Optimal fees in internet auctions

Matros, Alexander and Zapechelnyuk, Andriy (2008) Optimal fees in internet auctions. Review of Economic Design, 12 (3). pp. 155-163. ISSN 1434-4750

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An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Review of Economic Design
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 61400
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 03 Jan 2013 15:26
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 23 Feb 2020 01:54
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/61400

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