CEO Compensation, Incentives and Governance in New Enterprise Firms

He, Lerong and Conyon, Martin (2004) CEO Compensation, Incentives and Governance in New Enterprise Firms. Journal of Derivatives Accounting, 1 (1). pp. 47-60. ISSN 0219-8681

Full text not available from this repository.


This study investigates executive compensation, corporate governance and the determination of CEO equity incentives in US entrepreneurial high technology firms. We find the following. First, CEO equity incentives in these new enterprise firms are twenty times larger than that which previous large firm studies have found. Second, both economic factors (firm size, growth opportunities, and risk) and governance factors (founder, venture capitalist presence, board structure, and ownership distribution) determine CEO incentives in these firms. We document instances where direct monitoring arrangements (e.g. venture capitalist monitoring) act as substitutes for explicit incentives in aligning shareholder and CEO interests.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
Journal of Derivatives Accounting
Uncontrolled Keywords:
ID Code:
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
27 Jun 2012 08:08
Last Modified:
21 Nov 2022 22:15