical perspective that is concerned with the internal political and ideological tensions in both communities and how these tensions are discursively articulated in news discourse. The study, for instance, analyses how the following clauses from the Palestinian news websites *Maan* and *WAFA* refer to similar events that involve Hamas-affiliated actors:

[*WAFA*] A family of four was also killed, including the father, Osama al-Hayya, his wife Hala Abu-Hein, and their two children Omama and Khalil.
[*Maan*] Earlier on Tuesday morning, an Israeli reconnaissance drone fired missile at home of Ziad al-Thatha deputy prime minister of the former Hamas-run government.

I will explain how the different language choices above build into different representations and serve different political objectives. To do so, I adopt Critical Discourse Analysis as a general framework and adhere to the dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough, 1995a, b, 2000, 2003). I make use of transitivity (Halliday, 1985; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004), the social-actor model (van Leeuwen, 2008)

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and referential strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) which go beyond describing the internal systematization of language to identify the functions it has in a socio-political context. Ultimately, it will be possible to explain the different discursive functions of micro choices and the relevance of these functions to the socio-political context.

The scope of the study necessitates theoretical and methodological frameworks that go beyond mere description of language and identify its functions in a social context. These frameworks are thoroughly addressed in Chapter Two. In this chapter, I introduce the historical and political context which is relevant to the research questions of this study. Since the focus is on internal political and ideological tensions, the historical account includes a brief review of the main historical junctures that led to the struggle as we see it today. More precisely, the choice of historical events is meant to identify the trajectories that gave rise to the different ideological and political trends on each side, which are identified in section 1.7.

Reconstructing the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a controversial process, as each account adopts one view over another. This study, therefore, has to choose from a vast range of resources based on the academic, political and critical objectives it aims to achieve. It draws on the work of a number of Palestinian, Israeli and international historians and journalists who handle different aspects of the conflict. A few of those scholars are referred to frequently due to their critical assessment of the historical context and the ideological trends in Palestine and Israel. For instance, the study draws heavily on the work of Ilan Pappe, who is one of a relatively small number of Jewish Israeli intellectuals to break away from the Zionist ideology. It also relies on the work of Avi Shlaim who presents a rigorous critical assessment of the historical context of the Palestine-Israel conflict. Pappe and Shalim, however, differ in their explanation of the political and ideological implications of the

history of Israel and the extent to which the Zionist hegemonic narrative is to be problematized (see section 1.6.1). The study also draws extensively on the work of Yezid Sayigh, a Palestinian researcher of Middle Eastern Studies, and Helga Baumgarten, a German researcher in Palestinian politics. Sayigh provides critical historical and political analyses of the Palestinian national movement. Baumgarten, on the other hand, is interested in Palestine and Israel and has written about the internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Her accounts may represent the (legal) point of view of the international community towards Israel/ Palestine. Finally, in presenting different ideological trends in Israel, the study draws on two key works that provide a comparative assessment of these ideologies: Laurence Silberstein (1991) and Nimni Ephraim (2003). The rest of the resources incorporate different views on the socio-political and human situation in Palestine, especially the afflicted Gaza Strip.

1.2 Scope of the study and methodological motivation

This study proposes a new angle to perceive the socio-political context of Palestine-Israel by focusing on the internal political and ideological tensions on each side. The study attempts to make visible some discursive aspects of the conflict that are usually ignored when analysing major events. To this end, this study analyses Palestinian and Israeli journalism discourse when representing actions and actors during the 2014 Gaza war. Instead of focusing on hegemonic discourses in each community, unsurprisingly realized by positive 'Self' and negative 'Other' representations, primacy is given to discourse irregularities, tensions and conflicts amongst different newspapers in the same community. These irregularities and tensions are nuances that may hardly be noticed by merely reading news reports. Therefore, the study proposes methodological and analytical synergies for a language-based bottom-up analysis. It analyses micro-level linguistic realizations, explains their

discursive functions and then interprets their contextual relevance. Ultimately, the study explains some aspects of the discursive mechanisms of hegemonic and marginal ideologies.

1.3 Position of the analyst

This study is a critical language analysis of journalistic discourse in Palestine and Israel. As a Palestinian, I do not claim to have the same distance from both sides. On the contrary, my research tries to highlight the devastating situation of Palestinians in Gaza who are being subjected to one of the most brutal sieges in modern history, and who have been indiscriminately attacked in three destructive wars. In a wider context, I attempt to give voice to my people in their struggle for freedom and independence. Therefore, the theoretical framework I adopt in this study allows the articulation of my politically-driven research interests. Yet, the methods I employ are capable of objective textual analysis, limiting the inevitable analyst's bias to my interpretation of the findings by situating them in their socio-political context. Ultimately, this study provides an analytical format for investigating any complex conflict. It is useful for studying the subtle tensions between dominant and marginal ideologies, and identifying their discursive strategies that cannot be detected by merely reading news articles or by conducting a content analysis.

1.4 Research questions

To achieve its objectives, this study attempts to answer the following three overarching research questions and various related subsidiary questions.

1. How does journalism discourse function in the political and ideological debate in Israel, namely that between Zionism, neo-Zionism and post-Zionism?

a. What are the micro-grammatical and lexical choices used in the representations of actions and actors in three online Israeli newspapers, *Haaretz*, *Jerusalem Post* and *Yediot Aharonot,* in the 2014 Gaza war?

b. What are the discursive functions of these grammatical and lexical choices?

c. What is the socio-political relevance of discursive functions?

d. What political discourses do newspapers reproduce or challenge?

e. To what extent do newspapers conform to or deviate from Zionist sociocultural narratives?

2. How does journalism discourse function in the political and ideological conflict in Palestine, namely that between Hamas and Fatah?

a. Which micro-grammatical and lexical choices are used in the representation of actions and actors on three Palestinian news websites, *Maan News Agency*, *the Palestinian Information Centre* and *The Palestine News and Information Agency,* in the 2014 Gaza war?

b. What are the discursive functions of these grammatical and lexical choices?

c. What is the socio-political relevance of discursive functions?

d. What political discourses do websites reproduce or challenge?

e. To what extent do websites conform to or deviate from the hegemonic sociocultural narratives in Palestine?

3. How can transitivity and the discursive features related to it, mainly social-actor theory and referential strategies, be applied to identify differences between representations?

1.5 Thesis structure

This thesis consists of six chapters. In the remainder of Chapter One I introduce the socio-political and ideological context of Israel and Palestine. I then critically review the literature about journalism in Palestine and Israel in Chapter Two, which also includes a definition of the theoretical background of this study. In Chapter Three I present the analytical methods utilized to answer the research questions. Chapters Four and Five include analyses of Israeli online newspapers and Palestinian news websites, respectively. Finally, I conclude my thesis in Chapter Six.

1.6 Historical background

One important aspect of the contested history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the historical point from which the arguments that support each side's claims should begin. In this study, I choose to start from the establishment of Israel in 1948, because many of the background issues invoked in the analysed texts are from the intervening period, i.e. the last 70 years.

As a Palestinian, I do have political and ideological preferences which, inevitably, influence my view and re-construction of the historical context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This, nonetheless, does not exclude the fact that there is a variety of historical narratives drawn from different scholars and give different interpretations of the conflict. These narratives are necessary to validate the claim, which will become clearer in further sections, that social reality and history are partially discursive and socially-constructed. Furthermore, since the main focus of this study is on internal political and ideological conflicts in Palestine and Israel, it is necessary to orient the reader into the ideological conflicts that accompanied or resulted from major historical trajectories. The objective of the following review is thus to shed light on the events and the socio-political challenges that gave rise to

different discourses in Israel. This also includes identifying some important socio-political conditions under which different Palestinian discourses arose and developed.

1.6.1 The establishment of Israel in 1948

The British occupation of Palestine after World War One played a major role in the establishment of Israel. Britain reneged on its promise to King Hussein for an independent Arab nation and offered the Zionist movement political recognition in Palestine in 1917 (Pappe, 2006a). When the British government handed the Palestinian issue to the UN after World War Two, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution in 1947 in favor of the partition of Palestine between the Palestinians and the Zionist movement (Shlaim, 2000). The partition plan granted the Jewish minority 56 per cent of the land, which was rejected by the Palestinians. On the other side, some historians, such as Bregman (2003), believe that the Zionist leaders were very satisfied with the partition plan as it gave them a fertile coastal area which was three times bigger than what was suggested in previous plans. Other historians, however, disagree with this opinion. For instance, Shlaim (2000) argues that the Zionist leaders were ambivalent towards the partition plan mainly because it excluded Jerusalem and put forward the idea of a Palestinian state. They also questioned the possibility of a viable Jewish state within the UN defined borders. Therefore, the Zionist leaders did not think of the UN defined borders as permanent borders of Israel. Instead, as Gilbert (1999) suggests, they believed that the inevitable war with the Arab countries could be a chance to extend the borders and annex more lands.

The partition plan fed the growing hostility between both sides of the conflict. The period between 29 November 1947 and 14 May 1948, which was later referred to as the first phase of the war, or the unofficial war (Shlaim, 2000), witnessed a wave of

confrontations between Palestinian guerrilla and Zionist forces. Palestinian guerrilla

attacked Jewish targets and some Palestinian fighters, especially the forces led by

Abdul Qader Al-Husseini, achieved some minor victories. This was met by a proposal

by the Haganah to use military force against the Palestinian resistance. The proposal

was approved by David Ben-Gurion and a decision was made to escalate the military

conflict (ibid).

One major landmark of this phase was the Zionists' adoption of Plan D (ibid).

The Zionist forces won the fighting and, consequently, hundreds of thousands of

Palestinians were moved from their towns and villages. Yet, some Israeli historians

deny any forceful eviction of Palestinians. They claim that Palestinians left voluntarily

in response of Arab leaders (see Katz, 2002). This claim, however, was dismissed by

many historians who proved that violence was used at different stages to force

Palestinians to leave. As Shlaim (2000) asserts, by implementing Plan D, Haganah

directly and decisively contributed to the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem.

However, whether there was a political plan set in advance to expel Palestinians has

been since then a major controversy.

Israeli and Jewish historians, such as Benny Morris and Avi Shlaim argue that

the use of force was a result of the unfolding events on the ground and not a

systematic action arising from a political plan set in advance. Shlaim (2000, p. 31)

claims that Plan D aimed to "secure all the areas allocated to the Israeli state under the

UN partition resolution as well as Jewish settlements outside these areas and corridors

leading to them". He believes that some Palestinian populations were moved in order

to clear "hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements" (ibid). Similarly, Morris

(2008) claims that the expulsion of Arabs according to Plan D was intended to

safeguard the homeland of the Jewish population before it was attacked by the Arab

armies. In this sense, the actions were defensive and emanating basically from the new

reality after the first stage of confrontation between Palestinian fighters and the

Zionist forces.

The above historical narrative, however, came under criticism from other

historians, some of them are Israeli and Jewish. For instance, Hirst (1977) believes

that the Zionist actions were a result of a master plan designed to expel Palestinians

out of their land. Similarly, Segev (2010) believes that the expulsion of 400,000

Palestinians was a main reason of the Arab attack on Israel. He argues that there is no

evidence that the Arab countries wanted to attack the Jewish community before the

expulsion of Palestinians. Furthermore, Finkelstein (2001) argues that the evidence

presented by Benny Morris himself indicates a systematic process of expulsion and

not ad hoc and sporadic actions decided and carried out by military commanders. In

this sense, the problem of Morris's narrative is not factual but rather moral and

political. He fails to frame the events in their wider context and thus keeps many of

the political and ideological implications of the Zionist military actions hidden.

The second phase of the war started on 14 May 1948 when David Ben-Gurion

declared the establishment of the state of Israel. Ben-Gurion, however, decided not to

identify the borders of the state so that other lands beyond the UN borders could be

annexed (Shlaim, 2000). One day later, five Arab countries sent their Armies to

Palestine to fight against the Jewish forces. The war was violent and costly for both

sides. In the end, the Israeli forces won the war and around 810,000 Palestinians,

according to the British government at the time, became refugees in the West Bank,

the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (Gilbert, 1999). Those who remained in

their towns and cities were viewed by the Zionist leaders as a potential threat

(Bregman, 2003), although the Declaration of Independence promised equal rights to

the Arab inhabitants (Shlaim, 2000). Different representations arose in regard of this historical event. This includes a dispute over the real objectives of the Arab countries behind attacking Israel and whether their military capabilities were a serious threat to Israel's existence.

Mainstream Israeli academic, political and media discourses represented Arabs and Palestinians as a monolithic 'Other', who wanted to destroy the tiny state of Israel. The war, therefore, was presented as a 'battle for survival against overwhelming odds' (Shlaim, 2000, p. 34). Shlaim, however, disagrees with this claim and argues that the Israeli forces outnumbered the Arab armies. Other historians also disputed the claim that the objective was to destroy Israel. For instance, Flapan (1987) believes that the king of Transjordan was not aiming at destroying Israel but rather at taking control of the part of Palestine that it was given to Arabs by the UN partition plan. Although some of these narratives dominate the Israeli public and political discourse, while others are limited in terms of their scope of influence, the variety of these narratives foregrounds the discursive nature of social reality. That is, it highlights the role of discourse in partially constituting what people tend to believe as objective reality.

1.6.2 The 1967 war: Occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank

The political context in Israel and neighbouring Arab countries after 1948 encouraged further confrontations between the two sides. On the one hand, Israel did not show any serious intention to put an end to its expansionist policies. It resumed its violent practices against Palestinians and tried to grab more of their lands. On the other hand, the newly formulated Arab regimes were seeking public consent against their internal political rivals. To mobilize the masses, they adopted a rhetoric in which liberating Palestine was of pivotal interest. Both sides, therefore, represented the other

as an imminent threat, which led to the 1967 war between Israel on the one hand, and Egypt, Jordan and Syria on the other. In six days, Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights (Pappe, 2006a).

Different historical narratives arose in explaining the real intentions behind the 1967 war. Some historians, such as Shlaim (2000), argue that Israel genuinely felt threatened by the Arab countries. The war was a pre-emptive action to foil Egyptian and Syrian military preparations on the borders and to stop Palestinian guerrilla from shelling Israeli towns especially in the north. However, Finkelstein (2001) asserts that the US intelligence could not find any evidence that Egypt wanted to attack Israel, or that it had the military capacity to do so. Later, senior Israeli political and military officials admitted that Israel was never under an existential threat (Hirst, 1977). Israel's main motivation of the war, Finkelstein (2001) asserts, was to grab more lands. Even Benny Morris (cited in Finkelstein, 2001) implies this notion in his description of the general feeling in Israel after the 1948 war. Zionists believed that what was achieved at the time was less than the imagined promised land.

Similar to previous events, the dispute over the 1967 war points to the fissures and dissonances in the Israeli narrative. While hegemonic Zionism has always described the war as an act of defense, some historical narratives variably challenge this view and emphasize Israel's intentions to expand its borders. At the political level, fissures arose in the political and ideological discourses that Zionism developed to justify the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the construction of Jewish settlements in these territories.

The right-most parties, especially Likud, considered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to be part of *greater Israel*. On the other hand, the Labour Party considered these territories a strategic buffer that ensures secure borders for Israel (Bregman,

2003). Later, the Labour Party proposed a plan in which the West Bank and Gaza

Strip would be exchanged in any future peace settlement. They believed that giving up

the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would help to maintain a Jewish majority in Israel

(Pappe, 2006b). A smaller group in this camp, however, had moral considerations

behind their withdrawal proposal. This group included academics, artists and scholars

who initiated an alternative discourse that created a supportive atmosphere in Israel

for the peace process in the 1990s. The first organized group of this kind was *Mazpen*

(compass), which adopted an anti-Zionist and anti-occupation discourse. A stronger

voice of objection came from the Communist Party, which adopted the idea of a two-

state solution (ibid.). However, the hegemonic nationalist ideology in Israel has had

the upper hand and the mistreatment of Palestinians and the confiscation of their lands

have continued.

1.6.3 The first Intifada and the Oslo Peace Process

In a context of humiliation and political uncertainty, an impressive all-

encompassing uprising known as the first Intifada broke out in 1987 across all

occupied Palestinian territories. The Intifada imposed a new reality that Israel never

expected. For the first time in 20 years of occupation, confrontations erupted inside

the occupied lands and were led by a new and enthusiastic leadership. The Intifada

also witnessed the emergence of Hamas, one of the most influential movements in

Palestine today (Pappe, 2006a).

The Palestinian Intifada was an important event that reversed the roles in

Israel's *David vs Goliath* romantic narrative. For the first time, Palestinians were

internationally recognized as the victim while Israel was the perpetrator. This

encouraged the Zionist left, and some members of the Labour Party, to propose a plan

to reach an agreement with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) over the

West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This step was met with a historical change in the Palestinian national discourse when the PLO, for the first time, talked publicly about a partition plan instead of its dream of one secular Palestinian state. This paved the way for the Oslo peace process in the 1990s and gave hope to peace camps on both sides. It also created an atmosphere in Israel for an alternative discourse to operate in the academic and socio-political spheres. This discourse integrated, though only partially, a Palestinian voice in narrating the history of Israel. However, hope did not last long. Israel did not withdraw from the occupied territories, and the agreement lost its political or practical value.

In September 2000, the political deadlock that followed the failure of Camp David negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis created a suitable atmosphere for a new large-scale wave of violence. Palestinians were frustrated because the reality on the ground did not change after Oslo Accords. This ensured a public support for a confrontational approach (Pressman, 2003). Moreover, some parties on both sides were attempting to foil peace negotiations to achieve particular political or ideological goals (see section 1.7.2.2). Ariel Sharon's visit to Al-Aqsa mosque was the spark that sit the second Intifada into motion (Pressman, 2003), and the dream of peace soon turned into a nightmare.

This time the conflict was more violent. Palestinians launched military operations against Israeli soldiers and civilians. Israel, on the other hand, applied brutal measures of collective punishment against Palestinians (ibid). This was accompanied by big political changes in both polities. The Israeli peace camp was swept aside by the Zionist right-most parties that occupied the political arena and advocated a very extremist discourse. On the other hand, Hamas received vast support

amongst Palestinians. Its discourse of resistance and liberation replaced the discourse of peace and negotiations adopted by its rival, Fatah (ibid.).

1.7 Present-day political and ideological background

1.7.1 The political and ideological landscape in Israel

Due to the persistent wars in the short history of Israel, Zionism has managed to mobilize the Israeli public and sustain its hegemony over Israeli politics. Nonetheless, the socio-political and demographic realities that resulted from the 1967 war challenged Zionism and offered a chance for marginal ideologies to operate. In this section I review Zionism and the ideologies that have appeared at both ends of its spectrum: post-Zionism and neo-Zionism.

1.7.1.1 Zionism

Zionism can be seen as a form of settler-colonial nationalism that determines membership of the state of Israel on ethnic principles (Ram, 2003). Collective memory, according to Zionism, is an objective history which includes a one-sided historical narration of events before, during and after the creation of Israel. It presents a teleological view of events based on secular, nationalist and religious super narratives that construct Israeli identity, manufacture consensus and mobilize Jews outside Israel (Kimmerling as cited by Nimni, 2003, p. 5). Zionist narratives include only the Jewish voice, the Palestinian voice is consistently excluded and suppressed. When evidence of atrocities against Palestinians cannot be categorically rejected, Zionism justifies the use of force against Palestinians as the only way for 'national revival', 'territorial repatriation' and historical 'redemption' (Ram, 2003, p. 30). While trying to adapt itself to a democratic system, Zionism paradoxically and

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ironically combines ethnocentrism with liberal principles: Jews are privileged but the state can also be fair to other minorities (Nimni, 2003).

Zionism is a hegemonic ideology with which most Israelis identify (Erhlich, 2003). Its narratives are propagated extensively in different fields, such as academia and media, and it has established a tight affinity between power and knowledge in Israel (Ram, 2003). As Pappe (2003) argues, Zionism exploits fields of information dissemination to forge thousands of micro-histories into one macro-master story that defines the political culture of Israel. Zionist macro-narratives produce, adapt and change the social structures which control Israelis' knowledge. They regulate their social lives and determine their evaluations of events.

Before 1967, Zionism effectively presented itself as a 'national movement, humanist, liberal, and socialist, which brought modernization and progress to primitive Palestine […] to the benefit of everyone, Arabs and Jews alike' (Pappe, 2003, p. 46). It constructed a peaceful and defensive image of Israel, which was embraced and believed by the vast majority of the Jewish Israelis at the time. However, as Pappe argues, this image was shaken after, and because of, the 1967 war. The consequences of occupying more Palestinian and Arab lands led to the emergence of 'territorial expansionism and religious fanaticism on the right, and self-doubt and self-hatred on the extreme left' (ibid., p. 46). Zionism failed to persuasively explain its relationship with occupied lands and the Palestinian population. More challenges arose later, due to the Israeli involvement in several wars and confrontations. For instance, in 1982, a wide sector of the Israeli public rejected Israel's 'war of choice' in Lebanon. In late 1987, as I explained earlier, Israel had to confront civilian Palestinian resistance. Eventually, paradoxes and contradictions in the Zionist narratives started to be detected in social, academic and political arenas. This forced Zionism to undergo a

series of changes and adaptations. More importantly, it led to the emergence of ideological trends that share some basic convictions with Zionism, but differ in their historical narratives and future policies. These trends appeared at both ends of the political and ideological spectrum of Zionism: post-Zionism arose from the left, neo-Zionism arose from the right (Pappe, 2003; Silberstein, 1999).

1.7.1.2 Post-Zionism

Post-Zionism is one of the most significant ideological changes to take place in Israel's political culture. Although the term *post-Zionism* is vague and used in different ways by different scholars, Silberstein (1999, p. 2) broadly defines it as academic conduct which leads to political and ideological positions 'that problematize Zionist discourse and the historical narratives and social and cultural representations that it produced'. Unlike anti-Zionism, post-Zionism shares some basic convictions of Zionism, rejecting a complete dissociation from the hegemonic ideology (Erhlich, 2003; Pappe, 2003; Ram 2003).

The origins of post-Zionism go back to the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967. However, the socio-political environment remained inappropriate for effective ideological changes until the late 1980s. Supported by a passive public position vis-à-vis the Lebanon War in 1982, post-Zionism broke away from the idyllic academic conceptual paradigm designed to fit the Zionist narrative and enterprise (Silberstein, 1999). Academics adopted new methodologies to view and assess Israel's identity in light of its history with the Palestinians (Nimni, 2003). They largely benefited from the failure of Zionism to provide a convincing historical narrative and a practical liberal policy. Those academics were later referred to as *new historians* (Silberstein, 1999).

The heart of post-Zionist discourse is that Israel should develop a civic identity with universal institutional values that encompass all of its citizens equally. It believes that it is impossible to have a nation-state based on the ethnicity of one group in a multicultural context (Nimni, 2003). However, post-Zionism lacks organization, structures and ideological and political coherence to articulate its objectives (Silberstein, 1999). The new historians disagree on how to translate their reconstruction of Israel's history into future political practice. As Edward Said argues, post-Zionism is unable to move from analysis into perspective and to draw conclusions from its new critical assessment of the past (Nimni, 2003, p. 8). In addition, the majority of new historians were submissive to the pressure of the hegemonic Israeli institution. They questioned the historical context of the establishment of Israel but did not question the basic premises of Zionism (ibid.). A very few historians, such as Ilan Pappe, did break away completely from the convictions of Zionism and suggested political schemes based on humanist, liberal and democratic values.

Due to the lack of well-established macro narratives that frame its evaluation of events, post-Zionism is accused of being inconsistent and sometimes contradictory, which is, as Nimni (2003) suggests, the case for any alternative or marginal ideology in the process of transition. Post-Zionism has remained confined to the structural boundaries of Zionism, which affects not only its scope of practice, but also its mechanism for influencing people's evaluations of events. This mechanism, as I will discuss in later chapters, has a bottom-up direction: it tries to influence people's evaluations of particular events, especially those unsatisfactorily addressed by Zionism, without explicitly challenging the hegemonic narrative. The term 'bottom-up' is used here to refer to the direction of marginal ideologies challenging the social

structure. The term will also be used in a detailed analysis of micro-language choices and their functions in constructing the social reality (see Section 2.5.4).

1.7.1.3 Neo-Zionism

Neo-Zionism is 'an exclusionary, nationalist even racist, anti-demographic political-culture trend, striving to heighten the fence surrounding Israeli identity' (Ram, 2003, p. 28). From a neo-Zionist perspective, collective identity is based on affiliation to the Jewish people, rather than simply an Israeli nationality (ibid.). Unlike Zionism, which tries to combine secular democracy with ethnic theocracy, neo-Zionism openly prefers the latter (Pappe, 2003). It justifies the occupation by romantic religious narratives that describe the West Bank as a Biblical land which is more important to the Israeli identity than the land occupied in 1948. Nowadays, most neo-Zionists are settlers based in occupied Palestinian territories, as well as their supporters in religious and national movements in Israel, such as Likud (Ram, 2003).

The culture of neo-Zionism is a mixture of Zionist, national and Jewish values. However, for neo-Zionism, the secular state is merely a necessary stage in the revival of religious ownership of the motherland (Ram, 2003). Neo-Zionism thus discriminates against secular Israeli Jews who are described as 'Messiah donkeys' (Pappe, 2003, p. 54), an allusion to the Messiah returning on his donkey to redeem the world at the end of days. However, in today's Israel, the term is used to refer to anyone who does a 'dirty' job on behalf of others (Rakovski, 2003). In this sense, neo-Zionism believes that secular Jews achieved the objective of getting Jews into Palestine but should not rule any more. This means that legal affiliation to Israel is secondary and priority is given to allegiance to the Jewish people (Ram, 2003). Neo-Zionism has, therefore, revived the notion of the 'new Jew', originally a Zionist concept in the early years of Israel, to mobilize Jews worldwide. The 'new Jew'

represents the strong, socially successful and ready Jewish Israeli who bears arms to protect himself and his people (Israeli & Rosman-Stollman, 2015). By contrast, the 'diaspora Jew' is passive, studious and weak (ibid.). From a (neo-)Zionist perspective, it is vital for Jews to 'return' to Israel in order to validate their Jewishness and re-own the land.

Though still marginal compared with Zionism, neo-Zionism managed to infiltrate the social structure and the hegemonic discourse after the rise of rightist movements in Israel on two historical occasions. In 1977, the Likud Party won elections for the first time in the history of the state. This accelerated the confiscation of Palestinian lands and the construction of illegal settlements. It also strengthened the religious-national influence on Israeli politics. Around two decades later, Ariel Sharon's premiership at the onset of the second Intifada initiated neo-Zionism's militancy (Ram, 2003). The common convictions between neo-Zionism and Zionism also helped the former to take on a growing role in Israeli polity. It proposed a new vision for the future without problematizing the historical narratives of Zionism (Pappe, 2003). Neo-Zionists, therefore, managed to obtain legislative, judicial, military and governmental positions, thus forming a nucleus within the Israeli institution (Ram, 2003).

The different relationships that post-Zionism and neo-Zionism have in relation to social structures necessarily influence their representations of events. While post-Zionists take a rather cautious, inconsistent and indirect path in challenging hegemonic narratives (Nimni, 2003; Pappe, 2003; Ram, 2003), neo-Zionists are more open in articulating their propositions due to the ideological haven they enjoy. Both, however, have limited access to the formulation of people's knowledge compared with the hegemonic Zionist ideology. Therefore, a study of how these different

ideologies represent events must take into account how (in)consistent they are in relation to social structures. This, as will be explained in further chapters, will be a point of departure for this study in terms of analysing ideologies according to their modus operandi: whether they construct knowledge that regulates people's evaluation of events (hegemonic ideologies), or evaluate events in ways inconsistent with people's knowledge so that, in the long run, they change people's way of thinking (marginal ideologies).

1.7.2 Political and ideological landscape in Palestine

Before World War One, Palestinian nationalism was based on values similar to those of growing local Arab identities. For instance, Palestinians incorporated secular and religious elements in the construction of their identity, such as religious – Muslim and Christian – attachment and the historical continuity of the people on the land (Khalidi, 1997). But Palestinian nationalism underwent decisive changes due to the realities Zionism created in the socio-political and demographic landscape of Palestine (Pappe, 2006b; Sayigh, 1997; Welty, 1995). After the 1948 war, Palestinians' identification with their lost homeland was the binding tie of their national sentiment. A collective sense of loss and the marginality of Palestinian refugees in their host communities motivated Palestinian political practice, leading to Palestinian nationalism as we see it today (Lybarger, 2007; Sayigh, 1997).

Baumgarten (2005) argues that the Palestinian national movement has gone through three main stages: the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN), the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) and the Movement of Islamic Resistance (Hamas). These movements have different ideologies, approaches and political objectives. More importantly, as Baumgarten notes, each movement arose from its predecessor's failure to achieve Palestinian national objectives.

MAN dominated the Palestinian national movement directly after the Palestinian Nakba in 1948. It was established by a number of Palestinian and Arab students in Beirut who identified with pan-Arab nationalism. It was a movement of the educated elite that never enjoyed mass support. Following the defeat of Nasserism after the 1967 war, MAN was dissolved and other (small) political movements divaricated out of it. Therefore, the discussion below will be limited to Fatah and Hamas, which still dominate Palestine's current polity.

1.7.2.1 Palestinian National Liberation Movement – Fatah

With Nasser's defeat in 1967, pan-Arab nationalism was brought to a close and Palestinians realized that the Arab states were unable to confront Israel. This motivated a particularistic national movement that seeks a revived Palestine by advocating an independent Palestinian national and political body (Sayigh, 1997). In 1965, Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian activists, some previously affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, established the Palestinian Liberation National Movement (Fatah). Fatah is a secular movement that, alongside the exodus of Palestinians in 1948, relies on Palestinians' attachment to the land, their common suffering and resistance, and their quest for statehood as key elements in the construction of Palestinian identity (Amer, 2012). Fatah defined itself as an inclusive national movement with no specific ideology, aiming to adapt to new political challenges without losing much of its credibility (Lovlie, 2014).

Arafat and his comrades believed that only Palestinian action based on Palestinian nationalist ideology could liberate Palestine. They thought that military struggle led by Palestinian refugees was the only way to achieve this objective (Baumgarten, 2005; Welty, 1995). This notion was enhanced when Fatah, with the help of the Jordanian army and other Palestinian movements, achieved a remarkable

victory against Israel in the Alkarameh Battle in 1969. The movement won the support of Palestinians across the diaspora and later controlled the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (BBC, 2011). Under Fatah's domination, the PLO adopted a secular discourse that emphasized Palestinian particularity framed within wider pan-Arab nationalism (Amer, 2012).

The glory of Fatah did not last long. The movement encountered many challenges that forced it to substantially change its policies and strategies. For instance, a new stage in Egyptian-Israeli relations following the Camp David agreement in 1978 foiled Fatah's attempts to ignite a war between Israel and the Arab countries. Later, the PLO's withdrawal from Lebanon in 1982 deepened the isolation of Fatah and limited its options. More voices inside the movement called for political and diplomatic work instead of relying merely on military struggle. In 1988, the new doctrine of Fatah was formalized when the Palestinian National Council declared a Palestinian state on the lands occupied in 1967 (Baumgarten, 2005). Although the movement scaled down its objectives and agreed on a state alongside Israel, it did not give up its populist discourse that calls for liberating all Palestine. Since then, the movement has been trapped in a split between its rhetoric as the basis of military resistance and its actual diplomatic policies (ibid.).

When Arafat returned to Palestine in 1994, following the Oslo Accords, Fatah became the main force of the new Palestinian polity represented by the Palestinian Authority (PA). The movement's military wings were dissolved and incorporated into internationally supervised security forces. This resulted in a decline in the movement's public support and gave its rivals a chance to question its status as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (BBC, 2011).

With the outbreak of the second Intifada, a new generation within Fatah

formed the Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which were heavily involved in a military struggle

against Israel. This was rejected by the 'old guards' in Fatah who insisted that military

struggle would do harm to Palestinian national objectives (Jamal, 2005). When Yasser

Arafat died in 2004, the conflict between the new and old leaderships was brought

before the public. However, the old leadership dominated the movement when

Mahmoud Abbas was elected President in 2005, thus restricting the movement

completely to the diplomatic policies of the PA (ibid.).

1.7.2.2 Movement of Islamic Resistance – Hamas

Hamas was officially declared a Palestinian movement in 1988, at the onset of

the first Palestinian Intifada. Unlike MAN and Fatah, Hamas was established in

Palestine and experienced the Israeli occupation after 1967. The movement has,

therefore, been dominated by the concept of *resistance* (Baumgarten, 2005).

Hamas is an Islamic movement whose ideological roots go back to the Muslim

Brotherhood. It proposed Islam as the framework of a struggle (*Jihad*) that aims to

liberate Palestine (Baumgarten, 2005). As part of the Islamic movement in Palestine,

Hamas first practised a passive form of resistance: 'social and religious mobilization

through education, religious education and social welfare programmes' (Amer, 2012,

p. 120). In 1987, Hamas declared itself a movement that adopted different forms of

resistance to the occupation (Jamal, 2005). Hence, the concept of *resistance* in Hamas

doctrine refers to (organized) armed action, and popular civilian action which may

take less violent forms. The movement maintained a strong relationship with the

public by running institutions for social solidarity, believing that this constructs a

social haven for military struggle against the occupation (Tamimi, 2007).

Hamas ideology is based on the Muslim Brotherhood's universal Islamic

discourse. However, the movement simplified the sophisticated ideology of the

Brotherhood and turned it into a populist discourse that particularizes the issue of

Palestine (Baumgarten, 2005). For instance, Hamas' charter defines Palestine as a

religious endowment (*Waqf*) whose liberation is the responsibility of all Muslims in

the world (Hamas Covenant, Articles 11 & 15). However, the charter and other

foundational documents use secular elements in their construction of Palestinian

identity, such as the historical attachment to the land (Amer, 2012).

Since Hamas's appearance coincided with Fatah's adoption of a political

strategy in the late 1980s, conflict between the two movements seemed to be

inevitable. As Baumgarten (2005) suggests, Hamas presented itself as an alternative to

Fatah, due to the latter's failure to achieve Palestinian national goals. The first stage of

confrontation between the two sides was in 1994, when Hamas conducted military

operations to foil any potential Palestinian-Israeli agreement (Jamal, 2005). This

raised a big challenge to the PA and Fatah in their attempts to create a suitable

atmosphere for a political settlement. Fatah claimed that Hamas gave Israel a pretext

to disavow its peace commitments and helped the rightist Benjamin Netanyahu to gain

power (BBC, 2011).

With the ultimate collapse of peace negotiations in 2000, Hamas gained

unprecedented support amongst Palestinians during the second Intifada (BBC, 2014).

Many Palestinians cheered the military operations of Hamas and thought that the

movement's strategy was the only effective way to counter Israel's actions (Tamimi,

2007). This, alongside Palestinians' dissatisfaction with the rampant corruption in

Fatah and the PA, granted the movement a big victory in the Palestinian legislative

elections in 2006 (Jamal, 2005). The movement then had to combine its resistance

doctrine with political pragmatism. On the one hand, it has continued to adopt an anti-occupation stance which maintains a central role of resistance. On the other, the movement's discourse has changed remarkably, from a strictly religious discourse to a political discourse committed to international law, human rights, social reform and political pluralism (Amer, 2012; Jamal, 2005). Hamas also suggested a long-term truce with Israel, whereby it accepts a Palestinian state within the 1967 boundaries (Baumgarten, 2005). It showed further political flexibility to end the siege of the movement after winning the elections (Abu Amer, 2016; Saleh, 2007). Some researchers believe that the changes to Hamas' discourse are merely tactical and aim to break down the regional and international isolation of the movement (Amer, 2012). Others, however, argue that these changes are not only responsive to recent developments but also arise from a long history of internal struggles within the movement (Tamimi, 2007)

By and large, a review of the Palestinian national movement shows that it has developed around its struggle with Israel. Both secular and religious ideologies define the nation not only in primordialist terms, but also in the accentuation of the Palestinian experience in exile and under Israeli occupation (Amer, 2012). Their legitimacy is conditioned by their ability to achieve Palestinian national goals and protect Palestinians from Israeli atrocities. Therefore, investigating their discourse in relation to the struggle with Israel is inseparable from their rivalry over representativeness and legitimacy. This will be a point of departure in this study when analysing journalism discourse from both sides of Palestinian polity.

1.8 The Gaza Strip

As explained in previous sections, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are geo-political entities that resulted from the establishment of Israel in 1948. The West Bank

was administratively attached to Jordan in what was considered to be a strategic understanding with the Jordanian regime, while the Gaza Strip was designed as a huge receptor of refugees in an attempt to solve the demographic issues involved in creating a Jewish state (Pappe, 2015). After the occupation of the territories in 1967, Israel decided to isolate Palestinian towns and cities by establishing illegal Jewish settlements. The plan worked on the West Bank but failed in Gaza due to its geopolitical distinctiveness and high population density, and later due to its adamant resistance. The Strip was thus designed to be a ghetto in which Palestinians are subjected to impossible circumstances (ibid.).

1.8.1 Socio- and geopolitical realities

Gaza Strip is a 362-square-kilometre coastal territory. Around 1.85 million Palestinians live in Gaza, most of them refugees, making it the sixth most densely populated polity on earth (Cook & Copeland, 2011; PCBS, 2016). A UN report states that the number of Palestinians in the Strip is expected to reach 2.1 million in 2020. To make the Strip suitable for human life, huge efforts are needed to develop basic services, such as education, water and energy (United Nations TD, 2015).

The Gaza Strip has an 11-km border with Egypt to the south, and a 51-km border with Israel to the east and north. In the Oslo Agreement, Israel insisted on a 0.5 km-wide buffer zone along its borders with the Strip. In 2000, Israel unilaterally expanded the zone to 1.3 km, which occupied around 13 per cent of the strip's territory (Salem, 2011). Due to the tightened restrictions after Israel's withdrawal in 2005, Gazans who enter the buffer zone are shot on sight (Sanger, 2010). In 2005 Israel evacuated its military sites and settlements from the Strip. The then prime minister, Ariel Sharon, claimed that this withdrawal was a concession to grant Palestinians a chance to create their own state. However, Dov Weissglass, who was

appointed by Sharon to negotiate the withdrawal, announced that in return for its unilateral move, Israel was given American consent to continue its settlement construction in the West Bank (Chomsky, 2015). As for the Gaza Strip, Weissglass boasted that Palestinians there would remain 'on a diet' (ibid.). Consequently, Israel has continued to control six out of seven land crossings to the Strip, its maritime borders, airspace and the movement of goods and individuals (Sanger, 2010). Israel also controls the Strip's electricity, telecommunications, currency and many other civil services. It exploits these services to blackmail the Palestinian population into submission and surrender (Chomsky & Pappe, 2011). In addition, Israeli forces regularly enter the strip and watch over it all the time with high-tech drones. The Strip is thus still considered by the United Nations to be an occupied territory (Sanger, 2011).

1.8.2 Siege of Gaza

After Hamas achieved its democratic victory in the 2006 elections, Israel and the US led an international boycott against the movement and its government. The boycott amounted to a form of collective punishment of Palestinians in which, ironically, the international community sanctioned the occupied rather than the occupier (Roy, 2013). Israel has been closing all its crossings to the Strip, imposing import and export restrictions and a ban on movement from and to the Strip. This has led to soaring food prices, poverty and the destruction of agricultural areas. In 2009 the UN reported that the siege was deeply affecting all aspects of civilian life, especially electricity, food and medicine, considering the siege to be an action outside international law (IRIN, 2009). Egypt also closed its crossing to the Strip in 2007, claiming that opening the border would deepen the geo-political rift between Gaza and the West Bank and burden Egypt with Gaza's responsibility, instead of the

occupying force. When the Muslim Brotherhood won the Egyptian elections, Egypt partially relaxed some of its restrictions on the Strip (Bradley & Mitnick, 2011). However, shortly after the coup d'état in 2013, the crossing was again closed and the relations between Egypt and Gaza reached a state of unprecedented political rupture.

The socio-political and historical context outlined above is very important when viewing Israeli hostility towards the Gaza Strip. Israeli military action and restrictions are not merely reactions to security threats from Hamas. Rather, the Zionist movement has always planned to reduce Palestinians life in Gaza to mere survival (Chomsky, 2015). Whenever Palestinians try to challenge the Israeli oppression, Israel reacts violently 'to teach them a harsh lesson' (Blumenthal, 2015, p. 48). Therefore, what is happening in Gaza must not be dissociated from the long history of occupation, dispossession and imprisonment inflicted on the Palestinian people (Chomsky & Pappe, 2011).

1.8.3 Hamas-Fatah conflict

Hamas anticipated the hostile regional and international reaction to its victory in 2006 and asked Fatah to join a unity government. Fatah rejected this proposal and started to hinder Hamas's administration of Palestinian institutions. It refused to give up its leadership of the security forces and ordered its members to demonstrate against Hamas's delay in paying employees' salaries. Later, US-trained Fatah and PA affiliated forces sought to confront Hamas and trigger a coup. Preemptively, Hamas formed its own security forces in Gaza and foiled these plans (Chomsky, 2015).

In 2007, Hamas took over the PA's security bases and headquarters. In just three days the movement managed to drive Fatah's and the PA's apparatuses out of the Strip, making itself the only force ruling Gaza (Elmer, 2008). Hamas announced that it had saved the Palestinian legitimacy by preventing a PA coup supported by

Israel and America. It formed a government in Gaza supported by legislative elections. Fatah, on the other hand, called Hamas a terrorist and murderous organization that caused a rift in the Palestinian national body (Deeb, 2013). Abbas declared a state of emergency and suspended the Palestinian charter. Later, he formed an internationally-backed government in the West Bank (Elmer, 2008). This turned what was an ideological conflict between Fatah and Hamas into a political struggle over legitimacy and representativeness. Each side is hegemonic in its territory and excludes the political practices of the other. They accuse each other of being responsible for the political and human crisis in the Palestinian territories (Bseiso, 2015). In time, the conflict has become decisive in almost all political practices of both sides. More devastatingly, the conflict has resulted in political uncertainty and a crisis of legitimacy which has helped Israel to wage massive destructive wars against the Strip (Chomsky & Pappe, 2011).

1.8.4 *Cast Lead* and *Pillar of Defence*: Israel's wars against the Strip in 2008/9 and 2012

The 2014 Gaza war was the third official large-scale military confrontation between Israel and Hamas. The spiral of violence started in 2008 with the operation *Cast Lead*. Then another round of violence took place in 2012 when Israel conducted its operation *Pillar of Defense*.

Kaposi (2014) provides a detailed and multifaceted contextualization of the 2008/9 Gaza war. He traces the events that created an atmosphere of war back to 2005 when Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip. The author explains how different perspectives arose to explain the genuine Israeli intentions behind the withdrawal and the consequences of this decision on the relationship with Palestinians. The first perspective considers the withdrawal a risky political move that,

in spite of its limitations, was a positive attitude from Israel towards peace. Others, the author continues, believe that Israel took this decision based on pragmatic considerations that relate to the high cost of keeping settlements and military posts in the Strip. Finally, a third perspective finds Israel's disengagement with the Strip a mere political maneuver to grab more lands in the West Bank.

Regardless of the Israeli intentions, Kaposi notes, the Palestinian military movements immediately controlled the Strip and filled the power vacuum. They adopted a rhetoric that represents Israel as being driven away by the military Palestinian resistance. They also intensified their attacks on Israeli towns in the south to pressure Israel and get more political achievements.

Kaposi also describes other major events that intensified the enmity and created an atmosphere of violence. First, Hamas won the Palestinian elections and replaced Fatah, Israel's partner in peace negotiations. This was followed by a military conflict between Fatah and Hamas that ended with Hamas controlling the Strip (see 1.8.3). In describing the six-month truce prior to the war, Kaposi emphasizes that Israel and Hamas realized that war was just a matter of time. So both sides took actions to set the stage ready for the coming confrontation.

The context of the 2008/9 as delineated by Kaposi shows the complexity and correlation of different contextual factors that led to the war. This might be intended to show that it is hard to claim with certainty who was responsible for igniting the war. The argument made by Kaposi is convincing in relation to the very specific context of the war. But in terms of its wider context, a different point of view is also valid. One need to know that the Palestinian military actions cannot be dissociated from the continuing Israeli control over the Strip (see sections 1.8.1 and 1.8.2), and the general practices of occupation in the Palestinian territories, including the West

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Bank. Second, the growing frustration amongst Palestinians, and the belief that the military resistance is the only possible option, should be assessed in the light of the failure of negotiations to achieve any Palestinian objectives. Finally, it is important to notice the changes on Hamas' discourse after it won the 2006 elections. The movement showed unprecedented pragmatism and proposed a 30-year truce with Israel (see 1.7.2.2). This does not mean that Hamas has no role in escalating violence. On the contrary, the movement emphasizes its position as leading the active (military) resistance. As the analysis will show, the movement represents itself as an adversary that can act on Israel. However, the point I am trying to make here is that events in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank should not be dissociated from the long history of occupation. Palestinians are still subjected to military rules that make their lives, at many levels, unbearable.

