1	Social Drivers Forewarn Marine Regime Shifts
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25	Keywords: Tipping points; resilience; social-ecological systems; historical ecology

26 Abstract:

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28 Some ecosystems can undergo regime shifts to alternative compositions of species. While 29 ecological indicators can identify approaching regime shifts, we propose that rapid changes 30 in the social drivers underlying ecosystem change may provide additional and potentially 31 earlier indicators of impending shifts. We demonstrate this by reconstructing the 32 underlying social drivers of four iconic marine regime shifts: Pacific kelp forests, NW 33 Atlantic continental shelf, Jamaican coral reefs, and the Chesapeake Bay estuary. In all 34 cases, a range of social drivers, including opening of lucrative markets, technological 35 innovations, and policies that enhanced the driver, ultimately drove ecosystem shifts. 36 Drawing on examples emerging from environmental management practice, we present 37 three tangible recommendations for using social drivers as early indicators: monitor social 38 change, identify social trigger points, and identify policy responses. In doing so we argue 39 that accounting for the underlying social drivers of ecosystem change could improve 40 decision-making.

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43	In	a	nutshell:	
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45	• Ecosystems can undergo dramatic shifts in their composition due to increasing human pressure
46	• Identifying indicators of these shifts before they occur is key to early management intervention
47	• The underlying social factors that escalate human pressures may be useful early indicators of
48	ecosystem shifts
49	• We use four well known marine ecosystem shifts to investigate this hypothesis
50	• We suggest social monitoring programs, actionable social trigger points, and policy responses
51	that target incentives can help identify and manage the social factors responsible for ecosystem
52	shifts
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54	Regime shifts and drivers of change
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56	Many ecosystems can undergo dramatic and relatively persistent changes in their species
57	assemblages, termed regime shifts (WebPanel 1) (Scheffer et al. 2012). Following a regime shift,
58	the services provided by the ecosystem are likely to have changed, with potential ramifications
59	for the societies that depend on them (Graham et al. 2013). It may require considerable
60	management effort to reverse regime shifts, if at all possible.
61	
62	Much of the literature on regime shifts has focused on identifying direct, or proximate, drivers,
63	such as fishing, pollution or land clearing, and relating the magnitude of those drivers to the
64	changing ecosystem state (Geist and Lambin 2002). At low levels, a proximate driver such as
65	fishing, may have little effect on the ecosystem. As the driver increases, however, the

66 ecosystem's resilience, or its ability to withstand change, weakens. Pulse perturbation events, 67 which may be natural or anthropogenic in origin, can precipitate a regime shift, particularly when 68 interacting with chronic drivers, for example changes in grazing pressure (Holmgren & Scheffer 69 2001; Mumby et al. 2007) (Figure 1a). In theory, chronic proximate drivers can also reduce 70 resilience to the point where the ecosystem can transition to an alternative state without a pulse 71 perturbation (Figure 1a). In order to reverse regime shifts, some systems will need drivers to be 72 reduced below levels that caused the original shift; a phenomenon known as hysteresis. It is 73 therefore widely recognized that regime shifts are easier to prevent than to reverse (Hughes et al. 74 2013).

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### 76 Early warning indicators of regime shifts

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78 Natural resource management often only recognizes and responds to regime shifts at the point 79 when a change is imminent, or once a change has already occurred (Kelly et al. 2015). However, 80 anticipating when regime shifts are likely to occur is of great interest, as it offers potential for 81 management to ameliorate impacts before a system passes a tipping point. As such, recent 82 research has identified ecosystem behavior, such as rising variance of key system components, or 83 slowing recovery rates post perturbation (Scheffer *et al.* 2012), which indicate a system is 84 approaching a tipping point (Figure 1a). Other techniques, such as spatial correlation of 85 ecosystem variables (e.g. dominant habitat cover) (Dakos et al. 2010), or successively 86 incorporating new data into models as it is generated (Carpenter et al. 2014), may provide earlier 87 opportunities for managers to intervene. However, in many ecosystems these signals are difficult 88 to detect, partly due to insufficient data or long generation times of study organisms (Nyström et

*al.* 2008). In this review, we put forward the hypothesis that underlying social factors, that
escalate proximate drivers, may provide additional early warning indicators of regime shifts, and
thus inform management.

