Agent teams for design problems

Soriano Marcolino, Leandro and Xu, Haifeng and Gerber, David J. and Kolev, Boian and Price, Samori and Pantazis, Evangelos and Tambe, Milind (2015) Agent teams for design problems. In: 19th International Workshop on Coordination, Organisations, Institutions and Norms (COIN 2015). AAMAS, pp. 189-204.

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Abstract

Design imposes a novel social choice problem: using a team of voting agents, maximize the number of optimal solutions; allowing a user to then take an aesthetical choice. In an open system of design agents, team formation is fundamental. We present the first model of agent teams for design. For maximum applicability, we envision agents that are queried for a single opinion, and multiple solutions are obtained by multiple iterations. We show that diverse teams composed of agents with different preferences maximize the number of optimal solutions, while uniform teams composed of multiple copies of the best agent are in general suboptimal. Our experiments study the model in bounded time; and we also study a real system, where agents vote to design buildings

Item Type:
Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings
Subjects:
ID Code:
81480
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
19 Sep 2016 10:04
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
05 Apr 2020 00:46