In this restless context, a number of confrontations broke between Hamas and Israel. Israel implemented limited incursions under the pretext of demolishing tunnels, and Hamas launched rockets at Israeli targets. Eventually, a large-scale war started on 27 December 2008 when Israel hit 100 targets in 220 seconds (Kaposi, 2014). The war lasted for 22 days, during which 1,417 Palestinians were killed, the vast majority of them civilians, including 313 children and 116 women. Another 5,500 Palestinians were injured, almost half of them women and children. Many of the casualties were hit by internationally prohibited white phosphorus shells. In addition, more than 20,000 homes were completely or partially destroyed (Hasaneen, 2009). On the other side, three Israeli civilians and 14 soldiers were killed, some of them by friendly fire (ibid.).

Contrary to the Israeli plans, the 2008/9 war boosted Hamas's popularity in Gaza (Chomsky & Pappe, 2011). Hence, all the circumstances that ignited the war did

not change: the siege, Palestinian frustration, the political deadlock and the Israeli military-driven mentality. As for Hamas, the movement believed that merely sustaining the Israeli military actions is a victory, which motivated the movement to go for further military confrontations.

In 2012 Israel assassinated the commander-in-chief of Hamas's military wing, Mohammad Ja'bari. The movement reacted by launching missiles into Israel, giving Israel a pretext to wage its *Pillar of Defence* campaign. Israel killed 162 Palestinians, half of them women, children and the elderly, and injured more than 1,200 others. Similar to the previous war, Israel destroyed a huge number of homes and other civilian constructions (Middle East, 2012). At the same time, four Israeli civilians and one soldier were killed. Although the Israeli casualties were relatively very few, the Palestinian challenge to Israel reached unprecedented levels. For the first time in the history of the conflict, Palestinians managed to hit Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv (ibid.). Israel saw this as a serious military threat, which later paved the way for the 2014 war.

1.8.5 2014 Gaza War

As explained earlier, the rift between Fatah and Hamas has damaged Palestinian political legitimacy. It was not until 2014 that both movements agreed on a technocrat government unaffiliated with either side. This government could strategize a coordinated Palestinian policy, which was welcomed by the international community (Chomsky, 2015; Pappe, 2015). In addition, forming a unity government could refute the Israeli claim that there was no legitimate representative of Palestinians. It could also foil Israeli plans to deepen the geo-political division between Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel was, therefore, looking for a reason to foil the government and maintain its hegemony over the territories (ibid.).

In May 2014 an Israeli sniper killed two Palestinian children in the West Bank (Haaretz, 2014). Investigations proved that the soldier killed them for fun. Nonetheless, the event drew little attention since it was no more than a routine occurrence in Palestinian life (Chomsky, 2015). In contrast, when three Israeli settlers were kidnapped and killed in the West Bank a month later, Israel launched a massive campaign against the Palestinians. Although no Palestinian faction claimed responsibility (Beaumont & Crowcroft, 2014), and although some Israeli experts asserted that the action was carried out without the agreement of Hamas's leadership (Rudoren & Ghazali, 2014), the Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, blamed Hamas and vowed that the movement would pay a heavy price (ibid.). Netanyahu seized this opportunity and launched a military campaign in the West Bank which immediately derailed the Palestinian government. The Israeli army killed six Palestinians, arrested 419 others and searched thousands of locations and homes (Chomsky, 2015). The army also killed five Palestinians in Gaza on 7 July before Hamas finally reacted by launching rockets on Israel (BBC, 2014). On 8 July Israel launched its *Operation Protective Edge* against the Strip.

The war lasted for 50 days and resulted in more than 2,200 Palestinian fatalities, thousands of injuries and around 20,000 totally or partially destroyed homes (Dearden, 2014). According to UN reports, 70 per cent of Palestinian casualties were civilians (Booth, 2014). The Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza reported that ninety Palestinian families were removed from the civil record (Blumenthal, 2015, p. 49). Although the Israeli government insisted that its main targets were the tunnels, the army attacked schools, hospitals, power plants, water supplies, rescue teams and ambulances. As Chomsky and Pappe (2011) state about previous wars, Israel believes that targeting civilians will put pressure on resistance. Therefore, the whole Strip was

under fire, which nullifies Israel's claim that many of the victims could move to safer areas (Chomsky, 2015). On the other hand, 64 Israeli soldiers and six civilians were killed (Dearden, 2014). Flights into and out of Israel's main airport were suspended for a few days, and the Israeli economy suffered big losses.

1.8.6 Ground invasion: the battle of Shejaiyeh

After 12 days of artillery, aerial and naval bombardment, Israel launched its ground invasion. Israeli forces infiltrated the Shejaiyeh neighbourhood, located east of Gaza city, due to its military significance to Palestinian resistance. The Israeli army stated that the invasion of this area was meant to destroy a huge 'terror fortress' (Blumenthal, 2015, p. 40).

Shejaiyeh is a densely populated area where more than 100,000 Palestinian residents live. In a preemptive justification, Israel claimed that it asked residents to leave their houses but Hamas asked them to stay. As aforementioned, this claim clouds the fact that there were no such safe places in the Strip. More importantly, Israel was aware that its actions would lead to massive human losses amongst Palestinians. Nonetheless, Israel focused merely on the military significance of its operation (Blumenthal, 2015).

The large amount of Palestinian fire and the unexpected military tactics of Palestinian fighters prevented Israeli forces from achieving any military objectives. Many Israeli soldiers were killed and wounded in the first two days of the ground invasion, signalling the greatest loss for the Israeli army in such a short period. Moreover, Palestinian fighters managed to capture an Israeli soldier after they killed seven others. When the Israeli forces failed to dislodge the Palestinian resistance, they turned their attention to the civilian population and shelled the entire area with 'a storm of explosive rain' (ibid., p. 44). The army adopted an 'open-fire' policy, razing

Shejaiyeh to the ground. In two days, Israel killed and injured hundreds of Palestinian civilians (ibid.).

Obviously, the Gaza War deepened the socio-political rift between Israelis and Palestinians. Palestinians highlighted their massive human losses and damage and recalled the long history of occupation. Israel, on the other hand, exploited all possible channels to present the war as an inventible reaction to terrorism (Pappe, 2015). One field of struggle over *victim* vs *perpetrator* representation was media discourse. There is very little dispute over the fact that both sides' media were part of the struggle, and not merely conveyers of an objective reality. For instance, the Israeli media were accused of flagrantly adopting the narrative of the Israeli government in reporting the war, and failing to report army atrocities against Palestinian civilians (Pappe, 2015). Even media outlets that had different political orientations could not oppose the official one-sided narrative. Similarly, Palestinian media intensified the Israeli atrocities against civilians and focused on the disproportionate use of power.

I believe, however, that the above claims about the Israeli and Palestinian media are very general and miss the internal ideological and political tensions. First, while the war might be justified and normalized by Zionism and neo-Zionism, it may challenge the moral and liberal values of post-Zionism. Second, although Hamas suffered serious damage to its military body, the movement, as well as a wide sector of the Palestinian public, still believes that it achieved a victory against Israel. In contrast, Fatah believes that the war only caused mass Palestinian suffering with no significant achievements (El-Shenawi, 2014).

In light of the political and ideological context explained above, it can be argued that the representations of actions and actors in the war are associated with, and may be partially motivated by, the political and ideological tensions on both sides.

As delineated in Section 1.7, all the major events in the history of the conflict created a crisis for some ideological trends, but boosted others, which ultimately affected their discursive construction of the main aspects of the struggle. Therefore, the context introduced in this chapter is necessary to understand how representation in the press may function as a tool and field for internal conflicts. Moreover, the political and ideological context is a vital methodological basis for this critical study in which the findings of linguistic and discursive analysis are interpreted (see Section 2.5.1.1).

In the following chapter, I move on to the theoretical framework of this study, where I review the general role of journalism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I also explain how this study attempts to fill a gap in the literature by focusing on nuances of representation in different media outlets in Israel and Palestine, which is intended to reveal tensions between different ideologies and political orientations. This includes reviewing the constructivist definition of discourse adopted by this study and the relationship between (journalism) discourse and ideologies in modern societies. Ultimately, the study will synthesize different theoretical bases within a coherent and consistent methodology that is helpful in studying any complex conflict.

CHAPTER 2: Journalism and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

2.1 Overview

Based on the political and ideological context explained in Chapter One, it can be argued that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is an ideological struggle over the narratives and representations which construct the history and imagine the future of the people. By the same token, if we agree with the notion that each community contains different ideologies and political trends that function at the same time, it can be also argued that different ideologies and different political schemes have different representations of struggle. They exploit all possible means of information dissemination and knowledge construction, such as media, to enhance their own representations of conflict and challenge those of others.

The notion of conflicting representations within Palestinian and Israeli societies has been investigated in the fields of politics and sociology (see Section 1.7). However, this notion has received little attention from (critical) discourse studies. More precisely, few studies have investigated internal political and ideological tensions in Palestine and Israel by analysing the language of news. Therefore, in this chapter I review the literature to situate this study and its research questions, which will make it possible to understand why it is necessary to conduct a critical language analysis of the internal political and ideological tensions in Palestine and Israel. This is followed by a thorough discussion of how the research questions are best investigated via a multidisciplinary critical framework. This method will adopt a constructivist definition of discourse that goes beyond mere description of the internal systematization of language into its role in the social context (see section 2.5.1). I then explain relevant aspects of the correlation between journalism discourse, ideology and the socio-political context in which ideologies function. I finally end up with a

theoretical and methodological layout that can answer the research questions, while at the same time granting the articulation of my political views as one belonging to one side of the struggle.

2.2 Historical background

The emergence and development of the Palestinian and Israeli press can hardly be separated from the development of the conflict between the two sides. At the onset of the twentieth century, Zionist activists published newspapers like *Herut* and *Ha'ahdut,* in 1909 and 1910, respectively, to spread cultural and religious values that later helped in forming the identity Zionism claimed for itself (Gentile, 2016; Jacobson, 2011). In spite of the British censorship on publishing, the Zionist press enjoyed more freedom and witnessed considerable progress. Journalism has enjoyed well-established institutional journalistic practices, and major newspapers such as *Haaretz* and *Yediot Aharonot*, founded in 1918 and 1939, respectively, have continued to be at the centre of today's Israeli journalism (Gentile, 2016). Newspapers in Israel affiliate with different political factions and stand for different ideologies that these factions represent (Sheizaf, 2010). To a greater or lesser extent, Sheizaf argues, the preoccupation of these newspapers is not local issues, such as crime or local policies, but issues revolving around security, politics and diplomacy. In spite of their different political affiliations, Pappe (2014) asserts that all newspapers have been compliant with the Zionist movement and helped in obfuscating the atrocities against Palestinians, especially in the early stages of Israel. As such, the press in Israel has been always associated with disseminating Zionist values and political propaganda.

Meanwhile, Palestinians too launched a few newspapers, such as *al-Karmil* and *Filastin,* in 1908 and 1911, respectively, to mediate an anti-Zionist discourse and sustain the growing Palestinian nationalism (Gentile, 2016). In contrast to the Israeli

press, however, the Palestinian press has always been confined within restrictions that limited its freedom and development. The Ottoman authorities monitored the press to maintain a pro-Ottoman discourse opposed to the growing pro-Arab nationalism (Najjar, 2005). Similarly, the British mandate acted firmly against all attempts to circulate revolutionary discourses opposing foreign rule (ibid.). With the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Palestinian press continued on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip under the control of Jordanian and Egyptian regimes, respectively, and followed the rules and policies of those countries. After occupying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel applied an emergency law which was inherited from the British Mandate and practised direct military censorship on all Palestinian newspapers (WAFAinfo, 2011).

Major shifts in the Palestinian press occurred after the Oslo Accords. The press enjoyed unprecedented freedom and major newspapers, such as *Alquds*, *Alhaya Aljadeeda* and *Alayyam,* which were founded in 1951, 1994 and 1995, respectively, started to circulate widely within Palestinian society (Tarban, 2010). With the breakdown of the peace process and the growing independence and professionalism of Palestinian journalists, journalism entered a new era in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

2.3 Journalism and the ethno-national agenda

In his analysis of the representation of the 2008/9 Gaza war in British broadsheets, Kaposi (2014) asserts that another war was taking place in the British media to present and understand events. It is less surprising, therefore, to learn that journalism, and media in general, in Palestine and Israel has become another field of struggle between Palestinians and Israelis (Wolfsfeld, 1997, 2003). Both sides know the role the media plays in shaping the perceptions of local and international audiences (Slater, 2007). 'Israelis and Palestinians are both very aware that they are

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playing to an international audience and, as always, there is a major struggle over who should be cast as aggressor and who as victim' (Wolfsfeld, 2003). Media, especially news in the press, is a field where each side reinforces hatred against the other based on essentialized representations (ibid.). There is a general tendency to foreground the suffering of 'Self' by personalizing one's own victims and backgrounding the suffering of the 'Other' by making few references to *their* victims and using anonymous statistics (ibid.). Although the different newspapers in both societies have different political and ideological backgrounds, Liebes (1997) asserts that political and ideological differences tend to narrow during blatant confrontations, and that journalists 'rally around the flag' in times of crisis. Palestinian newspapers, representing the weaker side, try to convince other countries to intervene and stop Israeli practices, thus investing media outlets as 'equalizers' of their political and military weakness (Wolfsfeld, 2003). On the other hand, Israeli media try to convince the world that Palestinians are using terrorism to obtain what they failed to achieve through negotiations (ibid.). One of the most appalling outcomes of this recruitment of the media is their failure to contribute to the peace process. On the contrary, Wolfsfeld argues, Palestinian and Israeli media have fuelled the conflict by prioritizing enmity rather than building trust, putting media in the service of ethno-national objectives based on an essentialized distinction between 'Self' and 'Other'.

I will continue to use the term *essentialized representation* in the same sense as in the above studies. It is a representation that is based on socially-shared characteristics that associate an individual with a particular group, such as ethnicity or religion. It confines all further representations and judgements to out-of-context fixed images for social actors. For instance, Palestinian and Israeli media tend to construct two fixed roles for social actors. The actions of the 'Self' are legitimate, regardless of

their effect, while the actions of the 'Other' are illegitimate, regardless of their political or human legitimacy. In this sense, social actors are represented according to whom they are and not what they do.

2.3.1 'Self' and 'Other' in Israeli newspapers

In light of the above assumptions, the vast majority of research on the Israeli press has focused on the role of newspapers in reproducing essentialized representations of actors and actions. For instance, Nir and Roeh (1992) in their comparative analysis of *Haaretz's* and *Yediot Ahronoth's* coverage of the first Intifada found that both newspapers were very similar in articulating a hegemonic ideology rather than empowering public awareness of the factual importance of events. Dor (2004) also asserts that there is a tendency in Israeli newspapers to criminalize Palestinian resistance and label it as terrorism to get international support. Although these newspapers have different political agendas and ideological orientations, they produce, especially in times of confrontation, very similar representations of actors and actions (Rinnawi, 2007). Slightly different results are suggested by Dor (2015), who noticed some differences between Israeli newspapers in their coverage of the operation Defensive Shield during the second Intifada. These differences, however, are not suggestive of a deep ideological or political conflict between the newspapers. Rather, the author maintains that a hegemonic political discourse was the driving force for all the different newspapers which attempted to counter international condemnation by employing similar strategies of blame suppression. Other researchers demonstrate the direct interference of the state in newspapers in their reporting of Israeli military campaigns. Stein (2012), for instance, says that Israel's control policy over the media led to essentialized representations in the 2008 Gaza war based on the selective and partial coverage of incidents.

Only a few studies deviate from the traditional line and focus instead on the differences between newspapers in Israel. Slater (2007), for instance, found that the leftist newspaper *Haaretz* is critical of some Israeli practices in the occupied territories regarding the construction of illegal settlements and the inhuman treatment of Palestinians. On the other hand, the *Jerusalem Post* and other rightist newspapers intensify the Palestinian *threat*, frame it as terrorism and mitigate to a great extent the Israeli occupation and military action (ibid.). Slater's study, however, deals with editorials, which express different political views. It does not deal with news-reporting to investigate how the 'objective reflection' of one event produces different *realities*.

Other researchers and scholars who are influenced by growing awareness of the role of the media in modern societies suggest that the media should play a *positive* role by advocating peaceful solutions. A leading work in this respect is a collection of studies edited by Kempf and Shinar (2014) in which different authors investigate the tendency of media worldwide to favour violent action. They argue that the media should, instead, advocate peaceful solutions by showing the high price of violence and antagonism. However, what Kempf and Shinar are advocating is open to a lot of criticism. For instance, the authors argue that a change in journalism discourse in Palestine and Israel should be accompanied by changing the frames of interpretation which audiences adhere to in their understanding of events. The authors do not say how these changes should be brought about though. They even admit that 'radical right-wing government policies and right wing public opinion in Israel have increased' (Kempf & Shinar, 2014, p. 8) which paints a gloomy picture of the future, let alone the ability to change the frames of interpretation.

The socio-political and historical narratives on which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is based have deeply influenced journalism in Israel and assigned 'national'

roles for newspapers to play. The argument, therefore, is not whether what has been concluded is true or not. It is about the research questions of these studies which seem to be confined to the notions of essentialization and dichotomous representation, leading to unsurprising conclusions. To break with this traditional form of enquiry, one needs a study that is very sensitive to the implicit and covert political and ideological tensions within the Israeli community. The question should not be whether Israeli newspapers are biased or not, as that is a naive question. Instead, the question, which has rarely been asked, should be about how journalism discourse is a field where different ideologies in Israel subtly compete. One is unlikely to find explicitly stated propositions in any Israeli newspaper that radically challenge the hegemonic Zionist ideology during a war. However, it might be rewarding to systematically examine textual choices that build up into different narratives, even when they cannot be observed by merely reading news articles. This motivates a major objective of this study, which includes a language-based analysis of three Israeli newspapers to detect some aspects of the political and ideological debate in Israel.

2.3.2 'Self' and 'Other' in Palestinian newspapers

Research on Palestinian media in general, and Palestinian newspapers in particular, has attracted less attention than that on Israeli media. Before the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian press was highly censored by the Israeli authority, making its content an unfavourable option for readers and observers (Kuttab, 1998). The press was unable to mediate its own political and ideological orientations and, therefore, researchers were reluctant to analyse the Palestinian press due to the lack of a minimum level of freedom of expression. After the Oslo agreement, Daraghmeh (2003) asserts, the lack of adequacy in reporting many events was attributed not only to the political agenda, but also to the lack of professional staff and well-established

institutional journalistic codes. It is not surprising, therefore, to find media openly adopting a hegemonic national discourse. In fact, the few studies conducted in this context support this assumption and show the Palestinian media as having a national position in which the 'Self' is victimized while the 'Other' is persistently demonized. For instance, Dajani (2003) suggests that Palestinian newspapers are confined to certain cultural codes that allow very little tolerance of the 'Other'. Therefore, their coverage of the second Intifada was emotional and focused on Palestinian civilian casualties and damage to property. The aim was to defend Palestinian claims and stir up international condemnation of Israeli practices. This, Dajani maintains, led to exaggerated and inconsistent coverage of some events, due to the lack of institutional codes and a reliance on poorly-trained journalists.

In a similar vein, Daraghmeh (2003) argues that Palestinian newspapers are mainly concerned with issues that show Israeli brutality, simply because such material is favoured by their audience. In addition, Daraghmeh suggests that journalists enjoy great freedom in covering Israeli actions, compared with the considerable censorship imposed on reporting internal Palestinian issues. Daraghmeh also states that different media outlets have different political affiliations and thus propagate their world views from different perspectives. Based on the political spectrum in Palestine, there are three kinds of press: government-run newspapers which function as mouthpieces for the PA, semi-independent or independent newspapers which are mostly internationally funded, and opposition newspapers which represent factions such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Democratic Front (Daraghmeh, 2003; Kuttab, 2003; Pitner, 2012). However, the authors claim that the different political perspectives of these outlets are expressed in editorials, while news reporting adopts similar strategies for representing the 'Self' and the 'Other'. They all focus on, and sometimes

exaggerate, Israeli actions while fostering Palestinian resistance. Similar to what is claimed about the Israeli press, Daraghmeh says that different political affiliations play a minor role in times of violent confrontation.

Essentialized representation in the Palestinian press is also detected by Steele (2014). The author identifies the media frames employed by online Palestinian news websites in their representation of Israeli Jews. Based on content analysis, Steele concludes that news websites 'reinforce a stereotype and mentality that demonizes and dehumanizes the Israeli-Jew as "the Other", ultimately fuelling the conflict and straining peace-making efforts'. The author suggests that media frames are deeply entrenched in the socio-political and cultural narratives on which the conflict is based. She, however, does not capture the role of political and ideological dynamics in news representations, assuming there is a similar political agenda for different news websites.

Some scholars identify the changes in Palestinian journalism due to changes in the political context. Daraghmeh (2003), for instance, argues that after the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian press was openly trying to market the idea of a peaceful settlement based on a two-state solution. This changed dramatically during the second Intifada, when the Palestinian press focused on public support for all forms of resistance. However, no research has conducted a systematic and rigorous investigation of the relationship between changes in the Palestinian press and political dynamics *within* Palestinian society. Researchers have examined the content of newspapers merely to exemplify how the press's coverage of events is considerably determined by ethno-national polarization which assumes two homogeneous groups: Us vs Them.

The majority of research has thus ignored important political and ideological changes within Palestinian society, especially after Hamas won the elections in 2006. The rise of Hamas as a main political player has deeply influenced the Palestinian media landscape. A few studies have conducted content analysis of some press outlets of the PA/ Fatah and Hamas and concluded that the media have become a field of struggle between two main political blocs (Pitner, 2012). While Fatah and the PA use their newspapers to counter the political expansion of Hamas, Hamas invests in media to enlist the support of the Palestinian public, especially to justify its takeover of Gaza in 2007 (Hamdan, 2012). The movement has adopted a strategy that not only shows the brutality of the Israeli occupation, but which also praises military resistance as a means to achieve what negotiations have failed to do, thus claiming legitimacy as an alternative to Fatah (Pitner, 2012; Wolfsfeld, 2003).

These studies, however, depend on general and sometimes selective readings of the press, failing to capture particular discursive strategies used by different media outlets in representing different Palestinian political groups. More importantly, these studies are based on analysing editorials, thus ignoring news reporting which might include latent political tensions that cannot be explicitly articulated. They also take secular Fatah and religious Hamas discourses as a point of departure. They do not account for the fact that Hamas's discourse underwent considerable changes after winning the elections in 2006 (Amer, 2012). For instance, as Amer asserts, the Hamas discourse has shifted from a radical Islamist discourse into a more national/ secular discourse that advocates democratic rule and political pluralism.

This study, therefore, tries to fill a gap in the literature and change the traditional research layout when examining the media in Palestine and Israel. The question of journalism discourse in Palestine is not concerned with its biased role in

representing a criminalized 'Other' and a humanized 'Self'. This question has been sufficiently answered by many studies with similar findings. The overarching question this study attempts to answer is whether different news outlets in Palestine give different representations of (Palestinian) actors and actions, and from what political tensions these representations arise. In times of violent confrontation, this question touches on sensitive issues due to the huge civilian losses on the Palestinian side. Hence it investigates whether the overt enmity with Israel involved in such situations is invested with a latent political agenda that cannot be spelled out explicitly.

Thus far, I have been dealing with online and offline journalism discourse indifferently. It is important, therefore, to discuss some major characteristics of online journalism and then seek to justify why the study does not distinguish between languages of online and offline newspapers in Palestine/ Israel within the relevant research question.

2.4 Online journalism

The main focus of this study is the language of news reporting during a critical event in the deeply rooted Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The study seeks to understand how journalism discourse is intertwined with political and ideological objectives in both societies, and how it works to challenge them. It puts more emphasis on the linguistic dimension of reporting than the practices of news production and consumption. The study analyses reports from online news outlets because they are all published in English and primarily address an international audience. The role of new technology in news-making is thus beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, I briefly introduce online journalism and different views on the role of technology in relation to the changing the nature of the press, which ultimately justifies the choices of this study.

There is a wide belief that the Internet has changed basic traditions in the press and journalism, leading to a continuing debate about the position of new technology and the future of journalism (Paterson & Domingo, 2011; Yuan, 2012). New technology has created new affordances that have changed, to varying degrees, the way news is made, conveyed and consumed (Allan, 2006). Almost all of these changes relate to three main characteristics: hypertextuality, interactivity and immediacy, which refer, respectively, to the connectivity between non-linear texts via hyperlinks, the active role of the audience in the new medium – especially their ability to comment on some content items – and the ability of the Internet to offer immediate coverage of unfolding events (Allan, 2006; Steensen, 2011). These characteristics clearly indicate that technology has moved journalism into a new stage by modifying journalistic practices: eliminating old ones and creating new ones. There is, however, a dispute over the extent to which online journalism is related to offline journalism. While some researchers believe that both online and offline journalism have the same functions and position in society, others believe that online journalism is a completely different genre with a different role to play in contemporary societies. The dispute basically arises from a disagreement over the relationship between technology, human agency and the social structure in which social practices operate.

Some researchers adopt a technologically deterministic approach (Raymond Williams as cited in Tewksbury & Rittenberg, 2012, p. 8), which suggests that new technology has profoundly changed the social role of journalism and its position within the social order. They argue that it has changed the top-down relationship between media and their consumers into what Jack Fuller (as cited in Ashuri, 2014, p. 2) calls 'the collapse of the old order', whereby media have been transformed into collaborative communication models (Ashuri, 2014). The audience in these models

play an active role which allows them to comment on news content and express attitudes that could influence some journalists' practices (Tenenboim & Cohen, 2015). The new technology can also identify audience preferences by counting the clicks on each content item, thus helping journalists to focus on content and ways of representation that appeal to their target audience (ibid.). This has changed the audience from passive consumers into co-producers in a 'multiplicity of information flows' which offer them opportunities to 'enter and interpret the political world and influence the framing and setting of political agendas' (Yuan, 2013, p. 80).

The technological determinist approach of investigating online journalism has, however, been subjected to a great deal of criticism at the theoretical and analytical levels. It is accused of underestimating human agency in relation to technologies (Ashuri, 2014). Ashuri maintains that the changes in journalism are not determined by technology per se, but by journalists' adapting to the new affordances. For instance, when printed newspapers launch online versions, 'practitioners reproduce structures that secure the dominant position of their traditional organization in the mythical 'mediated centre', while altering those structures that threaten it' (ibid., p. 2). In applying his model to the Israeli online newspaper *Ynet*, Ashuri asserts that technology offers a reciprocal relationship between journalists/ editors and the audience by allowing people some space to share their stories and views. Nonetheless, journalists adopt the new technological affordances to maintain the traditional distinction between producers and consumers of news texts. Journalists still control the media frames that determine what stories to report and how to represent them, while readers are still in a 'different world', with their experiences excluded from news frames. This is realized by distinguishing between professional and non-professional news content, keeping journalists and editors as 'the principal source of

social facts and the provider of 'true' information and meanings at the societal level'

(ibid., p. 14). Similar conclusions were reached by Caspi (2011), who investigated the

online versions of the main Israeli newspapers. Caspi believes that technology is

adapted to sustain the traditional central role of media in Israeli society. As Jones and

Salter (2012) put it, offline and online outlets have very similar positions in relation to

the working social, economic and political structures of the societies in which they

operate.

The uncertainty in explaining online journalism arises from methodological

and analytical shortcomings in examining online news outlets (Steensen, 2011).

Steensen maintains that technology-oriented approaches give too much weight to the

new affordances and ignore vital dynamics which relate to the content and context of

the new form of news-making. This resembles to a great extent the failure of

traditional approaches to give a satisfactory account of news on TV and in the press.

Traditional approaches have focused on macro-contextual factors of news production,

such as the economic and political aspects of news processing, and they have paid less

attention to the message itself (van Dijk, 1988a, p. 1). Van Dijk has asserted that there

is a need for new approaches that deal with *what* is produced as news, with reference

to contexts of production and consumption. Similarly, Steensen calls for approaches

that treat online journalism as part of the development of journalism and media in

general, and not as a new paradigm that is detached from the historical and

institutional context of the press. He suggests that to understand how online

journalism connects media with society, one should combine discourse studies and

textual analysis to reveal the complexity of online journalism. A rewarding

investigation of online journalism focuses not only on the affordances of the new

technology, but also on the discourse itself and its relation to the social structure. This

would account for the human agency that defines the social role of every new medium. Ultimately, this would unveil the ideologies behind human agency and explain why online journalism is used the way it is.

Based on the above assumptions, and in light of some studies that have investigated the online versions of well-known offline newspapers (see Ashuri, 2014; Caspi, 2011; Tewksbury & Rittenberg, 2012), I assume that the traditional press and online journalism have similar journalistic and social roles, especially when reporting structurally entrenched issues. I believe that the representation of the Palestinian-Israeli struggle is not determined by new technological affordances as much as the socio-political structure in which the press functions. That is why, as I will explain in later sections, any examination of the fissures and ambivalence in both sides' representations should account for the latent strategies that covertly challenge the structures, strategies that cannot be identified by merely examining new affordances. As Allan (2006) puts it, no matter how its practices change, the ideological workings behind journalism remain active. This is a practical perspective that considers the integration of new affordances into news-making as an adaptation of technology to achieve (structurally) established objectives (Caspi, 2011). So, if traditional journalism and printed papers are arenas for ideologically-motivated representations of reality (Fowler, 1991), online newspapers maintain this function and offer political movements the advantage of 'a convenient and inexpensive means of maintaining an ideological in-house organ' (Caspi, 2011, p. 347).

Finally, unlike some forms of online practice, such as blogging, which lie on the boundary of the field of journalism (see Jones & Slater, 2012), the newspapers and news websites analysed in this study are run by professional editors and journalists. On the one hand, the Israeli online newspapers *Haaretz*, *Ynet* and *JP* are not

independent newspapers but Internet editions of printed papers. They are 'an immediate and perhaps simplistic response to the perceived threat posed by information websites, usually including all or at least part of the printed paper's content' (Caspi, 2011, p. 347). On the other hand, Palestinian news websites can be classified, according to Caspi's model, into independent online newspapers which are not connected to the printed press. As the author states, the owners, editors and journalists have no commitment to printed versions as these websites have their own practices and objectives. However, Caspi identifies crucial similarities in the way the printed press developed and the way independent online news websites are growing and developing today. Therefore, I will assume that the language of online journalism is similar, if not identical, to that of offline journalism.

2.5 Critical discourse analysis

The investigation of news reporting in Palestine and Israel in light of the political and ideological dynamics in each community necessitates not only new research questions, but also distinctive theoretical and methodological frameworks that analyse the language of news, explain their discursive functions (what images they construct for actions and actors) and evaluate the linguistic and discursive findings in relation to the social context. Since the research questions are politically motivated, there is also a need for a critical approach that allows the articulation of the analyst's political stance, while keeping the linguistic and discursive analyses of the data academically transparent and rigorous.

The method for this study is inspired by Roger Fowler's influential works in Critical Linguistics. Fowler, was first interested in stylistics, contributed to the rise of Critical Linguistics when he co-authored the book *Language and Control* in 1979, with Tony Trew, Bob Hodge and Gunther Kress. Their work initiated a new branch of

linguistics which goes beyond descriptions of systems of language into investigating the relationship between language use and social relations. Critical linguistics, therefore, was a major step in using language analysis to understand social phenomena. It is closely associated with Halliday's functional grammar, which associates language use with social needs (Johnson & Johnson, 1998). Later, Fowler published other influential works that focus on Critical Linguistics as a method of analysing news language. For instance, in 1991 he wrote his book *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press,* on which this study draws heavily. The new branch of linguistics that Fowler and his colleagues initiated played a major role in the development of Critical Discourse Analysis as a new overarching perspective that is concerned with the correlation between discourse and social reality.

Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) is a field of study that is interested in analysing aspects of social life by critically examining language use. CDA is not a method but a school of thought that has its manifold roots in many disciplines of social science (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). It consists of 'several identifiable 'schools' or 'approaches', each of which has its own distinct methodology' (Hart, 2014, p. 2). CDA is not concerned with language per se, but with how social processes and structures are manifested and maintained by language and language use (Wodak, 1996). It aims to investigate 'the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context' (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352) by 'linking linguistic analysis to social analysis' (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 206). Thus CDA has an emancipatory impulse that aims to resist all forms of social inequality (ibid.). To this end, it follows a constitutive problem-oriented and interdisciplinary approach that distinguishes it from other forms of discourse studies (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 2). This means that

CDA is structurally biased, since the analyst must hold a political point of view and 'some particular normative-ethical perspective' (ibid.). However, while CDA researchers should make their positions and interests explicit, they also need to retain their respective scientific methodologies when conducting analyses (ibid., p. 3). As Hart (2014, p. 2) argues, the disclosure of latent ideological and persuasive elements of language requires the 'assistance of a systematized descriptive framework such as a grammar or typology'. In fact, this juxtaposition of objective analysis with subjective evaluation of the findings is what makes CDA a distinguishable, interdisciplinary and emancipatory school of thought, and not merely a method of analysis.

2.5.1 Discourse as a social practice

CDA adopts a functional definition of discourse having a dynamic relationship with social structures and focuses primarily on what people can do with discourse (Richardson, 2007). In this sense, discourse is a social practice, meaning that there is a 'dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s), and social structure(s), which frame it' (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258). It assumes that discourse 'is socially shaped, but it is also socially shaping, or constitutive' (Fairclough, 2010, p. 92). It is socially conditioned, but it is also constitutive of situations, objects of knowledge, social identities and relationships between people and groups of people (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). This means that the ideologies – as part of the social structure – that underlie human action and interaction are not only represented but also constructed by discourse (KhosraviNik, 2015). Moreover, if discourse is constitutive of the hegemonic ideologies that it reproduces and sustains, then it can also challenge and transform these ideologies (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). In other words, while discourse constructs a representation of *reality* that is consistent with the hegemonic ideology, it can also

construct different *realities* that challenge the prevalent representations of socio-political issues, especially via mass communication discourses which may become fields of competing ideologies (KhosraviNik, 2015). In this study, for instance, the analysis of Israeli newspapers reveals how marginal post-Zionist ideology challenges hegemonic Zionism by constructing a different representation of the 2014 Gaza war. Consequently, investigating how discourse functions in constructing controversial issues can reveal some discursive aspects of working ideologies in a particular context. This is primarily based on the assumption that language plays a role in constructing people's perceptions of identities and events through the normalization and legitimization of ideologies (Hart, 2014).

As the critical analysis of discourse is necessarily concerned with the relationship between language and social structures and the assumptions that underlie the use of language in a specific way, two concepts are basic in any study that operates within the framework of CDA: context and ideology.

2.5.1.1 Context

Context has a basic role within CDA in linking discourse to social structures. As Fowler (1991) argues, the basic notion of CDA is situating texts in contexts. It involves 'analysing the relationship between texts, processes, and social conditions, both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote conditions of institutions and social structures' (Fairclough, 1989, p. 26). In fact, context is the starting point of CDA. The analyst first identifies 'social wrongs' that have semiotic aspects and then develops an interdisciplinary approach to address these wrongs (Fairclough, 2009, p. 167). Moreover, based on the functional definition of discourse, context is a structural built-in element of discourse. For instance, Fairclough refers to the actual usage of language as *semiosis*. He argues that social

processes include semiotic elements and non-semiotic elements, which have a dialectical relationship with each other (ibid.). Similarly, Wodak and Meyer (2009, p. 89) define discourse as 'a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action'. On the methodological and analytical levels, Wodak and Meyer (2009. 93) provide an inclusive and overarching definition of context that can apply to (most) critical studies:

1. The immediate language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse;

2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;

3. The extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific 'context of situation';

4. The broader socio-political and historical context, which discursive practices are embedded in and related to.

Cognitive approaches to CDA add another dimension of context that includes 'the mentally represented structure of those properties of the social situation that are relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse' (van Dijk, 1998). There is no specific manner of moving from one dimension to another in linking language to context. This depends on the analytical needs and the questions addressed, which mostly necessitate a recursive approach (Wodak, 2007).

2.5.1.2 Ideology

Ideology is another key concept in the analysis of discourse as a social practice. Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 8) argue that the traditional definition of ideology as 'a coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values' has not changed much. However, they suggest that the term has acquired different connotations in different fields of enquiry. In CDA, different approaches suggest different definitions

of ideology in order to suit their epistemological background. For instance, van Dijk (2005) believes that ideology is a world view that constitutes social cognition. He argues that human cognition mediates the relationship between discourse and social structures, and that in striving for discourse to be formulated and operated in a particular way, ideologies shape people's collective perceptions of themselves and of their surroundings, which ultimately leads to using discourse in the way it is used. Fairclough (2003), in his socially-oriented approach, conceives ideologies as perspectivised constructions of practices. He believes that ideologies are 'representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation' (Fairclough, 2003, p. 218). Fairclough also emphasizes the discursive aspect of ideologies. They are 'enacted in ways of interacting […] and inculcated in ways of being' (ibid.). Reisigl and Wodak (2016) argue that CDA is particularly interested in (latent) everyday beliefs that shape people's understanding of social phenomena and build into coherent basic assumptions that guide interpretations of events and actions. They assert that when these assumptions are shared by the majority, and people start to forget other alternatives to the status quo, the prevailing ideology becomes *hegemonic*.

Hart (2014) asserts that CDA practitioners share an inclusive definition of ideology as a world view. Ideologies in this sense are logically coherent and normalized patterns of beliefs and values that guide individuals' actions and influence their evaluations (ibid). More importantly, the different approaches of CDA foreground the discursive nature of ideologies as being – partially – constructed, proliferated, sustained or challenged via discourse. Therefore, the analysis of texts can be an 'important aspect of ideological analysis and critique' (Fairclough, 2003, p. 218). Systematic critical analysis of language can link the use of language to social

structures, explaining why language is used in the way it is, and how ideologies are reproduced or challenged by particular texts in particular social contexts.

2.5.2 CDA, journalism discourse and the analysis of ideology

Media discourse has become a focal interest of CDA in order to uncover how media language plays an important role in the formation of people's perceptions of social realities (Fairclough, 1995a; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Hart, 2014). Based on the assumption that discourse provides 'a finely articulated vehicle for differences in power in hierarchical social structures' (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 10), and based on the functional definition of discourse as a social practice guided by ideology, CDA aims to identify ideologies and political interests as they are overtly or covertly articulated in discourse (van Dijk, 1995b). CDA primarily seeks to analyse discourse that is directed or consumed by social collectives, such as media discourse which shapes social cognition in van Dijk's terms. However, van Dijk (1995c) argues that a theory that relates discourse to underlying ideologies has not yet been worked out. This study, therefore, introduces the ideological role of journalism discourse and then suggests how a textual analysis might reveal some discursive aspects of the way ideologies function in a given society.

Media are amongst the most powerful 'symbolic elites' (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 49) which 'have access to and control over a vast array of both informal as well as public and institutional forms of text and talk' (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 20). Since media are basic channels for the dissemination of information (van Dijk, 1993), and due to their access to symbolic capital that is not open to the public, they are important channels through which ideologies function in societies. As such, critical analysts provide a definition of journalism discourse that encompasses its ideologically based nature. For instance, Fowler (1991, p. 10) maintains that news discourse 'is not a clear

window but a refracting, structuring medium'. He argues that due to its social, political and economic situatedness, news discourse always conveys a particular ideological angle. Fowler also highlights the role of news in constituting people's mental construction of the social reality. He argues that news discourse is a constructive practice that is dialectically associated with 'stereotypes', socially-constructed mental categories into which events and individuals are sorted (ibid., p. 17). In similar terms, van Dijk (1988b) suggests that news is understood, and thus accepted or rejected, according to its consistency with cognitive frames of interpretation shared by a group of people. This notion is also raised by Chilton (2005), who asserts that discourse and human behaviour are mediated by cognitive processes, and that the construction of knowledge takes place in the minds of individuals. News, however, plays a major role in constructing these mental frameworks and cognitive processes, which provide interpretations of events and justifications of actions. Van Dijk asserts that the majority of news items usually fit into people's cognitive schema. When they do not, they 'provide the argumentative strategies that can handle them so that they can be discounted' (ibid., p. 207).

Like media in general, news discourse serves the interests of dominant groups (Fairclough, 1993). Not only does news sustains the dominant consensus as represented by prevailing cognitive frameworks, it also discourages any alternatives that might provide different perceptions of the reality on the basis of a more balanced distribution of power. It thus plays a vital role in reproducing dominant ideologies (van Dijk, 1988b). Although news discourse has certain functions to fulfil which might not necessarily be in the interest of the majority, the language of news is still highly persuasive (KhosraviNik, 2015). One important reason for this persuasiveness is the invisibility of the relationship between discourse and ideologies (Fairclough,

1995a). Since no news can be neutral (Fowler, 1991, p. 24), and because people are exposed to news on a daily basis, news discourse is assumed to play a role in constructing people's social, political and educational conceptions by projecting news events into their lives (KhosraviNik, 2015). By comparing it to other (personal) discourses, news discourse has been identified as a significant source of knowledge (KhosraviNik 2015, p. 73). The 'picture of the world', which media provide, deeply influences people's attitudes towards events unfolding in their social reality (ibid).

The relationship between journalistic discourse and people's perceptions is not deterministic though. Van Dijk (1995b) asserts that the audience generally retain a minimum autonomy and can actively engage in the use of mass communication. Hence, van Dijk continues, (some) news receivers are able to resist persuasive news discourse. If journalism discourse is, by necessity, ideologically driven, then analysing the language of news can be rewarding when investigating ideology and the way it discursively functions. More importantly, based on the role of ideology in guiding people's actions and interactions, the audience's rejection of ideologically-oriented news content, as van Dijk asserts, can be ideological in itself.

So far, the main focus of CDA has been to analyse the discursive functions of dominant and hegemonic ideologies as manifested in journalism (amongst others) discourse. Many studies have tried to uncover the mechanisms via which ideologies regulate the lives of people. For instance, van Dijk (1995b, p. 16) defines the dominant ideology as a system of 'norms and values that control the coherence and development of specific social attitudes'. Based on this definition, he maintains that news discourse has two parallel forms of ideological influence on the audience: influence over understanding, which results from contributing to the formation of *knowledge*, and influence over evaluation, which results from controlling the *attitudes*

of people. When entrenched in societal structures in hegemonic form, norms and values are no longer viewed as ideological but as self-evidently true (ibid.). This means that journalism discourse, amongst the discourses of other elite institutions, constructs people's knowledge, which in turn shapes their attitudes and evaluations of unfolding events. This hegemonic discourse sustains a top-down relationship with the audience: more or less fixed conceptions and assumptions provide interpretations of people's social reality, including their attitudes towards actions and (Self/ Other) actors.

Van Dijk (1995c) developed a socio-cognitive approach to analyse ideology based on the above assumptions. He argues that the relationship between ideology and discourse is not direct, but mediated by social (collective) cognition. It follows then that any investigation of ideology should take into account the mental/ social representations shared by a group of people. These representations influence the knowledge and attitude of individuals (or sub-groups) which, when featuring in personal cognition, influence and control discourse. Van Dijk, then, constructed his methodology based on a two-dimensional mechanism: micro- and macro-discourse structures that function to establish a positive image of 'Us' and a negative image of 'Them'.

This methodology proved to be useful in analysing specific kinds of texts in specific contexts, such as opinions in newspapers articles that discuss topics related to already discursively constructed groups, e.g. white/ black, Westerners/ (Middle) Easterners etc. But van Dijk does not indicate how the implicit ideological tensions within the same group can be spelled out via discourse structures. More importantly, van Dijk assumes that ideologies have a top-down direction where mental representations as attitudes and knowledge 'feature the overall evaluative concepts

that also influence lexical choice' (ibid., p. 143). He seems to believe that this mechanism of in-group favouritism and out-group derogation applies to dominant as well as marginal ideologies. One problem with this suggestion is that not all tensions in a society are explicit and classified on a dichotomous scale of representation. For instance, all Israelis during wars identify with the collective in-group, as explained earlier. It is unlikely then to find explicit discourse structures that distinguish between different groups of the same collective body.

As marginal ideologies do not have solid and widespread bases in social structures, their challenge to the hegemonic ideology may take a bottom-up direction. Van Dijk himself asserts that the relationship between ideology and the mental management of discourse is not direct but mediated by 'specific attitudes, knowledge and particular mental models of events and contexts of communication' (ibid., p. 140). Consequently, journalism discourse that serves marginal ideologies may change the *attitudes* of people by constructing events differently, especially events which are not explained satisfactorily by the hegemonic ideology. Eventually, constructing different attitudes/ evaluations of a certain social reality may lead to changing people's *knowledge* about it. Although this suggestion is too general and may vary from one context to another, applying it to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could be adequate. By analogy to van Dijk's (1995b, p. 18) exemplification, Israeli newspapers' discourse is confined to dichotomous positive 'Self' and negative 'Other' representation. Ram (2003, p. 30) argues that Israeli journalism, amongst other practices, played an active role in the composition and propagation of Jewish nationalism based on the Zionist narrative. This narrative never adopted an alternative liberal-territorial principle but rather systematically excluded the Palestinians. Similarly, Pappe (2014) argues that some media have tried to highlight the suffering of Palestinians but without radically

challenging the main Zionist narrative. This means that a similar frame of interpretation is adopted by different media outlets.

