Duplicative search

Matros, Alexander and Smirnov, Vladimir (2016) Duplicative search. Games and Economic Behavior, 99. pp. 1-22. ISSN 0899-8256

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In this paper we examine the dynamic search of two rivals looking for a prize of known value that is hidden in an unknown location, modeled as search for treasure on an island. In every period, the players choose how much to search of the previously unsearched portion of the island in a winner-takes-all contest. If the players cannot coordinate so as to avoid searching the same locations, the unique equilibrium involves complete dissipation of rents. On the other hand, if the players have some (even limited) ability to coordinate so as to avoid duplicative search and the search area is sufficiently small, there is a unique equilibrium in which the full area is searched and each player earns a positive expected return.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Games and Economic Behavior
Additional Information:
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behavior. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.001
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Deposited On:
25 Aug 2016 13:34
Last Modified:
19 Sep 2023 01:36