Mixed oligopoly, sequential entry and spatial price discrimination

Heywood, John and Ye, Guangliang (2009) Mixed oligopoly, sequential entry and spatial price discrimination. Economic Inquiry, 47 (3). pp. 589-597. ISSN 0095-2583

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Abstract

This paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of a public firm in a traditional model of spatial price discrimination. It demonstrates that when a private firm acts as a Stackelberg location leader, the presence of a public firm always improves welfare. Moreover, when three firms locate sequentially, the presence of a public firm improves social welfare unless it locates last. Thus, despite examining a variety of location timings, including simultaneous location, privatization never improves welfare and usually harms welfare. This conclusion differs from several currently in the literature in which privatization often improves welfare.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Economic Inquiry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Subjects:
ID Code:
64917
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
10 Jun 2013 18:58
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
24 Nov 2020 02:26