Monitoring matters:debt seniority, market discipline and bank conduct

Danisewicz, Piotr and McGowan, Danny and Onali, Enrico and Schaeck, Klaus (2014) Monitoring matters:debt seniority, market discipline and bank conduct. Working Paper. UNSPECIFIED.

[img]
Preview
PDF (DPL_Dec2014)
DPL_Dec2014.pdf - Submitted Version

Download (1MB)

Abstract

We examine if junior debtholders monitor banks and if such monitoring constrains risk-taking. Leveraging an unexplored natural experiment in the U.S. that changes the priority structure of claims on failed banks’ assets, we provide novel insights into the debate on market discipline. We document asymmetric effects for monitoring effort depending on whether a creditor class moves up or down the priority ladder. Conferring priority to all depositors causes declines in deposit interest rates but increases interest rates for non-deposit liabilities, suggesting greater incentives for junior debtholders to exert monitoring effort. Consistent with the idea that senior claims require lower risk premiums, banks increasingly rely on deposit funding following changes in priority structure. More intensive monitoring also influences conduct: subordinating non-depositor claims reduces risk taking. Our results inform the debate about bail-ins and highlight that changes in the priority structure are a complementary tool to regulation which has received little attention in prior work.

Item Type:
Monograph (Working Paper)
ID Code:
72079
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
09 Dec 2014 11:52
Refereed?:
No
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
05 Aug 2020 23:53