Optimal exercise of jointly held real options:a Nash bargaining approach with value diversion

Banerjee, Shantanu and Gucbilmez, Ufuk and Pawlina, Grzegorz (2014) Optimal exercise of jointly held real options:a Nash bargaining approach with value diversion. European Journal of Operational Research, 239 (2). 565–578. ISSN 0377-2217

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Abstract

This paper provides a two-stage decision framework in which two or more parties exercise a jointly held real option. We show that a single party’s timing decision is always socially efficient if it precedes bargaining on the terms of sharing. However, if the sharing rule is agreed before the exercise timing decision is made, then socially optimal timing is attained only if there is a cash payment element in the division of surplus. If the party that chooses the exercise timing can divert value from the project, then the first-best outcome may not be possible at all and the second-best outcome may be implemented using a contract that is generally not optimal in the former cases. Our framework contributes to the understanding of a range of empirical regularities in corporate and entrepreneurial finance.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
European Journal of Operational Research
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1800/1802
Subjects:
ID Code:
69629
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
12 Jun 2014 10:49
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
07 Jul 2020 03:27