A deep systematic analysis, however, may reveal varying attitudes about specific (controversial) events and actions, which ultimately construct different evaluations of these actions. In the long run, these (different) evaluations might disturb people's understanding of the conflict as derived from the hegemonic ideology. Van Dijk (1995c) himself asserts that the liberal press in Europe adopts a different discourse from rightist newspapers about refugees. He, however, maintains that the alternative discourse is realized by sporadic attempts to criticize the racist discourse. It does not provide radically different frames that stand in opposition to the majority's consensus on ethnic affairs. That is why, as will become clearer in later sections, analysing Palestinian and Israeli newspapers requires a set of research questions and methodological synergies that take into account ideological tensions not only across the two societies, but also inside each society. More importantly, detecting competing ideologies in both societies needs a rigorous and systematic analysis that reveals how alternative discourses influence people's evaluations without challenging their frames of interpretation.

Kelsey's (2014) work exemplifies this growing tendency in studying irregularities of representation in media discourse. By delineating the correlation between mythology, ideology and (media) discourse, the author makes explicit discourse paradoxes that result from resorting to myths to make sense of current issues. He examines the British media coverage of the financial crisis by analyzing the *Mail Online* representation of City bankers. He finds that some paradoxes arise when the newspaper negatively represents bankers as *tricksters* but refrains from systemically criticizing contemporary capitalism.

Although Kelsey's work is situated in a different context, and although it uses different analytical tools from those used in this study, his work is illuminating due to the emphasis it puts on the contradictions between the micro (the textual realizations) and the macro (the social structures). This study follows the same route and tries to find tensions and irregularities between news language (at clause level) and the social structures. In addition, similar to Kelsey's work, this study is interested in latent fissures and nuances. Therefore, the study should be sensitive to the mechanisms of marginal ideologies which may operate covertly in a bottom-up direction. The study should be designed in a way that brings together the discursive functions of different linguistic choices to see whether different *stories* arise in the newspapers, and what ideologies motivate and are reproduced by these differences in representation. I assume that this is a crucial step in developing methodologies that investigate latent ideological tensions in news reporting.

2.5.3 Dialectical-relational approach

As explained earlier, CDA adopts a functional definition of discourse. CDA practioners are interested in what people can do with language to analyze complex social problems, which necessitates theoretical and methodological multidisciplinarity (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Hart and Cap (2014) assert that this kind of critical analysis 'is a complex domain which is, in principle at least, without boundaries both methodologically and in terms of the type of data it targets' (p. 2). This identifies one of the most distinctive characteristics of CDA, it allows eclectic theoretical frameworks that address different aspects of linguistic, discursive and social phenomena (Weiss & Wodak, 2003). Since CDA is not an approach in itself, but rather a school of thought with a socio-political attitude (van Dijk, 2009, p. 62), it is possible to draw on different, but compatible, analytical approaches and tools to

address the research questions. Any approach of CDA should go beyond mere description of the linguistic components of texts and defining the purposes and functions they serve in human affairs (Richardson, 2007; van Dijk, 1995a). They have to be systematic and, more importantly, 'translate their theoretical claims into instruments and methods of analysis' (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 14).

Different researchers use theoretical entry points in a rather eclectic way (ibid.). In addition, some methods are typically associated with different approaches. Yet, these different approaches serve varying analytical objectives and give practitioners different points of departure to analyse the complex and dialectical relationship between discourse and social reality along a continuum 'that links the 'micro' (the linguistic) to the 'macro' (the social) (Hart and Cap, 2014, p. 1). Since this study is interested in conducting language analysis to answer questions of representation based on political and ideological workings in the structurally entrenched Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it adopts a dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough, 1995a, b, 2000, 2003, 2016) as a general framework based on theoretical, methodological and analytical considerations.

The dialectical-relational approach, (henceforth DRA), was proposed by Norman Fairclough to investigate the dialectical relationship between discourse, or *semiosis* in Fairclough's (1995a) terms, and other (non-linguistic) elements of social practices. At a higher level, the DRA aims to analyse the dialectical relationship between communicative events (e.g. a news report), social practices and social structures. Fairclough (1995a) argues that any social process is necessarily an interplay between these three levels of social reality. A dialectical relationship means that discourse has particular functions in reproducing or challenging these practices and structures, and the main aim of the DRA is to analyse these functions. Fairclough

(1995a, p. 55), therefore, defines three functions of discourse: it construes *social identities*, *social relations* and *systems of knowledge and belief*. In Wodak and Meyer (2016), Fairclough substitutes *social relations* for *facets of action*. Both, however, are the same in that they demonstrate how discourse constructs the relationships between people involved in a communicative event by constituting procedures (e.g. political texts constitute the procedure of governance and thus establish a specific relationship between the politician(s) and the audience). Using the term *facet of action* seeks to emphasize the notion that any social action or interaction is partially semiotic. Therefore, Fairclough's three semiotic categories, *discourses*, *styles* and *genres* that correspond to discourse functions have not changed.

The term *discourse* as used by Fairclough has two senses. The first refers to the actual usage of language, or what Fairclough (2016, p. 87) calls 'meaning-making as an element of the social process', while the second refers to the way of 'construing aspects of the world associated with a particular social perspective' (ibid.). In this study, the first meaning will refer to actual news language as found in the analysed data, while the latter will be used to refer to particular world view(s) such as *Zionist* and *post-Zionist* discourses.

As Wodak and Meyer (2016) demonstrate, the DRA is a structuralist approach with broad linguistic operationalization. In light of the complicated nature of the Palestinian-Israeli struggle, the DRA is useful for investigating the role of social structures in regulating people's perceptions of their social context. The main concern is how ideologies provide particular world views via discourse, while the agency of social actors (which is the interest of other approaches) is of minor interest. This does not mean an absolute determinist role for structures over individuals. Instead, it emphasizes the notion that, in the Palestine-Israel context, social structures are

entrenched in divisive ideologies that can hardly be openly challenged, either by individuals or by alternative ideologies/ discourses. That is why, as discussed earlier, this study assumes that marginal ideologies function covertly to change people's perceptions without constructing radically different world views.

A similar categorization of the DRA and other approaches appears in Hart and Cap (2014), where the approaches are arranged on a *cognitive–functional* continuum. Contrary to the cognitive approaches, the DRA investigates the *functions* of discourse, outside human cognition but within institutional and social structures. This trend assumes a correlation between the way language is used and the function it is intended to serve, without delving into the mental processes of language users. In a similar vein, Unger (2016, p. 3) points out that the DRA is preoccupied with the relationship between text and social contexts, at a relatively considerable distance from cognitive conduct. All these characteristics of the DRA are consistent with the research questions and the socio-political context of this study.

Hart and Cap (2014) introduced another useful distinction of CDA approaches based on their analytical attractors. The diagrams the authors use (see page 7 of Hart & Cap) show the DRA drawing on two analytical attractors: post-structuralism and systemic functional grammar. The first links the analytical objectives with the epistemological background of the approach. Instead of looking at how texts are unified by universal rules, the approach seeks to identify the distinctiveness of discourses and the way they evolve, change and compete. On the other hand, systemic functional grammar (henceforth SFG) is a basic linguistic methodology of the DRA. Unlike formalist methodologies, SFG links language articulation to varying functions, thus demonstrating part of the correlation between discourse and social context, which is consistent with the general commitment of CDA. More specifically, in dealing with

media discourse, SFG can 'anchor social and cultural research and analysis in a detailed understanding of the nature of media output' (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 16). It also inspired Fairclough's three functions of discourse. The DRA is mainly interested in a multifunctional view of texts, as proposed by Halliday (1985) who argues that any text has ideational, interpersonal and textual functions. Fairclough (1995a, p. 17) suggests that 'the ideational function of language is its function of generating representations of the world; the interpersonal function includes the functioning of language in the constitution of relations, and of identities'. In fact, SFG was invested in the first critical trends of linguistics to analyse ideological propositions in language (see Fowler, 1991; Hodge & Kress, 1993). What is new in the DRA, however, is a systematic association between functions of language and particular discursive functions – above the level of language. This is assumed to shift controversial pragmatic *interpretation* of language into a systematic *analysis* of the role of language in real social contexts.

The reliance of the DRA on SFG does not exclude other useful methods that can be applied in accordance with the research questions and objectives. This holds true because the DRA is not a fixed method but rather a framework which provides a theoretical basis on which different methods can be used according to how the object of research is theoretically constructed (Fairclough, 2016, p. 91). As Richardson (2007, p. 37) asserts, the DRA is flexible in combining a set of analytical tools to address different questions, thus providing an accessible method for doing CDA. Fairclough (1995a) himself gives isolated examples of textual analysis, such as vocabulary choices and metaphors, without exploiting SFG systematically. In this sense, SFG is not only an analytical attractor of the DRA, as Hart and Cap (2014) argue, but also a theoretical attractor which establishes Fairclough's discursive

functions in a linguistic theory that identifies functions of language in a social context – outside texts themselves. It makes a lot of sense, then, that any linguistic method that helps in identifying textual functions can be used.

Although the DRA has been exposed to criticism, especially in its theoretical and analytical shortcomings for analysing argumentation (see Reisigl, 2014), it has been widely recognized as a useful frame for media studies (Richardson, 2007). As Hart and Cap (2014, p. 9) argue, an important feature of the DRA is the conceptualization of discourse being merged with more recent work on context and production-reception dynamics in the media. This allows an adjustment to the analytical potential of the approach to suit the data and context of the study. The following is a discussion of the general epistemological and methodological characteristics of the DRA in relation to media discourse, while specific methods of analysis will be discussed in Chapter Three.

Equivalent to the three levels of social reality identified above, Fairclough distinguishes between three dimensions of analysis: analysing the form and function of texts, analysing the way texts are produced and consumed, and analysing the wider socio-political structures in which texts are embedded (Richardson, 2007). The textual dimension involves the analysis of vocabulary, semantics and grammar, as well as textual organization above the sentence level, such as the overall structure of a news article (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 57). The significance of this analysis lies in the functions of the textual elements and their direct and indirect involvement in (re)producing or resisting systems of ideology and social power (Richardson, 2007, p. 38). Richardson argues that linguistic analysis should be anchored in three fundamental assumptions. First, the form and content of texts are interrelated. This means that differences in meaning entail differences in form and, conversely, different forms produce different

meanings. Second, following Fairclough (1995a), analysing texts moves from micro-analysis (how propositions are structured to represent social actors, processes, actions and events) to macro-analysis (how clauses and propositions are structured to make one coherent whole). Third, as discussed above, texts are 'multifunctional'; they serve ideational, interpersonal and textual functions. Although textual and discursive functions can be served by the same text, one of the functions might appear to be more important than the other (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 55). Therefore, the researcher can focus on one discursive function and one (equivalent) textual function. Finally, any analysis within the DRA, and CDA in general, is sensitive to absences as well as presences (ibid., p. 58).

The second dimension of analysis is discursive analysis. Since the link between the textual and the social is indirect, the analysis here is concerned with mediating discursive practice: processes of text production, distribution and consumption (Fairclough, 1995a). For instance, in analysing a news report, the researcher may need to analyse institutional routines, such as the editorial procedures for producing a journalistic text and the routines of the audience receiving this text (see Deacon, Fenton, & Bryman, 1999; Perrin, 2013). Discursive practices are quite vast and interrelated. They include instruments of production and consumption as well as ways of storing and remembering (Blommaert as cited in Richardson, 2007, p. 75). Fairclough (1995a, p. 59) also talks about the transformations texts undergo through processes of production and consumption as a worthy aspect of investigation when analysing discursive practices. This notion is also dealt with from the perspective of *intertextuality*, which investigates how texts are linked to other texts in the same or in different contexts (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001b, p. 90). The process of transferring textual elements to new contexts is called *recontextualization*. The study of

recontextualization explains how textual elements acquire new meanings and, therefore, perform different functions (ibid).

Detecting changes in how texts are produced and consumed helps in identifying their normative and creative role in orders of discourse, whether texts reproduce existing boundaries of orders of discourse or work to restructure them (Fairclough, 1995a). By *order of discourse*, Fairclough (2001, p. 2) refers to 'the way in which diverse genres and discourses and styles are networked together. An order of discourse is a social structuring of semiotic difference - a particular social ordering of relationships amongst different ways of making meaning, ie different discourse and genres and styles'.

Richardson (2007) explains discursive practices in great detail. He distinguishes between a number of professional and organizational practices that play important roles in the way texts are produced and consumed. These explanations will not be referred to here because they receive little attention in this study.

The third dimension of analysis is concerned with the material social context. It deals with real social actors, social relations, histories and practices that 'while residing outside of the newsroom, permeate and structure the activities and outputs of journalism' (Richardson, 2007, p. 114). Fairclough (1995a) classifies social practices into immediate context, institutional context and a wider social and cultural context. He also distinguishes between economic, political and cultural aspects of social structures that can be referred to in the critical analysis of texts with varying emphasis. The analysis assumes a dialectical relationship between texts and social practices. However, as discussed when introducing the theoretical background of the DRA, texts and social structures do not necessarily influence each other equally. For instance, since the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is deeply entrenched in different aspects of both

peoples' lives, structures may have determinacy over texts. Both sides deal with each other according to hegemonic ideologies that allow very little room for tolerance. Therefore, (news) texts can hardly openly challenge the structures in which they are embedded. Moreover, it is political and ideological structures that are the focus of this study. More precisely, it is the 'constitutive effects' of ideologies (Richardson, 2007, p. 114) on journalism discourse that this study intends to reveal via language analysis. Richardson asserts that constitutive effects do not go unchecked by journalists. He says that there might be a certain resistance (ibid., p. 115) which, as explained above, could be motivated by another (marginal) ideology.

The three levels of analysis are interrelated. While doing textual analysis, the analyst draws on relevant discursive and structural practices. More importantly, as Fairclough (1995a, p. 62) asserts, the framework is compatible with various different emphases. The focus on each of the three levels is dependent on the research questions and objectives. Therefore, this study will focus primarily on textual (linguistic) analysis and on situating the discursive functions of texts in their social context. Little emphasis will be put on the discursive practices of news production and consumption.

2.5.4 Critique of CDA and Fairclough's discursive functions

CDA has succeeded in creating a new field of enquiry that has shifted the traditional description of language into a problem-oriented evaluation of the role of language in social life. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) assert, the criticality and multidisciplinarity of CDA have achieved intellectual advances that led to international visibility. The field has attracted the attention of many researchers from different backgrounds to analyse the ideologically-motivated role of discourse in the formation of people's conceptions of themselves and of their surroundings. However, the very properties which led to the unique success of CDA have been subjected to a

lot of criticism. It is beyond the scope of this study to conduct a survey of all the criticisms of and questions raised against CDA. So the study refers only to two of the most challenging critiques introduced by Michael Billig (2003) and Henry Widdowson (2004, 2007). The study highlights these critiques because, in my view, they are not satisfactorily answered by CDA practitioners. More importantly, these critiques are one of the reasons why this study adopts a bottom-up method of language analysis. As I sum up at the end of this section, the study addresses issues of criticality (the analyst's politically-motivated involvement) and distinction between analysis and interpretation, as raised by Billig and Widdowson. It suggests methodological and analytical procedures that may help to overcome CDA's identified shortcomings.

Billig's (2003) critique is mainly related to the critical role of CDA. He is concerned with its political impulse and possible ratification of institutionalized discourse. He argues that self-reflexivity should be an intrinsic feature of CDA to maintain its criticality and liberate it from the political economy in which it functions. However, Billig claims, establishing CDA as a discipline would risk its future by being complicit to the kind of social structure it criticizes, changing its direction from a radical critique of social relations into a mere critique of non-critical approaches. For instance, Billig finds CDA's critique of non-critical approaches irrational, simply because being non-critical is what made some of them successful. More importantly, both critical and non-critical approaches work within the same social systems and share some political and economic features. Billig suggests that the abbreviation 'CDA' is 'a product of the spread of marketing discourse within academic institutions', a notion that is consistently criticized by CDA practitioners, especially Norman Fairclough. As such, the criticality of CDA should not be defined as an intrinsic feature, but rather a (political) tool that is used in accordance with what the

analysis reveals. It seems that Billig calls for an open-ended approach to analysis that leaves the door open for new forms of criticism. By defining criticality as paradigmatic, he believes that CDA would suffer from what it criticizes in other approaches. These suggestions are partially reflected on by some CDA practitioners who discuss the critical *social* role of CDA when incorporating cognitive approaches (see Unger, 2016).

Wodak and Meyer (2009) provided a brief answer to Billig's concerns. They argue that CDA is not confined to a method, approach or field. Instead, interdisciplinarity is a defining feature of CDA on theoretical, methodological, analytical and interpretive levels. It can combine different forms of criticism based on the different fields it draws on.

Wodak and Meyer's answer opens the door for a more aggressive, though sensible, critique which accuses CDA of failing to distinguish between activism and academic conduct, thus failing to do proper discourse analysis. This is bluntly stated by Widdowson (2007), who claims that CDA proponents are undoubtedly activists and not merely analysts. He argues that since CDA practitioners are politically committed, their analyses cannot be valid. Widdowson also argues that there is no direct relationship between the semantic signification of a text and its pragmatic significance. Therefore, the top-down (discursive-textual) analytical preferences of CDA assigns specific functions to texts and limits the analysis to one specific reading based on the analyst's (political) assumptions. Finally, Widdowson believes that the selectivity on the part of CDA analysts in applying analytical tools is problematic because all textual aspects contribute to meaning and thus none of these aspects should be excluded.

These criticisms are answered by different CDA advocates. For instance, Hart (2014, p. 10) asserts that although CDA is politically committed, 'unbiased and scientifically grounded critical discourse research is perfectly possible when equipped with the right tools, including theories of language'. This means that CDA can distinguish between the academically transparent textual analysis and the interpretation of language functions in particular contexts. As for selectivity of analytical tools, the choice of any linguistic method is made according to the traditions the researcher is familiar with and the research questions they intend to answer (Unger, 2016). Nonetheless, I revisit these criticisms due to the sensitivity of the context of this study. There is a crucial need to be aware of my own *critical* political position as belonging to one side of the conflict. Since the study is conducted in an academic field, it is necessary to ensure a rigorous analysis based on well-established linguistic phenomena.

In light of Billig and Widdowson's criticisms, therefore, and in attempting to break away from a traditional investigation of the role of journalism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, I summarize the challenges raised against this study in three questions: (1) How can the study maintain academic objectivity while articulating the analyst's political stance, thus distinguishing between academic research and activism? (2) How can the study overcome the shortcomings of a top-down (discursive-textual) design which limits the analysis to already identified discursive functions? (3) And how can the study be novel when viewing the Palestinian-Israeli journalism discourse?

This study attempts to address some aspects of these questions at the methodological and analytical levels so as to provide the necessary starting points for more reliable critical research. The methods will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. Here I sum up the general boundaries of this study which are assumed to

answer the research questions and provide answers to some of the challenges raised above.

      This study establishes a language-based, bottom-up analysis within the general framework of CDA and the methodological flexibility of the dialectical-relational approach. It views linguistics as an essential part of CDA. In Unger's (2016) terms, it adopts a centripetal position which pulls CDA into linguistics. A language bottom-up analysis means that the textual analysis is first conducted without identifying prior discursive functions. After conducting a detailed analysis that focuses on micro-language choices, linguistic findings are categorized according to their discursive functions, based on a linguistic theory that relates form to function, which are in turn categorized into macro-discursive strategies (these will be defined in Chapter Three). This means that discursive functions are systematically worked out by rigorous linguistic analysis. Moreover, the distinction between linguistic and discursive functions – as objectively obtained – on the one hand, and the role of these functions in their social context (the third dimension of DRA) on the other, restricts the analyst's political bias to the social interpretive level. In other words, how these functions relate to the social context is determined by the research questions and the political objectives of the analyst. Such a distinction is suggested by Fairclough (1995a), who distinguishes between a *descriptive* textual level, an *explanatory* discursive level and an *interpretive* social level. In this study, therefore, the linguistic analysis and the direction of analysis from micro-linguistic choices up to discursive functions, then into the social context, ensures academic objectivity in spite of the politically-oriented objective of the research project.

Finally, a slight breakthrough at the theoretical level can be achieved by explaining how marginal ideologies operate in societies, thus helping to better understand the relationship between society, ideology and discourse.

In Chapter Three all these theoretical and methodological bases are operationalized by a set of linguistic features. I will explain how these features are carefully selected and operated to meet the theoretical principles of CDA by linking language choices to their functions, and how they are helpful in conducting micro-level, bottom-up analysis that accounts for linguistic nuances and their different discursive functions.

CHAPTER 3: Methods of analysis and data collection

3.1 A bottom-up critical linguistic analysis

I discussed in the previous chapter the necessity to fill a gap in the literature by providing another angle to view the role of journalistic discourse in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. There is a need to bring out the internal political and ideological conflicts in each society, which may identify some discursive aspects of how hegemonic and marginal ideologies function via discourse. I also referred to criticism of some methodological and analytical shortcomings of CDA and Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach. The criticism revolves around CDA's twofold bias: a methodological bias that arises from the (top-down) discursive regulation of textual analysis, and a political bias that relates to the analyst's assumptions and political objectives in identifying discursive functions, leading to subjective and selective interpretations of texts.

To overcome the gaps identified above, I proposed a language-based analysis that takes a linguistic theory as a methodological base. I aim to conduct a bottom-up linguistic analysis that regulates discursive functions which must be encoded formally in grammar. Fowler (1996) argues that critical analysis may choose from different linguistic theories. I assume then that the function of a text is to be decided according to its internal semantic signification, and not via an external social interpretation. The discursive functions of texts are, therefore, systematically worked out by a rigorous linguistic analysis that sets out the findings for an objective understanding of grammar. At the political level, the structural bias of CDA, as a politically-motivated school of thought, will be limited to linking an (objective) textual and discursive analysis with the social context and social structures. This will be explained in later sections of this chapter.

That said, below I explain how a bottom-up analysis is assumed to answer the research questions of this study in light of the methodological, analytical and contextual requirements explained in Chapter Two.

Based on the survey of studies in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 in Chapter Two, investigating the macro-narratives that motivate representation in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers and on news websites would not result in new findings. Such enquiry merely focuses on representations motivated by ideological commonalities. It is necessary then to look for latent political and ideological tensions within each community, as articulated by news language. This is expected to challenge the prevailing assumption that internal conflicts are not vital during violent confrontations between the two sides. This study, therefore, adds to the effort which approaches media discourse to detect fissures and dissonances, rather than identifying stabilities and symmetries.

Macgilchrist (2014) presents an important model in this respect. The author adopts a post-foundational theoretical base to analyse the representation of Africa in German commercial educational media. She presents a theoretical and methodological improvement to critical discourse studies which seeks to highlight 'ambivalences, tensions, and contradictions in discourse rather than to demonstrate how discourse appears to be coherently dominant or consistently alternative' (ibid., p. 388). Macgilchrist's study advocates a bottom-up methodology that brings out discursive changes in representing Africa and challenges the hegemonic colonial discourse in Europe. However, the study has a specific context that limits its applicability to the Palestine-Israel situation. It compares texts that belong to two different periods, texts which were produced and informed by a colonial hegemonic discourse, and a reproduction of these texts which has a relative anti-colonial stance. The tensions,

therefore, primarily arise from comparing the original text with its reproduction. In this sense, it is not the type of method the author applies that shows systematically the change as much as the stated intentions of those who produced the texts in 'changing contemporary discourse about Africa' (ibid., p. 392). By contrast, the analysis in my study is meant to uncover tensions within the same text and between different newspapers on each side in reporting the same event.

My study has also different definitions of tensions, fissures and dissonances. First and foremost, tensions arise from the contrast between micro-realizations of texts (linguistic choices) and the social structures in which they are embedded. Second, although the focus is on these tensions, it is still necessary to emphasize how and where hegemonic discourses are (re)produced in the texts. Examining hegemonic discourse maintains the comparative structure of the study. It first identifies the representations which are produced by hegemonic discourse. Then, which is more important, it compares these representations with different latent representations inspired by marginal ideologies. As explained in Chapter Two, it is almost impossible to find alternative discourses operating overtly in a state of war. Therefore, the study focuses on the differences between newspapers *within* each side to reveal how micro-choices build up into different *stories* without challenging the hegemonic narratives. In analysing Israeli newspapers, the study attempts to show how some newspapers function as a platform for rightist policies, whereas others problematize these policies without explicitly challenging the legitimacy of the Israeli and Zionist narratives. It adds to the multidisciplinary efforts to investigate the ideological debate in Israel, mainly between Zionism, neo-Zionism and post-Zionism. On the other hand, the comparison of Palestinian newspapers is meant to detect the influence of the political rivalry between Fatah and Hamas on reporting events and how these political tensions

are implicitly and subtly expressed by micro-linguistic choices. It examines how a state of war is invested with an implicit struggle over legitimacy and representativeness (see Sections 1.7.1 and 1.7.2).

The study is a qualitative context-sensitive treatment of a limited number of texts. Although frequencies of general linguistic and discursive tendencies are revealing, they are not part of the focus of this study. Rather, following Fowler (1991), it focuses on how values and ideologies that underlie news language differ with different forms of expression. In a highly sensitive and controversial context, such as the Gaza war(s), every linguistic choice is made to fit the newspapers' vigilant political and ideological objectives. Consequently, every single micro-linguistic choice is a complete linguistic package that includes some aspects of the social reality and carries some ideological significance (ibid.). This understanding requires analytical methods that fit a basic impulse of critical linguistics, which 'seeks, by studying the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of the social and historical situation of the text, to display to consciousness the patterns of belief and value which are encoded in the language' (ibid., p. 67). Moreover, it necessitates a special contextualization of the discursive functions of (isolated) linguistic choices in order to provide valid interpretations of their wider social roles. The following sections introduce three clause-level discursive features: transitivity, social-actor model and referential strategies, which are used in this study to analyse a relatively small number of texts. Then, it suggests a number of frameworks that have analytical and methodological significance in the contextualization of discursive functions. This includes two frameworks of systematization, aspects of representation and macro-strategies of representation, which are a key step in this analysis. The frameworks

assign specific patterns to the discursive functions of linguistic choices and interpret the relevance of these functions in the socio-political context.

3.2 Analytical methods at the clause level

The analytical body of this study has two complementary sections: the representation of *Actors* and the representation of *Actions*. Although it is not always analytically possible to distinguish Actors from their actions, different analytical methods and categories have been developed to deal with either category with varying emphasis on the other, meaning that the analyst's attitude to the tools is eclectic (Fowler, 1991). Accordingly, Actors are analysed using the social-actor model (van Leeuwen, 2008) and referential strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009), while actions are analysed using transitivity (Halliday, 1985; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004).

The choice of these categories is justified by the analytical and methodological interconnectedness between them on the one hand, and between them and the DRA on the other. Hart and Cap (2014) introduce a helpful figure in which they show the similar epistemic background of the DRA, the social-actor model and the discourse-historical approach (from which referential strategies are borrowed), based on which they define discourse and its role in the formation of social reality. More importantly, transitivity is a subsystem of systemic functional grammar (SFG), which is an analytical and theoretical attractor of DRA. It enhances the critical dimension of CDA, not only because it analyses the micro-choices of texts, but also because it conceives language choices as socially situated and politically and ideologically motivated (Hart, 2014, p. 6).

Employing discursive features at the clause level is meant to counter a prevailing tendency in CDA which assumes macro- (discursive) frames and moves down to exemplify them in texts, triggering some criticism because of its

methodological and political bias. In addition, a micro-analysis is consistent with my view of how marginal ideologies function (see Section 2.5.2).

3.2.1 Transitivity

For the analysis of actions and events, the study adheres to Halliday's (1985) transitivity model which is a subsystem of systemic functional grammar (SFG), a conceptualization of the role of grammar in creating meaning. SFG does not merely describe grammatical structures. It also matches different grammatical configurations with all the possible meanings they serve by identifying the functions of language, broadly conceived as grammar (Halliday, 1985). This model has come to be an influential analytical tool in critical discourse studies in general, and in the DRA in particular (Hart and Cap, 2014). It has proved to be a useful model for examining the connections between linguistic structure and social values (Fowler, 1991). A grammar model, as Hart (2014) argues, allows comparing a text with other unchosen potentials. More importantly, it allows the analyst to compare between different grammatical choices, tracking their discursive functions and identifying their different ideological motivations.

The main contribution of SFG is building a linguistic theory that accounts for the functions of language, contrary to the traditional formal approaches that merely describe the internal systematization of language. SFG is based on the assumption that segments of grammar have particular functions in the context of language use, and that different grammatical constructs necessarily have different functions/ meanings.

SFG consists of three major systems: transitivity, mood and theme. Halliday proposed these three systems so that they account for the three types of meaning encoded via language. First, transitivity is concerned with ideational meaning and reveals how *reality* is constructed via discourse. This includes an emphasis on what

aspects of that reality are foregrounded and what aspects are backgrounded or suppressed. Second, the mood system is concerned with the interpersonal function of language. It reveals how the relationship between people involved in a communicative event is constructed. Finally, the theme system is concerned with the textual function of language. It deals with the internal organization of the elements of texts and how such organization performs the functions of these texts. It is important here to reiterate Fowler's (1991) notion that the three functions of language are subject to social determinism. In other words, speakers or writers are not completely free in using language, rather they are invariably restricted by the immediate and wider context of language use.

The same text can be analysed by three different systems, providing different ways of looking at language to identify its three simultaneous functions. As Halliday (1985) sums up, transitivity views language as representation, mood views language as exchange, and theme views language as a message. Yet, Halliday emphasizes that although the three functions of texts operate simultaneously, they vary from one text to another, providing three different points of departure for different kinds of analysis.

This study, therefore, exploits transitivity as a main analytical method for revealing the relationship between (micro-) linguistic choices at the clause level and the aspects of reality these choices construct. Transitivity has been widely used in CDA due to its analytical potential for uncovering the relationship between grammar and ideology (Fowler, 1991; Halliday, 1985; Hart, 2014; Richardson, 2007). It 'provides systems of resources for referring to entities in the world and, crucially, the way that they interact with or relate to one another' (Hart, 2014, p. 22).

Simpson (1993, p. 88) argues that transitivity is part of the ideational function of language that explains how grammar encodes the mental patterns of writers and

speakers. It encodes people's perceptions of reality in terms of a set of processes. For instance, a journalist from *JP* conceives the Israeli military operation in Gaza by the following grammatical choices.

[JP] The increased presence in Gaza is aimed at destroying Hamas infrastructure.

These choices necessarily involve a structuring of the contextual elements in a way that conveys the writer's point of view. Unchosen grammatical potentials would then have different constructions of the same *reality*. As Halliday (1985, p. 1) postulates, 'our most powerful conception of reality is that it consists of going on: of doing, happening, feeling, being. These 'goings on' are sorted out in the semantic system of the language and expressed through the grammar of the clause.' Transitivity, therefore, is the 'foundation of representation', the way the clause is used to analyse events and situations as being of a certain type (Fowler, 1991, p. 71). It reflects 'goings on' as they take place in the inner or outer worlds of language users (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004). Transitivity, therefore, can 'enable us to see how, by making certain grammatical choices rather than others, the producer of a text is able to 'foreground' certain meanings in discourse while others are suppressed' (Chen, 2001, p. 190). It can unveil a world view encoded by linguistic choices and provide a method of analysing ideologies that construct these world views (ibid.). In comparing the linguistic choices in different newspapers that cover the same event, transitivity can distinguish functionally between the different choices of newspapers and the different world views they present for the same event.

Transitivity includes three main elements: *processes*, *participants* and *circumstances* (Hart, 2014, p. 22). Processes demonstrate the actions that appear in a text, participants represent who/ what does the action to whom/ what, and

circumstances represent time, place, manner and other contextual factors (Mills as cited in Richardson, 2007, p. 54). Participants are typically realized by noun phrases, processes are expressed by verbal groups, and circumstances are usually expressed by prepositional and adverbial phrases (Simpson, 1993, p. 88). I will continue using Thompson's (2004) label *verbal groups* to refer to the linguistic realization of process because it refers to another constituent apart from main verb. In addition, if more than one main verb is used, I use Thompson's label *verbal complex* to explain the process. Although functional analysis counts merely for the last verb, it is important to investigate how other verbs modify the semantic meaning of process and its experiential function. The following example has a process realized by the verbal complex *starts rocketing*. The experiential perspective is based on the verb *rocketing*, but I investigate how the verb *starts* modifies the process by contextualizing it temporally in relation to other events.

[*Ynet*] Hamas starts rocketing Israel.

The way the main elements of a process are articulated in relation to each other is a function of the writer's or speaker's world view (Chen, 2001, p. 191). For instance, the different processes below, from *JP* and *Haaretz* respectively, represent a military action carried out by Israeli forces during the same event: the Gaza War. However, the processes differ in their choices of three elements, giving two different *realities*.

[*JP*] The air force had struck some 500 targets since the start of the ground operation, the source added.
[*Haaretz*] The Israel Air force killed 35 members of two Gaza families in separate strikes.

The two processes represent two military actions and make different grammatical choices. In the analysis section, I explain how these differences produce different representations and, when mapped with other differences, lead to different *realities*.

Choosing from these alternatives is not random. Rather, it reflects the image each newspaper constructs for the social reality based on its ideological and political objectives (Fowler, 1991). Writers may alter the perception from which one views the actions without altering the material facts (Chen, 2001). But since meaning and form are intertwined, changes to the form of expression may involve conceptual shifts in the way events are perceived (Hart, 2014). When linked to other choices systematically, as I will show later, these choices can reveal macro-discursive functions and strategies about the war and conflict in general. Transitivity, therefore, has proved to be an efficient analytical tool for analysing the same event when represented in different ways, which is of great interest for the analysis of the language of newspapers (Fowler, 1991).

Halliday distinguishes between six types of processes based on two main characteristics: whether the process takes place in the inner or outer world of the speaker/ writer, viz. whether it happens in or outside their mind, and whether it represents a dynamic action (actual doing) or a state of being (static relation). These are:

- material processes;

- relational processes;

- verbal processes;

- mental processes;

- behavioural processes;

- existential processes.

3.2.1.1 Material processes

Material processes are to a greater or lesser degree the ones that demonstrate physical actions. They represent an entity doing an action (on/to another entity). Material processes, therefore, are the ones primarily investigated to see how changes are brought about in the (real) world which involve issues of agency and responsibility. The doer of the material process is called the *Agent*, and if the action is directed at/ against another participant, the second participant is called the *Goal*. While some grammatical participants have a congruent meaning, others may have grammatically metaphorical meaning. The former refers to the direct or typical relationship between form and meaning. For instance, an Agent in a material process is the entity that carries out the process (the action). The grammatical metaphor, on the other hand, refers to nonlinearity between form and meaning. The Agent, for instance, may be substituted by a nominalization that contains another action and backgrounds the doer's identity. In this case, the nominalization is classified as an Agent based on its shared experiential content with the nominalized action (Ravelli, 1988). For instance, in the following example the Agent is the nominalization *the strike*, which contains another action (e.g. the Israeli forces strike…).

[*Haaretz*] The strike {Agent} also wounded {Material Process} 25 people {Goal}.

In the analysis, following Halliday (1994), I make both the grammatically metaphorical meaning as well as the congruent meaning explicit. That is, I first deal with the nominalization as a grammatical participant, then I explain the nominalized

action it contains and what role it has in the experiential function of the process. For more explanation of nominalizations as grammatical metaphors see Hayvaert (2003).

Material processes may also include two other grammatical participants: *Initiator* and *Actor*. As the following example shows, the Initiator is the participant that provokes the process by influencing another participant, the Actor, to do it.

[*JP*] Hamas has ordered {Initiator} its members {Actor} to use {Material Process} remaining tunnels {Goal}

As for the other end of the process, there is another participant which is indirectly affected by the action called the *Recipient*. This is an oblique participant which is realized by nominal groups indirectly linked to the process by a preposition. The following example includes both participants and shows how the Goal is directly affected by the action, while the Recipient is embedded in a prepositional phrase.

[*Ynet*] Protesters {Agent} throwing {Material Process} stones {Goal} at a military jeep {Recipient}.

Thompson distinguishes between *intentional* and *involuntary* material processes. Intentional material processes are intended to be carried out by the Agent, while involuntary actions happen against the free will of the Agent. This study will use the labels *voluntary* and *involuntary* to demonstrate Thompson's classification. For instance, the process *destroy* in the first example below is voluntary, since the action is meant to be carried out by the Agent *we*, while the process *came* in the second example is involuntary because the Agent *troops* did not put itself deliberately *under fire*.

[*JP*] "We {Agent}'ll destroy {Material Process} more (tunnels) {Goal} in the future {Circumstance}".

[*Ynet*] Troops {Agent} came {Material Process} under fire {Circumstance} in the neighbourhood of Shajaiyya {Circumstance}.

And I use the labels *intentional* and *unintentional* to refer to Gross's (2009) distinction between military actions that target civilians. Gross argues that both guerrilla groups and conventional armies know that they cannot achieve victory without causing harm to the other side's civilians. Therefore, both realize that some of their actions will lead to civilian fatalities. In this sense, both intentional and unintentional military actions are voluntary; they are intended to be carried out. The difference, however, lies in the affected Goals of these actions. As Gross argues, 'if civilian deaths served a purpose, then the perpetrator acted intentionally, whether he thought ill of the civilians or not. If civilian deaths served no purpose, then the perpetrator acted unintentionally' (p. 322). In other words, intentional actions seek 'achievements' by targeting civilians (e.g. pressuring the other side's military forces), while the effect of unintentional actions might be collateral – regrettable but unavoidable. This distinction is not based on the will of the Agent, but on the role of the targeted Goal in achieving specific military and political purposes. Applying this distinction when analysing actions as they are represented in newspapers helps in identifying the writers' attempts to justify or problematize particular military actions.

For instance, the following processes, from *JP* and *Haaretz* respectively, refer to similar actions: killing Palestinian civilians. However, while the process in *JP* is represented as unintentional, thus representing the action as understandably unavoidable, the process in *Haaretz* is represented as intentional, problematizing the action and raising concerns over the suffering of civilians (detailed analyses in Chapters Four and Five will show how I distinguish between the two processes).

[*JP*] An air strike on Shejaia home of Khalil al-Hayya, a senior Hamas official {Agent} killed {Material Process} his son, daughter-in-law and two grandchildren {Goal}.

[*Haaretz*] The Israel Air Force {Agent} killed {Material Process} 35 members of two Gaza families {Goal} in separate strikes.

The process from *JP* represents the action as targeting the Hamas official, while the civilians are merely a collateral damage. This means that the army did not intend to act on civilians. On the contrary, the process in *Haaretz* does not represent the civilians as a collateral damage. This does not necessarily mean that the army intended to kill the civilians. Yet, the grammatical function of the process does not exclude such interpretation. It should be noted, therefore, that the distinction between intentional and unintentional processes is based on their grammatical function as well as the analyst's interpretation of this function in the relevant context.

Another important classification of material processes is the distinction between *active* and *passive* processes. These are functionally different and therefore there is a reason for one choice over the other. For instance, critical analysts used to highlight the role of passive constructions in mystifying the Agent of a process. However, the passive voice might also be used due to particular journalistic styles or information structures adopted by a given newspaper. As such, it is important to reiterate Fowler's (1991) notion that there is no direct relationship between a linguistic realization and its discursive function(s).

Finally, material processes can include *Scope* as a second participant instead of Goal. Scope is a participant that, unlike Goal, does not denote an actual entity in the real world (Thompson, 2004, p. 107). Although it functions as an independent participant, it does not specify a receiver of material actions. Rather, it is related to the

process itself by having one of the following two functions. First, it can be a circumstantial element that specifies an aspect of the process as an adverbial does, such as the Scope *the Gaza Strip* in the following example.

[*JP*] Large numbers of Ground Forces {Agent} entered {Material Process} the Gaza Strip {Scope}.

The Scope above is not represented as a target of the process *entered* but as a spatial circumstance that indicates its place of occurrence. This means that we rely on the process itself in distinguishing this kind of Scope from the Goal. If the process was *invaded*, for instance, *the Gaza Strip* would be a Goal because *invaded* includes the meaning of changing the state of affairs in the invaded place.

The second type of Scope is an extension of the verb. These types of Scope are either 'derived from the verb itself […], or they form a semantic unit with the verb' (ibid.), such as the Scope *a large-scale wave of air strikes* below.

[*JP*] The IDF {Agent} launched {Material Process} a large-scale wave of air strikes {Scope}.

In this example, the process *launched* is not factually separated from the Scope. In other words, *a large-scale wave of air strikes* is not an independent and identifiable participant, but rather a semantic specification of the process itself. As Thompson (2004, p. 107) puts it, Scope is a label given to the nominal group that works with the verb to express the process. The analytic relevance of Scope lies in its resemblance to the Goal. Scope appears in processes with transitive verbal groups, giving the impression that both the affecting and affected participants (doer and receiver) are included. However, since the Scope is not an actual participant, much about the receiver of the action is obfuscated. Moreover, the Scope is what identifies

the semantic load of the process, introducing it within particular political or ideological frames. For instance, the process above would differ radically if it were expressed as *launched an indiscriminate wave of air strikes*.

3.2.1.2 Relational Processes

Relational processes establish a more or less static relationship between two concepts, with the process signalling this relationship. A typical realization includes two nominal phrases in which one characterizes or identifies the other by the process 'be' (including *is*, *was*, *are* and *were*). For instance, the concept *a soldier in Golani* in the example below identifies the concept *Gabriel* by the process *is*.

[*Haaretz*] Gabriel is a soldier in Golani.

Since relational processes are a linguistic means of characterization and identification (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, p. 210), the label *process* does not indicate *doing* but rather, in functional terms, a continuous happening (ibid.). The predicator of these processes does not have to be 'be' though. It can be any verb that establishes some kind of relationship between two entities.

Relational processes are classified into two types: *attributive* relational processes and *identifying* relational processes. In attributive relational processes, a relationship is established between two participants: *Carrier* and *Attribute*. The Attribute is ascribed to the Carrier, representing one of its characteristics. The Attribute is either an adjective or an indefinite nominal group that assigns the Carrier to a general class of entity, such as *static* and *a returning citizen* in the following examples.

[*JP*] "The ground units {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} not static {Attribute}".

[*JP*] He {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} a returning citizen {Attribute}.

The above processes are directly encoded as relational. Others involve subtle transformations of dynamic material actions into states, which involves backgrounding some aspects of the action and a redistribution of social roles. For instance, the following process from *Ynet* has *the army* as a Carrier of a relational process, although it is the receiver of the material action that led to this state.

[*Ynet*] The army {Carrier} suffered {Attributive Relational Process} more losses {Attribute}.

Although *suffered* might look like a material process, it is classified as relational because it changes a dynamic action of doing into a stable state of being (see Thompson, 2013, p. 134).

Second, identifying relational processes are those which identify one participant by another. Both participants, realized by definite nominal phrases, refer to the same entity. One of the participants belongs to a specific semantic category labelled *Token*, while the other belongs to a general semantic category labelled *Value*. The identification process is realized by either the Token identifying the Value, or the Value identifying the Token. Analysing these participants can show what values the writers draw on in their representation of entities, thus revealing some aspects of their underlying assumptions (Thompson, 2004. p, 98). Before I exemplify these labels, I refer to some other labels used to define participants in relational processes: *Identified* and *Identifier*. Unlike Token and Value, which are external semantic properties of the participants, Identified and Identifier depend on how the language event unfolds. A participant which is represented as given is the Identified, and a participant which

gives new information is the Identifier. For instance, the following example from *JP*

has the pronoun *you*, which refers to a killed soldier, the Token/ Identified participant

which is identified by the Value/ Identifier *our hero*.

[*Ynet*] "You {Token/ Identified} 're {Identifying Relational Process} our hero {Value/ Identifier}".

Both kinds of relational processes are subdivided into *intensive*, *circumstantial*

and *possessive* relational processes. In the case of attributive relationals, intensives are

those in which the Attribute is represented by an adjectival or nominal group

(Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004), as the above examples show. In circumstantial

relationals, the Attribute involves a circumstantial concept, such as time or location, as

in *from Poriya* in the following process from *Haaretz*.

[*Haaretz*] Shaul {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} from Poriya {Attribute}.

Finally, possessive relational processes represent a relationship of ownership.

