Matros, Alexander (2012) Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 36 (4). pp. 642-656. ISSN 0165-1889
PDF (Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game)
john_dmt090306.pdf - Submitted Version
Download (360kB)
john_dmt090306.pdf - Submitted Version
Download (360kB)
Abstract
This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision rules. Several possibilities for both decision rules to be present in the population are considered. I show that altruistic behavior might survive if switching between the decision rules occurs less often than the probabilities of errors in choosing a strategy and if local neighborhoods are not too small or too large.
Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2600/2606
Subjects:
?? public goodimitation best reply decision rulescontrol and optimizationeconomics and econometricsapplied mathematics ??
Departments:
ID Code:
60741
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
14 Dec 2012 16:03
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
01 Oct 2024 23:58