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### 93 Changes to the rate at which a tipping point is approached

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95 It is possible that a range of underlying social factors, often termed distal drivers, can influence 96 the magnitude of a proximate driver, and thus the likelihood of a regime shift (Figure 2, 97 WebPanel 2). Distal drivers can include new technologies, opening of markets, demographic 98 changes, or changes in governance structures or policy (Lambin et al. 2001; Geist and Lambin 99 2002; Kittinger et al. 2012). These distal drivers, working singly or in concert, can escalate the 100 magnitude of a proximate driver, with consequent ecological outcomes (Brewer et al. 2012). For 101 example, fishing (the proximate driver) may increase linearly through time, with the rate of increase among locations tied to a changing distal driver, such as human population growth 102 103 (Mora et al. 2011) (slopes r1 and r2 on Figure 1b). Alternatively, the rate of change in fishing 104 can increase, or decrease, dramatically in response to a new distal driver, such as a new 105 technology enabling more efficient fishing (Squires and Vestergaard 2013), or connections to 106 global markets increasing incentives to fish (Berkes et al. 2006, Cinner et al. 2013) (r3 in Figure 107 1b). Despite the fact that distal drivers are major determinants of the extent of human impacts on 108 ecosystems, these social factors are rarely addressed in either the science or management of 109 ecosystems prone to regime shifts (Brewer et al. 2012).

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### 111 Reconstructing the distal drivers of iconic marine regime shifts

113	We identified the four most iconic examples (based on number of citations per year) of regime
114	shifts in different coastal marine ecosystems (kelp forests, continental shelves, coral reefs, and
115	estuaries) (Figure 3). We then drew from the historical literature on these case studies to assess
116	how the magnitude of the proximate drivers of the regime shifts were influenced by underlying
117	distal drivers.
118	
119	Northern Pacific sea otter loss causing kelp forest regime shifts
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121	One of the best known cases of predators driving ecological regime shifts, involves the northern
122	sea otter (Estes et al. 1998). In the North Pacific, otter populations had been harvested by native
123	hunters for thousands of years (Simenstad et al. 1978), but were driven close to extinction by
124	commercial hunting in the 1800s, creating an explosion in urchin densities that diminished kelp
125	forests and associated fish and invertebrates.
126	
127	Commercial hunting of sea otters was driven by a lucrative market for fashionable otter fur
128	(Figure 3a). A Russian expedition - the St. Peter - discovered the sea otter in 1741 and began
129	selling their furs in Kamchatka, Russia. In 1778, the British entered the sea otter trade when
130	Captain Cook sailed to Nootka Sound (Vancouver Island). Americans, inspired by reports from
131	Cook's expeditions, entered the trade in 1792 (Fontenoy 1997). The British, and later the
132	Americans, sold their furs in China for "nearly double the value" offered in Russia (Fontenoy
133	1997). This profitable market accelerated exploitation; one trip aboard the Columbia in 1792 sold
134	2000 otter furs for over \$45 each, totaling a current value of over \$1.2 million (Fontenoy 1997).
135	As supply increased in the late 1790s, prices fell to about \$20 per pelt, with the Americans

136 supplying an average of 35,000 pelts per year to the Chinese market by the early 1800s137 (Fontenoy 1997).

