Antidumping echoing

Tabakis, Chrysostomos and Zanardi, Maurizio (2017) Antidumping echoing. Economic Inquiry, 55 (2). pp. 655-681. ISSN 0095-2583

[thumbnail of Antidumping Echoing_for_Publication_28Apr2016]
PDF (Antidumping Echoing_for_Publication_28Apr2016)
Antidumping_Echoing_for_Publication_28Apr2016.pdf - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.

Download (362kB)


This paper documents that antidumping (AD) "echoing" (i.e., different countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the same exporter) is common practice among users of AD. We develop a dynamic game where two competing importers can impose AD measures on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their import-competing industry), AD echoing occurs only for intermediate values of a country's political-economy parameter. This result is confirmed by our econometric analysis, demonstrating that countries' political-economy-driven AD actions are interdependent and should not be analyzed in isolation.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Economic Inquiry
Additional Information:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Tabakis, C. and Zanardi, M. (2017), ANTIDUMPING ECHOING. Econ Inq, 55: 655–681. doi:10.1111/ecin.12369 which has been published in final form at This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Uncontrolled Keywords:
?? antidumpingpolitical economy of trade protectionbusiness, management and accounting(all)economics and econometricsf12f13f14 ??
ID Code:
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
28 Apr 2016 14:32
Last Modified:
18 May 2024 01:17