How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex

Manson, Neil Campbell (2017) How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex. Ethics, 127 (2). pp. 415-429. ISSN 0014-1704

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Abstract

It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter’s partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex by the concealment of a “deal breaker” fact, the normative situation is the same as there being no consent at all. Here it is argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Dougherty’s negative arguments against alternative theories of the deceptive undermining of consent are flawed, and his two positive arguments are unjustified.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Ethics
Additional Information:
© 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1200/1211
Subjects:
ID Code:
82950
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
17 Nov 2016 13:16
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
25 Sep 2020 02:50