Was Adam Smith right?:evidence of compensating differential in CEO pay?

Homroy, Swarnodeep (2016) Was Adam Smith right?:evidence of compensating differential in CEO pay? Manchester School, 84 (1). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1463-6786

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This paper estimates the compensating differential in CEO pay for the increasing risk of dismissal using contracted severance pay eligibility of the CEO as the main instrument. US CEOs receive a 3 per cent premium in pay for each percentage point increase in the risk of dismissal. In pointing to the dismissal risk as a determinant of CEO pay, these findings contribute to the debate on the recent growth in CEO pay and the potential impacts of governance reforms.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Manchester School
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/aacsb/disciplinebasedresearch
Subjects:
ID Code:
69753
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
26 Jun 2014 11:32
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
08 Jul 2020 03:42