Play hard, shirk hard?:the effect of bar hours regulation on worker absence

Green, Colin and Navarro Paniagua, Maria (2016) Play hard, shirk hard?:the effect of bar hours regulation on worker absence. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 78 (2). pp. 248-264. ISSN 0305-9049

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Abstract

The regulation of alcohol availability has the potential to influence worker productivity. This paper uses legislative changes in bar opening hours to provide a potential quasi-natural experiment of the effect of alcohol availability on working effort, focusing on worker absenteeism. We examine two recent policy changes, one in England/Wales and one in Spain that increased and decreased opening hours, respectively. We demonstrate a robust positive causal link between opening hours and absenteeism, although short-lived for Spain. The effect is long lasting for the UK where we provide evidence which suggests that increased alcohol consumption is a key mechanism.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
Additional Information:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Green, C. P. and Navarro Paniagua, M. (2016), Play Hard, Shirk Hard? The Effect of Bar Hours Regulation on Worker Absence. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 78: 248–264. doi: 10.1111/obes.12106 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/obes.12106/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1800/1804
Subjects:
ID Code:
73713
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
18 Jun 2015 05:42
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
21 Oct 2020 03:15