139	Between 1817-1822, the US trade averaged 20,000 furs per year, falling to 2000-3000 per year in
140	the 1830s, and by 1840 otters were depleted and trade plummeted. Trade resumed when America
141	bought Alaska from Russia in 1867, and furs were selling for \$100-165 per pelt [~\$2,500-4,200
142	in current dollars](McClung 1978). In 1903 a single sea otter pelt sold in London for the
143	equivalent of \$28,000 in current dollars (Gibson 1992). In 1911 some 30 schooners plied
144	Alaskan waters for sea otters, capturing just 12 individuals (McClung 1978). The North Pacific
145	Fur Seal Treaty, banning commercial seal hunting in an effort to preserve sea otter populations,
146	was signed in the same year.
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148	Lucrative foreign markets represent the main distal driver that caused an escalation in the
149	proximate driver - harvesting of sea otters - eventually resulting in the collapse of sea otter
150	populations, an explosion in sea urchin densities, and the loss of kelp forest habitat. Although
151	this market driven harvesting increased fairly gradually, it accelerated in pulses when new
152	markets or countries entered the trade (Figure 4a), highlighting the importance, to environmental
153	management, of monitoring markets.
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155	Canadian cod collapse causing continental shelf regime shift
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157	Canadian cod stocks have been fished for hundreds of years (Roberts 2007). However, in the
158	mid-1980s to early 1990s fishing caused cod biomass in the northwest Atlantic to collapse, with

159 concomitant increases in prey species such as small pelagic fish and benthic invertebrates (Frank
160 *et al.* 2005).

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Abundant cod stocks were discovered in the early 1500s (Roberts 2007), with dried and salted
fish sold in Europe, the West Indies, and Brazil from the 1600s (Figure 3b, Kurlansky 1997).
These markets were major drivers of exploitation rates; for example following the American War
for Independence in the late 1700s, Nova Scotia gained a monopoly on the substantial British
West Indies market, causing a boom in shipbuilding and an increase in cod exports from ~5000
tons in 1789 to ~25,000 tons by 1806 (Lear 1998).

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169 The early fisheries were under sail power and principally used hook and line recording huge 170 catches. In the mid-late 1800s, technological developments in the form of trawling by steam and 171 diesel-powered vessels greatly intensified catch rates (Jackson et al. 2001). Landings declined 172 briefly in the late 1800s due to a ~30% drop in export prices (Alexander 1974). However, 173 exports grew steadily from 1898-1913 (Alexander 1974) and new domestic markets developed, 174 including the sale of fresh fish, distributed by steam boats and the Intercolonial Railway (Lear 175 1998). By the 1920s steam trawlers with on-board fish filleting and fast-freezing technologies 176 further enhanced exploitation rates and export to foreign markets (Roberts 2007). The 1950s and 177 60s saw rapid growth of distant water high capacity trawler fleets (Roberts 2007). 178

A series of governance changes exacerbated the decline of Canada's cod stocks. In 1977 an
exclusive economic zone to 200 nautical miles was established, preventing other nations from
fishing the banks. Consequently, Canada invested heavily in fishing fleets expecting substantial

182 returns. Fisheries scientists in the 1980's, not having a long time series of unbiased scientific 183 trawl data, based their models on catch per unit effort data from the fisheries. However, the 184 introduction of new fish-finding technologies allowed fishers to maintain catches, despite the 185 dwindling stock (Roberts 2007). Some scientists sounded alarm, but quotas were set far too high 186 and the fishery collapse and associated ecosystem regime shift was already unfolding. 187 188 *Market, governance, and technological* changes represent the main distal drivers that acted in 189 combination to rapidly escalate the proximate driver - fishing - causing cod stock collapse and 190 an associated increase in prey species abundance (Figure 4b). The succession of technological 191 changes in particular played a key role in rapidly escalating fishing capacity, highlighting the 192 importance of carefully regulating this critical distal driver (Squires and Vestergaard 2013). 193 194 Coral to algal regime shifts in Jamaican coral reefs 195 196 Jamaican coral reefs underwent a dramatic regime shift in the 1980s, with coral cover declining 197 from 52% to 3% and macroalgal cover increasing from 4% to 92% (Hughes 1994). These 198 changes are largely attributed to long-term overfishing of herbivores and land-based pollution 199 which together enhanced algal overgrowth, diminishing the capacity of the reefs to recover from 200 successive perturbations - most notably hurricane Allen in 1980, and a disease in 1983 that 201 decimated herbivorous sea urchins (Hughes 1994, Lapointe 1997). 202 203 Fishing and pollution were mediated by a number of distal drivers. Between AD 600 and 1500 204 Jamaica's population, dependent on agriculture and fishing for food, grew rapidly, reaching, by

205	some estimates, 1 million (Hardt et al. 2009). Between 1500 and 1650, turtles and manatees were
206	hunted extensively, and pigs and cattle introduced to the land. However, disease brought by the
207	Spanish reduced the Jamaican population to 5,000 (Hardt et al. 2009).

