Do better governed firms make more informative disclosures? Canadian evidence

Beekes, W A and Brown, P and Chin, G (2006) Do better governed firms make more informative disclosures? Canadian evidence. Working Paper. The Department of Accounting and Finance, Lancaster University.

[thumbnail of Document.pdf]
Preview
PDF (Document.pdf)
Document.pdf

Download (111kB)

Abstract

Using a Canadian sample, we address Beekes and Brown’s (2005) external validity concerns by replicating their result that corporate governance influences the timeliness and informativeness of corporate disclosures. Based largely on their approach, we find Canadian firms with better governance structures release more documents to the share market, and share prices integrate information more rapidly. These firms also attract a larger following of analysts, who make forecasts that are less biased. However, three other predictions concerning analyst forecasts are not borne out. We interpret our results as, on the whole, confirming the Beekes and Brown conclusion that corporate governance standards can play a significant role in determining the efficiency of a country’s equity market.

Item Type:
Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/aacsb/disciplinebasedresearch
Subjects:
?? corporate governance qualitydisclosure frequencyanalysts’ forecastsprice discoverytimelinessdiscipline-based research ??
ID Code:
48826
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
11 Jul 2011 21:15
Refereed?:
No
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
10 Oct 2024 23:51