Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

Matros, Alexander and Zapechelnyuk, Andriy (2011) Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29 (4). pp. 426-431.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We consider a multi-period auction with a seller who has a single object for sale, a large population of potential buyers, and a mediator of the trade. The seller and every buyer have independent private values of the object. The mediator designs an auction mechanism which maximizes her revenue subject to certain constraints for the traders. In each period the seller auctions the object to a set of buyers drawn at random from the population. The seller can re-auction the object (infinitely many times) if it is not sold in previous interactions. We characterize the class of mediator-optimal auction mechanisms. One of such mechanisms is a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator a fixed percentage from the closing price.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
International Journal of Industrial Organization
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2200/2202
Subjects:
ID Code:
60743
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Dec 2012 16:09
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
01 Jan 2020 08:15