

ABSTRACT: Making of Meaning

This paper is the first of two related pieces which explore the value of applying speech act theory to the understanding of textual process and the full critical exploration of draft materials, with particular reference to Wordsworth and the manuscripts of *Home at Grasmere*. The piece opens with a theoretical section that summarises speech act theory, its adoption and redefinition by deconstruction (allowing for its application to literature) and finally what it might mean to think about speech acts for textual process. This part of the paper seeks to establish that an approach to manuscript materials through speech acts allows us to see more clearly the kinds of interpretative practice that such material requires. The paper argues that the performative element for text in a state of process is concerned with "bringing meaning into being" or "the making of meaning". This in turn demands that we view intentional acts within process differently from those within a "final" text and that we respond to the manuscript in three ways: as a physical object; as a sequence of acts and as part of the developing work of art.

The paper then moves from theoretical discussion to an exploration of the interpretation of process through speech acts in *Home at Grasmere*, a poem particularly suited to such an exploration. This section applies "micro-analysis" in relation to two detailed examples and then a third extended metaphor, ("the traveller in the fog"), reading across the developing teleology of the poem. This part of the paper aims to illustrate the value of uniting an understanding of the poem through its process with an understanding of the meaning of the final text.

The third section of the piece turns from reconstructed intended meanings to the issue of speech acts which may be "unintended" on the manuscript page. It analyses two examples of "meaningful conjunction" in *Home at Grasmere* MS R, a manuscript in which the draft text is written over a printed book, allowing for apparently accidental conjunctions of meaning to occur to quite a remarkable degree. Finally, the paper concludes by considering the issue of unconscious intention in minor "errors" on the manuscript page, interpreted as "Freudian slips". Ultimately, it seeks to show that the full interpretation of draft materials must incorporate both intended and unintended meanings, both the semantic and the material presence of the manuscript.

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The Making of Meaning in Wordsworth's *Home at Grasmere*: (Speech Acts, Micro-analysis and "Freudian Slips")

The purpose of this paper (and of a second which will come after it) is to revisit speech acts and their relation to literature, but to do so specifically in relation to the text in a state of process in order to develop distinctive modes of interpretation for such material. I want to argue that responding to marks upon the page for draft materials in the light of speech act theory may be crucial to our understanding of that material and our ability to respond to it fully. The first section of the paper is therefore concerned with defining the nature of the speech act in broad theoretical terms for the literary work and for the text in a state of process. The rest of the paper is concerned with different kinds of analysis and exploration of the making of meaning through "micro-analysis" of acts on the page and the interpretation of unintended meaning, "meaningful conjunction" and "Freudian slips" within draft materials. A second paper, to follow this one, will re-visit speech acts within textual process in spatial terms, responding to the manuscript text in terms of "textual place" and "textual space".

Whilst the primary aim of these papers is to enlarge our ways of responding to manuscript materials in a general sense, I have chosen to explore those ideas through a single author and work. However, the choice of Wordsworth's *Home at Grasmere* is not arbitrary.¹ The fact that this poem survives in a corpus of four main manuscripts and never achieves a lifetime published state allows the paper to illustrate two core concerns – firstly the value of working with, and across, an entire manuscript body for an unpublished text and, secondly, the emergence of different forms of interpretation for the three dimensions of the manuscript object (discussed below) and their *necessary*

¹ Familiarity with the manuscripts of *Home at Grasmere* comes from work on a pilot project, "From Goslar to Grasmere: Wordsworth's Electronic Manuscripts" the first attempt to present Wordsworth's manuscript materials in an accessible electronic form. This collaborative project between The Wordsworth Centre, Lancaster University, and The Wordsworth Trust, Dove Cottage, Grasmere, was funded by an Arts and Humanities Research Council grant under their "Landscape and Environment" programme, 2007. The website can be found at: <http://www.digitalwordsworth.org>

interaction. *Home at Grasmere* is also a poem self-consciously concerned with the act of writing about a particular place in complex, and at times contradictory, ways. As such, it allows for the exploration of an integrated interpretative model in which analysis of draft materials can be directly related to analysis of the meaningful content of the work.