209 During the British colonial period (1656-1852), changes to policy meant forested land was 210 progressively converted to sugar, coffee, and banana plantations to serve foreign markets, with 211 subsequent impacts to water quality (Higman 1987). Jamaica led global sugar production 212 between 1700 and 1900, producing 100,000 tonnes at its peak in 1805. The Jamaican population 213 grew, reaching 600,000 in 1891, due to the slaves imported to work sugar plantations (Watts 214 1987). Cultivated land increased throughout the 1900s with diversification of crops, and 215 accelerated land conversion for mining and urbanization. By 1980 the population was 2.2 million 216 (see: https://www.quandl.com/MADDISON). The 20th century saw the birth and growth of a 217 new market for tourism; visitor numbers growing from 100,000 in 1952 to 670,000 by 1981 218 (Taylor 1993, Jamaica tourist board).

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220 Prior to 1900 fish consumption consisted mainly of imported salted cod, herring, and mackerel. 221 In the early 1900s reef fish, caught using traps and longlines, were traded for salt fish (Hardt et 222 al. 2009). Technological developments in the form of new spirit sails enabled fishers to fish 223 further from shore, and chicken wire mesh allowed fishers to develop cheaper, larger, and more 224 durable traps (Figure 3c, Munro et al. 1971). This growth in fishing prompted an official 225 statement on the degraded nature of the fishery in 1945 (Hardt et al. 2009). However, policy 226 through the 1970's and 1980's involved subsidies (e.g. for engines, fuel, and chicken wire) 227 encouraging fishing and increasing local fish supply.

229	Rapid human <i>population</i> and <i>market</i> growth, coupled with <i>technological</i> and <i>policy</i> changes
230	represent the main distal drivers that acted to intensify the two proximate drivers - fishing and
231	pollution - ultimately resulting in the collapse of Jamaica's coral reefs (Figure 4c). The
232	complexity of multiple interactive drivers highlights the importance of a diverse monitoring
233	portfolio and cross-sectoral co-operation.
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235	Benthic to pelagic regime shift of Chesapeake Bay
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237	The Chesapeake Bay estuary underwent a system wide regime shift in the 1950s from a clear
238	water benthic estuarine ecosystem largely dominated by seagrasses and oyster reefs to one
239	dominated by planktonic communities and altered food webs (Kemp et al. 2005). This regime
240	shift is largely attributed to land-based pollution creating excessive nutrient input and
241	overharvesting of filter-feeding oysters.
242	
243	Europeans settled in the Bay's catchment in the 1600's, and following an initial decline, human
244	population grew exponentially (Curtin et al. 2001). Policy has meant the Bay watershed has
245	served various land-uses causing changes in land-based pollution, sediment and nutrient impacts.
246	During the 17th century, the Bay watershed was cleared for timber and agriculture (mainly
247	tobacco fields); however, long fallow periods meant little sediment escaped the land (Brugger
248	1988). Subsequent agricultural expansion for wheat, and crop rotation systems involved clearing
249	less fertile areas with more erodible soils, (Kemp et al. 2005). By the 1900s, the human
250	population in the Bay's drainage area was 16 million (Kemp et al. 2005) and, exacerbated by

251 technological developments and increasingly mechanized farming practices, many tributaries to 252 the Chesapeake were choked with sediments (Cronon 1983). In the 1900's the Great Depression 253 spurred the expansion of infrastructure through public works projects to repair and expand the 254 region's roads, bridges, parks, and electrical services into rural areas, encouraging further 255 population growth. Although expanding urban areas caused agricultural land use decline, 256 technological improvements in the form of commercial fertilizers in the 1950s continued to 257 accelerate nutrient loading in the bay (Brugger 1988). With, over half the bay's marshes 258 deteriorated, nutrient buffering capacity at the estuarine margins was reduced (Kearney et al. 259 2002).

