Fast-track authority and international trade negotiations

Conconi, Paola and Facchini, Giovanni and Zanardi, Maurizio (2012) Fast-track authority and international trade negotiations. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4 (3). pp. 146-189. ISSN 1945-7731

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Abstract

We develop a simple model of trade relations in which legislators with different stakes in import-competing and export industries decide whether to grant fast-track authority (FTA) to the president, giving up the power to amend international trade agreements. We show that strategic delegation motives are key to understanding FTA votes, which involve a decision between alternative country representatives: the executive or the majority in Congress. We then examine the determinants of all votes by US congressmen on FTA since the introduction of this institutional procedure in 1974. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of the model.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Additional Information:
Copyright © 2013 AEA
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000
Subjects:
ID Code:
64758
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
24 May 2013 08:59
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
24 Nov 2020 02:26