The relationship can be encoded from the point of view of the possessor, or from the

point view of the possessed. For instance, the following process from *Haaretz* has the

Attribute *two APC models* possessed by the Carrier *the IDF, and the Golani Brigade*

in particular:

[*Haaretz*] The IDF, and the Golani Brigade in particular {Carrier} has {Attributive Relational Process}
two APC models {Attribute}.

The same distinctions apply for identifying relational processes.

3.2.1.3 Verbal Processes

Verbal processes, or verbs of saying, are intermediate material and mental processes: 'saying something is a material action that reflects mental operations' (Thompson, 2004, p. 100). Every verbal process includes a *Sayer* participant, the one who or which sends the message. It can also include a *Receiver*, the participant to whom or which the saying process is directed, a *Target*, which is the entity at which the message of the verbal process is directed, and the *Verbiage* which is the message itself. These processes are very infrequent in my data. The vast majority of verbal processes found in the news articles analysed *project* other processes.

Projected clauses are clauses which appear in reported speech, indicating what the original source said. Although projected clauses look like the Verbiage, in that they express the message, they are functionally independent clauses and should be analysed separately. See for example the following process from *JP*. The Sayer *Halak*, the verbal process *told*, and the Receiver *the Jerusalem Post* constitute a process, while the message *He joined Golani* is a separate material process. That is why I use the brackets [ ] to distinguish processes from each other.

[*JP*] [Halak {Sayer} told {Verbal Process} The Jerusalem Post {Receiver}] "[He {Agent} joined {Material Process} Golani {Goal}]".

The analysis in this case will be interested in the material process, while the verbal process will be accounted for when it relates to the analysis of an indexing hypothesis or cascading activation (see Section 3.3.1). Another reason for excluding the functional role of verbal processes is that there is no considerable variation in using verbs of saying. Most of the verbs in my data are neutral (e.g. *said* and *told*). It should be noted, however, that this is not the case with all journalistic corpora (see

Gidengil & Everitt, 2003). Ultimately, analysing the projected processes and identifying the Sayer participants helps in defining social actors whose voices are incorporated in the news articles.

3.2.1.4 Mental Processes

Mental processes represent 'goings on' as they happen in the internal world of the mind and reflect some aspects of the mental states of actors. They are classified into four sub-types: processes of *emotion* (feeling), processes of *cognition* (deciding, knowing, understanding etc.), processes of *desideration* (wanting) and processes of *perception* (seeing, hearing etc.). These processes involve two main participants: the *Senser* in whose mental world the process occurs, and the *Phenomenon* which is the entity that triggers the happening of the mental process. See the following example from *Haaretz*.

[*Haaretz*] "[I {Senser} 'm not hearing {Mental Process} anything about ending the operation {Phenomenon}]", [said {Verbal Process} the official {Sayer}].

The analysis of mental processes, therefore, is very useful in identifying social actors whose subjective mental processes are incorporated into news reporting and the cultural and ideological values these actors draw on.

Like verbal processes, cognition and desideration processes can project other processes which are analysed separately. For instance, the mental process *believed* from *JP* below projects an attributive relational process which is analysed separately from the projecting process.

[*JP*] "[He {Senser} believed {Cognition Mental Process}] [that the connection between Israel and the USA {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} forever {Attribute}]".

Finally, mental processes can include another participant called *Range* which 'specifies the range or domain of the process' (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, p. 293). It is sometimes difficult to identify the Range with certainty as it refers to a variety of 'disparate-seeming cases' (Thompson, 2004, p. 107). For instance, Range appears only once in my data, in the following example. It refers to the participant *from returning home* which does not have one of the typical roles of a mental process.

[*JP*] "Beaches and parties {Phenomenon} could not distract {Mental Process} a native-son {Senser} from returning home {Range}".

3.2.1.5 Other process types

The last two processes in the system of transitivity are behavioural and existential processes. These are rare in my data, though more common in other kinds of data, and they will be introduced only briefly because they are not part of the analysis.

Behavioural processes are those which lie in-between mental and material processes. They represent psychological human actions which involve mental and physical characteristics (see Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 251). For instance, in the following example from Thompson (2004, p. 104), the process *laughed* has a mental aspect which is realized by a physical doing.

The boy {Behaver} laughed {Behavioural Process} a high, embarrassed laugh {Range}.

The main participant of this process is the *Behaver*, the one who/ which does the action. Some processes, as the example shows, involve a *Range* participant which adds a specification to the process.

Finally, existential processes express 'the mere existence of an entity without predicating anything else' (Thompson, 2004, p. 104). The only participant in these processes is the *Existent*. As the following example from Thompson (2004, p. 105) shows, the subject in these processes is normally 'there'.

Maybe there's {Existential Process} some other darker pattern {Existent}.

Before I conclude this section, it is important to notice that the above processes and their participants 'pertain to the semantic level and are not necessarily rendered explicit in the clause' (Hart, 2014, p. 23). To put it simply, distinguishing between the processes is based on their meanings/ functions and not on rigid grammatical categorizations. For instance, as I explained in Section 3.2.1.1, the Recipient participant in the following process is realized by the prepositional phrase *at the lower extremities of the rioters*.

[*JP*] The soldiers {Agent} […] fired {Material Process} at the lower extremities of the rioters {Recipient}.

A grammatical analysis would keep the participant dissociated from the process *fired* by classifying it as a prepositional phrase. A functional analysis, in contrast, accounts for the semantic meaning of the prepositional phrase and makes explicit how the participant is indirectly affected by the process. In this sense, the grammatical categorizations 'do not correspond directly with the realities they

describe' but reflect one version of the reality, which could be ideologically motivated (ibid., p. 19). The differences identified in how the newspapers use these processes reflect how different *realities* of the same event are *packaged* into different grammatical categories. The differences involve not only variations of the same process (e.g. active vs passive material processes), but also different processes that represent the same event.

The above understanding of the relationship between events and the way they are constructed via language helps in analysing metaphorical processes by identifying their non-metaphorical meanings. The analyst needs to identify the functions of using a metaphor to represent a particular event. Then they compare these functions with those of a typical non-metaphorical choice available to the writer. In this way, the analyst can identify aspects of the event the metaphor foregrounds and those it backgrounds. For instance, the process *sweeping* in the following example from *JP* refers to a military action.

[*JP*] The IDF {Agent} was sweeping {Material Process} the area {Goal}.

As a Palestinian, I know that this action may include checkpoints, the invasion of houses and arresting people randomly. However, these meanings are not included within the semantic scope of the verbal group *sweep*. I, therefore, classify a process according to the material event it represents, then I refer to how its function is adjusted by the metaphor.

In sum, transitivity analysis is meant to uncover the mental representations of journalists by analysing the way they are articulated via grammatical choices. It is mainly concerned with how writers express their mental conception of events by a set of goings on. As a sub-system of systemic functional grammar, transitivity analysis

can systematically identify the meanings/ functions of grammatical choices and their role in constructing the *reality* in a particular way. When choices of different newspapers are compared and contrasted, the ideologies that motivate the different mental representations are identified.

In this section I also discussed grammatical metaphor as referring to the nonlinear relationship between form and function, which can introduce a tension between a text's wording and a text's meaning (Devrim, 2015). The tension can background some aspects of the process, such as the agency of social actors on actions. An example is nominalizations that have Agent role.

Broadly speaking, language choices that involve the representation of processes as self-engendered can be analyzed from the *ergative perspective*. Ergativity involves the analysis of processes by focusing on the fact that the process may happen by itself or be caused to happen (Thompson, 2004, p. 135). For instance, the participant *Operation Protective Edge* in the following example has, according to transitivity, Agent role.

[*Ynet*] Operation Protective Edge {Agent} started {Material Process} on Thursday night {Circumstance}.

However, we know that *Operation Protective Edge* cannot happen by itself, so another participant must be involved. A re-wording of the process would be, for instance:

The Israeli army {Agent} started {Material Process} Operation Protective Edge {Goal} on Thursday night {Circumstance}.

In transitivity analysis this conflation between Agent and Goal roles remains obfuscated. According to ergativity, however, the participant *Medium* is suggested to distinguish between both roles. Analyzing the same process from an ergative perspective would be:

Operation Protective Edge {Medium} started {Material Process} on Thursday night {Circumstance}.

3.2.2 Reference to Social Actors

It was suggested above that transitivity deals with both social actors (as participants) and actions (as processes). However, the options open to language users in representing social actors extend 'beyond the functional participant categories of SFG' (Hart, 2014, p. 33). There is a need to elaborate analytical methods that describe more comprehensively all possible ways of referring to social actors. This need arises from the role of referring in associating or dissociating social actors with actions, social groups and social values. For instance, the reference *terrorists* in the following example is essential for viewing the event and the associated actors.

[*Ynet*] Nine terrorists {Goal} were killed {Material Process} in a security incident {Circumstance}.

The reference by itself represents the actors negatively. This becomes more ideological when little contextual information is provided, so that the reader relies on the reference to determine their judgemental position. As such, references to social actors are micro-argumentative schemes that have a decisive role in rendering actions

legitimate or illegitimate (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). The relationship between the lexical choices of referring and social roles is comprehensively outlined by two inventories: the social-actor model (van Leeuwen, 2008) and referential strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). The social-actor model identifies how a social role can be variably articulated by a number of textual choices, while referential strategies outline the different social roles and emotive and judgemental values a particular textual realization may have.

3.2.2.1 Social-actor Model

Van Leeuwen's (2008) social-actor model is a comprehensive inventory developed to analyse the representation of social actors by a network of socio-semantic categorizations. The term socio-semantic means the meaning potential of grammar, viz. what social roles a specific structural articulation can ascribe to social actors (ibid.). This inventory starts from the social and investigates how a specific role is variably constructed in a text by different linguistic realizations. It is thus concerned with the functions particular linguistic choices have in relation to the distribution and presentation of social roles. That is why van Leeuwen argues that it is almost impossible to find direct relationships between linguistic realizations and social roles. In other words, it is not possible to find a particular social role exclusively realized by a limited set of linguistic choices. For instance, as I explain below, one of the categories of the social-actor model is passivation. Social actors can be passivised as the receivers of actions by a number of textual realizations. In the first example, below, *2,600 Hamas targets* is passivised by having a Goal role. In the second, however, *Hamas* is passivised in a prepositional phrase, which has a Recipient functional role.

[*JP*] The IDF {Agent} has struck {Material Process} 2,600 Hamas […] targets {Goal}.

[*JP*] Israel {Agent} expanded {Material Process} its operation {Scope} against Hamas {Recipient}.

No study, van Leeuwen asserts, should limit itself to strict linguistic categorizations. More importantly, 'there need not [be] congruence between the roles that social actors actually play in social practices and the grammatical roles they are given in texts' (ibid., p. 32). This is a basic interest of critical studies which try to unveil how discursive constructions of social roles can be manipulative and ideologically motivated, and not factually based.

Van Leeuwen proposes a detailed network of socio-semantic roles which account for the most occurring social roles and their textual realizations. The network is comprehensive and detailed, different studies choose relevant categorizations and exclude others. Van Leeuwen developed his categories based on other specific texts. So I have chosen the categories that occur in my data. These include *Exclusion/ Inclusion*, *Activation/ Passivation*, *Functionalization/ Identification*, *Objectivation*, *Nomination*, *Indetermination*, *Individualization* and *Collectivisation*. It is worth mentioning here that these categories are in a hierarchy, so some of the distinctions only apply to one specific category of actor representation. All definitions below are based on van Leeuwen (2008).

Exclusion/ Inclusion

Exclusion/ inclusion are the basic and most important categories that identify whether social actors are referred to in a text or not. In a state of war, the exclusion of a group of actors that is directly affecting or affected by the war raises many questions about the reasons why the journalist wants them omitted from the representation. The most powerful kind of exclusion is the one that excludes actors and their activities completely, leaving no traces of their identity or influence of their actions. This is

highly important to this study because, as van Leeuwen (2008, p. 29) suggests, exclusion can play a role in the critical comparison of different representations of the same event. In this study, exclusion is identified when a newspaper represents a group of actors as playing a crucial role in the war while another newspaper categorically excludes them.

Less radical forms of exclusion are suppression and backgrounding. The first refers to categorically omitting social actors but referring to their actions or activities. One typical example of this kind is the passive processes with agent deletion where the doer is not mentioned, neither in the passive process nor in any other process in the text. Backgrounding, on the other hand, is the least radical form of exclusion. In this case, the social actors are not referred to by typical linguistic realizations (e.g. a foregrounded Agent of a material process) but mentioned elsewhere in the text, either in the same process (a backgrounded Agent of a passive material process) or in a different process.

Opposite to exclusion, social actors can be included in texts. As the following socio-semantic categories show, social actors can be allocated different social roles, articulated by varying textual realizations.

Activation/ Passivation

Activation refers to the endowment of social actors with active or dynamic forces in an activity. Unlike active processes of transitivity (see Section 3.2.1.1), activation here refers to the social role and not the grammatical realization. In this sense, actors can be activated as backgrounded doers in passive clauses. A distinction is thus always necessary between labels that indicate social roles and those that refer to grammatical participants. Actors can be activated clearly, as Agents in material processes, or opaquely by transformations that involve backgrounding their identity.

For instance, the doer of the process *were killed* from *Haaretz* below is represented by the nominalization *Israeli bombardment*.

[*Haaretz*] 100 people {Goal} were killed {Material Process} by Israeli bombardments {Agent}.

The role of the analysis is to uncover the functions of the existent choice and compare it with other choices available to the writer.

Passivation, on the other hand, is the representation of social actors as receiving or undertaking the activity. Typical realizations of passivation appear in participation roles, such as the Goal *100 people* in the previous example. However, the role of actors as direct receivers of the action might not be clear. For instance, the social actors affected by the Israeli action in the following example are represented as an indirect goal by the Recipient *against Hamas*.

[*JP*] Israel {Agent} expanded {Material Process} its operation {Scope} against Hamas {Recipient}.

Functionalization/ Identification

Functionalization occurs when social actors are referred to in terms of what they do. Since what social actors do may be evaluated, this category has a deep impact on relating social actors to social, cultural and ideological values. For instance, the nomination *IDF soldiers* refers to the actors in terms of their military role, which connotes positive meanings in Israeli society (this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four). This ideologically-laden representation of the actors would necessarily impact on the perception of their actions.

[*Ynet*] IDF soldiers {Agent} have eliminated {Material Process} more than 130 terrorists {Goal}.

Identification, on the other hand, occurs when social actors are represented in terms of what, more or less, they permanently are. This is another site of evaluative or pejorative representations based on essentializing discursive categorizations, such as *terrorists* in the previous example. These representations draw on out-of-context narratives and ideological assumptions, and at the same time reproduce these narratives and assumptions.

Van Leeuwen proposes subcategories of identification, two of which are relevant to this study: *classification* and *relational identification*. Classification is references to social actors by associating them with social classes in a given society (e.g. classes of age, sex and ethnicity), while relational identification identifies social actors in terms of their relationship to other social actors. Both have an impact on the way social actors are viewed and the way events involving them are evaluated.

Objectivation

Unlike the categories mentioned above, objectivation is references to social actors by textual articulations that do not include the semantic feature '+human'. It includes metonymical references that substitute the social actors by entities associated with them. Two subcategories of objectivation are crucial to this study: *spatialization* and *instrumentalization*. Spatialization is the substitution of social actors by places with which they are closely associated, while instrumentalization is references to social actors by the instruments they use in carrying out actions. For instance, the social actor who carried out the action in the following clause from *Maan* is replaced by the instrument they used, *rockets*, while the social actors who received the action are substituted by the place where they live, *Israel*.

[*Maan*] 116 rockets {Agent} hitting {Material Process} Israel {Goal} on Monday {Circumstance}.

Nomination

Nomination is references to social actors via their unique identities, mostly realized by proper names. This, as van Leeuwen argues, is dependent on the attention the writer wants to draw to those actors. For instance, people whose stories or identities *matter* are referred to by their proper names, while less important people fulfil passing and functional roles (p. 40). That said, including or excluding references to social actors by their names would necessarily influence the degree of engagement on the part of the reader. See for instance the following process from *Haaretz* in which a Palestinian family attacked by Israeli forces is referred to by their proper name.

[*Haaretz*] The Siyyam family, {Agent} however, began to evacuate {Material Process} its home {Goal}.

Collectivization/ Individualization

Two of the most recurring references to social actors are those which represent them as individuals or groups. The value of individuality in some spheres of society and the value of conformity in others make these references very important to CDA (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 37). In general terms, elite people, and those whose stories are worth reporting, are usually individualized, while ordinary people are usually collectivized.

The individualization and collectivization of social actors are part and parcel of how events in the war are meant to be constructed and conveyed to the audience. This also directly influences the degree of sympathy and engagement of the audience for and with the reported social actors. There is, however, no direct relationship

between the reference (individualization/ collectivization) and discursive functions. Questions about whom and in what context a reference is used can help in defining the function of each reference.

Indetermination

Indetermination is references to social actors while keeping their individual identities unspecified. Social actors are referred to in a way that makes it hard to know their relationship to actions and other social actors. The reader's assessment of events would thus be dependent on that of the writer, since the former has little information about the social actors involved. Critical analysis aims first to identify those actors, where possible, and reveal the functions of this choice of referring.

3.2.2.2 Referential Strategies

Referential strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) are linguistic and rhetorical tools with which individuals and groups are identified (Richardson, 2007). The analysis of referential strategies is based on three assumptions: referring to social actors in a certain way is a matter of choice (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001a), the way social actors are referred to carries value judgements, and referential strategies 'establish coherence relations with the way that *other* social actors are referred to and represented' (Richardson, 2007, p. 50).

In simple terms, the analysis of referential strategies is assumed to reveal *what is in a name*. The main distinctive characteristic of analysing referential strategies is a detailed account of all possible denotations and connotations a noun phrase that refers to social actors may have. Unlike the social-actor model which moves from the social to the textual (how a social role is variably represented by different textual realizations with different discursive functions), referential strategies move from the textual to the social: what meanings, connotations and social values a particular reference has. For

instance, the social-actor model labels both *Palestinians* and *the family* in the following examples as collectivizing references. However, it is the analysis of referential strategies that highlight the difference between the two references (e.g. *family* is emotionally evocative since it conveys meanings of innocence and vulnerability).

[*Ynet*] Israeli attacks {Agent} on Gaza {Circumstance} have killed {Material {Process} at least 60 Palestinians {Goal}.

[*Haaretz*] Fighter jets {Agent} blew up {Material Process} the home {Goal} on Sunday night {Circumstance}] [while the family {Agent} was eating {Material Process} its Iftar meal {Goal}].

In analysing referential strategies, special attention is paid to two important tropes: *metonymies* and *synecdoches*. I referred to metonymies in the previous section when I explained van Leeuwen's socio-semantic categories of *spatialization* and *instrumentalization*. I emphasize here that these references are 'substitutions involving two semantically (and materially or cognitively) adjacent fields of reference' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001a, p. 57). Social actors, therefore, are not clearly stated but represented by referring to a place or an object associated with them. Synecdoches, on the other hand, are 'substitutions within one and the same field of reference: a term is replaced by another term, the extension is either semantically wider or semantically narrower' (ibid.). For instance, *Israel* in the following example is a collectivizing reference (a wider semantic extension) that refers to a smaller group of actors.

[*PIC*] Israel {Agent} is deliberately targeting {Material Process} Gazan civilians and children {Goal}.

These tropes might be used as tools of generalization and essentialization by associating a whole community with the actions of a smaller group of actors. They can

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also background the social actors involved or keep them in the semantic background (ibid.).

All three discursive features introduced above, transitivity, social-actor model and referential strategies, deal with clause-level grammatical and lexical choices. As units of analysis, processes and lexical choices are analysed independently. This raises a challenge in framing the functions of these *isolated* micro-choices. The following section introduces two different frameworks used to systematize the relationship between textual choices, their discursive functions and the context in which they operate.

3.3 Frameworks of Systematization and Interpretation

3.3.1 Indexing hypothesis and cascading activation

Based on the role of the press in modern societies, every newspaper necessarily has its own political objectives that serve or challenge particular political parties and, at a wider level, particular ideologies (see Section 2.5.2). However, the political objectives of newspapers and their role in reproducing/ challenging sociocultural narratives are not always stated as part of a newspaper's agenda but propagated under the disguise of objective reporting. This applies to Israeli newspapers which have no direct affiliations to political parties (see Section 3.4.1).

It is necessary then to investigate the political discourse each newspaper draws on in order to reveal their (competing) interests in foregrounding particular political views and suppressing others. On the other hand, one of the concerns of this study is to uncover the ideological debate within Israeli society. One aspect of this debate is the (non)conformity of news discourse with the dominant sociocultural narratives. Therefore, the study employs the *indexing hypothesis* (Bennett, 1990) and *cascading*

activation (Entman, 2003, 2004), respectively, to detect the influence of political discourse and sociocultural narratives on the formation of news language.

The indexing hypothesis is a framework proposed by W. Lance Bennett (1990) to examine the relationship between the press and the state. The framework focuses 'on the journalistic practices of tying – or indexing – story frames to their sources and to the viewpoints found within official decision circles, a technique that reflects levels of official conflict and consensus' (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010, p. 411). In this study, the indexing hypothesis is used to identify the political preferences of newspapers by identifying the politicians' world views as they are incorporated in news articles.

On the other hand, cascading activation is proposed by Entman (2003, 2004) to investigate the sociocultural narratives activated by news to explain events within conventional out-of-context frames of interpretations, mostly confined to the dominant ideology. Entman (2003, p. 422) emphasizes that the more a news frame is congruent with the dominant political culture, the more it is successful in affirming particular representations. In this study, the investigation of national culture in news is based on analysing representations that are reported by ordinary people. These representations can reveal dominant ideological convictions and how they manufacture people's perceptions of their social context. It is important to note that people's re-articulation of these narratives is not necessarily conscious. Rather, narratives are best envisaged as integrated into the fabric of the thinking of people who ultimately reproduce them as natural representations of reality.

In sum, the indexing hypothesis and cascading activation are principally used to distinguish between two voices: the voice of politicians which reflects the political preferences of newspapers, and the voice of ordinary people which reflects the national narratives that newspapers reproduce. The study follows Gavriely-Nuri

(2010) in her critical employment of these frameworks. However, unlike Gavriely-Nuri who employs frameworks for macro-level analysis (analysis of TV video clips), this study uses frameworks to interpret the findings of other micro-level methods of analysis. After using transitivity, social-actor model and referential strategies, the study identifies and explains the (in)congruence between newspapers, political discourse and hegemonic national narratives. Moreover, since the analysis aims to uncover the political and ideological differences between newspapers, I coin the label *cascading interruption* to refer to newspapers' deviation from hegemonic narratives. This is especially helpful in analysing Israeli newspapers. It aims at a subtle investigation of the discursive strategies via which some newspapers covertly challenge the hegemonic national culture.

3.3.2 Aspects of representation and macro-strategies of representation

One concern of this study is to overcome the *analytical bias* of (some) CDA approaches in analysing the discursive functions of texts, especially when dealing with micro-linguistic choices (see Section 2.5.4). It proposes that textual analysis regulates discursive analysis which, in turn, is interpreted in the socio-political context. To make this explicit, the study systematizes the analysis and findings within two discursive and contextual frameworks: *aspects of representation* and *macro-strategies of representation*.

Aspects of representation are mappings of all the grammatical configurations and linguistic choices that have the same discursive functions in relation to a specific group of actors or specific event. Each aspect of representation is the sum of micro-textual choices distributed in and across texts. These are discursive, they mediate between language choices and the social context. For instance, one aspect of representation in this study is *Palestinian civilians are the main/ only receivers of*

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Israeli military action. It includes all grammatical and lexical choices that functionally foreground the effects of actions on civilians, such as passive clauses and active clauses which have nominalizations as Agents. This means that the examples used in the analysis need not belong to the same process type because different process types may have the same discursive function. The examples, however, start with the most typical then move on to the least typical realizations that serve a particular function. In this sense, discursive functions are based on linguistic theory (transitivity in this case) which considerably minimizes the subjective interpretation of language choices.

All similar aspects of representation are summed up to form macro-strategies of representation. The term is borrowed from Unger (2013) and refers to groupings of discursive strategies which may eventually lead to particular constructions of actors, events and social phenomena. Macro-strategies link the discursive to the context. In other words, they identify the contextual function of aspects of representation based on the discursive function itself (e.g. foregrounding vs backgrounding) and on the analyst's awareness of the context. As Fairclough (2003) explains, this is an interpretive level which situates the discursive functions of texts in their contexts. Therefore, two factors decide the choice of names of macro-strategies. First, the name of each macro-strategy should demonstrate its different aspects of representations. Second, the name is meant to give a logical order to aspects of representation when they seem to be correlated in the socio-political context. Although these strategies and their names might be based on the analyst's (biased) orientation of discursive functions into particular contexts, they are neither random nor selective. Instead, they arise directly from aspects of representation which, in turn, are based on linguistic theory. In this way, the analysis shifts systematically and consistently from the textual to the social. For instance, in analysing Palestinian newspapers I identify one macro-

strategy as *Palestinian civilians are the victims of military action*. This is worked out from different aspects of representation, such as *Palestinian civilians are the main/ only receivers of Israeli military action*, *the war is massively disproportionate*, and *most of the victims are vulnerable social actors*. One could suggest that these aspects might form another macro-strategy, but it cannot be claimed that the one identified here is wrong or invalid.

3.4 Israeli and Palestinian online newspapers and news websites: background and position in political and media landscapes

To answer the research questions about internal political and ideological tensions in Palestine and Israel as manifested in journalistic discourse, it is necessary to analyse different media outlets that are indicative of the media landscape on each side. In this section I introduce the three Israeli online newspapers and three Palestinian news websites dealt with in this study and identify their general positions in the political and media landscapes.

3.4.1 Israeli online newspapers

3.4.1.1 *Haaretz*

Haaretz is one of the oldest newspapers in Israel. It was first published in 1919 and run by Russian socialist Zionists (Open Source Centre, 2008). *Haaretz* describes itself as 'an independent daily newspaper with a broadly liberal outlook both on domestic issues and on international affairs' (Haaretz, 2001). It has been widely associated with journalistic quality and drawn the attention of the social and political elite as the only paper in Israel committed to supporting civil rights and promoting democratic values (Sheizaf, 2010; Tadmor, 2013). Schult (2008) argues that *Haaretz's*

deviation from the usual political line of the media in Israel has made its English website very popular with an international audience.

Haaretz has always reflected some aspects of the Palestinians' suffering under occupation. However, as Sheizaf (2010) argues, the paper's foregrounding of Palestinian rights mainly appears in editorials in which the newspaper shows its opposition to Benjamin Netanyahu and his rightist ministers, while news recently has been less occupied with the daily problems of occupation in the Palestinian territories. Medad and Pollak (2013) claim that *Haaretz* has an ideological agenda behind its controversial treatment of some issues in the occupied territories. The authors use the term *far left* pejoratively in describing *Haaretz's* critical attitude to the occupation. They claim that *Haarezt* lacks a professional code and national affiliation due to its dissociation from Zionism.

In spite of *Haaretz's* clear position on the left of the political map in Israel, the newspaper does not exclude other political views (Slater, 2007). It offers space to members of political and military mainstream establishments. In addition, some reporters and commentators in *Haaretz* have centrist or rightist orientations (ibid.).

3.4.1.2 Yediot Aharonot

Yediot Aharonot is one of the most widely circulated tabloids in Israel. It is a centrist newspaper which defines itself as the 'nation's newspaper', one that focuses on military and security issues as well as internal issues that concern the middle class (Sheizaf, 2010; Open Source Centre, 2008). The newspaper launched its online edition *Ynet* in 2006, which is independent from the printed paper edition and has a separate and autonomous editorial board (Doron & Lev-On, 2012). Nonetheless, *Ynet* is committed to the general policies and journalistic practices of *Yediot Aharonot* (Ynetnews, 2015). It is the most popular news website in Israel and soon paralleled

the long-term status of *Yediot Aharonot* in the printed press (Ashuri, 2014; Doron & Lev-On, 2012).

In striving for the widest readership possible, *Yediot Aharonot* and its online version offer a wide range of views from left to right (BBC, 2006). However, the general policy of the newspaper is pro-establishment (Madmoni-Gerber, 2009). For instance, the newspaper is well known for its sharp criticism of Netanyahu and his staff (Sheizaf, 2010). However, unlike *Haaretz*, *Yediot Aharonot* criticizes Netanyahu over internal issues in order to appeal to more readers and compete in the media market (ibid.). In this sense, the newspaper does not provide any substantial critique of the mainstream Zionist political culture, especially the dominant narratives about the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. The newspaper prioritizes reporting and commenting on issues concerning Jewish Israelis, while reporting on minorities, especially Arab Israelis, is mostly limited to crime and 'disorder' events (Open Source Centre, 2008).

3.4.1.3 Jerusalem Post

The *Jerusalem Post* (*JP*) is an Israeli broadsheet newspaper published only in English and French. Originally a left-wing newspaper, *JP* underwent a radical shift to the right after being taken over by the Hollinger Group, which owns other newspapers in the US and the UK (BBC, 2006). Although the newspaper is believed to have shifted slightly towards the centre in 2004, it is distinguished by a tough line on security and issues related to the conflict with the Palestinians (ibid.). Although its editorial policy seems to tolerate some diversity, it openly supports right-wing governments (Newman, 2002).

JP has a smaller readership share than other newspapers because it does not publish in Hebrew. However, it has 'a large sphere of influence because it is usually

read by diplomats and foreign journalists based in Israel' (Gentile, 2016). In addition,

it identifies an ethno-national function for itself as a newspaper that links Israel to

Jews outside Israel. It is parochial in addressing issues about Jews at the expense of a

broader coverage of world news (BBC, 2006).

3.4.2 Palestinian news websites

3.4.2.1 Palestinian Information Centre

The *Palestinian Information Centre (PIC)* is a Hamas-affiliated online news

website that was launched in 1997. It publishes in eight languages, including English.

Although *PIC* is an essential part of Hamas's media operation, it does not claim any

factional role. Instead, it describes itself as an independent Palestinian organization

that promotes 'awareness about Palestine, the Palestinians, and the Palestinian issue

and to balance the often distorted picture presented in the mainstream media'

(Palestinian Information Centre, 2016). It does not say, however, what the distorted

picture is that other media outlets produce, neither does it specify the ideological or

political bases of its presumed accurate *picture*.

Alongside other media outlets affiliated to Hamas, *PIC* has played an

important role in the Palestinian internal conflict. It was a tool that helped Hamas

establish its regime in Gaza by propagating its political and ideological agenda and

demonizing its rival, Fatah and the PA, as an illegitimate representative of

Palestinians (Oukal, 2012).

3.4.2.2 Palestine News and Information Agency

The *Palestine News and information Agency (WAFA)* is the PA's official news

agency that delivers news in Arabic, Hebrew, English and French (Abu Sada, 2016).

The Agency was established in 1972 by the PLO to counter the flow of news from the

Israeli side and to function as an independent Palestinian media stage (Khalidi, 2014). After the establishment of the PA, it became part of the PA's official media body.

When Hamas overthrew Fatah and the PA in Gaza in 2007, *WAFA* exclusively adopted Fatah's political agenda and dissociated itself from other members of the PLO. Alongside other affiliated media outlets, *WAFA* has played an important role in representing the PA and Fatah as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians, demonizing Hamas as a separatist movement that causes harm to the Palestinian national cause (Oukal, 2012).

3.4.2.3 Maan News Agency

The *Maan News Agency (Maan)* is part of the Maan Network which is the 'largest independent TV, radio and online media group in the West Bank and Gaza Strip' (Maannews, 2016). It publishes in Arabic and English and is one of the most visited news websites in Palestine (ibid.). By publishing in English, the news website conveys news to international readers and provides a stage for Palestinians to address the international community. However, the news website does not specify any national role it is meant to play, neither does it refer to the effects of the struggle with Israel on its journalistic practices. On the contrary, it refers to its cooperation with some Israeli mobile providers to offer an SMS breaking news service to its subscribers. In describing its mission, *Maan* says that it is preoccupied with internal political, economic and cultural events, as well as developments in Israel (ibid.). It represents Palestinian and Israeli affairs as adjacent but not necessarily overlapping. In other words, struggle as a defining feature of the socio-political reality of Palestinians is not a point of departure for *Maan's* journalistic practices.

The *Maan* network is funded by the Danish and Dutch governments and has a liberal stance towards socio-political issues. Its editorial board believes that the

Palestinian media, and even official TV channels, provide incomplete and ideologically-laden representations of events based on the interests of the political factions they serve (Sienkiewicz, 2010). *Maan*, therefore, attempts to fill this gap and 'consolidate freedom of expression and media pluralism as keys to promoting democracy and human rights' (Maannews, 2016). Nonetheless, the Hamas-affiliated media specialist Sadeq Ameen (2008) says that *Maan* plays a role in Palestinian political strife. He accuses *Maan* of propagating the PA's political agenda and backgrounding or demonizing Hamas during the Palestinian internal crisis in 2007.

3.5 Criteria for data selection

The 2014 Gaza War lasted for 51 days. Hundreds of news reports were produced by each news outlet to cover the war's rapidly unfolding events. For an in-depth qualitative analysis, the study chooses to focus on a key event in the war: the ground invasion of Shejayyah neighbourhood on 20 July 2014 (see Section 1.8.6). The study is interested in investigating how the various newspapers and news websites differ in their representations of this major event. It does not matter whether the news articles from each news outlet are representative of its general tendency or not. The concern of this study is with how each outlet deals with this event and the war in general, in light of its complicated military, political and human realities. The ground invasion was a very controversial event and linguistic choices are believed to be deeply entrenched within the political and ideological objectives of both newspapers and news websites. The focus on a limited number of articles relating to one specific event enables me to examine how – analytically independent – micro-linguistic choices package different aspects of the same social reality.

I choose to analyse 12 news articles from each news outlet taken from the first three days of the ground invasion: 20–22 July 2014. The choice of articles is based on

their chronological appearance in the newspapers and on news websites, so the first four articles are chosen from each day. The articles should be directly related to the events of the war. Other articles that deal with the war indirectly, such as international reactions and demonstrations in some Arab and Western countries, are excluded. The total number of news articles analysed is 72.

In this chapter I have delineated the discursive features used to conduct a clause-level analysis based on the theoretical, methodological and contextual requirements of this study. I have explained how transitivity, the social-actor model and referential strategies are used to identify linguistic nuances in order to reveal subtle political and ideological tensions between different media outlets by linking grammatical and lexical choices with their functions. I have also explained how two frameworks, indexing hypothesis and cascading activation, are employed to identify the political orientations of newspapers and the socio-political narratives they draw on and reproduce. Finally, I have demonstrated how linguistic analysis regulates, respectively, the discursive explanation and contextual interpretation of linguistic choices by systematizing them within aspects of representation and macro-strategies of representation.

In this chapter I also justify the criteria for data selection. Since the focus is on irregularities and fissures of representation within Palestinian and Israeli societies, the selected newspapers and news websites are indicative of the media as well as the political and ideological landscapes. Besides, the choice of a limited number of news articles is justified by the focus on a qualitative study that investigates the role of ideology in representing a particular event.

With this I conclude the first three chapters in which the political and ideological context of the study, its theoretical bases and its methodology are

explained. In the next two chapters I introduce the analysis. I present first the analysis of Israeli online newspapers in Chapter Four, and then the analysis of Palestinian news websites in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER 4: Analysis of Israeli online newspapers.

This chapter is the first of two main chapters of analysis. Here I analyse the micro-linguistic choices of three Israeli newspapers, *Haaretz*, *Jerusalem Post (JP)* and *Yediot Aharonot (Ynet),* and then identify the discursive functions of these choices and their political and ideological relevance. As I explained in Chapter Two, I analyse the grammatical and lexical choices used to represent actions and actors. I also distinguish between the linguistic choices reported from politicians and ordinary people. Consistent with the research questions, emphasis is put on the differences between these newspapers in order to identify how they compete in the political and ideological context of Israel.

Linguistic choices that have similar discursive functions are grouped into aspects of representation, which are in turn grouped into a set of macro-strategies of representation (see Section 3.3.2). However, for the sake of a smoother and engaging presentation of the study, I start with the salient macro-strategies in order to highlight the differences between the newspapers. Each macro-strategy is explained in terms of its aspects of representation, while reference is made to the linguistic choices that make up the aspects of representation by providing indicative examples. This layout of presentation does not contradict the bottom-up direction of the study because the macro-strategies are findings that are worked out from the analysis itself.

The analysis identifies seven macro-strategies that show differences between the newspapers in representing pivotal aspects of the conflict. The first and second macro-strategies show that *JP* and *Ynet* represent the war as a legitimate response to the Palestinian threat, while *Haaretz* focuses on the destructive consequences of the war for Palestinian civilians. The third macro-strategy shows that *JP* and *Ynet* normalize the war by backgrounding its effects on Israeli actors. In contrast, as the

fourth strategy shows, *Haaretz* deviates from the hegemonic political culture and highlights the suffering of Israeli soldiers. The fifth strategy shows the differences between the newspapers in representing the Palestinians in the West Bank. While *JP* and *Ynet* include stereotypical representations that associate Palestinians with violence, *Haaretz* includes a context-bound representation that links what happens in the West Bank with Israeli atrocities in the (Gaza) Strip. Finally, the sixth and seventh strategies show the differences between *Ynet* and *Haaretz* in representing different groups in Israel. *Ynet* employs representations that essentialize the differences between Arabs and Jews on ethnic bases, while *Haaretz* employs political distinctions without referring to the ethnicities of social actors.

By mapping the contextual relevance of all the strategies in the concluding section of this chapter, and by providing a further interpretation of the political and ideological relevance of the findings in Chapter Six, one can see that they are consistent and may reflect well-established discursive tendencies.

4.1 The war is an inevitable, legitimate and efficient military action against a threat from Hamas.

The first salient macro-strategy features variably in *JP* and *Ynet* and represents the war as a legitimate action against an imminent danger from Hamas. It also advocates military action as leading efficiently to desirable results by protecting the Israeli people. As the different aspects of representation below show, this macro-strategy constructs a complex, and sometimes contradictory, image for Israel; although Israel is threatened by a serious enemy, it enjoys military superiority allowing it to act efficiently to counter the threat.

4.1.1 Hamas is posing an imminent threat.

The central aspect of representation that legitimizes attacking the Gaza Strip is the representation of Hamas as posing an imminent threat to Israel. Different grammatical and lexical choices in *JP* and *Ynet* emphasize two of Hamas's actions associated with violence and danger: launching rockets and using tunnels. The first and most typical realization is material processes in which Hamas is a doer of actions directed at Israeli civilians. The processes are mostly quoted from Israeli military and political officials. They do not represent specific events but refer to a general and undifferentiated threat against *all* Israelis.

(1) [*Ynet*] Hamas {Agent} starts rocketing {Material Process} Israel {Goal}.

(2) [*JP*] "Rockets {Agent} are attacking {Material Process} it (Israel) {Goal}".

The collectivizing metonymical reference *Israel* conceals important contextual information about the Goal. It does not say when, how or whom is particularly affected by the actions. Rather, it confines the threat to collectivized Israelis by transferring "isolated situations of experience with individuals to a whole group" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001a, p. 109). *Ynet* refers explicitly to *Hamas* as a doer of the action and uses the verbal complex *starts rocketing* that suggests a sequential order of events: Hamas starts its violent actions, then Israel reacts. The simple present tense of *starts* generalizes this understanding from this specific war into a general conflict between the two sides. *JP*, on the other hand, focalizes the danger of Hamas's actions by substituting the actors with the instrument *rockets*. The present continuous verbal group *are attacking* emphasizes the immediacy and urgency of the action, and thus legitimizes the Israeli reaction.

JP uses further grammatical constructions that associate the collective Israelis with danger. First, the newspaper includes transitive and intransitive material processes in which Israeli civilians are the Agent. The processes are mostly involuntary and describe the displacement of actors due to military action.

(3) [*JP*] Residents of the council's 15 kibbutzim and 13 moshavim {Agent} are facing {Material Process} different levels of danger {Goal} based on their location {Circumstance}.
(4) [*JP*] As much as 75% of the residents {Agent} have relocated {Material Process} to areas farther from the Gaza Strip and the rockets, mortars, and tunnel threat {Circumstance}.

In example (3), the Circumstance *based on their location* associates proximity to the Gaza Strip with danger; the closer civilians are to Gaza, the more danger they face. This function is also served in example (4). The place *Gaza Strip* is grammatically equivalent to *rockets*, *mortars* and *tunnel threat*, assuming the same functional role of these semantically different references. Moreover, the use of the spatializing metonymy *Gaza Strip* to refer to Palestinians confers the alleged threat of one group of social actors onto collective Gazans. Representing the Strip as a monolithic threatening entity, while referring at the same time to smaller Israeli towns and cities, obfuscates the fact that the Gaza Strip is only 1.7 per cent of Israel's size (based on Israel's borders before the 1967 War).

JP also includes relational processes that foreground the alleged threat of Hamas against collective Israelis. For instance, the Attribute *in mortal danger* in the following example represents an imminent threat intensified by the adjective *mortal*. The threat motif and the geographical proximity between Gaza and Israeli places is articulated by the preposition *on the front lines*.

(5) [*JP*] Israeli citizens on the front lines {Carrier} will remain {Attributive Relational Process} in mortal danger {Attribute}.

Proximization between two entities or two (groups of) social actors is thoroughly discussed in cognitive approaches to CDA. For instance, Hart (2016, p. 168) explains how *spatial proximization* 'relies on a script involving an interaction between an ANTAGONIST and a PROTAGONIST'. The ANTAGONIST is represented as 'entering the PROTAGONIST'S ground, or 'territory', resulting in corporeal harm to the PROTAGONIST'. In the example above, the role of ANTAGONIST is implied as Gaza/ Gaza resistance, while the role of PROTAGONIST is filled by *Israeli citizens*. This representation highlights the threat of the ANTAGONIST and the victimhood of the PROTAGONIST, and justifies the need to take an action to prevent the threat.

JP also includes quoted mental processes that represent Hamas as doing illegitimate actions. Unlike material processes, mental processes do not represent what happens in the outer world. They expose Hamas's inner world to the public and inform the reader not only of the movement's actions but also of its intentions.

(6) [*JP*] "They {Senser} don't want {Mental Process} one (a cease-fire) {Phenomenon}".

In contrast, *Haaretz* refers to specific actions and represents their direct effect on Israeli civilians. For instance, the process *was killed* represents an action in one time and place that affects an individualized and identified Goal *her father*.

(7) [*Haaretz*] Her father {Goal} was killed {Material Process} in a rocket attack {Circumstance}.

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Second, the three Israeli newspapers use transitive material processes in which Hamas acts on an inanimate Goal *tunnels*. Some processes in *JP* and *Ynet* passivize Israeli civilians as indirect receivers of actions.

(8) [*JP*] Hamas has ordered {Initiator} its members {Actor} to use {Material Process} remaining tunnels {Goal} for immediate cross-border attacks {Circumstance} against Israeli civilians and military targets {Recipient}.

(9) [*Ynet*] [A terrorist organization {Agent} has seen fit to dig {Material Process} tunnels {Goal}] [and come {material} through those tunnels {Circumstance} with handcuffs and tranquilizer drugs {Circumstance}], [prepared to try to capture {Material Process} Israeli citizens {Goal}].

In *JP*, the civilians are embedded in a prepositional phrase as a Recipient, while in *Ynet* they are a Goal of a subsequent process. These processes are quoted from Israeli and American politicians, respectively, and represent external realities. Although the actions did not actually happen, the processes construct a world view in which Hamas is associated with terrorizing actions targeting collective Israelis, reproducing the image Zionism constructs for Israel as a 'nation under threat' (Jones & Murphy, 2002). In contrast, the processes in *Haaretz* represent what allegedly happened, and not what is intended by Hamas to happen. Therefore, the processes do not represent the actions as directly affecting Israeli civilians.

(10) [*Haaretz*] Hamas {Agent}, [the army (Sayer) said {Verbal Process}], has over the past decade {Circumstance} considerably upgraded {Material Process} its tunnelling capabilities {Goal}.

Finally, *JP* and *Ynet* associate Hamas with a threat by using relational processes. These processes frame the *realities* represented by material processes and introduce them as propositions. For instance, the Attribute *obvious* in example (11)

represents the threat as a state of affairs. In example (12) the process proposes the action required to counter this threat by establishing a causative relationship between Hamas's actions and Israel's war.

(11) [*JP*] For the council head {Circumstance} the threat {carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} obvious {Attribute}.

(12) [*Ynet*] The aim {Value/ Identified} is {Identifying Relational Process} to remove the threat of terror {Token/ Identifier}.

In sum, the first aspect of representation foregrounds Hamas as indiscriminately threatening Israel. It is a contextualization of the war that gives legitimacy to Israeli actions, as the following aspect of representation shows. This, however, backgrounds the wider context of the war, especially violent Israeli actions prior to the military campaign (see Section 1.8.5).