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Oysters, which are critical to Chesapeake Bay's ecology, have been harvested since Europeans arrived in the 1600's. A big change occurred in the late 1800s, when technological developments in the form of dredges escalated harvesting of oysters (Figure 3d) and, between 1890 and 1930, landings declined by two-thirds (Brooks 1981). Although harvests remained relatively stable between 1930 and 1950s, a pair of diseases decimated the remaining oyster populations (Kemp *et al.* 2005). While oyster populations could filter the Bay's water in three to six days prior to the 1870s, remaining populations in the 1980s would take 11 months (Newell 1988).

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In Chesapeake Bay, a combination of *population* growth, *technological*, and *policy* changes were the main distal drivers that exacerbated the two proximate drivers - land-based *pollution* and oyster *harvesting* - ultimately creating a benthic to planktonic regime shift (Figure 4d).

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### 274 Interactions between distal drivers and ecosystem ecology

275 Each of our case studies involves a different suite of distal and proximal drivers acting on 276 distinct ecological species or processes. Perhaps the two simplest case studies are the otter and 277 the cod examples, with harvesting, a proximate driver, causing population collapse of key 278 species in the ecosystem. The collapse of otter populations was much faster than cod. 279 Commercial otter loss occurred within 100 years of commercial harvesting, while cod collapse 280 took about 500 years. The distal drivers of harvesting differed; an explosive export market for 281 sea otter fur stimulated rapid harvest, while markets for salt cod, changes in regulatory policy, 282 and technological innovations drove the overexploitation of cod. However, the effects of 283 harvesting, and the rates at which the system collapsed, are also related to differences in the 284 ecology. Sea otters are relatively long lived and have limited reproductive capacity, so the 285 vulnerability of their populations to heavy exploitation is high. Otters were also behaviorally 286 susceptible, due to the accessibility of foraging grounds. Conversely, cod were somewhat more 287 robust to exploitation due to their faster life history (growth and reproductive potential), 288 mobility, and complex population structure. Furthermore, cod inhabit a much more inaccessible 289 environment, with the banks of the NW Atlantic causing challenges for fishers due to the dangers 290 of the open ocean, and the technologies required to exploit resources from the sea bottom. In 291 situations where a keystone species is being harvested, their ecology can alert managers as to the 292 type and rate of distal driver to monitor.

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The Jamaican and Chesapeake Bay case studies are more complex, in that both involved two dominant proximate drivers; a reduction in water quality and harvesting of species that provide key ecosystem processes. The distal drivers differed somewhat, yet the impact on ecosystem

297 processes was quite similar. While reduced water quality favored algal or plankton proliferation, 298 the capacity of ecosystem processes (by fish in Jamaica, and oysters in Chesapeake Bay) to 299 respond was undermined by harvesting. These two case studies highlight the importance of 300 understanding interactions among multiple distal and proximate drivers and key ecological 301 processes leading to system collapse. 302 303 Applied solutions to manage shifting social drivers 304 305 Our review highlights how it is incumbent on managers and scientists to look deeper into the 306 underlying social drivers of change to aid in anticipating undesirable regime shifts. However, the 307 science and policy options to effectively incorporate distal drivers into early warning indicators 308 and decisive action need to be carefully developed. Importantly, the root social drivers 309 implicated in ecological shifts are often context specific, which will require managers to gain an 310 understanding of the history of human-environmental interactions, and of the ecology of their 311 system. 312 313 From our review, we propose three primary ways in which distal drivers influence ecosystem 314 condition, each with differing implications for detection and response. The first category is 315 where a single distal driver acts continuously but at different rates in different locations (e.g. 316 population growth). Although it may be difficult to recognize an impending shift, these slow 317 drivers can provide managers with the time necessary to respond (Hughes *et al.* 2013). The 318 second category is where multiple distal drivers act in combination to exacerbate change (e.g. 319 population, economic growth, and land use change). In these instances, it is important for

