How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex

Manson, Neil Campbell (2017) How not to think about the ethics of deceiving into sex. Ethics, 127 (2). pp. 415-429. ISSN 0014-1704

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It is widely held that some kinds of deception into sex (e.g., lying about what pets one likes) do not undermine the moral force of consent while other kinds of deception do (e.g., impersonating the consenter’s partner). Tom Dougherty argues against this: whenever someone is deceived into sex by the concealment of a “deal breaker” fact, the normative situation is the same as there being no consent at all. Here it is argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Dougherty’s negative arguments against alternative theories of the deceptive undermining of consent are flawed, and his two positive arguments are unjustified.

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© 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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?? consentdeceptionphilosophy ??
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17 Nov 2016 13:16
Last Modified:
15 Jul 2024 16:33