4.1.2 The Israeli army is mainly acting against sources of threat.

Another salient aspect of representation in *JP* and *Ynet* that serves to legitimize the war is the representation of the Israeli army as acting mainly against sources of threat. This aspect is basically realized by transitive material processes that foreground the Israeli army and its agency over actions targeting Palestinian fighters.

(13) [*JP*] The IDF {Agent} has struck {Material Process} 2,600 Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets {Goal} since the start of Operation Protective Edge {Circumstance}.

(14) [*Ynet*] "We {Agent} hit {Material Process} the leadership of Hamas' military wing {Goal}".

The reference *2,600 Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets* in *JP* conflates animate and inanimate Goals. The nomination *target* presupposes that the Goal is deliberately

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attacked since it belongs to the enemy identified by the collectivizing nomination *Hamas and Islamic Jihad*. Similarly, the collectivizing reference *the leadership of Hamas' military wing* in *Ynet* refers to a general Goal, which does not specify whom the social actors are. Nonetheless, the mere reference implies that the action is legitimate.

Similar processes in *Ynet* foreground Israeli agency and represent the Palestinian fighters as submissive. For instance, the verbal group *caught* in example (15) represents the action as non-challenging and constructs the army as militarily superior to submissive fighters.

(15) [*Ynet*] "In the last day {Circumstance} we {Agent} caught {Material Process} 13 terrorists {Goal}".

Ynet also emphasizes the desirable consequences of the actions by foregrounding the Goal in passive material processes.

(16) [*Ynet*] Nine terrorists {Goal} were killed {Material Process} in a security incident {Circumstance}.

The vast majority of passive processes are reported from the army and do not provide further information about the actors targeted or their activities. Nonetheless, the functionalizing reference *terrorists* presupposes that they are legitimate goals. It associates the fighters with danger and threat by evoking a 'series of nuances in the reader's or listener's mind, which are linked emotionally with previous experiences' (Reyes, 2011, p. 788).

Active material processes that have similar functions in *Haaretz* are relatively infrequent. As the following example shows, almost all of the processes are quoted from Benjamin Netanyahu and represent general actions.

(17) [*Haaretz*] "We {Agent} target {Material Process} only the sources of terror {Goal}".

Although such processes have a role in the experiential function of *Haaretz*'s news reports, other representations challenge their discursive functions.

(18) [*Haaretz*] [Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu {Sayer} on Sunday {Circumstance} defended {Verbal Process} the military actions {Matter}] [that {Agent} resulted in {Material Process} some 60 Palestinian deaths, mostly civilians, in Gaza's Shujaiyeh neighbourhood {Goal}].

Haaretz does not challenge the truth value of Netanyahu's claims, but it subtly introduces counter-representations that construct a different reality. The newspaper identifies the Matter participant by a subsequent material process in which Palestinian civilians are the Goal of military action.

Representing the Israeli army as acting on sources of threat in *JP* and *Ynet* is also realized by material processes with inanimate Goals. The majority of these processes represent the army as acting against *tunnels*. They are either active and foreground the agency of the army, or passive and foreground the military significance of the actions. Similar to previous instances, the majority of these processes are reported from Israeli military sources.

(19) [*Ynet*] "We {Agent} locate {Material Process} the terror tunnels and rocket launchers {Goal}".
(20) [*JP*] Thirteen cross-border tunnels {Goal} have been destroyed {Material Process} since Thursday night {Circumstance}.

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(21) [*Ynet*] [IDF officials {Sayer} said {Verbal Process} Sunday {Circumstance}] [that Israeli ground forces {Agent} have significantly damaged {Material Process} the tunnels {Goal}].

(22) [*JP*] [23 tunnels {Goal} have been destroyed {Material Process}] [and 183 terrorists {Goal} killed {Material Process}].

JP also includes processes that represent high-tech military equipment and its role in protecting Israeli soldiers and civilians. This is mainly realized by material processes with metonymical Agents, such as *the system* and *the Iron Dome system* in the following examples, in which the instrument replaces the actors.

(23) [*JP*] The system {Agent} successfully blocked {Material Process} an anti-tank missile {Goal}.

(24) [*JP*] At least two rockets {Goal} were shot down {Material Process} by the Iron Dome system {Agent} over metropolitan Tel Aviv {Circumstance}.

In the following example, the action of intercepting rockets is nominalized and represented by the Phenomenon *rocket interception*.

(25) [*JP*] Rocket interceptions {Phenomenon} were also heard {Mental Process} above Bat Yam, Holon, and Rishon Letzion {Circumstance}.

The mental process *heard* represents the action from the (inner) view of the Israeli civilians. It puts them in close proximity to the Iron Dome and its success in preventing an imminent danger.

4.1.3 The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government are in control of events.

The third aspect of representation in *JP* and *Ynet* represents Netanyahu and his government as controlling and deciding the course of actions. This is realized by

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material processes that foreground the agency of politicians over what the army is doing in the Strip.

(26) [*JP*] Israel {Agent} sent {Material Process} ground forces {Goal} into the Gaza Strip {Circumstance}.

(27) [*Ynet*] "[We {Agent} must execute {Material Process} it {Goal}]" [said {Verbal Process} Finance Minister Yair Lapid {Sayer}].

The process *sent* in example (26) is non-violent and backgrounds the military role of the *ground forces* in the Gaza Strip. It describes the agency of the politicians over the army but backgrounds the effect of the action over Palestinians. The Actor is referred to by the collectivizing nomination *Israel*, assuming a consensus behind the decision to *send ground forces to the Gaza Strip*. Another ideological representation appears in example (27), which has the Agent *we*. This inclusive pronoun constructs a conflated group of 'Self' by blurring the boundaries between Netanyahu and his rightist government, the army and the Israeli people. Similar representations also appear in *JP*. As the example below shows, some of these processes represent external realities.

(28) [*JP*] "We (Israelis) {Agent} do not want to harm {Material Process} even one innocent civilian {Goal}".

The process is realized by the verbal complex *do not want to harm*, which represents an intended future action. The process subtly conflates the external reality, realized by the mental process *want*, with the reality in which innocent civilians were killed.

JP also includes material processes that allocate the politicians an Initiator role. These processes represent the politician's direct agency over the army and its actions. For instance, the army's action *to prepare* in the following clause is not carried out by its free will. It is rather an action initiated by Netanyahu.

(29) [*JP*] [Netanyahu {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [he {Initiator} has directed {Process:-} the army {Actor} to prepare {Material Process} for the possibility of a significant expansion of the ground operation {Circumstance}].

Finally, *JP* and *Ynet* include attributive relational processes which are mostly quoted from the politicians themselves. They stand for the politicians' point of view and represent them as being in control of the course of events.

(30) [*JP*] "I {Carrier} am {Attributive Relational Process} sure {Attribute}".
(31) [*Ynet*] "We {Carrier} have {Attributive Relational Process} a mission {Attribute}".

The Attribute *sure* in *JP* characterizes Netanyahu and allocates him higher ground to judge events and take decisions. This process is an example of *epistemic modality of truth* (Fowler, 1991, p. 85), which refers to speakers committing themselves to the truth of their proposition. According to the scale of this type of modality, the process expresses absolute confidence on the part of Netanyahu.

In *Ynet*, the clause is a possessive relational process that establishes a state of belonging between *we* and *a mission*. The relationship represents the action as inevitable, whereas the reference *mission* backgrounds its violent and destructive effects on Palestinians.

Haaretz, in contrast, does not include processes that characterize politicians positively or conflate them with the Israeli people. Contrary to example (31) from

Ynet, a possessive relational process in *Haaretz* establishes a relationship between the Attribute *more pressing matters*, which highlights the (negative) repercussions of the war, and the individualized *Netanyahu*. This is emphasized by a necessary future action represented by the material process *to deal with*.

(32) [*Haaretz*] [Netanyahu {Carrier} now has {Attributive Relational Process} more pressing matters {Attribute}] [to deal with {Material Process}].

The same representation appears in a mental process that distinguishes the leadership from the Israeli public and foregrounds the challenges raised by the war. It exposes the inner world of politicians and downplays their certainty about events. Similar to the above example, it associates what the army did with a necessary future action that has not been fulfilled yet.

(33) [*Haaretz*] Israeli political and military leaders {Senser} will need to decide {Mental Process} how to proceed with the operation {Phenomenon}.

These examples indicate how the processes in *Haaretz* represent not only what happened but also what ought to happen. They subtly introduce the challenges and negative consequences of the war for Israel, rather than merely celebrating its military significance.

4.1.4 The war has little effect on Palestinian civilians.

The last aspect of representation that serves to legitimize the war is backgrounding the effects of military action on civilian society in Gaza. The three Israeli newspapers include grammatical and lexical choices that background the suffering of Palestinian civilians. However, in later sections, I will explain how

Haaretz and *Ynet* represent Palestinian civilians as receivers of military action. Therefore, this aspect of representation is particularly distinctive of *JP*.

This aspect of representation is first realized by material processes which have circumstantial Scope. They merely present where actions took place, with no reference to the social actors affected.

(34) [*JP*] Large forces {Agent} entered {Material Process} Gaza {Scope} overnight {Circumstance}.

 (35) [*Ynet*] Large infantry forces {Agent} entered {Material Process} Gaza {Scope} overnight {Circumstance}.

(36) [*Haaretz*] The IDF {Agent} continued searching {Material Process} the area {Scope} for DNA evidence {Circumstance}.

The processes *entered* and *continued searching* represent actions in terms of 'motion and location', in which 'the destructive nature of the processes is glossed over' (Hart, 2014, p. 30). Actions are represented as moving *into* Palestinian cities 'rather than acting *upon* their Palestinian populations' and are significantly chosen from among other alternatives such as 'invaded' or 'attacked', which would have conveyed the violent nature of the actions (Richardson, 2007, p. 59).

Other processes in *JP* have inanimate Goals and background the military nature of actions. For instance, the process *coordinate* in the following example represents the action as a less obviously physical act.

(37) [*JP*] Which (IDF sensors of shooter-cycle centres) {Agent} coordinate {Material Process} air strikes {Goal} against terrorists {Recipient}.

The Goal *air strikes* is a nominalization that contains another process. It backgrounds the doer, the effect of the nominalized action, and the contextual

information surrounding it. In a similar vein, *JP* uses the process *sweeping* to refer to the military action in the West Bank.

(38) [*JP*] The IDF {Agent} was sweeping {Material Process} the area {Goal} for the suspect {Circumstance}.

By drawing on the domestic semantic field of cleaning, the metaphor normalizes the action and represents it as a necessity against an oddity. As I noted earlier, these actions usually include curfews, random detention and road closures. It is unlikely, however, that the process *sweeping* conveys to an international reader the true nature of the action.

Affected Palestinian civilians are also backgrounded in *JP* and *Ynet* by using transitive material processes with Scope as a continuation of the process. Functionally, the verbs in these processes are empty, while the semantic load is conveyed by the Scope (see Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, p. 193). As the following examples show, these constructions allow exclusion of the affected social actors. They exemplify what Fairclough (1989, p. 54) calls a discursive strategy of manipulation, in which emphasis is put on the idea that the action is done, regardless of its effect on social actors.

(39) [*JP*] The IDF {Agent} launched {Material Process} a large-scale wave of air strikes {Scope}.
(40) [*Ynet*] IDF {Agent} launched {Material Process} its ground incursion {Scope}.

In more subtle representations in *JP,* the Scope conceptually shifts the way actions are viewed (see Section 3.2.1). For instance, example (41) below is quoted from an Israeli politician. Although they still refer to the domain of war, lexical

choices such as *security and quiet* represent aggression as an act of peacekeeping (Hart, 2014, p. 29), instantiating 'the semantic blurring between peace and war' in the Israeli hegemonic discourse after the 1967 War (Gavriely-Nuri, 2015, p. 58).

(41) [*JP*] "[We {Agent} restore {Material Process} security and quiet {Scope}]", [Bennet {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}].

Second, *JP* and *Ynet* background the effects of military action on civilians by using intransitive material processes. As the following examples show, these processes categorically exclude the social actors affected and explicate contextual information about the actions themselves.

(42) [*JP*] "They {Agent} are fighting {Material Process} for a supreme goal {Circumstance}".
(43) [*Ynet*] Many different units {Agent} operate {Material Process} in the area {Circumstance}.

JP also includes processes in which the army has an Initiator role, acting on civilians who have an Actor role. These processes represent actions intended to save Palestinians' lives.

(44) [*JP*] [The IDF {Initiator} called on {Process:-} residents of the area {Actor} to take {Material Process} the opportunity of the cease-fire {Scope}] [to vacate {Material Process} Shejaia {Goal}] [and make their way {Material Process} to Gaza City {Circumstance}].

The example above foregrounds the positive action of the army in giving an *opportunity* to the residents to leave and go to safer places nearby. The representation, however, does not refer to the massive suffering of the civilians before and after the very short cease-fire.

Finally, *JP* backgrounds the effects on civilians by using relational processes. For instance, the process below identifies civilians as *mass casualties in Shejaia*. Although this reference expresses the large number of victims, it does not provide detailed information about them. Knowing that no other processes serve further identification, necessary information remains excluded.

(45) [*JP*] The mass casualties in Shejaia {Token/ Identified} appeared to be {Identifying Relational Process} the heaviest {Value/ Identifier}.

The verbal complex *appeared to be* serves as an epistemic hedge by putting the process on a scale of likelihood. This, in addition to backgrounding necessary contextual information, leads to a speculative mode of representation in which the newspaper maintains a distance from the sufferers, resulting in what Chouliaraki (2006, p. 97) calls 'compassion fatigue – the audience's indifference towards distant suffering'.

4.2 The war is causing huge damage to civilian society in Gaza.

The previous macro-strategy involves the intensification of Hamas's threat and the ability of military action to counter the movement's danger. One of the important aspects of representation that is necessary to validate this strategy is backgrounding the effect of the war on Palestinian civilians. In contrast, a macro-strategy in *Haaretz* and *Ynet* highlights the effects of the war on civil society in Gaza. The newspapers include an aspect of representation that shows the effects of Israeli military action on Palestinian civilians. However, *Haaretz* and *Ynet* put variable emphasis on the victimhood of civilians. While *Ynet* adopts a generalizing and less informative representation of the victims, *Haaretz* covers different aspects of the civilians

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suffering. It refers exclusively to civilian victims due to the ground invasion of

Shejaiyeh, emphasizing that most of the victims belong to vulnerable social classes,

and it refers to the insufficient medical and rescue services dealing with the mounting

causalities in the Strip.

4.2.1 Civilians are receivers of military action.

Different grammatical constructions in *Haaretz* and *Ynet* represent civilians as

receivers of military action. First, the newspapers include transitive material processes

in which Palestinian civilians are the Goal. Almost all of the processes in *Ynet* are

devoid of emotional references. For instance, although the Goal *at least 60*

Palestinians in the following clause is generic and may inclusively refer to civilians,

the action of killing is not problematized.

(46) [*Ynet*] Israeli attacks {Agent} on Gaza {Recipient} have killed {Material Process} at least 60

Palestinians {Goal}.

The doer of the action is substituted by the nominalization *Israeli attacks*,

which contains another process, *attacking*, about which little information is provided.

Although the Israeli agency over both actions, *attacking* and *killing*, can still be

recovered from the co-text and the context, the nominalization leads to a conceptual

shift of reference. Knowing that no other processes emphasize the agency of Israeli

forces, the process represents the action as having no particular purpose (see Section

3.2.1.1). The civilians are thus 'collateral damage' of an unintentional action. This

representation hinders any involvement on the part of the reader because, as

Chouliaraki (2006) explains, recipients of news feel powerless about misfortune to

other actors when the doer of the action and their purposes are not clearly stated.

Similarly, *Haaretz* uses processes that background the agency and the intentionality of the forces regarding the actions. As the following examples show, some processes appear in passive constructions with Agent deletion, while others have nominalizations as Agent.

(47) [*Haaretz*] 436 Gazans {Goal} had been killed {Material Process} since the beginning of the operation {Circumstance}.

(48) [*Haaretz*] The strike {Agent} also wounded {Material Process} 25 people {Goal}.

The Goals of some of these processes provide further information about the victims. For instance, the Goal in example (49) is modified by the proper name *Ahmed Abu Sanima*, which highlights the experience of those actors and brings them closer to the reader.

(49) [*Haaretz*] The third and fourth (warning missiles) {Agent} hit {Material Process} the house of Ahmed Abu Sanima {Goal}.

Similarly, the Goal in the following example is referred to by the classification categorization *two men, their wives, and six children aged 9 months to 15 years*. It associates civilians with social classes that are clearly illegitimate targets, which highlights their innocence and vulnerability.

(50) [*Haaretz*] Two men, their wives, and six children aged 9 months to 15 years {Goal} were killed {Material Process}.

More surprisingly, *Haaretz* includes material processes in which Israeli forces are foregrounded as a doer.

(51) [*Haaretz*] The Israel Air force {Agent} killed {Material Process} 35 members of two Gaza families {Goal} in separate strikes {Circumstance}.

Foregrounding the doer does not necessarily mean that the action is intentional and aiming at a specific goal, but it does not exclude such an interpretation either. Furthermore, the nomination *families* emphasizes the innocence and vulnerability of the victims, which may raise questions about how the army is conducting military action.

Highlighting the effect of actions on civilians also appears in material processes which have inanimate Goals that refer to civilian properties. In *Ynet*, the processes completely background the civilians affected. For instance, the process *damaged* below represents an action affecting the Goal, *several houses*, with no reference to the civilians who live in these houses. This, in Chouliaraki's (2006) terms, is a scene of suffering without a sufferer that excludes the resultative attributes of the victims.

(52) [*Ynet*] Tank shells {Agent} damaged {Material Process} several houses {Goal} along the eastern border of the territory {Circumstance}.

The metonymical Agent *tank shells* substitutes the actual doer and backgrounds its intentionality in causing damage to civilians' houses. The action is thus not problematized. Similarly, the only process in *Haaretz* of this kind backgrounds Israeli intentionality by using the metonymy *fighter jets* in an Agent role.

(53) [*Haaretz*] [Fighter jets {Agent} blew up {Material Process} the home {Goal} on Sunday night {Circumstance}] [while the family {Agent} was eating {Material Process} its Iftar meal {Goal}].

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However, the subsequent clause *while the family was eating its Iftar meal*, which represents the civilians as doers of a domestic action, contextualizes the first process. It describes a vulnerable domestic action (eating a meal after a day of fasting) during which the family was attacked and killed. This instantiates what Chouliaraki (2006, p. 99) calls a conceptual complexity, 'semantic relationships that explain, elaborate on and evaluate the events'. Although the violent military action *blew up* affects an inanimate Goal, the conceptual complexity served by a subordinate clause, as well as the reference *the family*, emphasizes the civilians' innocence, vulnerability and detachment from any military action. Only one process in *Ynet* refers to civilians. However, this reference is embedded in a coordinate clause and represented as unproblematic.

(54) [*Ynet*] [The IDF {Agent} bombed {Material Process} the house {Goal}] [in which he {Agent} was staying {Material Process}], [and his wife and son {Goal} were also killed {Material Process}].

While the intentional process *bombed* is active, the process that describes the killing of the wife and son is passive. The processes could have a different function if introduced, for instance, as *the IDF bombed the house in which he was staying and killed his wife and his son*, in which the processes are part of one clause instead of being realized in two clauses with different functions. Moreover, the relational identifying reference *his wife and son* identifies the victims in terms of their relationship to the legitimate target (a Hamas leader). This represents the victims as unavoidable collateral damage.

Haaretz also explicates the effect of actions on civilians by representing their actions. As the following example shows, the actions of civilians reflect the hardship they encounter due to the war.

(55) [*Haaretz*] The Siyyam family {Agent}, however, began to evacuate {Material Process} its home {Goal}.

In addition, *Haaretz* includes mental processes that represent the inner world of the victims and expose their states of mind. For instance, the mental process below represents the confusion of the families in responding to the alleged warning missiles and their failure to act properly. It highlights further aspects of their suffering and associates them with weakness, innocence and victimhood.

(56) [*Haaretz*] None of the three families {Senser} knew {Mental Process} which of the families the missiles were meant to warn {Phenomenon}.

In sum, *Haaretz* and *Ynet* are distinguished from *JP* by referring to the effects of the military action on Palestinian civilians. However, *Ynet* does not include representations that influence the legitimacy of the war and a positive image of military action in terms of solving the 'security' threats. This is realized by keeping a considerable distance from the victims and backgrounding the Israeli intentionality over the actions. In contrast, *Haaretz* includes processes that highlight important contextual information about the victims. It also includes some processes that subtly foreground the intention of the Israeli forces in targeting civilians, which may give the audience solid reasons to stand against the war.

4.2.2 The Israeli attack on Shejaiyeh led to mass suffering.

This aspect of representation appears in *Haaretz* and foregrounds the effects of military action on Shejaiyeh residents during the first days of the ground invasion. Although the invasion led to large numbers of civilian fatalities, this aspect is not found in *JP* and *Ynet*.

The suffering of Shejaiyeh people is foregrounded by using different grammatical and lexical choices. First, *Haaretz* includes material processes that represent the desperate search by civilians for safer areas. Although the civilians are Agents in these processes, they do the actions involuntarily under the direct effect of military action.

(57) [*Haaretz*] Thousands of people {Agent} from Shujaiyeh {Circumstance} have streamed out {Material Process} of their homes to the centre of Gaza City {Circumstance}.

Other material processes have collectivized civilians as Goals of military action. Almost all of these processes background the Israeli forces as a doer. For instance, the Goal *many people* in example (58) is acted upon by the nominalization *the artillery fire*, representing mass civilian suffering with little emphasis on Israeli agency.

(58) [*Haaretz*] [The artillery fire {Agent} had grown {Material Process} massive {Resultative Attribute} by Sunday morning {Circumstance}], [trapping {Material Process} many people {Goal} inside {Circumstance}].

Similarly, example (59) has *many bodies* as a foregrounded Goal with no reference to the Israeli forces who killed them.

(59) [*Haaretz*] many bodies {Goal} were removed {Material Process} from the area {Circumstance}.

In more shocking representations in *Haaretz*, the Agent of material processes refers to killed civilians. These processes are involuntary and represent the resultative attributes of civilians as receivers of actions.

(60) [*Haaretz*] The dead {Agent} lying {Material Process} in the street {Circumstance}.

Although *Haaretz* focuses on foregrounding the human aspect of the war with little problematization of the reasons behind the attack, one process subtly links the attack on Shejaiyeh to the military losses of the Israeli army.

(61) [*Haaretz*] [The bombardment of Shujaiyeh {Agent} came {Material Process} on a tough day {Circumstance} for the Israel Defence Forces {Circumstance}] [in which {Circumstance} 13 soldiers {Goal} were killed {Material Process}].

The Agent *the bombardment of Shujaiyeh* is a nominalization that obfuscates the doer of the nominalized action. The Circumstance and the subsequent process contextualize the action in another event: killing 13 soldiers. This representation does not necessarily mean that Israel attacked Shejaiyeh *because* 13 soldiers were killed. Nonetheless, if the reader is not provided with further explanation, they might consider the two events to be contingent, something which is adamantly rejected by the army (see Section 1.8.6).

In contrast, *Ynet* and *JP* almost background completely the mass suffering of Palestinians in Shejaiyeh. A few processes in *Ynet* orient the reader to the attack and its general effect on civilians. For instance, the affected social actors in example (62)

are substituted by the metonymy *the Saja'iyya neighbourhood of Gaza City* and represented as an Agent of the involuntary process *came*. This backgrounds the Israeli agency and conceals many of the massive effects of the war on civilians.

(62) [*Ynet*] The Shaja'iyya neighbourhood of Gaza City {Agent} came {Material Process} under heavy IDF artillery bombardment {Circumstance} overnight Saturday {Circumstance}.

Another process in *Ynet* backgrounds the effect of the attack by presenting a desirable external reality. The process does not represent what happened, it introduces what was intended to happen.

(63) [*Ynet*] The heavy artillery fire on Shaja'iyya and the air force sorties {Actor} were intended {Process:-} to isolate {Material Process} the area of operations {Goal}.

The process justifies the use of massive fire by the intended objective, to *isolate the area of operations*. It also presupposes that civilian fatalities are unintentional since they were not part of the intended objective. *Ynet* also includes quoted and reported processes that give contrasting representations of the attack. One material process which is reported from an Israeli source represents the army as acting on a legitimate Goal *100 targets*.

(64) [*Ynet*] [He {Sayer} further said {Verbal Process}] [that 100 targets {Goal} were attacked {Material Process} in the Shuja'iyya neighbourhood {Circumstance}].

In contrast, a relational process quoted from a Palestinian source identifies the action as a *massacre* and *a war crime*.

(65) [*Ynet*] "The massacre of civilians in Shaja'iyya {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} a war crime {Attribute}".

Notice, however, that the processes do not have the same discursive function. While the material process represents a specific action, whether it actually happened or not, the relational process represents a proposition made by the source. In other words, the material process represents an event, while the relational process represents a subjective evaluation of that event.

JP, on the other hand, excludes completely the effects of the attack on Palestinian civilians and represents it as targeting sources of threat. For instance, the process *launched* below has the Scope *a large-scale wave of air strikes*, which makes no reference to the social actors affected.

(66) [*JP*] [The IDF {Agent} launched {Material Process} a large-scale wave of air strikes {Scope} in Shejaia, northeast in Gaza overnight {Circumstance}], [hitting {Material Process} 100 targets {Goal} there {Circumstance} in the past 24 hours {Circumstance}], [including {Identifying Relational Process} weapons, and Hamas infrastructure sites {Token/ Identifier}].

The Circumstance *in Shejaiyeh* represents the afflicted place as a mere location. This is contextualized by the subsequent process of *hitting* and the Goal of *100 targets*, which is identified by the relational process as *weapons, and Hamas infrastructure sites*.

4.2.3 Many Palestinian victims belong to vulnerable social groups.

One of the distinctive aspects of representation in *Haaretz* highlights the effects of the war on women and children. The newspaper represents both groups as specifically illegitimate targets due to their innocence and vulnerability, which is

mainly realized by identifying relational processes. As the examples below show, the processes provide a detailed identification that provides necessary information about the victims. This includes their sex, age, place of residence and, to a lesser degree, their names.

(67) [*Haaretz*] In addition to Sahmoud, the dead {Value/ Identified} included {Identifying Relational Process} a woman of 60, one of her sons, four of her daughters-in-law and 19 grandchildren aged four months to 14 years {Token/ Identifier}.

(68) [*Haaretz*] The dead {Value/ Identified} include {Identifying Relational Process} a 15-year-old girl in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip {Token/ Identifier}.

More emotion-laden representations appear in attributive relational processes that refer to distinctive and highly vulnerable characteristics of the victims. For instance, the Carrier *two of the women* in the following clause refers to a vulnerable social class. This meaning is intensified by the very sensitive and provoking Attribute *pregnant* that calls up universal human qualities, pregnancy and motherhood, creating what Chouliaraki (2006, p. 124) calls a condition in which 'the sufferer symbolizes a 'universal' human state of existence'.

(69) [*Haaretz*] Two of the women {Carrier} were {Attributive Relational Process} pregnant {Attribute}.

As mentioned above, *Haaretz* does not put particular emphasis on Israeli agency or intentionality in carrying out these actions. Nonetheless, by representing a counter reality to what the Israeli government claims to be true, *Haaretz* implicitly questions the truth value of the claims behind the war. It shows that the actions mainly affect the civilian society with no significant political or military achievements.

Ultimately, this may raise major concerns about the war and the way it is implemented.

4.2.4 Medical and rescue teams are unable to provide sufficient help for civilians.

The last aspect of representation that represents the war as affecting deeply civilian society foregrounds the hardship of the Palestinian medical and rescue teams. This appears in transitive material processes which have animate and inanimate Goals that refer to civilians and civilian property. The processes are mostly quoted from Palestinian medical staff, giving them space to tell their stories about a very devastating human aspect of the war. As the following examples show, the processes represent the inability of medical and rescue teams to act efficiently and provide help for afflicted civilians.

(70) [*Haaretz*] [Palestinian rescue workers {Agent} laboured {Material Process} throughout the night {Circumstance}] [to rescue {Material Process} the wounded {Goal}].

(71) [*Haaretz*] "Medical teams {Agent} can't reach {Material Process} the houses {Goal}".

The challenges facing medical and rescue teams are also represented by possessive relational processes. The attributes in these processes highlight their inability to deal with mounting casualties under worsening circumstances. Similar to material processes, the agency of the Israeli forces is backgrounded.

(72) [*Haaretz*] [Medical teams {Carrier} were having {Attributive Relational Process} trouble {Attribute}] [reaching {Material Process} every necessary location {Goal}].

(73) [*Haaretz*] [Staff {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [the hospital {Carrier} was having {Attributive Relational Process} a very difficult time {Attribute}] [treating {Material Process} all the wounded {Goal}].

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In sum, all the above aspects of representation in *Haaretz* represent the war as profoundly affecting civilian society in Gaza. They represent civilians in different times and spaces before, during and after they are attacked. The multiplicity of temporality and spatiality complicates the reporting by connecting events to each other. It transfers isolated processes into a coherent mode of representation that gives a panoramic view of the war. Ultimately, this constructs an image of mass suffering in Gaza and fosters pity on the part of the reader. Pity, as Chouliaraki (2006) argues, can motivate the audience to choose a future course of action to end the victims' suffering. In contrast, referring to Palestinian suffering in *Ynet* is limited and lacks important contextual information. The representations unfold in one singular time and one general space. Hence different aspects of the events which could trigger the sympathy of the reader are glossed over. This also undermines the agency of Israeli forces and their direct role in causing massive human suffering. Finally, *JP* excludes any representation of Palestinian suffering. The image it constructs for the army as conducting a legitimate war against terror is hardly challenged.

4.3 The war is a normal social practice.

Another pivotal macro strategy in *JP* and *Ynet* normalizes the war and constructs it as a necessary aspect of the sociocultural fabric of Israel. The different aspects of representation background the undesirable consequences of the war for Israeli society, especially soldiers, and conceptually shift negative actions into positive and socially-appreciated practices. As the analysis below shows, some aspects of representation reveal the ideological objectives of the newspapers by identifying the narratives they draw on and reproduce.

4.3.1 Palestinian military action has little effect on Israeli soldiers.

JP's reporting is distinguished by downplaying the effect of Palestinian military action on Israeli soldiers. The newspaper has relatively few instances in which soldiers are represented as receivers of military action. Lieberman (2013) and Haber (2015) believe that backgrounding the losses of the Israeli army is a strict strategy in Israeli military institutions that aims to maintain Israeli deterrence as well as public support for the war. When complete exclusion of the soldiers affected is not possible, *JP*, and to a lesser degree *Ynet*, employs subtle representations that alter the roles of social actors. For instance, the transitive and violent action of *killing* in *JP,* below, is represented by the agentless and natural process *died*.

(74) [*JP*] He {Agent} died {Material Process} on Sunday {Circumstance}.

The use of agentless verbs such as *died* might be a usual rephrasing of other verbs that the journalist avoids repeating. However, the verb has a particular value in *JP* due to the absence of other processes that represent the agency of Palestinian fighters. Similarly, the process *came under fire* in *Ynet* backgrounds the agency of Palestinian fighters and the effects of their action on Israeli soldiers.

(75) [*Ynet*] Troops {Agent} came {Material process} under fire {Circumstance} in the neighbourhood of Shajaiyya {Circumstance}.

4.3.2 The military roles of Israeli soldiers are socially appreciated: de-contextualized representation.

This aspect of representation assigns killed soldiers military roles appreciated by the Israeli public, which backgrounds the context of their suffering. It is first realized by relational processes that represent military roles positively without referring to actual undesirable events. The following examples are indicative of the majority of these process, which are quoted from the friends and relatives of killed soldiers and include evaluative nominal Attributes.

(76) [*JP*] "Rahav {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} a lone soldier {Attribute}".
(77) [*Ynet*] "Yuval {Carrier} became {Attributive Relational Process} a commando like the rest of the family {Attribute}".

In an editorial published on 23 July 2014, *JP* defines *lone soldiers* as 'men and women who leave "the good life" in the Diaspora to defend the Jewish state'. This definition has its roots in the Zionist celebration of the 'new Jew' who returns from the diaspora to defend Israel (Almog, 2000; Israeli & Roseman-Stollman, 2015). Similarly, *Ynet's* Attribute *a commando like the rest of the family* draws on public appreciation for militarism. Since the majority of Israeli people serve in the army, military service is considered an important shared experience for social actors to validate their national commitment and transcendence from adulthood into maturity. It is military service that identifies their collective identity and classifies who is a 'good' citizen. (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010; Israeli & Roseman-Stollman, 2015; Klein, 1999).

In *JP*, this aspect of representation is also realized by material processes. For example, the process *joined Golani* below is functionally and pragmatically equivalent to the subsequent process *lived the dream*. The grammatical and functional parallelism represents militancy as a supreme goal for Israeli actors.

(78) [*JP*] [Halak {Sayer} told {Verbal Process} the Jerusalem Post {Receiver}] "[He {Agent} joined {Material Process} Golani {Goal}] [and lived {Material Process} the dream {Scope}]".

More ideologically, *JP* includes processes that conceptually shift negative actions into positive practices. In the following process, the undesirable action of *killing*, in which soldiers are the Goal, is substituted by the desirable action of *sacrificing* in which the soldiers are the Agent. The voluntary process *made* and the positive Scope *the ultimate sacrifice* background the undesirable consequences of the action and construct, instead, a socially appreciated act of heroism.

(79) [*JP*] "They {Agent} made {Material Process} the ultimate sacrifice {Scope}".

JP is also distinguished by using these representations in referring to working forces. The processes are usually quoted from officials who represent soldiers without indicating any contextual military reality. These representations are similar to the ones quoted from ordinary people, in that they draw on the Zionist ethos and emphasize the courage of soldiers. For instance, the relational process below constructs a proposition by which the speaker refers to the soldiers' positive inherent characteristics.

(80) "They {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} unbelievably impressive, courageous, determined, full of faith and values {Attribute}".

The Attribute *full of faith and values* does not specify which faith and values the speaker means. Nonetheless, they are assumed to be part of the ideology that most Israelis identify with. The same function is served by the following mental process which exposes the inner world of the Senser as triggered by the Phenomenon *at the motivation of our soldiers, both the regular soldiers and reservists.*

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(81) [*JP*] "I {Senser} stand in wonder {Mental Process} at the motivation of our soldiers, both the regular soldiers and reservists {Phenomenon}".

Like the previous instances, the mental process links the soldiers' appreciated performance not only to their personal characteristics, such as courage, but also to ideological values that construct their personalities and drive their behaviour.

4.3.3 Soldiers are successful civilians.

A more ideological aspect of representation in *JP* and *Ynet* represents killed soldiers as successful civilians. The representation backgrounds all undesirable events associated with soldiers' suffering and constructs an image of successful, lively and loved young people. Since representations are part of war reporting, they are not completely dissociated from the military role of soldiers. Rather, they establish a contingent relationship between militarism and social success. This is first realized by material processes in which soldiers are doers of domestic civilian actions. These processes are mostly reported from ordinary people and describe actions of physical or academic success. For instance, the processes below represent a killed soldier as an *athlete* and a *student,* respectively.

(82) [*JP*] He {Agent} won {Material Process} a national championship {Goal} as the captain of Kiryat Tivon {Circumstance}.
(83) [*Ynet*] He {Agent} graduated {Material Process} from Herzog high school {Circumstance}.

Second, *JP* and *Ynet* use attributive and identifying relational processes that characterize and identify killed soldiers with positive attributes and social roles. The majority of attributive relational processes are intensive; they characterize soldiers by

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using adjectival and nominal Attributes. The adjectival Attributes are emotional and lively. They are dissociated from the military context in which the soldiers were killed.

(84) [*JP*] "He {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} happy {Attribute}".
(85) [*Ynet*] "You {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} angry with me {Attribute}".

The recurrent pronoun *you* in *Ynet* is indicative of an informal conversational style (Tannen, 2005). It produces an emotional representation with less informative functions. On the other hand, the nominal Attributes represent soldiers as kind and soft *boys* and *young* actors. Both references are examples of classification categorization. They associate the soldiers with social classes based on their (young) age.

(86) [*JP*] "Sean {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} a gentle kind boy {Attribute}".
(87) [*Ynet*] "Adar {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} a young man with a huge soul {Attribute}".

Although this might suggest vulnerability on the part of soldiers, another set of processes challenge this vulnerability and represent soldiers as role models and heroes. This draws on the image of the mythical new Jewish Israeli who is soft on the inside but thorny on the outside (Klein, 1999).

(88) [*JP*] "Sean {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} a sweet and kind example to everyone else {Attribute}".
(89) [*Ynet*] "You {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} a leader from birth, responsible and a true patriot {Attribute}".

Similarly, the majority of identifying relational processes in *JP* and *Ynet* are intensive and circumstantial identifying processes. Intensive relational processes have a decoding mode of identification in which soldiers are identified by general semantic categories. The processes are quoted from ordinary people and represent soldiers as *boys*, *sons* and *heroes*.

(90) [*JP*] Carmeli {Token/ Identified} was {Identifying Relational Process} the son of Israeli parents, Alon and Dalya {Value/ Identifier}.

(91) [*Ynet*] "You {Token/ Identifier} are {Identifying Relational Process} our hero {Value/ Identifier}".

Value participants in these processes background the military context and exclude the undesirable suffering of soldiers as receivers of military action. More importantly, relational processes reflect representational ambivalences due to incorporating tough and soft elements in representing killed soldiers. They represent soldiers as *boys* and *sons*, who are presumably vulnerable social actors, and as *heroes*.

Researchers have suggested different explanations for these ambivalences. For instance, Klein (1999) believes that there is a tension between the growing role of parenting in the military in Israel on the one hand, and Zionist culture that creates pressure for heroism on the other. He argues that Israeli journalism discourse draws on ideological narratives but at the same time adapts to new social values. Similarly, Israeli and Rosman-Stollman (2015) attribute the combination of soft and tough elements to universal changes in the perception of masculinity and militarism. The authors argue that tough elements prevail in high-level intensity conflicts such as the 2014 Gaza War, whereas soft elements prevail in low-level intensity conflicts such as

the 1982 Lebanon War. However, Israeli and Stollman do not link these external factors to the dynamics of ideology or the political orientations of the different media outlets they investigate. They do not examine any potential differences between newspapers, nor do they subdivide soldiers into fine categorizations (e.g. killed vs working soldier) to see if each sub-group is represented differently.

This study, in contrast, shows that combining soft and tough elements in a *hero* image appears only in *JP* and *Ynet* in their representations of killed soldiers. Their representations invoke the image of the mythical new Israeli Jew who is best incarnated by the Israeli soldier (see Section 1.7.1.3), which normalizes the soldiers' suffering in order maintain public consent for further wars (Almog, 2000; Gavriely-Nuri, 2010). Civilian characteristics, therefore, are not completely dissociated from militarism. Rather, they reflect how the 'public experience is enveloped in ceremonial endeavour dominated by soldiering and military professionals' (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 138). Characteristics such as *leader* and *patriot* indicate how the orientations of the public are defined in terms of readiness for war. This is a cultural aspect of militarism which reflects its centrality in Israeli society (Klein, 1999). Ultimately, the representations construct wars as necessary and unavoidable societal processes (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 138). In contrast, *Haaretz*, does not incorporate these elements in its representation of killed soldiers. Its representation is mostly confined to the military context and does not draw on mythical characteristics. This reveals that the representation of soldiers is based, in addition to external factors, on internal factors that have to do with the ideology each newspaper serves and the political objectives it works to fulfil.

In addition to the above representations, *JP* is also distinguished by highlighting the image of 'returning Jews' and their positive role in Israel. This appears in material processes which have killed soldiers as Agents.

(92) [*JP*] He {Agent} returned {Material} to Israel {Circumstance}.

The process of 'returning' is not merely a physical act of changing one's location. As explained in Section 1.7.1.3, the 'returning Jew' plays an essential role in the nationalistic-religious discourse of Zionism and, more recently, neo-Zionism. Since the soldier's place of birth is the US, his *return* to Israel means a Jewish return to Jewish land. In a mental process, the state of mind of the soldier is exposed, revealing his commitment to return despite the distractions in the diaspora.

(93) [*JP*] "Beaches and parties {Phenomenon} could not distract {Mental Process} a native-son {Senser} from returning home {Range}".

Such representations frame militancy within romantic narratives and obfuscate the relevant socio-political and economic realities. For instance, while *JP* introduces a national and religious explanation of why some Jews choose to fight in the Israeli army, it massively backgrounds the fact that Israel offers those soldiers special financial and social privileges which might be the reason for their service.

Other processes in *JP* represent the role of those soldiers after they come to Israel. For instance, the processes *helped turn* in example (94) below describes a positive social role for a soldier that positively influences his local community. The reference *the Carmelis* collectivizes the soldier with other family members, meaning that his role is not only military but also social and shared by other social actors. The

process highlights the civilian role of killed soldiers and subtly contextualizes his death, constructing a contingent relationship between success in civilian life and service in the Israeli army.

(94) [*JP*] The Carmelis {Agent} helped turn {Material Process} the small town {Goal} into a tight-knit community {Resultative Attribute}.

This notion is also foregrounded by the Phenomenon *giving back to the community* in the following mental process. Similar to example (93), the process magnifies the soldier's unique and appreciated experience by bringing the reader closer to his state of mind.

(95) [*Ynet*] "[Yuval {Senser} loved {Mental Process} life {Phenomenon}], [loved {Mental Process} giving back to the community {Phenomenon}].

Unlike *JP* and *Ynet*, very rarely does *Haaretz* quote ordinary people's characterizations of soldiers. As the following macro-strategy shows, almost all processes are confined to the military context and do not have any positive or evaluative characterization.

4.4 The war has negative consequences for Israel.

In a stark contrast to *JP* and *Ynet*, *Haaretz* does not have macro-strategies that normalize the war. On the contrary, the newspaper includes a counter macro-strategy that highlights the negative consequences of military action for Israeli soldiers. To a lesser degree, some representations in this strategy are also found in *Ynet*. This adds to previous findings that *Ynet* has the most representational ambivalences that may reflect ideological uncertainties.

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4.4.1 Palestinian fighters act on Israeli soldiers.

This aspect of representation is context-bound and represents soldiers as variably affected by the military action. Undesirable consequences are foregrounded, either by representing a challenging military context or by representing resultative attributes on the part of soldiers. *Ynet* and *Haaretz* represent the hardships encountered by Israeli soldiers in the first days of the ground invasion by using relational processes. For instance, the Attribute *involved in massive fighting* in the following example provides contextual information about the Carrier *the Ergoz unit*. The challenging context is inferred from the adjective *massive*.

(96) [*Ynet*] The Ergoz unit {Carrier} was involved {Attributive Relational Process} in massive fighting {Attribute}.

Similarly, the following clause from *Haaretz* represents a military action by a relational process which backgrounds the doer and the resultative attribute of the soldier. Yet, the subsequent material process *hit* and the Circumstances *at the battle in Gaza's Shujaiyeh neighbourhood* indicate, though indirectly, that the soldier is affected by the military action.

(97) [*Haaretz*] [The 21-year-old Golani sergeant {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} in a vehicle {Attribute}] [hit {Material Process} at the battle {Circumstance} in Gaza's Shujaiyeh neighbourhood {Circumstance}].

Other relational processes foreground the undesirable consequences of the war by representing the collective losses of the Israeli army. This is different from the

image constructed in *JP* which represents Hamas as the main party that suffers damage to its military capability.

(98) [*Ynet*] The army {Carrier} suffered {Attributive Relational Process} more losses {Attribute}.

(99) [*Haaretz*] The infantry brigade {Token/ Identified} suffered {Identifying Relational Process} the heaviest casualties {Value/ Identifier}.

Second, *Haaretz* and *Ynet* include processes that represent wounded soldiers who are completely excluded from *JP*. This is realized by material processes in which soldiers are Goals. As the following examples show, almost all the processes are passive, with agent deletion.

(100) [*Haaretz*] Gabriel {Goal} had been wounded {Material Process} in action in Gaza {Circumstance}.

(101) [*Ynet*] Overnight Monday {Circumstance}, three soldiers {Goal} were severely wounded {Material Process}.

Other representations background completely the fighters' agency and foreground the resultative attributes of soldiers. For instance, the following material process in *Haaretz* has the *wounded soldiers* as Agents of the involuntary process *are coming*. The reference *the wounded* and the Circumstance *with greater frequency* highlight the soldiers' undesirable image as receivers of military action.

(102) [*Haaretz*] "The wounded {Agent} are coming in {Material Process} with greater frequency {Circumstance}".

Similarly, the following process in *Ynet* represents military action by a relational process. The wounded soldiers are a Carrier participant, which is equivalent to an Agent in material processes.

(103) [*Ynet*] Four {Carrier} sustained {Attributive Relational Process} military injuries {Attribute}.

The noun *injuries* and the verb *injure* have the same core meaning and are at the same level of abstraction. The Attribute is thus indicative of the negative effect of the actions on soldiers.