320 scientists and managers to develop an understanding of the interacting and cumulative effects 321 these drivers have, and target interventions appropriately. The final category includes distal 322 drivers that can have pulse effects that rapidly escalate change (e.g. a new technology, a new 323 rapidly developing market). These drivers are likely to be the easiest to detect due to the sudden 324 nature of their appearance, and because they have a dramatic and rapid effect on the proximate 325 driver. Effectively responding to social drivers will require management agencies to build 326 interdisciplinary and social science capacity through training existing staff and securing funding 327 for new social science specific positions. We recommend the following steps to incorporate 328 distal drivers into early warning of regime shifts:

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330 **Invest in social monitoring**. In addition to monitoring ecosystem responses to proximate 331 drivers, there is a need to routinely monitor the distal social drivers that underlie change. 332 Although data on some distal drivers may be difficult to collect, others are relatively 333 straightforward, through interacting with relevant agencies (e.g. government bodies for 334 population and economic growth rates), resource user groups (e.g. fishers organizations for 335 technological changes), market, and social surveys (e.g. consumers for changing market 336 preferences). Indeed, recent years have seen some government agencies responsible for marine 337 systems implementing social monitoring programs, for example the US's National Oceanic and 338 Atmospheric Agency (Breslow et al. 2013). Key to the success of this work is the involvement of 339 social scientists from the earliest stage possible, specifying what needs to be collected and 340 identifying the most suitable approaches, scales, and timings to do so (Meyfroidt et al. 2013). To 341 ensure the drivers that accelerate ecosystem change are captured, an agency's environmental 342 monitoring framework should at a minimum include all five categories of distal social driver

343 (demographic, technological, market, culture, and governance) (Figure 2). Such an approach
344 should also allow for alternate distal drivers to be detected, if and where they exist.

345

346 **Specify social trigger points.** To be effective, any monitoring program needs clear guidance on 347 what information should trigger a response. These trigger points should be informed by 348 hypothesized scenarios of how the system will change, can be based on the distal driver reaching 349 a certain level, or the proximate driver responding in a specific way. For example, a trigger point 350 level that may be suitable for a single distal driver acting continuously (e.g. population growth), 351 may have to be adjusted when multiple distal drivers act in combination. For distal drivers that 352 have a pulse effect (e.g. new technology), trigger points should be based on variation in the rate 353 of change of the proximate driver.

354

355 **Identify policy responses.** Each actionable trigger point needs to be associated with a suitable 356 management or policy response. Typically, policy responses designed to influence social factors 357 either attempt to control people (e.g. restricting access), or change their incentives. For example, 358 markets are powerful drivers of overexploitation, but can also be used to shape behavior. Up to 359 16% of the global marine fisheries catch is controlled by just 13 corporations, presenting the 360 opportunity to influence a significant proportion of globally harvested marine products 361 (Osterblom et al. 2015). Having reached a trigger point, and enacted a response, the social 362 ecological system needs to be monitored and assessed against the expected outcomes to ensure 363 success and avoid any unexpected or perverse outcomes (Allen and Garmestani 2015).

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365 Through monitoring social drivers, specifying social trigger points, and identifying policy 366 responses, managers will be presented with a clear strategy for where action is possible; such as 367 to regulate or close a market (e.g. for a specific species, as may have been appropriate for 368 northern sea otters); ban or modify a technology (e.g. that spreads rapidly or impacts critical 369 ecosystem processes, such as those in the Canadian cod or Chesapeake Bay oyster fisheries); and 370 amend or lift a policy (e.g. that creates unexpected or perverse behaviors, such as those 371 enhancing fishing in Jamaica). Operationalizing these ideas requires a broadening of the 372 conventional purview of environmental management and increasing, or redirecting, resources. 373 For example, an understanding of distal drivers is likely to benefit contemporary challenges such 374 as fishery responses to the redistribution of fish stocks and community compositions due to 375 ocean warming (Pinsky et al. 2013), enabling appropriate management responses. Ultimately, a 376 greater understanding of the causal pathways through which social drivers influence ecological 377 outcomes, may endow managers and conservation practitioners with early warning signs with 378 long lead times to anticipate ecosystem shifts, and effectively respond to the underlying social 379 drivers of change, thus proactively avoiding the potential onset of major impacts to ecosystems 380 and resource users.

