Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Conconi, Paola and DeRemer, David R. and Kirchsteiger, Georg and Trimarchi, Lorenzo and Zanardi, Maurizio (2017) Suspiciously timed trade disputes. Journal of International Economics, 105. pp. 57-76. ISSN 0022-1996

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Abstract

This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of International Economics
Additional Information: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of International Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of International Economics, 105, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 83407
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 05 Dec 2016 11:34
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 18 Feb 2020 03:03
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/83407

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