Stochastic Synergies in Sequential Auctions

De Silva, Dakshina G. and Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Kosmopoulou, Georgia (2005) Stochastic Synergies in Sequential Auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23 (3-4). pp. 183-201.

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We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the earlier auctions are more likely to participate in later auctions. Moreover, conditional on participation, past winners place lower bids, on average, and are so more likely to win in later auctions. We present evidence in support of these predictions using sequential construction auctions conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2200/2202
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 52457
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 06 Feb 2012 16:36
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 01 Jan 2020 07:47

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