381

### 382 Acknowledgements

383

This work was supported through the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Ocean Tipping Points project), the Center for Ocean Solutions, and the Australian Research Council. The manuscript was improved through the comments of Joshua Cinner. Jerker Lokrantz and Cindy Huchery helped with figures. Many thanks to Valery Garrett for the photo in Figure 3a, the

- 388 Archives and Manuscripts Division of the QE II Library at Memorial University, Canada for
- 389 Figure 3b, Jennie Franks for Figure 3c, and the Chesapeake Bay Program for Figure 3d.

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496 **Figure captions** 

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498 Figure 1. (a) Heuristic model depicting the influence of a driver(s) on ecosystem state (usually 499 described based on species composition and processes). In a two state system, the ecosystem, 500 under the same magnitude of a given driver, may exist in one of two states (solid horizontal 501 lines), separated by a threshold (dashed line). The upper solid blue dot is the forward tipping 502 point from one state to the other, whereas the lower blue dot is the backward tipping point. The 503 vertical arrows depict the rebound potential from acute disturbance events (e.g. hurricanes) that 504 may displace the system. If the system is displaced across the threshold, it will transition to the 505 other ecosystem state associated with reinforcing feedback mechanisms. Ecological early 506 warning indicators (red arrowheads in top system state), indicate a regime shift is approaching, 507 but typically are close to the tipping point. Based on evidence from four iconic marine ecosystem 508 shifts, we show that underlying social factors predictably escalate the intensity of the proximate 509 driver of change (yellow arrows in top ecosystem state), and thus may offer additional early 510 indicators of regime shift risk. (b) The relationship between the intensity of proximate drivers 511 and time, with rates of driver increase influenced by social changes. r1 and r2 could be the same 512 proximate driver in different locations, where differences in the underlying social distal driver, 513 such as population growth rates, create differences in the intensity of the proximate driver. The 514 rate of change in the proximate driver can also show a dramatic change in response to distal 515 socioeconomic change, for example a new fishing technology or new connections to global 516 markets (r3).

Figure 2. A heuristic framework describing the linkages between distal and proximate social
drivers and marine ecosystems. Social systems, like ecosystems, exhibit hierarchical patterns of
organization, with distal drivers directly mediating proximate drivers, which in turn affect
ecosystem structure and function. Adapted from Geist and Lambin (2002) and Kittinger *et al.*(2012).

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524 Figure 3. Social drivers linked to iconic marine regime shifts. (a) Otter fur trimmed winter court 525 gown from Qing Dynasty, China (Garrett 2008). Overharvesting of Pacific sea otters for these 526 luxury fur markets caused regime shifts from kelp-dominated ecosystems to sea urchin barrens. 527 (b) Salt cod drying in St John's, Newfoundland, in the 1800s for export to international markets 528 (Memorial University, Canada). Overfishing of NW Atlantic cod stocks escalated through 529 various technological innovations, causing trophic cascades and the dominance of alternative 530 species. (c) Small mesh chicken wire fish trap introduced to Jamaican coral reef fisheries (Jennie 531 Franks). Overfishing and declines in water quality driven by land use change, subsidies and new 532 technology, caused regime shifts from coral-dominated reefs to macroalgae-dominated reefs. (d) 533 Oyster dredging enhanced harvest rates and ecosystem damage in Chesapeake Bay (Chesapeake 534 Bay Program). Increasing nutrient loads and reductions in oyster populations due to land use 535 change and a shift to dredging, caused a shift from a clear water benthic ecosystem state to a 536 plankton dominated ecosystem state.

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Figure 4. Simplified timelines representing key changes in distal drivers contributing to regime
shifts in four marine ecosystems. (a) North east Pacific kelp forests; (b) North west Atlantic
continental shelf; (c) Jamaican coral reefs; and (d) Chesapeake Bay estuary. \* Otter pelt price

- 541 converted to current day dollar values. \*\* Relative cod price index based on Spanish and US data
- 542 (1505-1892) from Vickers (1996).

