Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests

Balart, Pau and Flamand, Sabine and Troumpounis, Orestis (2016) Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests. Social Choice and Welfare, 46 (2). pp. 239-262. ISSN 0176-1714

PDF (Publication)
Publication.pdf - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.

Download (590kB)


Competition between groups often involves prizes that have both a public and a private component. The exact nature of the prize not only affects the strategic choice of the sharing rules determining its allocation but also gives rise to an interesting phenomenon not observed when the prize is either purely public or purely private. Indeed, we show that in the two-groups contest, for most degrees of privateness of the prize, the large group uses its sharing rule as a mean to exclude the small group from the competition, a situation called monopolization. Conversely, there is a degree of relative privateness above which the small group, besides being active, even outperforms the large group in terms of winning probabilities, giving rise to the celebrated group size paradox.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Social Choice and Welfare
Additional Information:
The final publication is available at Springer via
Uncontrolled Keywords:
ID Code:
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
18 Aug 2015 13:28
Last Modified:
22 Nov 2022 02:08