Other relational processes in *Haaretz* and *Ynet* do not refer to the military action that led to the soldiers' injuries, but they do represent their health status. For instance, the Attribute *in a moderate condition* in example (104) represents a soldier in terms of his bodily characteristics that resulted from military action.

(104) [*Ynet*] He {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} initially {Circumstance} in a moderate condition {Attribute}.

Similarly, the adjectival Attributive *fine* in the following process from *Haaretz* represents the health status of a wounded soldier. Unlike the adjectival Attributes in *JP*, it does not represent positive personal characteristics.

(105) [*Haaretz*] [The doctors {Sayer} said {Verbal Process} "[he {Carrier} 's going to be {Attributive Relational Process} fine {Attribute}]".

The processes in *Haaretz* and *Ynet* do not specify the exact injuries of wounded soldiers. This might be due to the firm censorship imposed on the media in reporting Israeli casualties (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010). Nonetheless, representing wounded

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soldiers constructs a context-bound and multi-dimensional image of the war. In *Haaretz*, this image is particularly important because it is not counterbalanced by any representations of military achievements of the war. Gavriely-Nuri (2010) asserts that such an image can shake the public's support for the war and raise questions about its usefulness.

Haaretz and *Ynet* are also distinguished from *JP* by reporting a controversial and sensitive event: capturing an Israeli soldier. Interestingly, both newspapers represent the event by using material processes quoted or reported from a Palestinian military source.

(106) [*Ynet*] [Hamas' military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades {Sayer} claimed {Verbal Process} Sunday evening {Circumstance}] [that the organization {Agent} had successfully kidnapped {Material Process} an Israeli soldier {Goal} in the Gaza Strip {Circumstance}].
(107) [*Haaretz*] [Hamas' military wing {Sayer} said {Verbal Process} Sunday {Circumstance}] [that it {Agent} had abducted {Material Process} a soldier {Goal} during the battle in Shujaiyeh {Circumstance}].

They use neutral references as they are used by Palestinians, *Hamas' military wing (the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades)*, and foreground Palestinian fighters as the doer of the action to the Israeli soldier. This is one of the most disturbing images for the Israeli public that the army and politicians had tried to avoid. For instance, a process reported in *Haaretz* shows how an Israeli official backgrounds much of the undesirable event. He employs a relational process that backgrounds the doer of the action and hedges its undesirable consequence by using the Attribute *missing* instead of *captured*.

(108) [*Haaretz*] [The army {Sayer} also declared {Verbal Process}] [that the seventh soldier, identified as Sgt. Oron Shaul, {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} "missing" {Attribute}].

Haaretz and *Ynet* also include frequent processes that represent specific events in which soldiers are killed. The majority of these processes are passive constructions. For instance, the following processes foreground the Goal and highlight the results of the action, while the doer is activated in subsequent processes.

(109) [*Haaretz*] [Four {Goal} were killed {Material Process} by terrorists {Agent}] [who {Agent} infiltrated {Material Process} Israel {Goal} from Gaza {Circumstance} through a tunnel {Circumstance}].
(110) [*Ynet*] [He {Goal} was killed {Material Process} in the incident {Circumstance} Monday morning {Circumstance}] [in which {Circumstance} terrorists {Agent} infiltrated {Material Process} Israel {Goal}].

This is a roundabout representation of actions. A more direct representation, for instance, would be *terrorists infiltrated through a tunnel and killed the soldier(s).* Nonetheless, the link between killing soldiers and infiltrating through tunnels can still be recovered. Although the processes do not negate the possibility that the tunnels are used for other purposes, it is important to notice how they represent what actually happened. In contrast, as the first macro-strategy above shows, *JP* includes external realities that represent tunnels as merely targeting civilians.

Haaretz is also distinguished by using lexical choices that foreground provoking resultative attributes on the part of killed soldiers. For instance, the process *burned* and the adverb *badly* in example (111) construct a disturbing image that is not conveyed by the more frequent process *killed*.

(111) [*Haaretz*] The soldiers {Goal} inside {Circumstance} were badly burned {Material Process}.

Finally, foregrounding the effects of military action on Israeli soldiers is realized by material processes which have inanimate Goals. The Goals, such as *the armored personnel carrier (APC)* in example (112)*,* refer to Israeli military equipment. Some processes have Recipient actors embedded in further processes such as *carrying Keidar and his men* in example (113).

(112) [*Ynet*] Anti-tank missile {Agent} hit {Material Process} the armored personnel carrier (APC) {Goal}.
(113) [*Haaretz*] [One of the cells {Agent}, however, managed to fire {Material Process} an anti-tank missile {Goal} at the military jeep {Recipient}] [carrying {Material Process} Keidar and his men {Goal}].

Before I conclude this section, it is important to notice the differences between the three Israeli newspapers when using the reference *terrorists*. The analysis so far shows that *JP* and *Ynet* use *terrorist(s)* interchangeably with other references. Although it is a functionalizing reference, *JP* and *Ynet* use *terrorist(s)* as an identification strategy; it refers to all Palestinian fighters, regardless of what exactly they do. For instance, I explained in previous sections that little contextual information is provided when the army targets *terrorists*. The reference itself functions as a micro-argumentative scheme that essentializes the 'Other' and represents the action of the 'Self' as legitimate. In contrast, very few examples in *Haaretz* refer to fighters as *terrorists*. As example (109) shows, almost all of these instances refer to fighters who crossed the border into Israeli sites. This does not mean that *Haaretz* legitimizes other actions carried out by fighters, but it shows a less

essentializing and more context-sensitive reference which accounts not only for whom the actors are but also what they do.

Another distinctive feature of *Haaretz's* language choices is maintaining the military role of killed Israeli soldiers. For instance, example (114) is the only attributive relational process that has a nominal Attribute in *Haaretz*. It identifies a killed soldier in terms of his military role, *a soldier in Golani, the infantry brigade*, which serves identifying functions. The rest of the processes, as example (115) shows, have circumstantial Attributes that contextualize the representation in a military context.

(114) [*Haaretz*] Gabriel {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} a soldier in Golani, the infantry brigade {Attribute}.

(115) [*Haaretz*] [The seven soldiers {Carrier} were {Attributive Relational Process} amongst the ground forces {Attribute}] [attacking {Material Process} Gaza {Goal}].

The Attribute *amongst the ground forces* is contextualized by the material process *attacking Gaza*, in which the metonymy *Gaza* refers to fighters and civilians alike. The *attacking* action, therefore, is not celebrated as a military achievement. This may imply that war is an absurd action; soldiers are killed in a war that mainly affects civilians on the other side. Obviously this conclusion is not reached from this process only, but it is the sum of the different aspects of representation and macro-strategies discussed so far in *Haaretz*.

4.5 Palestinians in the West Bank are responsible for violence: de-contextualized representation.

Analysing the representations of events and actors in the West Bank reveals further differences between the newspapers. *JP* and *Ynet* include a macro-strategy that

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stereotypically demonizes Palestinians. As the following aspect of representation shows, both newspapers represent the Palestinians as responsible for violence. *JP*, however, includes further ideological representations that subtly represent the Palestinian territories as part of Israel.

4.5.1 Palestinians are doers of violent actions.

JP and *Ynet* use grammatical and lexical choices that represent Palestinian civilians as doers of violent actions. This is mainly realized by transitive material processes which have inanimate Goals. In some processes, as example (117) shows, Israeli forces are passivized as a Recipient that is indirectly affected by an action.

(116) [*JP*] A group {Agent} was throwing {Material Process} fire-bombs {Goal} during a riot {Circumstance}.

(117) [*Ynet*] Protesters {Agent} throwing {Material Process} stones {Goal} at a military jeep {Recipient}.

The newspapers also activate Palestinian civilians even when they are receivers of Israeli actions. For instance, in reporting an event in which the Israeli forces killed a Palestinian man, *JP* and *Ynet* use the following material processes.

(118) [*JP*] A Palestinian man {Goal} [who {Carrier} was {Attributive Relational Process} part of a group {Attribute}] [that {Agent} was throwing {Material Process} fire-bombs {Goal} during a riot {Circumstance}] was killed {Material Process} by IDF soldiers {Agent} in the West Bank town of al-Ram {Circumstance}.

(119) [*Ynet*] [Medics {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [soldiers {Agent} shot {Material Process}] [and killed {Material Process} a Palestinian man {Goal}] [while {Circumstance} dispersing {Material Process} protesters {Goal}] [throwing {Material Process} stones {Goal} at a military jeep {Recipient}].

Both newspapers contextualize killing the man in processes that activate Palestinian protestors as doers of violent actions. This presupposes that the soldiers' action is a *response*, thus understandable. What the representations obfuscate, however, is that the event took place in Al-Ram city in the West Bank which is under the PA's control. As a Palestinian, I can say that Israeli invasions usually involve closing the entrances to cities and towns, imposing partial or full curfews, and randomly arresting young people. This is basically what leads to a Palestinian response in which demonstrators throw stones at Israeli soldiers. So the Israeli forces could thus presumably have avoided killing the man simply by not entering a Palestinian city and provoking its Palestinian citizens. All these details are not made clear, especially when Israeli forces are represented as trying to avoid targeting Palestinians. For instance, a process in *JP* activates soldiers as acting on an inanimate Goal *warning shots*, which represents the action as cautionary and responsible. This notion is further explicated in the subsequent process in which the forces act on the Recipient *the lower extremities of the rioters*.

(120) [*JP*] [The soldiers {Agent} fired {Material Process} warning shots {Goal}] [and fired {Material Process} at the lower extremities of the rioters {Recipient}].

In a stark contrast to *JP* and *Ynet*, *Haaretz* represents the actions of Palestinian demonstrators as non-violent. For instance, the newspaper uses the intransitive process *took the streets* to refer to the action of demonstrating which has no effect on other (Israeli) actors. Moreover, the actors are referred to by the neutral collectivizing reference *people*, unlike the derogatory functionalizing reference *rioters* in *JP*.

(121) [*Haaretz*] In the West Bank {Circumstance}, people {Agent} took the streets {Material Process} Sunday {Circumstance} in Jenin and Ramallah {Circumstance}.

In addition, a verbal process in *Haaretz* contextualizes the action by linking it to the war on Gaza.

(122) [*Haaretz*] People {Sayer} calling for {Verbal Process} a cease-fire and international protection for the Palestinian people {Matter}.

The Matter participant *a cease-fire and international protection for the Palestinian people* represents a legitimate reason for the demonstration. More importantly, using a verbal process gives voice to the demonstrators by letting them express their human and political rights.

4.5.2 There is no clear geo-political distinction between Israel and Palestine.

JP is distinguished by having an aspect of representation that backgrounds the geo-political independence of Palestine. As example (120) above shows, *JP* uses the nomination *rioters* to refer to Palestinians in the West Bank. Unlike the clear geo-political distinction between 'Us' and 'Them' in representing events and actors in Gaza, the references *riot* and *rioters* represent the events as *internal* actions of disturbance, blurring the geo-political boundaries of Israel and backgrounding those of Palestine. This aspect of representation is also realized by the nomination *Samaria* that refers to the West Bank in the following example.

(123) [*JP*] A terrorist shooting {Agent} left {Material Process} an Israeli teenager {Goal} injured {Resultative Attribute} in Samaria {Circumstance} early on Tuesday {Circumstance}.

The reference *Samaria* is used by Israeli right-wingers and settlers to emphasize that the West Bank is part of the Biblically promised land of Israel (see Sections 1.6.2 and 1.7.1). This is made explicit by the hardliner Oded Revivi (2014), who says that such references are better used in order to express the Jewish ownership of the land.

So far, the study has been dealing with macro-strategies that are variably based on the distinction between Palestinian and Israeli social actors. The analysis has identified a number of macro-strategies that reveal political and ideological differences in representing the war and the struggle in general. The following two macro-strategies, however, deal with less obvious dichotomous contexts. They involve representations of Jewish and Arab Israelis. These representations are not found in *JP's* analysed data. Therefore, the analysis below deals with news reports from *Ynet* and *Haaretz* only.

4.6 Arab and Jewish Israelis are two different ethnicities: in-group vs out-group.

Ynet represents Israeli actors based on the ethnic distinction between Arabs and Jews. As the following aspects of representation show, *Ynet* adopts a stereotypical and essentializing representation in which one group is represented as homogeneously violent, while the other is represented as homogeneously peaceful.

4.6.1 Arab Israelis are violent: de-contextualized representation.

The first aspect of representation in *Ynet* activates the anti-war Arab Israelis as doers of violent actions that disrupt public order. This is mostly represented by transitive material processes with inanimate Goals such as *to throw* and *had blocked off* in the following examples. The first is directed against the Recipient *police forces*

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while the other disrupts the normal flow of life by directly affecting the Goal, *a main road*. They are, therefore, illegitimate actions.

(124) [*Ynet*] [Hundreds {Agent} emerged {Material Process} from the angry crowd {Circumstance}] [to throw {Material Process} rocks {Goal} at police forces {Recipient}].

(125) [*Ynet*] The rioters {Agent} had also blocked off {Material Process} a main road {Goal} through the city {Circumstance}.

The protesters are also delegitimized by the way they are referred to. The collectivizing nomination *angry crowd* filters down into the psyche of the protestors, making their violent actions predictable to the reader. Similarly, the functionalizing reference *rioters* implies that the actors are involved in illegal acts of civil disturbance.

This aspect of representation foregrounds the alleged violence of Arabs but backgrounds the context of their demonstration. Instead of representing their actions as legitimate civil actions that aim to stop the war, the newspaper represents them as the violent actions of a group that is identified with the enemy. For instance, the reference *rioters* is used interchangeably with the identification reference *Palestinians*, thus dissociating the actors from their civil citizenship by distinguishing them based on their ethnicity.

(126) [*Ynet*] Thousands of Palestinians {Agent} took to the streets {Material Process} in Nazareth {Circumstance}.

As First (2010) puts it, this is a twofold otherness that distances Arab Israelis from the 'Self' and associates them with the 'Other'.

4.6.2 Jewish Israelis are peaceful: goal-oriented political representation.

In this aspect of representation, *Ynet* represents the actions of Jewish Israelis as peaceful. In most of the processes, the actions of pro-war Jewish Israelis are represented by intransitive processes, thus having no effect on other actors or the public order.

(127) [*Ynet*] Israelis in favour of the IDF's military action in the Strip {Agent} also made an appearance {Material Process} Monday evening {Circumstance}.
(128) [*Ynet*] When some 200 people {Agent} showed support {Material Process} in front of the Kiryah army headquarters in Tel Aviv {Circumstance}.

The process *made an appearance* in example (127) represents the action as smooth and peaceful and limits its potential to cause a disturbance. It is very different from *blocked off the main road* as it does not show any negative effect on other actors or the flow of public life. Similarly, the process *showed support* in example (128) is non-violent. These processes have a representation that is goal-oriented. They represent the goal the Jewish Israelis want to fulfil: supporting the army in the war, contrary to the de-contextualization of Arabs' actions which backgrounds their goal to stop the war. Furthermore, no functionalizing or ethnic identifying references are used to refer to Jewish demonstrators. *Ynet* uses only the overarching identification reference *Israelis* which conflates the civil identity of all Israeli actors with the ethnicity of Jewish actors.

The aspects of representations in *Ynet* show that representing Arab and Jewish Israelis is confined to what van Dijk (1998) calls the ideological square. On the one hand, *Ynet* foregrounds the good actions of the in-group (the Jewish Israelis) and the bad actions of the out-group (Arab Israelis). On the other hand, the representation

backgrounds the bad actions of the in-group and the good actions of the out-group.
First (2010) argues that this ethnic and stereotypical representation of Israeli actors is
a general tendency in almost all media outlets in Israel, including *Haaretz*. However,
the analysis of the following macro-strategy reveals unexpected findings in *Haaretz'*
analysed data that challenge First's claims.

4.7 Israeli actors are distinguished, based on universal political values.

Contrary to *Ynet*, *Haaretz* represents Israeli social actors according to their
political orientations which are realized by the universal distinction between *right* and
left. As the following aspects of representation show, *Haaretz* does not refer to the
ethnic origins of each side. Instead, political groups can include social actors of
different ethnicities.

4.7.1 Rightist protestors are violent.

Most of the grammatical constructions that refer to pro-war demonstrators in
Haaretz are transitive material processes that represent violent actions against anti-
war demonstrators. For instance, pro-war demonstrators are activated in the following
clauses and represented as doers of violent actions *attacked* and *threw*, while anti-war
(Arab and Jewish) demonstrators are passivized as direct or indirect receivers of those
actions.

(129) [*Haaretz*] Right-wing activists {Agent} attacked {Material Process} left-wingers {Goal}.
(130) [*Haaretz*] The war's supporters {Agent} threw {Material Process} plastic bottles {Goal} at the
other side {Recipient}.

Note the shift from Goal to Recipient on the part of *left-wingers* in the above
examples. Transitivity analysis shows that the former is a direct receiver of the action,

while the latter is an indirect receiver. However, in semantic analysis, *the other side* in (130) would still be the Goal and *plastic bottles* would be a Theme. This means that the effect of the action on social actors is remarkably preserved.

Unlike *Ynet*, the references *right-wing activists* and *left-wingers* in *Haaretz* identify social actors according to their political affiliation. They are both assumed to belong to the overarching political system *Israel*. Moreover, *Haaretz* denounces the position of pro-war demonstrators by using the reference *war's supporters*. Contrary to the euphemized reference *action* in *Ynet*, the *war* is associated with violence and aggression, and thus supporting it is abnormal.

4.7.2 Anti-war protestors are peaceful and defensive.

Another aspect of representation in *Haaretz* emphasizes the peacefulness of anti-war protestors. The actors, who are individualized and referred to by their proper names, are activated in intransitive material processes that have no effect on other actors. When the processes entail another party, as example (132) shows, the processes represent the actions as defensive.

(131) [*Haaretz*] "Luckily he {Agent} didn't fall down {Material Process}".
(132) [*Haaretz*] [Assad {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [he {Agent} tried to fight back {Material Process}].

Other processes in *Haaretz* characterize a Jewish Israeli woman who tried to prevent *right-wingers* from attacking *left-wingers*. These processes are mostly quoted from the woman herself and serve the journalist who indirectly denounces the actions of *right-wingers*. For instance, the Attribute *not used to things like that in Haifa* in the

process below refers to the negative stance of the woman towards the *right-wingers'* illegitimate action.

(133) [*Haaretz*] I {Carrier}'m {Attributive Relational Process} not used to things like that {Attribute} in Haifa {Circumstance}".

The Attribute gives the event a wider context. It constructs co-existence between Arabs and Jews in Haifa as a permanent state of being. It is made clear then that the stance of the *right-wingers* is not representative of all Jewish Israelis. On the contrary, *Haaretz* adopts a political distinction between actors and actions. It is a distinction that legitimizes or delegitimizes the actors based on what they do and not on whom they are. Since the study deals with a limited number of news articles, it is hard to claim that this representation is representative of *Haaretz's* general discursive strategies. However, this macro-strategy marks an important difference from *Ynet* in reporting actions and actors in a critical and controversial major event, whether it is a general discursive strategy or not.

4.8 Overview of representation in the Israeli press

In this chapter I have analysed three online Israeli newspapers *JP*, *Ynet* and *Haaretz,* in their coverage of the 2014 Gaza War. The analysis has revealed that the newspapers' reporting of actions and actors is complex and reflects internal tensions in Israel. The newspapers use different macro-strategies of representation that reflect their reliance on or deviance from the shared knowledge of the Israeli majority. While *JP* and *Ynet* adopt hegemonic narratives that frame the reader's explanation and evaluation of events, *Haaretz* extensively contextualizes events to explain and

evaluate them based on practical and human considerations. The newspaper covertly challenges the narratives that *JP* and *Ynet* draw upon.

First, *JP* and *Ynet* adopt the official narrative that invokes the right of self-defence to justify the war. To represent the war as a legitimate retaliatory action, the two newspapers employ macro-strategies of representation that maintain proportionality and distinction. Much of this representation is based on presuppositions. For instance, Hamas is represented as using tunnels to attack Israeli civilians. Although this never happened during the war, this claim is a starting point from which the Israeli military actions are evaluated. *JP* further constructs a false balance by exaggerating the Palestinian threat and representing Gaza as militarily and geo-politically equivalent to Israel. On the other hand, Israeli military actions are represented as affecting Palestinian fighters, while their massive effect on Palestinian civilians is backgrounded or excluded. A paradox, therefore, appears in representing Gaza as militarily equivalent to Israel while simultaneously emphasising Israel's military superiority.

In referring briefly to Palestinian causalities, *Ynet* emphasizes that the victims are regrettable but unavoidable. A substantial part of this representation is based on what politicians and officials in Israel claim to be true, which reflects the rightist political point of view that frames the newspapers' coverage.

To validate the rightness of the war, *JP* and *Ynet* emphasize the efficiency of military action in achieving desirable objectives. This is based on emphasizing Israel's military superiority. Israel is represented as deciding the start and end of the war on its own terms and for the sake of its own interests. All representations that might challenge this view are excluded or backgrounded, especially military losses. However, since the complete exclusion of killed and wounded soldiers is not possible,

the newspapers normalize the war by representing it as an essential social practice. The war validates the true belonging of individuals to their communities. By and large, these representations appear in speeches of ordinary people who align with the hegemonic political culture. One important aspect of this representation in *JP* is the emphasis on the religious characteristics of soldiers and their families. The religious discourse and its role in obfuscating expansionist Zionist policies also appears in *JP's* representation of the West Bank. It excludes Palestinian political independence by representing Palestinian lands as part of Israel. Finally, *Ynet* adopts an ethnic-based representation of different groups in Israeli society. This involves a positive representation of the majority, Jewish actors, and a negative representation of the Arab minority based on stereotypical associations.

JP seems to primarily address Jewish communities in the West to provide the basic premise of how to defend Israeli narratives that justify the war. This explains the extensive use of presuppositions that draw on religious and cultural values. The targeted audience is assumed to share the basic assumptions that underlie *JP's* reporting. *Ynet*, on the other hand, seems to be interested in addressing a wider audience, both locally and internationally. This is realized by some representational ambivalences which reflect competing values (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4). The newspaper combines different discourses, though all compatible with Zionist ideology, to address different Israeli groups. This might also be intended to produce more balanced reporting for international readers.

Haaretz, in contrast, represents the war based on practical and human considerations. The newspaper foregrounds the rightist political decisions behind the war. It chooses to cover the actual effects of the war on both sides, and not what the war is intended to achieve. As such, military action is represented as being able to

destroy Gaza but not to achieve victory. For instance, *Haaretz* highlights the massive

impact of the war on Palestinian civilians. Its language choices build into a

humanizing representation that explicates the suffering of civilians and sheds light on

different aspect of their misery. So while *JP* and *Ynet* prioritize the value of Israeli

lives and the need to protect Israeli civilians, *Haaretz* represents the lives on both

sides as worthy. It is the only newspaper that refers to individual Palestinian victims

or families and gives a close-up representation of their suffering.

    Haaretz also focuses on the negative consequences of the war for Israeli

society. It represents Israeli soldiers as human beings who suffer due to their

involvement in military action. No reference, however, is made to any major

achievements that ensure security for the Israeli people and make the suffering of the

soldiers understandable. *Haaretz's* deviance from the hegemonic discourse also

appears in its representation of the different groups in Israel. This representation is

politically based, it distinguishes between two universal political groups that can

include different ethnicities.

    Haaretz seems to address the local audience by providing a contextualized

image of the war that shows how it negatively affects their lives. The humanizing

discourse representing Palestinian civilians might, on the other hand, be targeting the

international audience. As I explained in Section 4.2, this representation is capable of

giving reasons to intervene and stop the war.

    In sum, news reporting in the three Israeli newspapers is motivated by

different political and journalistic objectives. The study has been able to detect

differences between the newspapers based entirely on language choices made at the

clause level, not by looking at the newspapers' statements about themselves or the

statements of others about them. In this section I have explained the main political and

journalistic interests served by the different representations. In Chapter Six I give

further framing of these differences to explain how they function as an indicator of the

deep ideological tensions in Israel.

CHAPTER 5: Analysis of Palestinian news websites.

In this chapter I analyse three Palestinian news websites: *Maan News Agency (Maan)*, the *Palestinian Information Centre (PIC)*, and the *Palestine News and Information Agency (WAFA)*. Similar to Chapter Four, the analysis is organized into five main salient macro-strategies which are realized by different aspects of representation, while linguistic choices are demonstrated by using indicative examples.

In dealing with these macro-strategies, a focus is put on the subtle differences between the newspapers in representing pivotal aspects of the struggle. The first two macro-strategies show how the three news websites differ in their emphasis on the victimhood of Palestinian civilians and the agency of Israeli military action. They also show that *WAFA* represents Palestinian civilians as merely receivers of military action, while *PIC* and *Maan* construct two roles for civilians: a receiver role that associates them with victimhood, and a responsive role that represents their attitude towards some acts of Palestinian resistance. However, as the third and fourth strategies show, *PIC* and *Maan* differ in representing Hamas and its military actions in relation to the Palestinian people. Finally, the fifth macro-strategy is shared by *Maan* and *WAFA* and reveals some ambivalences in representing Arab Israelis.

By explicating the macro-strategies by a number of aspects of representation, the analysis maps out the differences between the newspapers to reveal internal political and ideological tensions in Palestine. As Section 5.6 below shows, the findings also reflect the outlets' preferences for addressing their target audience. Further framings of the different representations will be discussed in Chapter Six.

5.1 Palestinian civilians are the victims of military action

The most salient macro-strategy on the three Palestinian news websites represents Palestinian civilians as the main, if not the only, victims of the war. This may not be surprising in light of the large numbers of Palestinian civilian fatalities. As I explained in Chapter One, the war caused massive damage to civilian society in Gaza, which was the focus of all Palestinian and most foreign media agencies. However, although the Palestinian news websites share some aspects of representations in this anchoring strategy, they differ in emphasizing particular aspects of the events. Eventually, the analysis will show how these differences emanate from political tensions and strive for different political objectives.

5.1.1 Palestinian civilians are the main/ only receivers of Israeli military action.

The first aspect of representation that gives rise to the macro-strategy at hand foregrounds Palestinian civilians as the main receivers of Israeli military action. This is basically realized on the three websites by passive material processes which put emphasis on the foregrounded Goal. These processes highlight the effects of such actions more than the agency of the doer.

(1) [*Maan*] Ten others {Goal} were injured {Material Process} in the attack {Circumstance}.

(2) [*WAFA*] [At least 11 people {Goal} were killed {Material Process}] [including {Identifying Relational Process} 7 children {Token/ Identifier}] [and more than 20 others {Goal} were injured {Material Process} mostly in critical situation {Circumstance}].

The same applies to *PIC*. It uses passive processes that foreground Palestinian civilians as receivers of violent military action. However, *PIC* maintains a doer-receiver presentation by highlighting Israeli agency even when structurally backgrounded. This will be discussed in more detail later. Here I just refer to one

material and one mental process which intensify Israeli agency by the use of pre-modifiers, *barbaric* and *savage*, respectively.

(3) [*PIC*] [More than 60 Palestinians {Goal} were killed {Material Process}] [and 400 others {Goal} wounded {Material Process} in an Israeli barbaric shelling of a small Gaza neighbourhood {Circumstance}].

(4) [*PIC*] [The ministry {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that most of the half million students in the Gaza {Senser} have been traumatized {Mental Process} due to the savage Israeli military campaign {Circumstance}].

In contrast to *PIC*, the passive processes on *WAFA* focus on civilians' suffering and not the violence of Israeli military action. Only one example on *WAFA* evaluates a nominalization that contains Israeli agency. The adjective appears in scare quotes in a subsequent process.

(5) [*WAFA*] [Journalist Khalid Hamed, of Continue TV Production, {Goal} was killed {Material Process}] [while covering {Material Process} the 'barbaric' Israeli bombardment and the attempted ground incursion into Shuja'iyya {Goal}].

Although the scare quotes might function to emphasize the adjective, they can also function as a *hands-off* strategy that distances the journalist from the quoted source. They confer a sense of objectivity on the report by drawing a line between the journalist's own choices and the most forceful expressions of the source (Semino & Short, 2004).

Other grammatical configurations on *PIC* embed the agency of Israeli forces in subsequent processes in which the forces are foregrounded as the doer. Consequently, the roles of social actors are emphasized in separate processes; first, emphasis is put

on the Goal by the use of passive processes; then, emphasis is put on the Israeli forces as a doer in the following processes.

(6) [*PIC*] [At least 12 Palestinians {Goal} were killed {Material Process} on Monday night {Circumstance}] [when Israeli warplanes {Agent} bombed {Material Process} a residential tower {Goal} in Gaza {Circumstance}].

WAFA and *Maan* also emphasize the effects of actions on civilians by using active material processes which are typically used to emphasize the doer. The Agents of these processes are nominalizations which themselves contain other military actions. The social actors responsible for the nominalized actions as well as the actions included in the processes are not explicitly mentioned.

(7) [*Maan*] Earlier {Circumstance}, an Israeli airstrike {Agent} killed {Material Process} 11 members of the Siyam family {Goal} in Rafah {Circumstance}.
(8) [*WAFA*] Air attacks on Ash-Shoka area {Agent}, northwest of Rafah City {Circumstance}, killed {Material Process} at least 11 family members {Goal}.

By transforming verbs/ actions into nominalizations with an Agent role, the processes highlight how the actions are carried out. Unlike some nominalizations that emphasize the violence of actions on *PIC*, *Maan* and *WAFA* do not include pre-modifiers that evaluate Israeli actions/ actors. Again, this does not mean that the doers of the actions are mystified, it means rather that newspapers focus on a victim image of Palestinian civilians more than a perpetrator image of Israeli forces.

The three news websites also include frequent passive processes which include inanimate Goals. The processes represent actions in which Israeli forces target civilian

property, especially houses, mosques and schools. Here, too, emphasis in put on the effect of such action.

(9) [*WAFA*] [The Red Crescent headquarters in Ezbat-Abed-Rabbu {Goal}, near Beit Hanoun {Circumstance}, was bombed {Material Process}] [and destroyed {Material Process}], [reported {Verbal Process} Awwad {Sayer}].

(10) [*Maan*] [Three mosques {Goal} were demolished {Material Process} by Israeli raids {Agent} between midnight and Tuesday morning {Circumstance}], [locals {Sayer} told {Verbal Process} Maan {Receiver}].

(11) [*PIC*] [Another nearby tower {Goal} was also significantly damaged {Material Process} during the attack {Circumstance}], [the sources {Sayer} added {Verbal Process}].

In updating readers on the mounting human and property losses, the journalists might be using passive processes to avoid repeating the same information and focusing instead on revealing the results of these actions. The Goals of these processes are thus foregrounded as the most important part of the news, whereas the doer is backgrounded. One difference between the newspapers, however, lies in the different emphases they put on Israeli agency as the only reason for Palestinian suffering. As the examples above show, *PIC* emphasizes Israeli agency even when the doer is backgrounded. In later sections, the analysis will reveal more ideological differences between the newspapers in relation to the political and strategic value of Palestinian suffering.

The three websites also foreground the effects of military action on civilians by using relational processes. These processes usually involve restructuring material processes, thus leaving out the doers of actions and focusing on the results. For instance, the attributive relational process *had sustained* in example (12) represents

the material process of *wounding* by the Attribute *wounds*, while the Israeli agency is backgrounded in the Circumstance *in an earlier Israeli bombing*.

(12) [*WAFA*] Wounds {Attribute} he {Carrier} had sustained {Attributive Relational Process} in an earlier Israeli bombing {Circumstance}.

Similarly, examples (13) and (14) are circumstantial attributive and identifying relational processes on *PIC* and *Maan* that explicate civilians' state without referring to the doers of actions.

(13) [*PIC*] As a number of casualties {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} still under the rubble {Attribute}.
(14) [*Maan*] Among the victims {Identifier/ Value} was {Identifying Relational Process} photojournalist Khalid Hamid and paramedic Fuad Jabir {Identified/ Token}.

One final note in this respect is the extensive spatial contextualization of these processes on *Maan* and *WAFA* compared to active processes. As the examples below show, many of the passive constructions include more precise references to places where actions were carried out.

(15) [*Maan*] His brothers Muhammad, 30, and Hamzah, 21 {Goal}, were killed {Material Process} in al-Juneina neighbourhood of Rafah {Circumstance}.
(16) [*Maan*] Bilal Abu Daqqa and Abdul-Rahman al-Qarra {Goal} were killed {Material Process} in an airstrike {Circumstance} on the al-Mughrabi family home east of Khan Younis {Circumstance}.

This contextualization informs the reader about the circumstances of actions and adds more information about the victims, which mostly indicates their innocence, while the agency of Israeli forces is backgrounded.

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5.1.2 The war is massively disproportionate.

The second aspect of representation that foregrounds Palestinian civilians as
victims is the emphasis on the disproportionate use of power. In representing Israeli
forces, many active material processes on the three news websites have metonymical
Agents as doers of military action directed against civilians or civilian property.
According to the ergative perspective, these are instances of INSTRUMENT FOR
AGENT metonymy which substitutes social actors with the tools they use. They
emphasize the military advances of the Israeli army as being unreasonably directed
against civilians.

(17) [*PIC*] [Eyewitnesses {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that Israeli F16 fighter jets {Agent} bombed
{Material Process} on Monday {Circumstance} a 12-story residential tower {Goal} in Gaza city
{Circumstance}], [Quds Press {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}].
(18) [*Maan*] Israeli warplanes and artillery {Agent} targeted {Material Process} Palestinian homes
{Goal} in Gaza {Circumstance}.
(19) [*WAFA*] Israeli jet fighters {Agent} further targeted {Material Process} the city of Rafah {Goal}.

Typical for active material processes, the most important participant in the
instances above is the Agent. However, having civilians on the other end of these
processes also highlights their suffering by putting them face to face with the military
machinery of a massive power. This is further emphasized by representing some
vulnerable aspects of those civilians. For instance the Goals *a 12-story residential
tower* and *Palestinian homes* on *PIC* and *Maan*, respectively, are places where
families live. Similarly, the Goal *the city of Rafah* on *WAFA* is presumed to refer
collectively to Palestinian civilians. When these Goals are affected by advanced

military equipment, the reader will most probably think of disproportionate power unjustly leading to heavy civilian losses on the Palestinian side.

5.1.3 Most of the victims are vulnerable social actors.

The Palestinian news websites emphasize the victimhood of Palestinian civilians by representing some social groups as particularly illegitimate targets due to their vulnerability. They quite often emphasize that many civilian victims are women, children, journalists and medical staff, who should be avoided during military action. This is mostly realized by identifying relational processes that define the victims as belonging to those vulnerable social classes.

(20) [*Maan*] The majority of the injured {Identified/ Token} [arriving {Material Process} in the al-Shifa hospital {Circumstance}] were {Identifying Relational Process} women and children {Identifier/ Value}.

(21) [*PIC*] 5 of whom {Identified/ Token} were {Identifying Relational Process} children in addition to their father, mother and siblings {Identifier/ Value}.

(22) [*WAFA*] Among the wounded {Identified/ Value} were {Identifying Relational Process} medical practitioners, nurses, patients {Identifier/ Token}.

Interestingly, unlike *PIC* which in some instances emphasizes the cruelty of Israeli military action, some processes on *WAFA* emphasize the innocence and victimhood of Palestinian civilians. For instance, the following example is a passive process in which the foregrounded Goal *civilians* is pre-modified as *innocent*. The process foregrounds and highlights the vulnerability of civilians more than the violence of the doer.

(23) [*WAFA*] More than 50 innocent civilians {Goal} were killed {Material Process} today on Sunday {Circumstance} in Shuja'iyya neighbourhood to the east of Gaza city {Circumstance}.

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WAFA and *Maan* also emphasize the suffering of Palestinian civilians by representing their own actions. This is basically realized by material processes in which civilians are Agents of involuntary actions. The processes represent what civilians do under the direct effect of military action. For instance, the process *fled* in both clauses below is not a happy choice by civilians to move from one place to another, but an involuntary action due to the military action inflicted on them.

(24) [*Maan*] Residents who {Agent} fled {Material Process} their homes in Shujaiyya {Circumstance} "under fire" {Circumstance} to the hospital for shelter {Circumstance}.

(25) [*WAFA*] [Hundreds of patients, doctors and nurses and even nearby residents {Agent} fled {Material Process} the violent airstrikes {Circumstance}] [seeking {Material Process} a safer refuge {Goal} in Shuhadaa al-Aqsa Hospital {Circumstance}].

In other processes on *WAFA* civilians are Agents of processes where they have a receiver role. For instance, the process *succumbed* below describes an action in which a civilian is a receiver. The process highlights the actor's suffering by foregrounding his undesirable resultative attribute without referring to the doer of the action.

(26) [*WAFA*] [Al-Qidra {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [22-year-old Mahmoud Salim Mustafa Daraj {Agent} succumbed to his wounds {Material Process} in Jabalia refugee camp {Circumstance} in the northern Gaza Strip {Circumstance}].

By and large, the analysis above reveals that *WAFA* and, to a lesser degree, *Maan* persistently emphasize the huge suffering on the part of civilians in Gaza. If no other representations were also introduced, especially those concerning Palestinian

fighters, this representation would lead to the conclusion that the war is being fought merely between the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians.

5.1.4 Palestinian medical and civil services are insufficient.

This aspect of representation emphasizes the hardship that Palestinian medical and rescue crews encounter when giving help to civilians. The processes that contribute to this aspect are frequent on *Maan* and *WAFA* but relatively infrequent on *PIC*. The few processes on *PIC* are mostly transitive material in which rescue and medical staff *successfully* act on civilians. They represent the ability of those staff to deal with urgent situations. In the following material process, for instance, the Agent *civil defence* is acting on the Goal *survivors* in a way that meets what people expect of civil defence. The present continuous tense of the verbal group *is working* represents the immediacy of the action – as if it were happening now – conveying a sense of urgency on the process, while the process *to find survivors* foregrounds the relevance of the action of helping people.

(27) [*PIC*] [Civil defence {Agent} is still working {Material Process}] [to find {Material Process} survivors {Goal} throughout Gaza {Circumstance}].

Similar processes are also found on *Maan* and *WAFA*. However, *Maan* and *WAFA* also include processes that represent the inability of medical and rescue staff to deal with the situation, which further emphasizes the suffering of civilians. For instance, the process and the Attribute in example (28) from *Maan* refer to the inability of the main hospital in Gaza to deal with the large number of casualties.

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(28) [*Maan*] [Palestinian medical sources in al-Shifa Hospital {Sayer} told {Verbal Process} Maan {Receiver}] [that the hospital {Carrier} was unable to cope with {Attributive Relational Process} the large numbers of residents {Attribute}].

WAFA, on the other hand, foregrounds afflicted social actors and highlights their undesirable resultative attribute.

(29) [*WAFA*] Cancer, thalassemia and kidney patients in Gaza hospitals {Carrier} are also facing {Attributive Relational Process} severe difficulties {Attribute} due to mass shortage of medical supplies and drugs {Circumstance}.

Notice how the Circumstance *due to mass shortage of medical supplies and drugs* attributes their suffering to a lack of medicines, which is the responsibility of the hospital and the Ministry of Health in Gaza, without referring to Israel and its responsibility for preventing those medicines getting into the Strip.

In this sense, the suffering of civilians as represented on *Maan* and *WAFA* has two causes: they are receivers of disproportionate Israeli military action, and they receive insufficient medical and civil help. As the processes show, there is no direct criticism of Hamas and its performance in the war. The processes, instead, suggest a direct criticism of Israel as the one responsible for these bad circumstances. However, when different aspects of representation emphasize the inability of civilians to cope with Israeli military action, some questions might arise about the reasonableness of getting involved in a war with Israel. This is particularly distinctive of *WAFA's* reporting, which focuses merely on the human aspect of Palestinian suffering. For instance, *WAFA* includes a detailed representation of civilians that constructs provocative images and a state of urgent human crisis. It adopts what Chouliaraki (2006) calls a mode of representation that evokes empathy with the sufferers by

focusing on their state and explicating their suffering. However, this representation provokes an emotional affiliation of the audience to the victims but not indignation towards the persecutor (Boltanski, 1999). This is mainly realized by material processes with metonymical Goals that refer to places. As the adjective *battered* in the following example shows, some Goals emphasize collective suffering by highlighting the shocking resultative attributes on the part of the receivers.

(30) [*WAFA*] Israeli warplanes {Agent} continued bombing {Material Process} the battered Shuja'iyya neighbourhood {Goal} in Gaza {Circumstance}.

Furthermore, unlike *Maan* and *PIC*, most of the material processes on *WAFA* which represent the actions of Palestinian rescue staff are passive. As the following example shows, they foreground the shocking resultative attributes for civilians.

(31) [*WAFA*] The bodies of 28 Palestinians {Goal} were recovered {Material Process} from under the rubble of their three-story house {Circumstance}.

More processes have the victims themselves as Agents of involuntary actions. These, as the following example shows, give a detailed description of the image of the victims due to military action.

(32) [*WAFA*] [Hospitals across the Gaza Strip {Sayer} reported {Verbal Process}] [that they {Agent} have received {Material Process} dozens of cases of injuries and deaths {Goal}] [where bodies {Agent} reached {Material Process} the hospital {Goal} charred, body parts blown off, or amputated limbs {Resultative Attribute}], [most {Identified/ Token} belonging to {Identifier Relational Process} innocent children and women {Identifier/ Value}].

The Agent *hospitals* is involuntarily acting on the Goal *dozens of cases of injuries and deaths*. The same relationship is then restructured in the subsequent process where *bodies* is the Agent of the involuntary action *reached*, while *hospital* is the Goal. Then, the resultative attributes *charred, body parts blown off, or amputated limbs* give further information and construct a shocking description of the victims.

The above instance exemplifies an evocative representation based on 'explication of emotion' (Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 157). It details the results of actions with little emphasis on the agency of the doers or their political and ideological motivation. Unlike *PIC*, for instance, *WAFA* does not seem to be preoccupied with intensifying the violence of Israeli actions as deliberately targeting Palestinian civilians. With the absence of any reference to Palestinian fighters, whether as doers or receivers of military action, this gives rise to the notion that the two sides of the war are only the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians. *WAFA's* elaboration of civilians' victimhood may overemphasize feeling 'at the expense of rationality' (Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 179). In other words, it may lead the reader to think about the effects of actions more than the political and ideological implications of the war. This does not mean negating or obfuscating Israeli agency, but it does mean highlighting the suffering of civilians based on human considerations, whereas the Israeli war is represented as the general context of Palestinian suffering. Central political issues, such as the siege imposed on the Strip, thus remain irrelevant given the urgent need to stop the human crisis resulting from the war. As such, there seems to be no national, political or practical value for this suffering. On the contrary, these representations highlight the negative effects of the war on the Palestinian people without explicitly denouncing the resistance to it. Yet, in light of the conflict between Fatah and Hamas,

WAFA might be aiming to undermine Hamas's attempts to represent itself as a protector of the Palestinian people by engaging in military resistance.

5.2 The Israeli army targets Palestinian civilians: emphasis on agency and political motivation.

The first macro-strategy above revealed the variable focus of the Palestinian websites on Palestinian suffering and the degree to which it is associated with other aspects of the war. I explained how even when referring to human suffering, *PIC* maintains a considerable emphasis on the Israeli agency that is responsible for Palestinian suffering. In this macro-strategy I analyse all aspects of representation on *PIC* and, to a lesser degree, *Maan* which represent the Israeli army as intending to target civilians. Unlike *WAFA* which highlights the human aspect of the war, this macro-strategy reveals that *PIC* is preoccupied with emphasizing the Israeli violence which, as further macro-strategies show, justifies Palestinian military resistance. Moreover, analysts tend to believe that the intensification of the brutality of Israeli military action is intended to address an international audience. As Zeitzoff (2013) argues, representing the conflict as asymmetric might make an international audience put pressure on the stronger side to avoid civilian casualties. Zeitzoff claims that Hamas's intensification of the brutality of Israeli actions was efficient in previous confrontations when Israel was pressured into decreasing the intensity of some its operations. More importantly, these representations legitimize Hamas's involvement in the war by representing the Israeli actions as politically and ideologically motivated.

5.2.1. Israeli forces violently and intentionally act on civilians.

This aspect of representation on *PIC* foregrounds the violence of actions and the intentionality of Israeli forces targeting Palestinian civilians. Similarly to the

previous macro-strategy, this representation necessarily constructs civilians as victims. However, unlike the emotion-evocative mode of representation on *WAFA*, *PIC's* representation is based on a 'denunciation of the persecutors' (Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 157), which emphasizes Israeli agency and explicates how actions are intentionally carried out. To put it differently, the representation situates the war in the context of a siege and occupation of the Palestinian territories. This, as Chouliaraki argues, gives the reader further reasons to intervene by revealing the political implications of actions within their wider context.

