Why did preparers lobby to the IASB's pension accounting proposals?

Chircop, Justin and Kiosse, Paraskevi (2015) Why did preparers lobby to the IASB's pension accounting proposals? Accounting Forum, 39 (4). pp. 268-280. ISSN 0155-9982

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We examine the characteristics of firms that lobbied on the 2010 Exposure Draft (ED) on pensions and find that signalling influences the decision to lobby. Further, we examine preparers position to two important proposals in the ED. We find that preparers are less likely to agree with the abolition of the corridor when they report unrecognized actuarial losses and that firms are more likely to oppose the replacement of the expected rate of return with the discount rate when the spread between these two rates is large. These results suggest that while signalling drives firm decisions to lobby, self-interest influences how firms lobby.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Accounting Forum
Additional Information:
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Accounting Forum. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Accounting Forum, 39, 4 2015 DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002
Uncontrolled Keywords:
?? financeaccounting ??
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Deposited On:
03 Dec 2015 13:10
Last Modified:
31 Dec 2023 00:37