Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation

De Silva, Dakshina G. (2005) Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation. Economic Inquiry, 43 (1). pp. 55-66. ISSN 0095-2583

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This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: Economic Inquiry
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 52458
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 06 Feb 2012 16:52
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 07 Jan 2020 03:33

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