This aspect of representation is basically realized by material processes in which Israeli forces are foregrounded as doers of violent actions. Unlike the passive processes, these are typically used to introduce the Agent as the most important part of the processes. For instance, the following example emphasizes the intentionality of the Israeli army in targeting civilians by the Circumstances *with a direct rocket* and *without a prior warning*.

(33) [*PIC*] Israeli forces {Agent} had targeted {Material Process} al-Qassas family {Goal} to the west of Gaza City {Circumstance} with a direct rocket {Circumstance} without a prior warning {Circumstance}.

Unlike the extensive contextualization of resultative attributes of the victims on *WAFA*, these Circumstances explicate the actions themselves to emphasize that they were meant to kill civilians. Other processes include adverbs that modify processes and represent them as intentional in the sense that they are meant to achieve specific goals. This is bluntly stated in the following process, quoted from a Hamas leader, which introduces a highly essentialized representation of actors and actions.

(34) [*PIC*] [Israel {Agent} is deliberately targeting {Material Process} Gazan civilians and children {Goal}] [after failing to confront {Material Process} Palestinian resistance fighters {Goal}], [he {Sayer} added {Verbal Process}].

The Agent *Israel* foregrounds the Israeli agency over the action, while the adverb *deliberately* emphasizes the intentionality of the Agent in *targeting* the Goal, *Gazan civilians*. The purpose of this intentional action is then explained in the Circumstance *after failing to confront Palestinian resistance fighters*. These processes, therefore, devalue the Israeli army both morally and militarily: it fails to confront Palestinian resistance, so it acts on civilians to pressure the resistance. It is also important to notice the presuppositions included in the process above. Not only do they introduce a homogenous violent 'Other' by the synecdoche *Israel*, but they also imply a collective *Palestinian resistance* that is associated with all Palestinians. This interplay between Hamas and all other Palestinians will be discussed later. Suffice to mention here that such representations do not clarify whom the social actors referred to as *Palestinian resistance* are. Instead, it builds on assumed public knowledge about this social group. In other words, the representations are based on presuppositions that emanate from the hegemonic discourse and its political and cultural narratives. The distinction between a civilian body and a military body on the Palestinian side also marks a major difference from *WAFA*, which represents the war as having two parties only: the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians.

PIC also distinctively uses a number of referring strategies that function as micro-argumentative schemes (see Section 3.2.2.2). In the processes where the website refers explicitly to Israeli actors as doers of military material actions, actors are referred to by the nomination *Israeli Occupation Forces*, which is then followed by the acronym *IOF*.

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(35) [*PIC*] Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) {Agent} committed {Material Process} a new massacre {Scope} on Monday {Circumstance}.

Regardless of what the actors do, the nomination and the acronym represent Israeli forces as part of the illegitimate occupation, which is contrary to the reference adopted by the Israeli side that identifies the forces as having a defensive role: *Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)*. Unlike *Maan* and *WAFA*, this is another example of how representations of the war draw on the wider political context.

PIC also highlights the violence and intentionality of Israeli actions by using evaluative lexical choices in referring to actions of the Israeli army. For instance, *PIC* employs nominalizations that function as Agents of material processes. As the following example shows, the nominalizations are pre-modified by adjectives that express how violent the Israeli actions are.

(36) [*PIC*] The Israeli army's vicious attack {Agent} on the Palestinian people {Recipient} in Gaza {Circumstance} ruthlessly {Circumstance} targeting {Material Process} civilians and their homes {Goal}.

The nominalization *Israeli army's vicious attack* contains another action about which very little information is provided. However, the nominalization emphasizes the notion that targeting civilians is intentional and very brutal. The same applies for the adverb *ruthlessly* which modifies the process *targeting*; while *targeting* represents the intentionality of the action, *ruthlessly* intensifies its brutality and inhumanity.

In other processes, the nominalizations are Agents of intransitive material processes. Nonetheless, the actions are evaluated and civilians are passivised in a Recipient role. As the following example shows, the focus is put on the brutality of

the actions more than the innocence of civilians. The reference *Palestinian people* may be emotionally loaded by invoking the different social groups affected by the actions. However, unlike *WAFA*, these nominations are hardly modified by adjectives that emphasize the vulnerability of the actors.

(37) [*PIC*] Israeli army's vicious attack {Agent} on the Palestinian people {Recipient} in Gaza {Circumstance} was escalating {Material Process}.

In a similar vein, *PIC* intensifies the violence and intentionality of the Israeli forces by using material processes that have a Scope as a second participant. In the example (38) below, the Scope *war crimes* is by itself evaluative, while the Scope *aerial bombardment* in example (39) is pre-modified by the intensifying adjective *ferocious*. In both cases, the brutality of the actions is represented as directly affecting civilians who are passivised in a Recipient role.

(38) [*PIC*] [Hamas {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that the Israeli occupation forces {Agent} had committed {Material Process} war crimes {Scope} against Gazan civilians {Recipient}].
(39) [*PIC*] Israel {Agent} launched {Material Process} two weeks ago {Circumstance} a ferocious aerial bombardment of the Gaza Strip {Scope}.

Similarly, the Circumstance *on the heads of their inhabitants* in the passive material process below contextualizes the process *was destroyed*. It foregrounds the notion that the army intended to act against those inhabitants.

(40) [*PIC*] The house {Goal} was destroyed {Material Process} on the heads of their inhabitants {Circumstance}.

It could be argued, therefore, that the representation of the effects of the

military action on *PIC* is mostly contingent. *PIC* seems to be preoccupied with

ascribing a criminal role to the forces more than a victim role to Palestinian civilians.

It is a presentation that mobilizes 'indignation towards the unfairness of the event'

(Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 157), rather than evoking the emotions of the reader towards

the sufferers. This mode of representation is oriented towards action, in that it

necessitates the identification and accusation of the persecutor (Boltanski, 1999).

By comparison, foregrounding the brutality of Israeli actions and the

intentionality of Israeli forces to act against civilians is not very frequent in *Maan*. It

appears only in material processes which are quoted from Hamas leaders and

undefined eyewitnesses. As the following examples show, the evaluation of Israeli

actions in these processes is realized by Scope participants.

(41) [*Maan*] "[The Israeli occupation {Agent} is committing {Material Process} a war crime {Scope}
in the full sense of the word {Circumstance} in Gaza City {Circumstance}]", [he {Sayer} charged
{Verbal Process}].
(42) [*Maan*] [Residents {Sayer} say {Verbal Process}] [invading Israeli forces {Agent} committed
{Material Process} "a new massacre" {Scope} in the Shujaiyya neighbourhood of Gaza City
{Circumstance}].

In a more stark difference from *PIC*, some lexical choices on *Maan* and *WAFA*

exclude a great deal of the violence of Israeli actions and merely focus on the results

of these actions. For instance, example (43) from *Maan* refers to military action by the

verbal group *brought* which is semantically void of any vestiges of violence. The

process lacks important contextual information concerning how the attacks resulted in

a massive number of fatalities.

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(43) [*Maan*] The latest Israeli attacks {Agent} brought {Material Process} the Palestinian death toll {Goal} to 587 {Resultative Attribute}.

Similarly, the following intransitive process *ended up* from *WAFA* is non-violent, although it refers to military action, while violent action is embedded in the nominalization *the killing* which has a Circumstance function.

(44) [*WAFA*] Israeli bombing {Agent} on Nasr quarter in Rafah City {Recipient} also ended up with {Material Process} the killing of Khadra Tailakh, and the injury of two other Palestinians {Resultative Attribute}.

Although the violent nature of the process is recovered from the Circumstance, and the Israeli agency in the action is evident in the co-text of the process, this process establishes a weak link between the action and the effect. It does not seem to problematize Israeli intentionality over the actions as much as it emphasizes the results of the action. This marks a crucial difference from *PIC* which tries consistently to link the huge number of fatalities with the intentionality of the forces attacking Palestinian civilians.

More surprising representations in *Maan* are reported from Israeli sources. The following clause is a transitive material process with a Scope as a second participant. Although the process is indirectly quoted, which means that the journalist could reword it in a way that expresses its violence, the positive connotations of the process are preserved and conveyed by the Scope *progress*.

(45) [*Maan*] Israeli forces {Agent} made progress {Material Process} in their invasion {Circumstance} across swathes of northern and southern Gaza {Circumstance}.

Since the process does not include a Goal, the affected actors are completely backgrounded. It exemplifies *Maan's* tendency not to problematize actions when they are reported from Israeli sources. This will be discussed more in later sections.

The macro-strategies discussed so far are concerned with two main groups of social actors: Israeli forces and Palestinian civilians. The analysis has revealed how different grammatical realizations and lexical choices emphasize variably different aspects of military action and foreground different contextual associations and political/ human implications. The analysis concludes that *WAFA* includes consistent representations of the war being between the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians. However, this is not exactly the case with *PIC* and *Maan*. The following macro-strategy reveals how a third party, Palestinian fighters, has a decisive role in the war according to *PIC* and *Maan*. Yet, the news websites differ in their construction of a relationship between fighters and civilians. This reveals differences in the ideological narratives they draw upon and the political objectives they attempt to achieve.

5.3 The war is between two military sides.

Although *PIC* and *Maan* are interested in showing the massive effect of Israeli military action on Palestinian civilians, both websites represent the war as being basically conducted between two military sides: the Israeli army and Palestinian fighters. In doing so, *PIC* and *Maan* construct a considerably wider image of the war by representing one of its main aspects that is ignored on *WAFA*. This macro-strategy is realized by the following aspects of representation.

5.3.1 Palestinian fighters act against Israeli soldiers.

The first aspect of representation that constructs the war as being between two military sides foregrounds the role of Palestinian fighters while acting against Israeli soldiers. This is articulated in news reports by different grammatical realizations.

First, *PIC* and *Maan* include processes in which the effect of military action against soldiers is foregrounded, while Palestinian fighters as doers are completely backgrounded. Some of these processes do not assert the role of Palestinian fighters due to the way social roles are realized. For instance, Israeli forces appear as an Agent in the following process although they are the receivers of actions. The process completely backgrounds Palestinian fighters.

(46) [*PIC*] [Earlier in the day {Circumstance}, the Israeli occupation {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [it {Agent} lost {Material Process} 27 troops {Goal} in its ongoing ground offensive {Circumstance} in Gaza {Circumstance}].

Backgrounding fighters also appears in the Circumstance *in its ongoing offensive*. The possessive pronoun *its* attributes military action to one party only: Israeli forces. Similarly, the following intransitive material process from *Maan* has the killed soldiers as an Agent of the involuntary action *died*, leaving out the doer of the action of *killing*.

(47) [*Maan*] 27 soldiers {Agent} have died {Material Process} in the past four days {Circumstance}.

Nonetheless, the co-text and context of these processes can help the readers infer that the processes refer to military actions carried out by Palestinian fighters. Consequently, they would assign a new role to the Israeli army; not only it acts on Palestinian civilians, but it also receives military actions.

Other processes background the doers but have the Israeli forces as Goals of the actions. As the following example from *PIC* shows, the process *were wounded* implies a doer who did the action of wounding.

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(48) [*PIC*] 50 others {Goal} were wounded {Material Process}.

Some processes in *Maan* imply that there are two military sides in the war by the way they are contextualized. For instance, the following process includes the Circumstance *in intense fighting* which leaves no doubt that the war is between two military sides that have considerable military capabilities. It is important to notice here that this process is reported from an Israeli military source.

(49) [*Maan*] [An Israeli military spokeswoman {Sayer} told {Verbal Process} Maan {Receiver}] [that 13 soldiers {Goal} have been killed {Material Process} in intense fighting {Circumstance} in the Gaza Strip {Circumstance} on Sunday alone {Circumstance}].

Maan also includes active processes that foreground the fighters as acting against Israeli soldiers or inanimate Goals that refer to Israeli military equipment. In example (50) below, the material process foregrounds the doer *the armed wing of Hamas* as acting against *an Israeli soldier*. Similarly, example (51) foregrounds the fighters' agency in acting against military equipment, presumably affecting the soldiers inside it.

(50) [*Maan*] [The armed wing of Hamas {Sayer} claimed {Verbal Process}] [it {Agent} kidnapped {Material Process} an Israeli soldier {Goal}].
(51) [*Maan*] [Hamas {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that the fighters {Agent} destroyed {Material Process} an Israeli military jeep {Goal}].

As it appears in the examples above, *Maan* uses some processes from Israeli and Palestinian military sources, conferring a sense of objectivity on reporting or at

least a sense validation of what is reported. It is quite surprising, however, that some lexical choices have negative connotations in representing Palestinian actions. The verbal group *kidnapped* in example (50) is associated with immoral unacceptable criminal actions, usually against civilians. In other instances, *Maan* uses the reference *militants* to refer to Hamas fighters. Like the previous example, this backgrounds the political legitimacy of the actors by merely identifying them based on what they do.

(52) [*Maan*] Palestinian militants {Agent} have engaged {Material Process} the Israeli military {Goal} in fierce fighting {Circumstance} across the Gaza Strip {Circumstance}.

These choices are not used on *PIC* which seems more alert to the role of lexical choices in (de)legitimizing Palestinian actions. It is thus consistent in using choices that have positive associations. For instance, in covering the event reported on *Maan* in example (50), *PIC* uses the verbal group *captured* instead of *kidnapped*. The semantic meaning of this choice is different as it draws on legitimate military action. It is thus pragmatically, and morally, acceptable.

(53) [*PIC*] [He {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that the soldier {Goal} was captured {Material Process} in the battle {Circumstance} in Shujaia suburb {Circumstance}].

In a more interesting case, *Maan* reports the same event from both sides by using different choices that construct the same event differently.

(54) [*Maan*] [It {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that early Monday {Circumstance} 12 al-Qassam fighters {Agent} infiltrated {Material Process} an Israeli military site {Goal} in eastern Beit Hanoun {Circumstance}].

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(55) [*Maan*] "[Hamas terrorists {Agent} infiltrated {Material Process} Israel {Goal} through two tunnels {Circumstance} from north Gaza {Circumstance}]", [Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner {Sayer} wrote {Verbal Process} on his official Twitter feed {Circumstance}].

Both processes are transitive material processes in which Palestinian fighters act against inanimate Goals that refer to places. However, the processes differ in the way Palestinian fighters are referred to. While the indirect reporting of the Palestinian source includes a (positive) reference *al-Qassam fighters*, the direct reporting of the Israeli source has a negative reference, *Hamas terrorists*, infiltrating *Maan's* gatekeeping and conveying an Israeli viewpoint.

Furthermore, the Palestinian source represents the action as targeting *an Israeli military site*, which is a legitimate action directed against soldiers. In contrast, the Goal that is quoted from the Israeli source is the collectivizing synecdoche *Israel*, which conveys a negative meaning as the action might be directed against civilians. This is another site on which Israeli discourse finds its way into *Maan's* reporting to counterbalance the Palestinian, especially the Hamas, narrative.

The above examples show that *Maan* maintains a clear distinction between Palestinian civilians and Palestinian fighters. Although this might not be surprising, the distinction between the two groups is later compared with a completely different representation on *PIC*. Furthermore, some instances on *Maan* blur the Israeli intentionality of targeting civilians. For example, the Palestinian civilians in the following example are foregrounded as the Goal. The Circumstance *in ongoing fighting* contextualizes the event as resulting from military action between two military sides: Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters. The process does not provide any clues about who is responsible for killing civilians, which obfuscates Israeli agency and intentionality in doing the action.

(56) [*Maan*] Three others {Goal} were killed {Material Process} in ongoing fighting {Circumstance} in the besieged Shujaiyeh neighbourhood of Gaza City {Circumstance}.

Similar uncertainty appears in the following example where *Maan* refers to Palestinian fatalities by using the collectivizing reference *Palestinians* which is functionally parallel to *Israeli soldiers*.

(57) [*Maan*] At least 140 Palestinians and 13 Israeli soldiers {Goal} were killed {Material Process} on Sunday {Circumstance}.

Without additional information, it is quite difficult to infer whether the *Palestinians* are civilians or fighters. But the functional parallelism between Palestinian actors and Israeli soldiers suggests that the former are fighters.

Finally, *Maan* exclusively refers to the effects of Palestinian military action on Israeli civilians. Almost all of these representations background one part of the process. For instance, the following process is a passive construction that foregrounds the affected Goal, *two Israeli civilians*, while the doer is backgrounded and substituted by the metonymy *rocket fire*.

(58) [*Maan*] Two Israeli civilians {Goal} have also been killed {Material Process} by rocket fire {Agent}.

Even in active processes, the doer is usually backgrounded. In the following process, the doer of the action is represented by the metonymical Agent *116 rockets*, while the actual receivers are represented by the collectivizing synecdoche *Israel*.

(59) [*Maan*] 116 rockets {Agent} hitting {Material Process} Israel {Goal} on Monday {Circumstance}.

Other processes have Israeli civilians as doers of intransitive material processes. In the following example, the actors are referred to as *residents*, which affirms their civilian status. They are the Actor in the involuntary process *to stay* which represents an action presumably carried out to avoid a threat.

(60) [*Maan*] Residents in Kissufim and nearby areas in southern Israel {Actor} were told {Process:-} to stay {Material Process} in their homes {Circumstance}.

In sum, *Maan* represents the war as being between the Israeli army and Palestinian fighters in which the affected actors are mostly Palestinian civilians. This distinction will be compared later with the ideological conflation of fighters and civilians on *PIC*.

5.3.2 *Hamas is a military adversary.*

Another aspect of representation that constructs two military sides in the war on *PIC* and *Maan* represents Hamas as a military adversary that enjoys considerable public support. This has a deep impact on the overall representation of the war. Foregrounding the military achievements of the Palestinian resistance would necessarily change the perceptions of human losses as well as the perceptions of Israel as the absolute power in the confrontation.

One grammatical realization of representing Hamas as a military adversary is transitive material processes in which fighters act against Israeli soldiers. These are either active processes that foreground the doer, or passive ones that foreground the Goal and the effects of actions. For instance the verbal group complex *had been forced to retreat* in the process below represents the forces as militarily inferior to the

Palestinian resistance. The forces have an Actor role in the process *to retreat*, while the fighters have an implied Initiator role in the process *forced*.

(61) [*Maan*] [Eyewitnesses {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that Israeli forces {Actor} had been forced {Process:-} to retreat {Material Process} from Beit Lahiya {Circumstance}].

PIC also includes processes that represent the resistance as more powerful. For instance, the passive process below includes the Circumstance *against the occupation's will* which explicates how the action is carried out.

(62) [*PIC*] [Saying {Verbal Process}] [that they (Palestinian prisoners) {Goal} will be liberated {Material Process} against the occupation's will {Circumstance}].

The process, therefore, allocates the fighters a powerful position to decide the future course of actions.

Representing the resistance as powerful also appears in the example below. The verbal process *warned* represents Palestinian fighters as confident about their military superiority from which they judge and predict future events. The mental process *heed*, on the other hand, brings the reader closer to the inner world of the Israeli forces to represent their failure to act responsibly.

(63) [*PIC*] "[We {Sayer} have warned {Verbal Process} the Israeli enemy {Receiver} against such invasion {Matter}], [but it {Sensor} did not heed {Mental Process} our warning {Phenomenon}]", [he {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}].

In less rhetorical terms, *PIC* and *Maan* intensify the military ability of Hamas by reporting highly challenging, but successful, military actions. For instance, in

reporting an event in which fighters captured an Israeli soldier, *PIC* dramatizes the action and intensifies its operational complexity. The verbal complex *managed to capture* is a conventional implicature that represents the difficulty of achieving a goal which is set in advance. Therefore, doing the action means achieving one of Hamas's objectives.

(64) [*PIC*] [Hamas's armed wing, the Qassam Brigade, {Sayer} said {Verbal Process} on Sunday {Circumstance}] [that it {Agent} managed to capture {Material Process} an Israeli soldier {Goal} during the heavy clashes east of Gaza city {Circumstance} Saturday night {Circumstance}].

The complexity of the action at the operational level is also constructed in the Circumstance *during the heavy clashes* which represents the fighters as an adversary to be reckoned with. It is important to mention here that this action is one of the very few in which reference is made specifically to Hamas fighters, precisely *the Qassam Brigades*, and not to *Palestinian resistance* as I explained in previous examples and as I will discuss in more detail in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3.

Similarly, in reporting the killing of two Israeli soldiers by Hamas fighters, *Maan* uses the nominalization *Hamas-cross border raid* as the Agent. It backgrounds the social actors but highlights the way the action was carried out, which poses a big challenge for the Israeli forces.

(65) [*Maan*] Hamas-cross border raid {Agent} into Israel {Circumstance} Sunday {Circumstance} killed {Material {Process} two Israeli soldiers {Goal}.

The process foregrounds one of what Hamas boasts of as 'surprises' during the war, the movement's ability to carry out military action beyond Israeli military sites (Attaher, 2014). *Maan* also includes intransitive processes which represent the success

of Palestinian fighters in implementing military action 'beyond the borders', as Hamas likes to call them. As the following examples show, these processes explicate the military activities of Palestinian fighters in different contexts. This represents them as decisively directing events according to their objectives.

(66) [*Maan*] The other group {Agent} clashed {Material Process} with Israeli special forces {Circumstance}.

(67) [*Maan*] Two {Agent} returned {Material Process} safely {Circumstance}.

It is worth referring to the linguistic relevance of the verb *clashed* in example (66) above. Although it is syntactically intransitive, it usually necessitates mentioning the other part involved in the action, thus functioning semantically like a transitive verb. As such, the process helps in emphasizing the action itself, but at the same time keeps the two military sides in the process evident.

In a similar vein, *PIC* and *Maan* represent the (positive) public response to some of the resistance actions. In doing so, they emphasize the role of Palestinian military action in changing some realities relevant to the Palestinian people. This mainly appears in material processes in which Palestinian civilians are Agents. The processes represent their happiness with some actions, especially capturing an Israeli soldier, and the relevance of these actions for their lives or the lives of their relatives in Israeli prisons. This is exemplified by the following example from *PIC*.

(68) [*PIC*] The announcement (of capturing an Israeli soldier) {Goal} was met {Material Process} with great joy {Circumstance} in the Palestinian street {Circumstance} in Gaza Strip {Circumstance}.

The Goal *the announcement* is foregrounded as the most important part of the process, while the process *was met* is intensified by the Circumstance *with great joy*.

This representation emphasizes the political and practical relevance of the action for the Palestinian people, who are collectively represented by the metonymy *the Palestinian street*.

Similarly, the following processes in *Maan* have Palestinian civilians as Agents of actions that represent their positive response towards the same event. The first is a transitive material process with an inanimate Goal, while the second is an intransitive process. The processes are motivated by actions of the resistance and basically represent psychological states of affairs and not actual changes in the material context.

(69) [*Maan*] [Hundreds of people in Ramallah, Hebron and Bethlehem {Agent} […] honking {Material Process} their car horns {Goal}] [and launching {Material Process} fireworks {Goal} following news of the capture {Circumstance}].

(70) [*Maan*] [Palestinians across the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip {Agent} celebrated {Material Process} late Sunday {Circumstance} following an announcement by Hamas' military wing {Circumstance}] [that it {Agent} had captured {Material Process} an Israeli soldier {Goal}].

Maan also includes a relational process that refers to civilians' positive attitude towards capturing an Israeli soldier. As the following example shows, these processes are typical in showing that civilians' actions do not bring about important changes in the material world as much as they reflect their response to the fighters' actions.

(71) [*Maan*] [In Hebron {Circumstance}, the families of Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [they {Carrier} were {Attributive Relational Process} happy with the news {Attribute}].

The Attribute *happy with the news* demonstrates the emotional state of civilians towards the action. The Sayer *the families of Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons* refers to a specific group of social actors who are identified in relation to Palestinian prisoners. This highlights the practical value of the action by foregrounding its potential in changing particular realities: releasing Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.

By and large, the two aspects of presentation discussed above activate Palestinian fighters as doers of military actions that affect Israeli actors. The following section discusses processes from *Maan* in which Palestinian fighters as well as Hamas (civilian) members are passivised as receivers of Israeli military action, which also represents the war as being between Hamas/ fighters and the Israeli army. This representation is completely excluded from *PIC*.

5.3.3 Israeli forces act against fighters/ Hamas members

A distinctive aspect of representation in *Maan* foregrounds the effects of Israeli actions on Palestinian fighters. This is realized by material processes in which Israeli forces and the Palestinian fighters are Agents and Goals, respectively. Remarkably, most of these processes are reported from Israeli military sources. As I explained earlier, some lexical choices convey the political and ideological connotations of the source by using the functionalizing reference *terrorists* to refer to Palestinian fighters and the abbreviation *IDF* to refer to Israeli forces, which contrasts sharply with *PIC's* attempt to circulate the counter-argumentative nomination *Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF)*. When processes are indirectly reported, as the following example shows, the journalists use neutral references such as *fighters* which are usually modified by *Hamas* to make clear the political orientation of the actors. This emphasizes the distinction between fighters and civilians.

(72) [*Maan*] [Israel's army spokesman {Sayer} confirmed {Verbal Process}] [that 10 Hamas fighters {Goal} were killed {Material Process}].

In a more surprising representation, a process in *Maan* uses the generalizing Goal *targets* which is later explained as referring to buildings used by Palestinian fighters.

[73] [*Maan*] [The Israeli army {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [it {Agent} had targeted {Material Process} some 310 targets {Goal} in Gaza {Circumstance} in the last 24 hours {Circumstance}]. "[An additional mosque {Goal} used {Material Process} by the PIJ {Agent} as a rocket storage facility {Circumstance}], [operations room, and gathering point, {Goal} was targeted {Material Process}]".

The process foregrounds the notion that some civilian facilities could genuinely be targeted because they were used for military purposes. This claim is conveyed from an Israeli source but, surprisingly, not problematized by *Maan*.

A distinction between different groups of Palestinian actors in *Maan* appears also in the reference to 'Hamas actors': politicians and civilians but not fighters. In a material process that represents an event in the West Bank, *Maan* uses a reference that identifies the political affiliation of actors.

(74) [*Maan*] A massive assault {Agent} against Hamas {Recipient} in the West Bank {Circumstance} left {Material Process} more than 600 Hamas-affiliated individuals {Goal} in prison {Circumstance}.

Although the civilian status of the actors is not negated, the reference distinguishes them from all other Palestinians. Such a choice represents the Israeli action as being limited to those who are assumed to have taken part in actions related

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to Hamas and its practices in the West Bank. In other words, the action is somehow understandable by presupposing the correctness of categorizing actors as *Hamas-affiliated*. Moreover, the process *left* itself mitigates the action *arresting* by leaving it implicit.

Other processes refer to civilians and politicians by the generalizing reference *Hamas*. In the following example, the material process refers to an event similar to the one in example (74) above: Israeli forces act against civilians and politicians in the West Bank who have no involvement in military activities. However, collectivizing them as *Hamas* limits the target of the Israeli forces to a specific group of people who are known already to be an enemy of Israel. This deems the action understandable or at least expected.

(75) [*Maan*] Israel {Agent} launched {Material Process} a massive assault {Scope} against Hamas {Recipient} in the West Bank {Circumstance}.

Finally, *Maan* includes material processes in which Israeli forces act against inanimate Goals, mostly the houses of Hamas political leaders. As the following example shows, the process usually refers to actors by their proper names and political affiliation to the movement.

(76) [*Maan*] Earlier on Tuesday morning {Circumstance}, an Israeli reconnaissance drone {Agent} fired {Material Process} missile {Goal} at home of Ziad al-Thatha deputy prime minister of the former Hamas-run government {Recipient}.

I do not claim that *Maan* justifies the actions because they target 'less' civilian social actors. Instead, the analysis attempts to show systematically how *Maan* maintains a clear distinction between the different groups of social actors. In contrast,

the data analysed from *PIC* do not include processes in which Israeli forces act against Palestinian fighters. Moreover, only one process in *PIC* refers to an Israeli action that targets the house of a Hamas leader.

(77) [*PIC*] [Israeli warplanes {Agent} blasted {Material Process} the house of Hamas leader Emad al-Alami {Goal} in Gaza City {Circumstance} at dawn Monday {Circumstance}] [with no casualties {Goal} reported {Material Process} in the incident {Circumstance}].

It can be argued that both *PIC* and *Maan* distinguish between two major groups of Palestinian actors: civilians and fighters. However, some differences between *PIC* and *Maan* arise concerning the relationship they construct between these groups. The analysis so far has revealed that both news websites construct two roles for civilians in terms of military action. The first is a receiver role that associates civilians with victimhood, and the second is a responsive role that represents civilians' attitude towards some actions of the Palestinian resistance. Both actions are passive as they emanate from the doings of other actors. Consequently, they do not lead to substantial changes in the context of the war. However, in the fourth macro-strategy below I explain how *PIC* attributes civilians a more dynamic and active role to the war, shifting their representation from a *victim* to a *hero* image.

Finally, it is important to reiterate that all representations of Hamas-affiliated actors or Palestinian fighters are excluded from *WAFA*. As explained earlier, the only group of Palestinians *WAFA* constructs is innocent civilians who are victims of military action. In the very few incidents where complete exclusion seems impossible, *WAFA* backgrounds the military or the political role of actors by using generalizing references that background their identities. For instance, one process in *WAFA* uses

the reference *a group of people* that makes it impossible to tell whether the actors killed are civilians or fighters.

(78) [*WAFA*] An unmanned reconnaissance aircraft {Agent} targeted {Material Process} a group of people {Goal} in Khan Yunes City {Circumstance}.

Another process in *WAFA* refers to killing the sons of a Hamas leader. The clause identifies all the victims by their proper names.

(79) [*WAFA*] [A family of four {Goal} was also killed {Material Process}], [including {Identifying Relational Process} the father, Osama al-Hayya, his wife Hala Abu-Hein, and their two children Omama and Khalil {Identifier/ Token}].

However, unlike *Maan* and *PIC*, and even in contrast to some Israeli newspapers that reported the event, *WAFA* does not mention that this actor is affiliated to Hamas. It backgrounds the notion that Hamas members and their families are also targeted by Israeli forces.

5.4 Hamas military action is legitimate and representative of all Palestinians: passive and active forms of resistance.

This macro-strategy is mainly found on *PIC* and involves all aspects of representation that foreground one or more of the reasons that deem Palestinian military action to be legitimate. The website employs a set of representations that either draw on the immediate context of the war or on out-of-context ideological macro-narratives.

5.4.1 The Palestinian resistance aims to achieve legitimate human and political needs.

In this aspect of representation, the Palestinian involvement in the war is contextualized in the wider context of a struggle in which the political and human needs of Palestinians are at stake.

This aspect is operated in *Maan* by a few grammatical choices. As explained earlier, *Maan* represents some actions of the Palestinian resistance as positively influencing basic Palestinian issues. For instance, the mental process *hope* in the following example exposes the state of mind of *many families* in relation to capturing an Israeli soldier.

(80) [*Maan*] [Many families {Sensor} hope {Mental Process}] [that their relatives {Goal} will be released {Material Process} in exchange for captured Israeli soldiers {Circumstance}].

The processes in *Maan* do not explicitly legitimize the actions of Palestinian fighters. They show rather the political value of these actions for the Palestinian public. *Maan* merely contextualizes them in their wider context so that their strategic relevance becomes clear. In contrast, *PIC* clearly states that the Palestinian actions have specific legitimate needs that must be met. For instance, the following example has a verbal and a projected relational process that identify Hamas's *priority*. The verbal process *affirmed* expresses the authoritative position of Hamas in dictating its conditions, while the relational process identifies these conditions as *stop the Israeli aggression* and *meet the resistance's demands*.

(81) [*PIC*] [Hamas Movement {Sayer} has affirmed {Verbal Process}] [that its top priority at present {Value/ Identifies} is {Identifying Relational Process} to stop the Israeli aggression on the Palestinian people and to meet the resistance's demands {Token/ Identifier}].

Unlike *WAFA*, *PIC* emphasizes that these needs are not merely human, e.g. stopping the Israeli operations, but also political. In this respect, Hamas is represented as pursuing collective Palestinian rights. While the Sayer in the verbal process is *Hamas movement*, the political demands in the relational process are affiliated with the collectivizing *resistance* with which all Palestinian may identify. In this sense, Hamas is represented as a movement that is interested in achieving collective Palestinian rights, which ultimately legitimizes involvement in the war.

In another ideological representation, the demands are represented not only as aiming to serve the Palestinian people, but also as being dictated by them. The following example is a relational process that is followed by three material processes. Each of the material processes identifies one of the Palestinian demands.

(82) [*PIC*] [Deputy Chairman of Hamas's political bureau Ismail Haneyya {Sayer} said {Verbal Process} Monday {Circumstance}] [that the Palestinian people's demands for ceasefire {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} clear {Attribute}]: [stop {Material Process} the aggression {Goal}], [do not repeat {Material Process} it {Goal}], [and lift {Material Process} the siege on Gaza {Goal}].

In the above example, the immediate, political and strategic demands are made clear: stopping the war and lifting the siege on Gaza. No one can argue that these are not Palestinian rights. However, what matters for the analysis is how these rights are used by Hamas to represent the war as consensual, and thus legitimate. In this sense, the human losses on the Palestinian side are perceived to be understandable when targeting supreme collective aims. This is made explicit by the following relational process. The speaker, a Hamas official, vows that Palestinian fatalities will never stop the pursuit of Palestinian demands. Palestinian victims are referred to by the national/

religious nomination *martyrs* which in itself implies that the victims voluntarily or involuntarily sacrifice their lives for supreme goals.

(83) [*PIC*] "[Our martyrs' blood {Carrier} will never go {Attributive Relational Process} in vain {Attribute}]" [Hamas {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}].

In contrast, different grammatical realizations on *WAFA* represent stopping the suffering of civilians as the ultimate goal of political and diplomatic endeavours, downplaying the calls for political investment in the war before reaching a ceasefire. For instance, the following material process has the PA official *Nabil Abu Rdainah* as Initiator, while *the Israeli government* is the Actor in the process *stop its aggression*. In this sense, the process represents what the official wanted Israel to do, not what it did. Nonetheless, representing the official as the Initiator allocates him the high ground of power and responsibility, while the action is meant to save the lives of Palestinians who are collectivized by the metonymy *Gaza Strip*.

(84) [*WAFA*] Presidential spokesperson, Nabil Abu Rdainah {Initiator} demanded {Process:-} the Israeli government {Actor} to stop {Material Process} its aggression {Goal} on the Gaza Strip {Circumstance} immediately {Circumstance}.

These representations in *WAFA* exclude completely the role of Hamas or the resistance in deciding on the course of action. Instead, they foreground the PA as the only party which has the legitimacy and political capacity to save Palestinian lives. For instance, the following process represents the political role of the Palestinian President as a legitimate and representative actor. His political action is represented by the material process *exerting* and the Scope *necessary efforts*.

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(85) [*WAFA*] [Abu Rdainah {Sayer} noted {Verbal Process}] [that President Mahmoud Abbas {Agent} has been exerting {Material Process} all necessary efforts {Scope} since the first day of aggression up until the moment {Circumstance} with the Arab and international community {Circumstance}].

The political role of Abbas is emphasized by the Circumstance which not only indicates the continuity of political efforts, but also the distinctive role of Abbas as the one who can deal with the Arab and international communities. This is best understood in light of Hamas's bad relationship with Egypt, the most influential Arab country during the war, and its limited diplomatic relations with the most influential international states. Hence, Abbas's actions represent not only what he and the Palestinian authority can do, but also what Hamas presumably cannot do. More specifically, the ultimate goal of the political endeavours is to stop the war, with no reference to any further political demands. For instance, the following example has Abbas as the Initiator while the international community is an Actor. Abbas is referred to by the political identifying reference *the President of the State of Palestine Mahmoud Abbas* which emphasizes his role as representative of all Palestinians, although his term as president expired in 2009.

(86) [*WAFA*] [The President of the State of Palestine Mahmoud Abbas {Initiator} on Sunday {Circumstance} appealed to {Process:-} the international community {Actor} to promptly {Circumstance} intervene to stop {Material Process} the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip {Goal}], [and to impose {Material Process} a cease-fire {Goal}].

The actions that Abbas urges the international community to take relate only to the immediate context and primarily aim to save 'the lives of the innocent' (Al-Hindi, 2014). Unlike Hamas's demands, this does not include any Palestinian conditions concerning the siege and future policies towards the Strip.

In contrast, a few processes in *PIC* represent the political role of Hamas and its important position locally and regionally. As the following example shows, these processes refer to the same event and represent Hamas's response to an Egyptian invitation to visit Cairo.

(95) [*PIC*] [Political bureau chairman of Hamas Khaled Mishaal {Agent} has turned down {Material Process} an invitation {Goal}] [to visit {Material Process} Cairo {Goal}] [to discuss {Verbal Process} the Egyptian ceasefire initiative in Gaza {Matter}].

Although the Egyptian authorities denied it, *PIC* represents the action as a reality and not a disputed opinion. It allocates Hamas a position from which it practises its authority as an important political player. The representation is used by Hamas to introduce itself as a viable entity in the new regional order in which it leads the Palestinian political system (Joudeh, 2012).

The representation of the different goals of both sides reveals deep political strife between the two main Palestinian factions. While Hamas tries to represent its actions, including military resistance, as the means to achieve Palestinian objectives, Fatah and PA downplay the achievements of the resistance compared with the civilian losses, thus preventing Hamas from boosting its popularity amongst Palestinians.

5.4.2 Resistance is a collective Palestinian body.

One of the most salient aspects of representation on *PIC* conflates Palestinian fighters with Palestinian civilians. When the line between the two groups is blurred, the actions of the resistance are legitimized as having a wide national affiliation. For instance, the material process *being injured* in the following example, which is reported from the Israeli newspaper *Ynet*, represents a military action carried out by Hamas fighters against Israeli soldiers.

(87) [*PIC*] [30 Israeli soldiers {Goal} were transferred {Material Process} to hospitals {Circumstance}] [after {Circumstance} being injured {Material Process} during clashes {Circumstance} with resistance fighters {Circumstance}], [Yediot Ahronot Hebrew newspaper {Sayer} added {Verbal Process}].

The Goal *30 Israeli soldiers* is foregrounded while the doer is embedded in the Circumstance. What matters the most is the way the fighters are referred to. Unlike *Hamas fighters*, the reference *resistance fighters* gives a wider affiliation to the actors with which all Palestinians can identify. Their action is thus legitimate, being representative of a major Palestinian body: the resistance.

In another example, *Palestinian resistance* appears as the Sayer in a verbal process, while the projected relational process states a *fact* about the losses of the Israeli army. Although the reference does not specify who exactly announced this proposition, it presupposes that there is an identified body called the Palestinian resistance which is expected to address the audience and provide trustworthy information about the events.

(88) [*PIC*] [Palestinian resistance {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}] [that Israeli casualties {Carrier} are {Attributive Relational Process} far greater than declared {Attribute}].

When the boundary between Hamas and all other Palestinians is obscured, the movement and its actions are legitimized as being consensual. As Druckman (2001, p. 228) suggests, the use of different, but logically equivalent, lexical choices creates a 'considerable change in the preference of the audience when the same issue is being produced and presented in different vocabularies'. This also sends a clear message to Israel that Hamas is 'an adversary to be reckoned with, rather than an unrecognized regime that can be forcibly removed' (Joudeh, 2012). Ultimately, these

representations are meant to increase the public support for Hamas as a movement that manages Palestinian affairs.

More ideologically, *PIC* uses references that completely blur the distinction between the civilian body and the resistance body. For instance, the following relational process includes the synecdoche *Gaza* to refer to fighters. The process does not represent a particular event but introduces a proposition. The Attribute *a graveyard for its invaders* refers metaphorically to the ability of the resistance to act against the Israeli army and defeat it in Gaza. However, the Carrier *Gaza* does not specify the fighters or distinguish them from other Palestinians.

(89) [*PIC*] "Gaza {Carrier} is {Attributive Relational Process} a graveyard for its invaders {Attribute}".

In sum, *PIC* emphasizes that Hamas is a resistance movement, which is a basic reason for the movement's popular legitimacy (Hroub, 2006). However, at this critical moment, its legitimacy is enhanced by representing military resistance as a popular Palestinian choice. This, in addition to legitimizing Hamas's actions as being representative of all Palestinians, backgrounds its discrete decision to wage the war, which is a major conflictual point between Hamas and Fatah.

5.4.3 Active and passive forms of resistance are correlated.

One of the most ideological aspects of representation on *PIC* that serves to legitimize Hamas's military actions and normalize civilian losses is the interplay between the voluntary actions of fighters and the involuntary actions of civilians. In many cases, the boundary between the two groups is obfuscated and so one collective body of Palestinians is constructed.

The conflation between civilians and fighters is mostly realized by material processes quoted from Hamas leaders. Some of these processes have the inclusive pronoun *we* as Agent. For example, it is not clear who the Agent *we* in the following example refers to exactly, neither is it clear whether the process *are now working to stop* represents a military or a political action.

(90) [*PIC*] "We {Agent} are now working to stop {Material Process} Israeli aggression {Goal} on Gaza {Circumstance}".

Even if the reader assumes that *we* refers only to Hamas, the process is directed at the interests of all Palestinians, which makes it an emancipatory action. In another example, the action is explicitly stated as military, yet the conflation of civilians and fighters is more ideological.

(91) [*PIC*] "[We {Agent} decided to end {Material Process} Gaza siege {Goal} by our blood and resistance {Circumstance}]", [he {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}].

The process *decided to end* describes a voluntary action carried out by the Agent *we*, which does not draw a clear boundary between Hamas/ fighters and other Palestinians. Moreover, the Circumstance juxtaposes the suffering of civilians, *by our blood*, with the military action of the fighters, *resistance*, representing them as one action that represents all Palestinians. The verbal complex *decided to end* associates the mental state of the actors with their material action. It represents the deliberate involvement of civilians in the war, as if they voluntarily chose to sacrifice their lives to end the siege. This legitimizes the actions of the fighters and normalizes civilians' suffering as seeking to achieve a necessary goal.

Other processes have the Israeli forces as an Agent acting against Goals that collectivize fighters and civilians. For instance, the following process has the evaluative nominalization *Israeli crimes* as an Agent and *the Palestinian steadfastness and resistance* as a Goal. Yet the process is negated so that the Israeli army is represented as failing to cause a change in the Goal.

(92) [*PIC*] "[Israeli crimes {Agent} will never succeed to break {Material Process} Palestinian steadfastness and resistance {Goal}]", [Hamas {Sayer} said {Verbal Process} in its statement {Circumstance}].

A conceptual shift in this representation conflates the voluntary acts of fighters with the involuntary receptive role of collective civilians. Similar to the examples above, the representation combines *passive* and *active* forms of resistance (Singh, 2012). On the one hand, *steadfastness* is a signifier of passive/ popular resistance which refers to preserving a presence on Palestinian lands, accompanied by patience over the hardships caused by the Israeli occupation (van Teeffelen, 2016). It includes challenging the occupation through all everyday practices (Halper, 2006). In this context, however, it basically means civilians enduring Israeli military action during the war, and accepting the fact that large numbers of people will be killed or wounded. Although civilians have a receptive involuntary role, the term *steadfastness* represents their role as a deliberate and voluntary act of defiance. *Resistance*, on the other hand, is active/ military work that aims to change the political reality on the ground. Alongside the term *steadfastness*, *resistance* is modified by the generalizing adjective *Palestinian* which blurs the boundary between combatants and civilians. More importantly, the juxtaposition represents passive (civilian) *steadfastness* as a correlate to militarily active *resistance*. This normalizes the 'heroic warfare' of Palestinians

which 'embodies a certain tolerance for casualties' (Singh, 2012, p. 535) and forms 'resistance capital' which Hamas utilizes in its struggle over the representation of the Palestinian people (Hroub, 2008, p. 67).

In other processes, the legitimacy of some of Hamas's actions is derived from the supreme goals they seek to achieve. This appears mostly in relational processes that introduce propositions as given facts. For instance, the Token/ Identified participant *Gaza* in example (93) below is identified by the Value/ Identifier *the bridge to the liberation of Jerusalem.*

(93) [*PIC*] "[Gaza {Identified/ Token} is {Identifying Relational Process} the bridge to the liberation of Jerusalem {Identifier/ Value}]", [he {Sayer} said {Verbal Process}].

Jerusalem, which is a key element of the Palestinian national identity, functions here as an ideological symbol that links military action with national aspirations that invoke collective Palestinian experiences (Singh, 2012, p. 536). Moreover, the relational process is a metaphorical configuration of a material action, which could be reworded as *Gaza/ Gazan resistance is fighting to liberate Jerusalem,* for instance. However, the relational process does not only refer to the strategic goal, liberating Jerusalem, but also to the important position Gaza occupies in this process. It is *the bridge* through which achieving the goal is possible. In this sense, Hamas propels an identification of legitimacy that involves 'furthering national goals and enhancing the resistance strategy against Israeli occupation' (Hroub, 2008, p. 67). This forms the 'symbolic capital' from which the group and its leaders derive authority (Singh, 2012, p. 534). Similar to previous instances, the process also blurs the line between civilians and combatants by using the reference *Gaza* which represents civilians as part of the victory and not only a beneficiary of it. Unlike the

victim image of civilians which is basically directed at an international audience, this message is mainly directed to a local audience for whom Hamas is represented as fighting for/ with all Palestinians.

