The phenomenal separateness of self:Udayana on body and agency

Ram-Prasad, Chakravarthi (2011) The phenomenal separateness of self:Udayana on body and agency. Asian Philosophy, 21 (3). pp. 323-340. ISSN 1469-2961

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Abstract

Classical Indian debates about ātman—self—concern a minimal or core entity rather than richer notions of personal identity. These debates recognise that there is phenomenal unity across time; but is a core self required to explain it? Contemporary phenomenologists foreground the importance of a phenomenally unitary self, and Udayana's position is interpreted in this context as a classical Indian approach to this issue. Udayana seems to dismiss the body as the candidate for phenomenal identity in a way similar to some Western philosophers. He also provides some inkling of how alternative ways of defending phenomenal unity without self fail. A criticism of some Western phenomenological theories of self is that they do not explain how unity is provided by the ‘mineness’ of cognition. Udayana's suggestion that a sort of agency provides such an explanation can be developed as an original argument for a phenomenally unitary self.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Asian Philosophy
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/researchoutput/libraryofcongress/bl
Subjects:
ID Code:
55386
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
25 Jun 2012 11:01
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
01 Jan 2020 07:56