Partial privatization in a mixed oligopoly with an R&D rivalry

Heywood, John and Ye, Guangliang (2009) Partial privatization in a mixed oligopoly with an R&D rivalry. Bulletin of Economic Research, 61 (2). pp. 165-178. ISSN 0307-3378

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Abstract

This paper is the first to examine the incentive for partial privatization in a mixed duopoly with R&D rivalry. We show that because mixed duopolies engage in more R&D, the optimal extent of privatization is unambiguously reduced. Yet, this reduction is often very modest. Adopting the extent of privatization that would be optimal if one ignored the R&D rivalry routinely results in greater welfare than retaining a fully public firm and ignoring partial privatization. Only when R&D has an extremely low cost would it be preferable to ignore partial privatization.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Bulletin of Economic Research
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 64919
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 10 Jun 2013 18:59
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 15 Feb 2020 03:38
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/64919

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