Participation quorums in costly meetings

Flamand, Sabine and Troumpounis, Orestis (2014) Participation quorums in costly meetings. Public Choice, 159 (1-2). pp. 53-62. ISSN 0048-5829

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Meetings of shareholders, societies, and clubs often require a minimal participation quorum. In the absence of a quorum, no valid decisions can be made; thus, decisions are postponed to a later meeting. This paper examines the effect of such quorum constraints on both individual behavior and collective outcomes in a model of costly meetings. We show that when a binding quorum constraint delivers an immediate decision, it also induces a welfare loss with respect to the outcome that prevails when no quorum applies, potentially including policy distortions. When the quorum requirement is high and causes the decision to be postponed, the number of participants in the (second) meeting may decrease with respect to the zero-quorum rule.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Public Choice
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3312
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 64753
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 24 May 2013 08:03
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 01 Jan 2020 08:29

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