Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

Matros, Alexander and Possajenikov, Alex (2016) Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. Economics Letters, 142. pp. 74-77. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.

Item Type:

Journal Article

Journal or Publication Title:

Economics Letters

Additional Information:

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 142, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

Uncontrolled Keywords:

/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2003

Subjects:

?? common valuecontestsauctionsfinanceeconomics and econometrics ??

Departments:

Lancaster University Management School > Economics

ID Code:

78715

Deposited By:

ep_importer_pure

Deposited On:

27 Jun 2016 15:50

Refereed?:

Yes

Published?:

Published

Last Modified:

28 Oct 2024 01:21

URI:

https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/78715