When aspiring and rational agents strive to coordinate

Roy, Jaideep (2007) When aspiring and rational agents strive to coordinate. International Game Theory Review, 9 (3). pp. 461-476. ISSN 0219-1989

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Abstract

The paper studies a game of common interest played infinitely many times between two players, one being aspiration driven while the other being a myopic optimizer. It is shown that the only two long run stationary outcomes are the two static equilibrium points. Robustness of long run behavior is studied to show that whenever the optimizer is allowed to make small mistakes, players are able to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium point most of the time in the long run if the speed of evolution of aspirations is sufficiently fast. However, when only the aspiring player is allowed to make small mistakes, achieving coordination is inevitable and independent of the speed at which aspirations evolve.

Item Type: Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title: International Game Theory Review
Uncontrolled Keywords: /dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/aacsb/disciplinebasedresearch
Subjects:
Departments: Lancaster University Management School > Economics
ID Code: 44619
Deposited By: ep_importer_pure
Deposited On: 11 Jul 2011 18:18
Refereed?: Yes
Published?: Published
Last Modified: 22 Jun 2019 04:00
URI: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/44619

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