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545 Distal Driver: the underlying factors that influence the magnitude of the proximate drivers that
546 have a direct impact on the environment.

- **Ecosystem Services:** the range of benefits people gain from nature.
- **Ecosystem State**: a description of the composition, traits and functional attributes of an

549 ecosystem.

**Hysteresis:** the situation where the pathway of degradation differs from recovery, such that

- drivers of change need to be reduced beyond the original tipping point in order to reverse a
- regime shift.
- **Open Access Resource:** a situation where there are no restrictions on the groups of people that

554 can extract a resource.

- **Proximate Driver:** the factors that have a direct impact on the environment.
- **Regime Shift:** substantial changes in the constituent species of an ecosystem, which may be
- 557 persistent through time.
- **Tipping Point:** the point at which a system undergoes a transition from one regime to another.
- **Threshold:** points where a system can transition to an alternative regime.

**Trophic Cascades:** predatory mediated changes to the abundance of prey populations through at

- 561 least three levels of a food chain, often resulting in dramatic changes in ecosystem structure.

### 567 WebPanel 2. Proximate and distal drivers of change

568 Social systems, like ecosystems, exhibit hierarchical patterns of organization, with clear links 569 between underlying social factors, and the proximate drivers that influence ecosystems (Geist 570 and Lambin 2002, Kittinger et al. 2012). Proximate drivers are the human activities (such as 571 fishing or pollution) that directly influence an ecosystem. Most research considers only this first 572 interaction in the chain of causation. For example, assessments of the status or collapse of many 573 marine fish stocks are usually based on catch rates as an indicator of fishing (Branch et al. 2010). 574 Similarly, eutrophication of lakes, estuaries, or near-shore marine environments is usually linked 575 directly to the input of nutrients and pollutants, as an indicator of agricultural land-use (Lunau et 576 al. 2013). However, the magnitude of proximate drivers is determined by a range of distal factors 577 (e.g. technologies, markets, population growth) (Geist and Lambin 2002). For example, 578 technological developments such as fish finding equipment, opening of profitable markets, and 579 policies such as subsidies can greatly influence catch rates in fisheries (Squires and Vestergaard 580 2013). Similarly, land use policy such as urbanization, or subsidies that enhance fertilizer usage 581 on farms, can substantially alter nutrient and chemical pollution of lakes and nearshore waters 582 (Rabalais *et al.* 2009). There is a long tradition in the social sciences examining the relationship 583 between distal and proximate drivers and their environmental outcomes (e.g., Lambin et al. 584 2001; Geist and Lambin 2002), which can be drawn on to understand ecological regime shifts. 585

586 By assessing the relationships between distal and proximate drivers, researchers and practitioners 587 may develop a deeper understanding of the complex pathways influencing ecosystem change and 588 ultimately the management actions that may avoid undesirable ecosystem regime shifts. 589 Focusing only on the proximate drivers is akin to addressing the symptoms of illness, without

590	diagnosing and managing the root causes of a disease. Distal-proximate driver pathways of
591	human mediated ecosystem degradation have been examined in some detail in a range of
592	terrestrial ecosystems. For example Lambin et al. (2001) uncovered the complex social drivers
593	and pathways that led to tropical deforestation. Governmental decisions to increase infrastructure
594	(a distal driver) often increases access for both industries and migrants, leading to deforestation
595	(Lambin et al. 2001). Identifying the key distal mechanisms causing escalating proximate drivers
596	and ecosystem degradation enables policy to target the root cause of social-ecological system
597	change.
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Drivers



### Time

## Distal drivers

# Policy, institutional and governance factors

### Economies and market factors

### **Technological factors**

### Demographic factors (population)

Cultural and sociopolitical factors (values, mores/ethics, social preferences)

# Proximate drivers

Fishing, hunting, harvesting

Pollution (nutrient, sedimentation, & pathogens)

Climate change (temperature stress, acidification)

Habitat destruction

Invasive species introductions



### Marine ecosystems