Since civilian suffering is represented as part of the resistance, the success of Palestinians is measured by the continuity of their defiance regardless of the large numbers of fatalities. This appears in the following negated process *failing to score* which underlines the main goal of the Israeli operation by the Scope *any military achievement*.

(94) [*PIC*] Israeli occupation forces {Agent} failing to score {Material Process} any military achievement {Goal}.

PIC backgrounds Palestinian suffering and foregrounds the notion that Palestinian military defiance remains intact. This is an Israeli failure and, of necessity, a Palestinian success. In other words, the civilian losses are not considered strategic losses as long as the resistance still has its military capability.

In sum, *PIC's* representation of Palestinian actors alternates between a *victim* image of civilians as receivers of military action and a *heroic* image of civilians as participants in the resistance. This might arise from the website's attempts to address different audiences: Palestinian, Arab, international and Israeli. Tensions arise between the victim image, which is directed at an international audience, and the image of Hamas as a powerful movement that controls and leads the events which is directed at a Palestinian audience. The conflation of Hamas and all other Palestinians also helps the movement to legitimize its military actions, especially when Israel sees them as a pretext for its large-scale attacks that lead to large numbers of civilian casualties. This representation is very different from *WAFA* where civilians are

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constructed as helpless sufferers. It is also different from *Maan* which maintains a distinction between civilians and fighters and their social roles.

5.5 Arab Israelis identify with other Palestinians: representational ambivalences.

The final macro-strategy in this chapter is concerned with the ambivalent representation of Palestinian Israelis in *Maan* and *WAFA*. The aspects of representation that give rise to this strategy are realized by a few grammatical choices. Therefore, it is hard to draw solid conclusions from this section. Nonetheless, the analysis helps to uncover some political uncertainties in representing this groups of actors. Moreover, the analysis can be a starting point for more comprehensive research focusing on representations of different ethnic groups in Israel.

5.5.1 Arab Israelis politically identify with Gazans: synchronic contextualization.

The representation of Palestinian Israelis on the *Maan* news website is realized by a few transitive and intransitive material processes. The transitive processes describe peaceful actions of demonstration, such as *held up* in the following example, which are contextualized in the context of the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip. As they aim to stop illegitimate atrocities against Palestinians, these demonstrations are understandable and legitimate.

(*96*) [*Maan*] [Demonstrators {Agent} held up {Material Process} placards {Goal}] [reading {Verbal Process} "Israeli army commits genocide in Gaza" {Verbiage}].

In contrast, the intransitive processes describe violent actions, such as *clashed with* in the following example.

(97) [*Maan*] [Palestinian citizens of Israel {Agent} clashed {Material Process} with police {Circumstance} in the northern city of Nazareth {Circumstance} on Monday {Circumstance}], [police

{Sayer} said {Verbal Process}, at the end of a protest against Israel's deadly military strikes in the Gaza Strip {Circumstance}].

By making the actors the Agent of the process, they are represented as initiators of violent action, while the Israeli police are passivised in the Circumstance. However, the process is conceptually shifted by the Circumstance *at the end of a protest against Israel's deadly military strikes in the Gaza Strip*. It portrays the demonstration as a powerful sign of sympathy with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, which represents the action as understandable. This link between the two groups of actors is also evident in the reference *Palestinian citizens of Israel*.

5.5.2. Arab Israelis historically identify with other Palestinians: diachronic contextualization

In these relational processes, *Maan* provides historical information about Palestinian Israelis in which their actions with/ against Israeli forces are contextualized and, more or less, legitimized. For instance, the Palestinian Israelis referred to above as doers of material processes are defined in terms of a critical historical point: the creation of Israel.

(98) [*Maan*] [They {Token/ Identified} are {Identifying Relational Process} the descendants of 160,000 Palestinians {Value/ Identifier}] [who {Agent} managed to remain {Material Process} on their land {Circumstance}] [when Israel {Goal} was created {Material Process} in 1948 {Circumstance}].

The historical contextualization of the actors' current actions explains their antagonism towards *Israel* in a wider context. Not only does it emphasize their national affiliation with Palestinians in Gaza, it also confers uncertainty on their relationship with the state of Israel, which ultimately makes their actions

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understandable. Moreover, this identification reveals *Maan's* focus on an international audience, as it is unlikely that this is meant to address a local audience that is familiar with this historical information.

One process in this aspect of representation appears on *WAFA*. As the clause below shows, the Goal is first referred to as *Israeli Palestinians* in which a distinction is established between citizenship (Israeli) and national identity (Palestinians).

(99) [*WAFA*] Israeli police {Agent} arrested {Material Process} around 36 Israeli Palestinians (1948 Palestinians) {Goal} during confrontations inside Israel {Circumstance}.

However, this reference is followed by a historical-national identification, *1948 Palestinians*, which emphasizes that these Palestinians are the ones who remained on their lands when Israel was established in 1948. It is unlikely that the reference has an explanatory function. Rather, it appeals to those who negate the legitimacy of Israel by constructing one political body of Palestinians. This discourse is quite the opposite of that of the PA, with whom *WAFA* is affiliated, which maintains that Palestinians inside Israel are nationally linked to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, but politically affiliated to another state.

As mentioned above, these representations are quite few and need further analytical support to draw trustworthy conclusions. However, they may give us an important clue about the political and ideological tensions involved in representing Palestinian Israelis. On the one hand, almost all Palestinian movements employ a populist discourse that identifies those actors as ethnically and politically affiliated to the rest of Palestinians. However, the policies of some factions, such as Fatah, are based on political dissociation from Israel in order to validate a two-state solution.

Therefore, further research is necessary to investigate how journalism discourse deals with these political uncertainties.

5.6 Overview of representation in the Palestinian press

In this chapter I have analysed the micro-level language choices on three Palestinian news websites: *WAFA*, *PIC* and *Maan*. The analysis has identified a set of differences that build into different representations of the war. On *WAFA* and *PIC*, the representations are consistent with the world views adopted by Fatah and Hamas, respectively, and reflect the political tension between the two movements over legitimacy and representativeness. The analysis has also shown that different language choices on these three news websites are meant to address different audiences.

First, *WAFA* represents the war as being between the powerful Israeli army and helpless Palestinian civilians. It constructs a humanizing image of the victims by explicating their devastating situation more than the causes leading to their suffering. When accompanied by an emphasis on Israel's disproportionate use of power, Palestinians are passivised as merely receivers of actions. They have no role in opting for the war or supporting the party which chose it, which makes the decision to confront Israel militarily unwise and irresponsible. Hamas, therefore, might be implied as failing twice in dealing with the crisis: it failed to take the right decision to avoid an unbalanced confrontation, and when the war happened it failed to protect civilians. This negative attitude towards Hamas is constructed by downplaying and trivializing its political role through a systematic process of exclusion. Moreover, *WAFA* backgrounds all issues that may justify Palestinian involvement in the war. For instance, no reference is made on the website to the siege of the Strip or Israeli military action prior to the war. This exclusion enhances the claim of the PA that the siege is a result of Hamas's control over Gaza and the war with Israel will not lead to

changes to this issue. The representation also excludes all actions of the Palestinian resistance. *WAFA* seems to downplay the ability of the resistance to save civilians, challenge Israel and achieve anything of political or strategic value. However, it does all this without directly criticizing the resistance.

The humanizing discourse on *WAFA* seems to address an international audience by touching on universal human values. It enhances the international community's isolation of Hamas and introduces the PA as a legitimate and moderate alternative. The same rhetoric is used to address the Palestinian audience. Backgrounding any value to the war enhances the Palestinians' dissatisfaction with the decisions of Hamas as the ruling power in the Strip. The PA, in contrast, is introduced as a party that works to save Palestinians and offer them a better life.

PIC, in contrast, represents the war as being between Israel and the Palestinian people: both civilians and fighters. It represents the war as part of the general Palestinian struggle by maintaining a perpetrator image for Israel and giving the Palestinians reasons to act against the occupation. Hamas, therefore, is not to be blamed for human losses. On the contrary, it is a legitimate and representative power that leads the Palestinian action in which human losses are understandably part of the national struggle. As the analysis in Section 5.4.3 reveals, what matters most is that Hamas's military capability remains intact. Emphasis, therefore, is put on the role of resistance in acting against the Israeli army, leading to significant changes in the socio-political context. Consequently, any party that does not support the resistance is implied as being against the Palestinian collective and its national rights.

PIC juxtaposes different, and sometimes ambivalent, representations that address international, Israeli and Palestinian audiences. First, it encourages an international audience to intervene and stop the war by adopting a humanizing

discourse that emphasizes the suffering of civilians. Second, *PIC* targets an Israeli audience by constructing a powerful image of Hamas. With the exclusion of the PA's political role, Hamas is represented as the only political authority that decides the course of action. Any attempt to put an end to the continuing conflict should take Hamas into account. More importantly, a war that is meant to provoke Gazans to turn against Hamas is doomed to failure. So, Israel has to use other ways to deal with the movement. Internally, *PIC* affirms to the Palestinians that Hamas is their powerful and legitimate representative. This is basically realized by reporting Hamas as the leader of military resistance via which it can achieve Palestinian aspirations.

Finally, *Maan* represents the war as being between Israel and Hamas, in which Palestinian civilians bear the vast majority of losses. It incorporates different representations of the war without fully adopting any of the Hamas or Fatah narratives. On the one hand, the representations on *Maan* refer to crucial contextual issues, especially the Israeli siege of the Strip. Although the war and the siege are not emphasized as contingent, the representation gives the reader a wider view that may render Palestinian involvement in the war understandable. It also refers to the Palestinian resistance, its role in acting against the Israeli army and bringing about important changes for the Palestinian people. On the other hand, *Maan* maintains a clear distinction between the active role of the resistance and the recipient and responsive role of civilians. In addition, resistance is not represented as the only way to achieve Palestinian objectives. It is clearly associated with Hamas and thus stands for one particular political scheme. Since *Maan* foregrounds the political role of the PA, resistance does not mean the automatic legitimization of Hamas as a representative of the Palestinians.

By avoiding any internal controversial issues, *Maan* seems to address the Palestinian audience inclusively. Neither of the aspects of representation seems threatening to any Palestinian movement. So it attempts to be an outlet with which all Palestinians can identify. *Maan* also seems to be interested in a relatively more balanced coverage that addresses an international audience. For instance, it is the only news outlet that writes about the effects of Palestinian actions on Israeli civilians. The website, therefore, may appear to provide a wider coverage which is necessary for an international audience to get a more comprehensive view of the war.

In sum, the analysis in this chapter has shown that Palestinian news outlets have different political and journalistic objectives. The differences were made explicit merely by analysing language choices at the clause level, not by interpreting news websites' statements about themselves or by my own attribution of their positions. In Chapter Six I provide further contextualization of these differences and discuss more aspects of the political tensions in Palestine.

CHAPTER 6: Conclusion

6.1 General review

This study was a language-based analysis of the political and ideological tensions in Palestine and Israel, as manifested in journalism discourse. The study was politically motivated; it was not interested in language per se, but in the functions of language in its socio-political context. It aimed to shed light on the calamity of oppressed Palestinians, especially those who live under devastating circumstances in the Gaza Strip. As a Palestinian, I was concerned with the role of language in constructing the conflict in particular ways which influence the course of events in the occupied territories. The way people perceive the conflict via language is vital for (de)legitimizing actions that directly affect the lives of millions of Palestinians.

In this study I aimed to identify discourse fissures and irregularities that reflected political and ideological tensions in Palestine and Israel. To achieve these objectives, I used transitivity, social-actor model, and referential strategies to conduct a micro language analysis. I also made use of the indexing hypothesis and cascading activation as general frameworks to distinguish between the voices incorporated in news reporting and their role in constructing their experiential functions. By the same token, I proposed cascading interruption as a framework that described newspapers' deviation from the hegemonic political culture.

The research interest of this study was addressed by answering three overarching research questions. In question one I examined the role of journalism discourse in the political and ideological debate in Israel by analysing news articles from three Israeli online newspapers *Haaretz*, *Jerusalem Post (JP)* and *Yediot Aharonot (Ynet),* in reporting the 2014 Gaza war. As Chapter Four shows, I first

identified the different micro language choices the newspapers used in representing

actions and actors. These choices were then classified into a set of aspects of

representation that served varying world views. By interpreting these aspects of

representation in the socio-political context, and by categorizing them with other

similar aspects, I worked out the different macro images the newspapers constructed

for the war. Finally, I identified the political, ideological and journalistic frames that

each newspaper operated in its representation. For instance, in section 4.1.2 I

explained how the Israeli newspapers *JP* and *Ynet* represented the war as targeting

Palestinian fighters and, therefore, leading to desirable results. This aspect of

representation and similar others constructed a macro strategy that represented the war

as an inevitable, legitimate and efficient military action against a threat from Hamas

(see section 4.1). In contrast, language choices in *Haaretz* served different world

views. The war, as section 4.2.1 shows, was represented as primarily affecting

Palestinian civilians. A set of aspects of representation built into a macro strategy of

representation in which the war was represented as merely destroying Gaza but not

achieving political or security objectives (see section 4.2). By working out a number

of macro strategies in the three newspapers, I mapped the different representations of

pivotal aspects of the war, which reflected subtle political and ideological tensions in

Israel. For instance, the analysis showed how *JP* reproduced a discourse that

supported the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, while *Haaretz*

articulated some basic human and political rights of Palestinians.

In question two, I examined the political tensions in Palestine as manifested in

journalism discourse of three Palestinian news websites *Maan News Agency (Maan)*,

the Palestinian Information Centre (PIC) and *The Palestine News and Information*

Agency (WAFA), in reporting the 2014 Gaza war. By identifying the different

language choices on each website, and by classifying them according to their discursive functions, I captured the different world views they conveyed about actions and actors. The different world views were then classified to work out the macro images each news website constructed for pivotal aspects of the war. For instance, the Fatah-affiliated website *WAFA* represented only two sides of the war: the powerful Israeli army and the powerless Palestinian civilians, emphasizing the disproportionate power between both sides and the unnecessary suffering of civilians (see sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2). In contrast, the Hamas-affiliated website *PIC* represented three parties: the Israeli army, the Palestinian civilians, and the Palestinian fighters (see section 5.3.1). However, as section 5.4.3 shows, *PIC* sometimes blurred the distinction between the different Palestinian actors. The different aspects of representation constructed different macro strategies of representation which served different political objectives. For instance, *WAFA* downplayed the role of resistance in saving Palestinians or achieving any political or strategic objectives, which diminished Palestinian uprisings as a plausible choice to confront Israel. In contrast, *PIC* represented the resistance as the only way to achieve the Palestinian national objectives, and that Hamas was representative of the Palestinian people because it led the military struggle against the occupation. Ultimately, the analysis reflected some aspects of the conflict between Hamas and Fatah over legitimacy and representativeness.

The analysis provided an answer to the third research question, in which I tackled the role of transitivity, social-actor model, and referential strategies in examining issues of representation. Supported by the findings of Chapters Four and Five, I claim that language analysis at clause level can give the reader a view of the political tensions in a given polity. In other words, by using linguistic models that

linked language use with language functions in actual contexts, language analysis provided another angle to study socio-political phenomena, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, by investigating subtle internal political and ideological tensions. This was achieved by a bottom-up method in which textual analysis regulated discursive analysis, which was in turn situated in a socio-political context.

The detailed analysis, however, raised some challenges that could not be sufficiently addressed in this study. First, the grammar-driven analysis was restricted to the clause level. In a few cases I had to refer to other adjacent clauses to better explain the discursive functions of a particular clause. In this sense, it was still necessary to go beyond the clause level in analysing some instances. There must, therefore, be a method that maintains grammar as the driving force of analysis while accounting for the way processes successively build into macro-discursive strategies. Second, the method of this study required very close manual analysis, so it cannot be adapted to larger collections of texts.

These challenges, nonetheless, were limited and did not undermine the claims I made from the analysis. The study was still reliant on separate grammatical choices and a systematic categorization of these choices. By careful contextualization in a socio-political context, analysing a limited number of texts revealed the political and ideological workings of language use. This study, as far as I know, was the first that made empirically supported claims about the internal conflicts in Palestine and Israel by conducting critical language analysis. Even readers not initially familiar with the socio-political context will be able to understand the political and ideological tensions in both polities. Moreover, the study provided new insights that specialists in media, sociology and discourse could not detect in previous research.

In sections 4.8 and 5.6 I discussed the political discourses the Israeli and Palestinian media outlets, respectively, reproduce or challenge. I also summarised the main journalistic objectives and explained how each media outlet targeted particular audience(s). In the remainder of this concluding chapter, I give further contextualization of the findings. I intend to provide a wider understanding of the differences and state final claims about the ideological and political debates and conflicts on each side. I also provide a cross-societal review of the findings in order to shed more light on the discursive strategies of hegemonic and marginal ideologies, and how they contrast according to their position in the social structure. Finally, I suggest some other contexts in which the method of this study may lead to new findings.

6.2 Political and ideological implications

This study found that Israeli and Palestinian media coverage of the war produced a more complex representation than a positive 'Self' and a negative 'Other'. In Chapters Four and Five, I explained this complexity and showed how representations revealed internal political tensions. In this section I provide further contextualization of the findings in which I identify a set of political and ideological implications by reflecting on the different news outlets analysed in this study. On the one hand, the study revealed that post-Zionism did not disappear from Israeli polity. It has, rather, changed its discursive strategies to implicitly raise challenges to the hegemonic ideology. The analysis also explained how *Ynet* and *JP* reproduced (neo)Zionist hegemonic narratives by relying on the shared knowledge of the majority of Israelis. *Haaretz*, in contrast, challenged these narratives by providing contextualized representations of particular events based on post-Zionist values. On the other hand, the study showed how different representations on the Palestinian

news websites *WAFA* and *PIC* reflected a deep conflict between Fatah and Hamas, while those on *Maan* were less affected by this political cleavage and more interested in addressing an international audience. It also explained how the representations revealed Fatah and Hamas's recent perceptions of pivotal issues, such as the role of military resistance in the Palestinian national struggle.

6.2.1 Israeli online newspapers

The analysis revealed that a hegemonic Zionist discourse operated variably across the three Israeli newspapers. This was realized either by an overt adoption of Zionist narratives to explain events, or by abstaining from articulating counter macro-(anti-Zionist) narratives that could provide a completely different understanding of events. However, the detailed analysis revealed that *Ynet* was the only newspaper that adopted a full-scale Zionist discourse, whereas *JP* and *Haaretz* leaned towards neo-Zionism and post-Zionism, respectively. Furthermore, due to the different relationships that neo-Zionism and post-Zionism have in relation to the social structures in Israel, the ideologies operated in the newspapers in contrastive directions.

First, news reporting in *Ynet* seemed to fit perfectly with the hegemonic Zionist ideology in representing the war and its socio-political context. The newspaper was committed to a national role for Israeli media in times of conflict and avoided any kind of criticism of Netanyahu or his government. On the contrary, politicians played a major role in constructing the world view of the newspaper. It was also distinguished by representational fissures that reflected the ideological uncertainties of Zionism in recent decades. The newspaper massively suppressed the political dimension of the Palestinian struggle and constructed actions in the occupied territories from a security point of view. The war on the Strip was thus a legitimate response to the threat raised by Hamas. The representation was based on a set of

presuppositions that associated social actors with stereotypical and essentialized social roles. As I explained in Section 4.1.1, Hamas was assumed to use tunnels to attack Israeli civilians, although this never happened before or during the war. Yet, this assumption was basic in legitimizing military action against the Strip. Presuppositions, therefore, enabled the writer to construct external realities and exclude crucial contextual information that could challenge their representations. For instance, if the fact that most of the victims in the war were innocent Palestinian civilians was made clear, the macro-narrative that Israel was fighting a filthy enemy would lose its credibility. Instead, the newspaper only briefly referred to Palestinian victims and represented them as collateral damage. This representation kept the Zionist narrative intact and obstructed any intervention on the part of the international community to stop the war.

   Ynet also reflected the Zionist uncertainty in its representation of the West Bank. Although it demonized Palestinians and backgrounded completely the context of occupation, it did not explicitly articulate Israeli/ Jewish ownership of Palestinian territories. Internally, *Ynet* included a set of representational fissures due to incorporating Zionist and universal values in representing the effect of the war on Israeli soldiers. On the one hand, the newspaper normalized the war by emphasizing Zionist convictions that view militancy as an essential part of the Israeli social fabric. The death of soldiers was celebrated as a heroic practice based on out-of-context narratives incorporated via the voices of ordinary people. Again, this lacked crucial contextual information and depended on people's presuppositions and prevailing frames of interpretation. On the other hand, *Ynet* referred to challenges that the Israeli army encountered in the war, either by representing soldiers as receivers of actions or representing challenging military contexts. This included undesirable consequences of

the war but not to the extent that these challenged the hero image of soldiers or the effectiveness of the war for solving Israel's 'security' problems.

Finally, *Ynet's* news reporting reflected and reproduced a Zionist discourse in emphasizing a secular Zionist identity. The newspaper did not focus on the religious aspects of Jewish identity as a distinctive characteristic of a collective 'Self'. Rather, it adopted the prevailing national construction of Israeli identity that incorporates religious elements, but within an overall primordialist discourse. As a newspaper that has a wider range of readership, *Ynet* adopted a general Zionist perspective which is, more or less, inclusive of the different Jewish groups in Israel. However, it excluded Arabs who are the biggest minority. It demonized, essentialized and represented them as affiliating with the enemy. Similar to the above aspects of the struggle, the representation of Arabs was based on de-contextualized stereotypical distinctions shared by the majority of Jewish Israelis.

Second, *JP* leaned towards neo-Zionism in representing these pivotal aspects of the struggle. The war was represented as merely acting on legitimate goals which posed a threat to Israel. Although the vast majority of Palestinian victims were civilians, *JP* backgrounded Palestinian suffering almost completely. This representation lacked most of the contextual information about the immediate event and the overall context of the struggle. It could be argued, therefore, that *JP's* news reporting reflected and reproduced the political unrealism and fanaticism of neo-Zionism which excluded even the basic human rights of Palestinians.

This particularistic neo-Zionist discourse also appeared in *JP's* representation of the West Bank. Unlike *Ynet*, *JP* seemed to be more decisive in reviving the notion of a *greater Israel* by affirming the Jewish ownership of Palestinian lands. Interestingly, *JP* did not contextualize its propositions to counter any potential

unacceptability amongst an international audience. Rather, it presupposed that Israeli ownership of the occupied territories is something that the audience is expected to know and agree with. As I explained in Section 4.8, this may reflect *JP's* focus on addressing Jewish groups outside Israel, especially those who have strong Zionist affiliations in the USA and Europe.

Similar to *Ynet*, *JP* revived Zionist narratives that normalized the war and represented it as an essential social practice. However, *JP* differed from *Ynet* in that it backgrounded most of the context-bound representations of killed and wounded soldiers. So, a major aspect of the war remained, surprisingly, obfuscated. *JP* was also distinguished by emphasizing religious elements in the construction of Israeli/ Jewish identity. The religious characteristic was not merely one value of Israeli identity, it was also an important driving force of everyday practices that build up a desired social fabric. This was also enhanced at a global level by establishing a close relationship between Judaism and Zionist nationalism; Jewish people around the world validate their true Jewishness by 'returning' to the land of Israel. It is important to notice here that these representations were quite detached from the context of the war. They primarily relied on out-of-context narratives that assumed shared knowledge amongst the readers.

It could be claimed, therefore, that *JP* functioned in a similar way to the hegemonic Zionist ideology; it employed top-down discursive strategies in constructing events according to a neo-Zionist world view. This may basically arise from the close relationship between Zionism and neo-Zionism. The basic convictions of neo-Zionism are not categorically rejected by Zionism though they have been downplayed in recent decades due to political pressures and ideological sociocultural changes. In addition, as I explained in Chapter One, neo-Zionism has managed to

infiltrate Israeli social structures. It builds on people's shared knowledge to evaluate

unfolding events. Therefore, the newspaper did not seem to be challenging the

hegemonic discourse.

Haaretz, in contrast, seemed to stand at the other end of the ideological

spectrum by adopting a post-Zionist perspective. This appeared not only in adopting

the values of post-Zionism, but also in reflecting its ideological and political

uncertainties, such as its ambivalent relationship with Zionism (see Section 1.7.1.2).

For instance, *Haaretz* considered Palestinian resistance as a form of violence and, in

some cases, terrorism. Accordingly, *Haaretz* and post-Zionism in general did not

contemplate absolute justice for Palestinians. Nonetheless, the newspaper gave a

much more moderate representation of the war that articulated some basic human

rights of the Palestinian people. First, *Haaretz* did not represent the war as the best

solution to a political struggle. Although it referred to some Israeli actions that might

be considered as achievements, *Haaretz* did not represent the war as a success. On the

contrary, the newspaper highlighted Palestinian suffering to a considerable extent,

which was basically realized by contextualized reference to actions and their effects

on Palestinian civilians. It is important to reiterate that these representations did not

denounce Israeli actions. In other words, *Haaretz* did not explicitly problematize

Israeli responsibility for these actions. Rather it explicated in some detail contextual

information about Palestinian civilians and the devastating circumstances under which

they lived. This built into a humanizing discourse that associated Palestinian civilians

with victimhood, without emphasizing the agency of the Israeli army.

Another prevailing macro-strategy in *Haaretz* highlighted the negative

consequences of the war for Israel, especially by referring to killed and wounded

Israeli soldiers. *Haaretz* deviated from sociocultural narratives that represent soldiers

as heroes. Instead, it maintained a context-bound representation that foregrounded their suffering. Finally, in representing the different groups in Israel, *Haaretz* advocated civil and liberal values in the construction of Israeli identity. Israeli citizenship was inclusive of both Arabs and Jews and the only distinction was based on universal political values. As explained in Chapter One, this is one of the basic objectives of post-Zionism.

Interestingly, the analysis revealed that the post-Zionist discourse that operated in *Haaretz* had a completely different discursive strategy from that of the neo-Zionist discourse. It showed that *Haaretz* did not overtly challenge the official Zionist narrative. It did not, for instance, doubt the truthfulness of representations reported from Israeli political and military officials, neither did it adopt an anti-Zionist position that recognized full political rights for Palestinians. Rather, the newspaper reported different aspects of the war and, in general terms, maintained a context-bound representation. The ideological functions of its news reporting were embedded in language choices at the clause level. Since the newspaper did not rely on socio-political narratives to interpret current events, it explicated the contextualization of events to construct them differently from what the majority of Israeli people believe. The micro-level choices built up into a different reality, but without being framed within clear political schemes or ideological frames. This may affect people's evaluations of these events and, in the long run, change their way of thinking about the whole struggle. As such, contrary to the wide belief that post-Zionism was dispensed with in the 2000s, this study found that this ideological trend was still functioning, but via less visible discursive mechanisms; it took a bottom-up direction that constructed different realities without challenging the hegemonic ideology.

6.2.2 Palestinian news websites

The analysis of Palestinian news websites showed that *WAFA*, *PIC* and *Maan* proliferated different discourses and thus constructed different *realities* concerning the war and its human and political implications. Each newspaper had different discursive strategies that may index its journalistic, political and ideological objectives.

First, *WAFA* adopted a humanizing mode of representation that focused mainly on civilian victims and their suffering due to the war. The newspaper explicated the circumstances of Palestinian civilians and their undesirable image as the (only) receivers of military action. A good deal of *WAFA's* representations emphasized the disproportionate power of the Israeli army and Palestinian civilians who appeared to be the only sides in the war. However, *WAFA* put less emphasis on Israeli agency and the intentionality of forces to target civilians. It did not problematize the brutality of military action as much as it put emphasis on the vulnerability of civilians. More surprisingly, the news website completely excluded any representations of Palestinian fighters, whether as doers or receivers of military action. It also backgrounded the political affiliation of social actors if they belonged to the political wing of Hamas.

Hardly ever did *WAFA* associate civilians' suffering with the Palestinian political struggle against the occupation. In other words, no political or strategic objectives were sought from the war. In addition, the newspaper excluded important contextual factors, such as the Israeli siege of the Strip, and focuses instead on the consequences of military action. This, alongside the humanizing discourse, reflected important aspects of the conflict between Fatah/ the PA and Hamas, as well as the more subtle struggle between the PA, represented by Mahmoud Abbas, and some trends in Fatah. First, *WAFA's* strategies seemed to devalue Hamas as a legitimate and representative power in Gaza. It completely excluded the political role of the

movement before and during the war. It also excluded the role of the resistance in directing the course of action or achieving any objectives relevant to the Palestinian people. By focusing on the destructive consequences of the war for civilians, Hamas was implied as failing to lead in the Strip and avoid Palestinians being involved in a war against a much more powerful enemy. Stopping the war and saving civilians was, instead, associated with the political endeavours of the PA which was represented as the only legitimate representative of Palestinians to take responsible actions. Moreover, *WAFA* backgrounded the siege and its role in the war based on the assumption that the siege was an internal Palestinian issue. While Hamas insisted that the siege is the main reason for the war, the PA claimed that the siege was due to Hamas's control of the Strip. Therefore, the siege was not a valid justification for getting civilians involved in a disproportionate war. This, however, did not necessarily mean ignoring the role of Israel as an occupying force. But it meant that the misery of Palestinians in the Strip was basically caused by Hamas policies, contrary to the PA which had international support and utilised political pragmatism in dealing with Israel.

Internally, the analysis showed that the PA, which is a semi-state polity, dominated Fatah which is a movement of liberation. The newspaper undermined the role of military resistance, although some trends in Fatah believe that resistance is still essential to the movement's doctrine (see Section 1.7.2.1). More importantly, backgrounding resistance and dissociating Fatah from military action obfuscated the fact that many factions affiliated to Fatah were fighting in Gaza. *WAFA*, therefore, adopted the position of Mahmoud Abbas, the PA's president, who rejects all forms of military struggle or a popular civilian uprising. The PA was represented as the only representative of Palestinians which can lead their national struggle due to its position

as an internationally-backed semi-state. Fatah has thus had to change its perspective as a movement of liberation. The role of the people is not to support resistance by tolerating occupation practices. They should instead be protected by the ruling authority which needs to adopt practical and pragmatic political schemes that offer them a better life. This may justify the relatively minor emphasis on Israeli agency in targeting Palestinian civilians. *WAFA* avoided giving Palestinians (especially in the West Bank) reasons to engage in a new uprising and focused instead on representing the negative consequences of a disproportionate confrontation. *WAFA* seemed to be aware of the fact that a large-scale Intifada might lead to the collapse of the PA and the rise of Hamas in the West Bank. This was translated into tough measures on the ground by the PA to prevent any changes to the political reality. For instance, PA security forces suppressed Palestinian demonstrations and prohibited all forms of support for Palestinian resistance.

I believe, therefore, that a basic objective of *WAFA's* representation was to maintain the status quo in which the PA acts as the only representative of Palestinians. However, since an explicit denunciation of resistance, especially during violent confrontations, was not possible, *WAFA* relied on extensive contextualization of human suffering. It did not openly challenge the Palestinian political culture in which resistance is an essential means of liberation. Instead, it employed bottom-up discursive strategies that provided a challenging evaluation of particular events. The concentration on one aspect of the war, i.e. human suffering, and the exclusion of any achievements of resistance may change people's perceptions of the value of military action as a useful method to confront Israel. Ultimately, the representation presented the political and diplomatic actions of the PA as the only pragmatic strategy that can save Palestinians from disproportionate wars.

In contrast, *PIC* constructed a different image of the war based on hegemonic narratives and collective Palestinian political and strategic objectives. It was a war between Israel, an occupying force, and all Palestinian people. The war was represented as massively affecting Palestinian civilians. However, *PIC* employed a political mode of representation that was based on denouncing the perpetrator – Israeli occupation. The main emphasis in *PIC* was put on the brutality of Israeli military action and the intentionality in targeting civilians. The war was not represented as a general context where Palestinians were killed and wounded. Rather, actions were consistently associated with their political and military context. For instance, *PIC* represented the Israeli army as targeting civilians due to its failure to act against Palestinian resistance. This means that, unlike *WAFA*, the Israeli army was not represented as the absolute power but as a coward and immoral army that deliberately targets civilians.

Another major difference from *WAFA* was the representation of Palestinian resistance. Fighters were represented as causing serious losses to the Israeli army and leading to important changes in the war and the wider context. However, this representation did not always distinguish between civilians and fighters. Rather, it drew on national narratives that represent resistance as a collective Palestinian action. So, *PIC* represented the involuntary passive role of Palestinian civilians as a voluntary action of steadfastness and resistance. This normalized Palestinian fatalities as having supreme national objectives, such as lifting the siege and liberating Jerusalem. It also mitigated the criticism of Hamas since it represented the war as a consensual Palestinian decision.

The political objectives of the representations in *PIC* seemed to counter those in *WAFA* and reflect a struggle for legitimacy and representativeness. *PIC* drew on a

hegemonic national culture in which resistance is celebrated as an essential means of liberation. *PIC*, accordingly, represented Hamas as the legitimate power based on its ability to lead the military resistance. Any party that stands against resistance was presupposed to oppose collective Palestinians. Excluding PA and Fatah, therefore, may mean that they were neither representative nor influential in current events due to their failure to meet Palestinian expectations.

Internally, the representations in *PIC* revealed that Hamas, though an authority in the Gaza Strip, did not act as a ruling power that needs to protect people. It was rather a movement of resistance that was partially dependent on Palestinians' sacrifices and tolerance of occupation practices. This representation backgrounded the movement's responsibility for securing a better life for Gazans. That is why, for instance, the legitimacy of the movement, based on elections, was massively backgrounded and the focus instead was on its role in leading the military resistance. Hamas seemed to alternate between different discourses according to political developments. While the movement came to be pragmatic and relatively flexible after the 2006 elections (see Section 1.7.2.2), in a state of war it adopted a revolutionary discourse that represented the resistance as inclusive of all Palestinians. As such, *PIC* used top-down discursive strategies that drew on hegemonic national narratives. The news website did not evaluate events based only on their immediate contextual relevance but also in terms of already established representations that explain events and justify actions. That is why, for instance, many representations on *PIC* seemed to be ambivalent. For instance, the website contextualized the suffering of Palestinian civilians and represented them as victims. In other representations, victims were represented as deliberate sacrifices to achieve supreme national objectives. I believe that the main reason for such ambivalence was *PIC's* attempt to address different

audiences via different discourses. While the victim image was directed at an international audience, the heroic one was directed at the local Palestinian audience (see Section 5.6).

The comparison between the discourses of *PIC* and *WAFA* shows that the Palestinian internal conflict is political, over legitimacy and representativeness. There was very little evidence that the conflict is ideological; between secular and religious discourses adopted by Fatah and Hamas, respectively. The political and contextual factors discussed in this study, such as changes to the Hamas discourse after the 2006 elections, and the interest in addressing an international audience via a political discourse based on universal values, definitely played a role in giving the conflict a political nature. In addition, Fatah and Hamas competed to be representative of all Palestinians. They expressed their political schemes in broad political terms that backgrounded any particularistic or exclusive aspects of their ideologies.

Finally, the *Maan* news website represented the war as being between Hamas and Israel but referred to civilians as the main party affected by military action. It differed from *WAFA* and *PIC* in that it did not reflect the political cleavage in Palestine. It referred to the two sides of Palestinian polity, the PA/ Fatah and Hamas, without getting involved in controversies over representativeness and legitimacy. On the one hand, *Maan* highlighted the human aspect of the war by explicating Palestinian civilian suffering. Similar to *WAFA*, *Maan* emphasized that the war was disproportionate and that Palestinian civilians were facing a sophisticated military machine. However, *Maan* represented three different groups involved in the war. In addition to Israeli forces and Palestinian civilians, it represented Palestinian fighters as doers and receivers of military action. A more political representation appeared in the distinction the website established between *the people of Hamas* and the rest of

Palestinians. However, *Maan* did not show any negative attitude towards Palestinian resistance. On the contrary, it showed the positive attitude of the Palestinian public towards some Palestinian military actions. It did not frame these actions within super national narratives, but it showed their immediate impact on current Palestinian issues, such as Palestinian prisoners. It was thus left to the reader to evaluate the war in light of the political and strategic objectives it may achieve.

It seems, therefore, that *Maan's* primary concern was to address the widest range of readership. It focused on an extensive contextualization of events in order to clarify their immediate consequences, especially for Palestinian civilians. But it also foregrounded some contextual complexities, such as the Israeli siege of the Strip. As I explained in Section 5.6, the inclusive representation might be intended to appeal to all Palestinians regardless of their political affiliations. It also addressed an international audience by covering further aspects of the war, such as the effects of actions on Israeli civilians. Although it did not negatively evaluate these actions, merely writing about them may associate Palestinian military action with potential violence against civilians, which may shake the image of Palestinians as the only victims of the war.

Another distinctive feature of *Maan's* coverage was its incorporation of representations that carried the Israeli point of view. In reporting Israeli sources, some language choices were not modified. Instead they had experiential functions as intended by their sources. Knowing that it was impossible for *Maan* to refer to Palestinian fighters as 'terrorists' on its Arabic website, these representations revealed the deep impact of the international audience and its expectations on the website's journalistic practices. I believe, however, that these representations also reflect a low level of professionalism and experience on the part of Palestinian journalists. They

seemed to be unaware of the decisiveness of micro-language choices in representing events in a particular way. Unlike *PIC's* journalists, who seemed aware of the role of particular language choices in representing actions and actors, *Maan* journalists focused on macro-narratives and general themes. They ignored some micro-choices that could change the functions of texts by loading them with an unintended ideological perspective.

6.3 Cross-societal comparison

Although this study was interested in comparing and contrasting different media outlets in the same community, the analysis revealed a number of cross-societal discursive similarities in Palestine and Israel. More precisely, there appeared to be discursive similarities between *Haaretz* and *WAFA*, *JP* and *PIC*, and *Ynet* and *Maan*. The similarities, obviously, did not reflect similar political or ideological stances. Instead, they reflected similar positions of the news outlets in relation to the social structure, i.e. whether they produced hegemonic or marginal ideologies. Besides, the study showed that when media outlets had similar journalistic objectives, especially in relation to their target audience, they adopted similar discursive strategies that drew on different discourses.

First, *JP* and *PIC* adopted top-down discursive strategies. They drew on hegemonic narratives in representing events and (de)legitimizing actions. In other words, they drew on what the majority of people in both societies believe to be true. Therefore, the two outlets used presuppositions in representing events and explaining their political or ideological relevance. Their representations were goal-oriented; they undermined some contextual peculiarities by linking actions with ultimate desirable (national) goals. This can blur the line between what happened and what was meant to happen. Consequently, people did not evaluate events based only on their contextual

relevance, but also according to already established categorizations of social relations and social roles, which left considerable space for stereotypical and essentialized representations. For instance, *JP's* representation and legitimization of military action was based on the presupposition that Hamas and the Palestinian resistance wanted to attack Israeli civilians. Although no evidence for this claim was derived from the immediate context of the war, it drew on a widespread narrative that Israel is a threatened nation and, therefore, justified the use of massive power against the besieged Strip. Similarly, *PIC* presupposed that Palestinians were willing to support the military resistance because it is essential in the Palestinian national struggle. The war was thus represented as a consensual Palestinian decision, which backgrounded crucial contextual information about the role of Hamas as the responsible authority in the Strip. These presuppositions were basically realized by language choices that constructed external realities, such as *attacking Israeli civilians through tunnels* in *JP*, or those which have national connotations such as *Palestinian resistance* in *PIC*.

JP and *PIC* consistently associated the suffering of the 'Self' with the agency of the 'Other'. They adopted a mode of representation that was based on a denunciation of the enemy on two levels: a moral level that represented the enemy as targeting civilians, and a political/ military level that represented the enemy as failing to achieve its objectives. This justified the actions of the 'Self' and represented involvement in the war as a necessity.

JP and *PIC* also drew on hegemonic narratives to normalize the war. First, they backgrounded the suffering of actors by changing the involuntary passive role of actors into voluntary acts of heroism. Second, they represented the war as an essential practice that validates the individual's belonging to the collective 'Self', or as an inevitable means to achieve collective objectives and aspirations. In this sense, the

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two news websites emphasized a particularistic view of the in-group. What makes a person good is their commitment to unique social practices associated with a particular group of social actors, and not to universal values that might be shared by different communities.

In contrast, *Haaretz* and *WAFA* employed bottom-up discursive strategies. They adopted a mode of representation that implicitly challenged major constructs of hegemonic ideologies by extensive contextualizations of events. The two news outlets seemed hesitant to articulate explicit objections to what the majority of people believe in. Therefore, they relied on context-bound representations in which they evaluated events according to their immediate contextual relevance, especially their effects on social actors. Their representations built into a humanizing discourse which represented the war as a human crisis without focusing primarily on the agency of the perpetrator or the political or practical achievements of the war. This discourse was assumed to address its audience based on universal human values that denounce the involvement in military confrontations to solve political conflicts. For instance, *Haaretz* did not highlight what the war was intended to achieve. Rather, it maintained a contextualized coverage which showed the consequences of military action on social actors. Similarly, *WAFA* foregrounded the high number of Palestinian victims and extensively reported the devastating circumstances of civilians without associating their suffering with supreme national objectives. This was particularly realized by emotionally-loaded language choices that emphasized the innocence and vulnerability of social actors.

The humanizing discourse in *Haaretz* and *WAFA* did not assume clear political framings of events. Nonetheless, it may provoke negative attitudes on the part of the reader towards military action based on pragmatic treatment of the consequences of

war. If the same events are not satisfactorily explained by hegemonic narratives, the representations in *Haaretz* and *WAFA* may shake people's beliefs and change their way of thinking. For instance, if the Israeli audience is persistently exposed to the fact that the war may not provide security for Israel, they might start to question the value of wars that cost human and economic losses. Later, Israelis may change their political preferences and choose a government that adopts peaceful strategies to deal with the Palestinians. By the same token, with *WAFA's* consistent comparison of the huge human losses and the very limited achievements of the war, Palestinians may change their attitude towards military resistance as a sufficient strategy to deal with Israel, at least for the time being. In the long run, they may adopt different frames of interpretations that support, for instance, political strategies which do not involve them in disproportionate wars.

Finally, *Ynet* and *Maan* seemed to have similar discursive strategies due to their focus on the widest range of readership. To address readers with different preferences, the two news outlets drew on different discourses that, in some cases, had competing world views. For instance, *Ynet* adopted a Zionist ideology in its representation of the war. However, since it addressed most Israeli groups that may not share all the convictions of Zionism, and since it addressed an international audience as a source of wider coverage, it incorporated some representations that drew on universal values, especially those related to the representation of soldiers as vulnerable human beings. Similarly, *Maan* incorporated some representations that did not fit the Palestinian narrative as they convey the perspective of Israeli sources. While this might be intended to produce a balanced coverage, it led to fissures of representation due to the tensions between different world views. I reiterate here that these journalistic interests are not the only factors that define the policies of *Ynet* and

Maan. As I explained in the previous section, there are different political motivations that play a role in their choice of what events to cover and how to cover them. Yet, I claim that when they address readers with different political backgrounds, they necessarily draw on different values which feature in fissures and ambivalences of representation.

In sum, the position of the media outlets on the political and ideological landscapes decides much of their discursive tendencies. The closer the newspapers are to social structures, the more they rely on macro-narratives in representing actions and actors. By the same token, the further they are from social structures, the more they rely on extensive context-bound representations that produce different *realities* but without overtly challenging what people believe to be true. Moreover, the study showed that outlets that had a specific and limited target audience, such as *JP*, had more consistent representations. They usually operated with one discourse which has one world view. In contrast, outlets that targeted readers with different preferences drew on different discourses. Their coverage was distinguished by fissures and tensions due to the different values they incorporated. I emphasize here that these findings were based on comparing nuances of representations at the clause level. It was the method, a detailed linguistic analysis, that made it possible to capture these nuances.

6.4 Suggestions for further research

This study demonstrated that the analysis of language choices at clause level was rewarding in detecting fissures and irregularities of representation. It was useful in identifying political and ideological tensions in and across communities as manifested in journalistic discourse. Therefore, I recommend this method for use in other contexts where explicit and implicit political and ideological tensions are

involved. For instance, the method can be useful in analysing representation in different Lebanese newspapers. This may make explicit the different aspects of the political and religious (sectarian) conflict in Lebanon as well as the ideological objectives served by different representations. Analysts might also use this method to study the tension between China and the US. This could reveal some aspects of the political and economic rivalry between the two states that the audience are not familiar with. Finally, analysts can use the method to examine the (mis)representations of migration in Europe. It can attribute the different language choices used in reporting migrants and refugees to particular world views that stand for particular discourses/ ideologies and identify the immediate political objectives served by those different representations.

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