How might I have been?

Cooper, Rachel (2015) How might I have been? Metaphilosophy, 46 (4-5). pp. 495-514. ISSN 0026-1068

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Abstract

What would my life have been like if I had been born more intelligent? Or taller? Or a member of the opposite sex? Or a non-biological being? It is plausible that some of these questions make sense, while others stretch the limits of sense making. In addressing questions of how I might have been, genetic essentialism is popular, but this article argues that genetic essentialism, and other versions of origin essentialism for organisms, must be rejected. It considers the prospects for counterpart theory and shows how counterpart theory can be used to illuminate volitional accounts of identity as proposed by Harry Frankfurt. This enables one to make sense of claims that, say, being gay, or Deaf, or black, can be essential to someone's identity. The discussion is then extended to show how it can be made applicable to the transworld identity theorist who denies that individuals possess essential properties.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Metaphilosophy
Additional Information:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cooper, R. (2015), How Might I Have Been?. Metaphilosophy, 46: 495–514. doi: 10.1111/meta.12152 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12152/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1200/1211
Subjects:
ID Code:
75683
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
28 Sep 2015 11:05
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
25 Nov 2020 03:12