Speech Act Theory, the Literary Work and the Text in Process

It is necessary to begin with a brief account of speech act theory and its subsequent development within deconstructive criticism before considering its relevance to interpretation of draft materials. J. L. Austin's hugely influential 1955 lecture series, published as *How to Do Things With Words* (1962), first made explicit the extent to which language use is also a kind of action, by distinguishing between words as utterance and the way in which such utterances also perform acts.² Austin stated that: "the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something" (6-7). In Lectures 1-7, Austin initially made a distinction between a "constative" utterance as a true or false statement concerned with *saying* and a "performative utterance" as a statement explicitly concerned with *doing*. However, in his own performative turn within the lecture series, Austin used the later lectures to deny that any absolute distinction existed: "Once we realize that what we have to study is *not* the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act" (138). A second, important distinction (which led Austin to this realisation) was that between a "locutionary" and an "illocutionary" act. The locutionary act can be defined as "the act of 'saying something'" (94), (the production of speech and its meaning), the illocutionary act as the "performance of an act *in* saying something" (99), (the utterance in context). Whilst some acts are more clearly constative/locutionary, and others explicitly performative/illocutionary (e.g. " 'I salute you' "[85]), Austin concluded that "in general the locutionary act as much as the illocutionary is an abstraction only: every genuine speech act is both" (147).

² J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things With Words* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962).

Austin's pupil, John R. Searle, took his ideas forward in his work on *Speech Acts*.³ Searle argued that to speak a language is to perform speech acts which function according to conventions so that "a theory of language is part of a theory of action, simply because speaking is a rule-governed form of behaviour" (17). For Searle, "talking is performing according to rules" (22). These are made possible by background rules which we know without knowing we know them: "illocutionary acts are performed within language in virtue of certain rules" (38). So, for example, in relation to Searle's account of "promising" and the various conditions implicit in that act, he points out, "Seldom, in fact, does one actually need to say the explicit 'I promise'" (68). The meaning of the promise is held beyond the verbal utterance.

Both Austin and Searle were concerned with speech acts in the world, rather than with the concept of *literary* speech acts, so that where literature was mentioned in their work it was treated (negatively) as a special case. Austin went so far as to describe literature as "parasitic":

a performative utterance will, for example, be *in a peculiar way* hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem Language in such circumstances is in special ways – intelligibly – used not seriously but in ways *parasitic* upon its normal use . . . (22).

For his part, Searle discusses fictional works in relation to "reference" as a special function of speech acts. (78-79). Both of them thus hierarchise "real" speech over creative representation of speech (a point that Derrida later explicitly opposes).

In *Speech Acts in Literature*, J. Hillis Miller makes clear the way in which we can move from a concern with speech acts in the world to speech acts in literature by means of "citation" which has the effect of distinguishing "use" from "mention" and so "turns an utterance, in a manner of speaking, into literature, into fiction".⁴ In Austin's and Searle's terms, citation as an indirect presentation of actual speech cannot be a successful speech act, because it is not directly functional: "to cite an utterance is to suspend it" (3). However, as Miller points out, a number of speech acts in the world which are considered functional – such as the "I do" of the marriage ceremony – are *also* in fact citations. Such

³ John R. Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

⁴ J. Hillis Miller, *Speech Acts in Literature* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) 3.

instances undermine the hierarchy of "real" vs. "fictional" speech acts, present in the work of earlier theorists. Instead, Miller suggests at least two ways in which literature is *itself* a form of speech act:

"Speech acts in literature" can mean speech acts that are uttered within literary works, for example promises, lies, excuses, declarations . . . said or written by the characters or by the narrator in a novel. It can also mean a possible performative dimension of a literary work taken as a whole. Writing a novel may be a way of doing things with words. (1)

The latter suggestion is particularly relevant for this paper, which will go on to consider the extent to which the process of creative composition and the materials which result from it can also be understood as "a way of doing things with words", although perhaps differing from that of the completed literary work of art.

Miller's book also makes clear the way in which the relationship between speech acts and literature lies at the heart of Jacques Derrida's work. A number of Derrida's core ideas – concerning iterability and the role and function of intention – are defined by him in opposition to the more traditional speech act theory of Austin and Searle, both of whom have a much narrower definition of what constitutes a speech act. Speech act theory is important to Derrida because it reveals the way in which language can function outside of, or in conflict with, the actual words uttered (or written). Such a concept emerges from the earlier constative/performative distinction but, crucially, Derrida refuses to give any priority to the original context of production or to allow that the meaning provided by such a context is in any way intrinsic to the utterance. It is unsurprising, then, that when Derrida engages directly with speech act theory, in the essay "Signature Event Context", he argues *against* Austin's desire to assert that a contextual meaning is still linked to the consciousness of its "origins" (an idea implicit in Austin's description of "successful" and "unsuccessful" speech acts).⁵

It follows from this that both traditional speech act theory and Derrida's radical re-definition of it are bound up with ideas about intention and the extent to which it can, or cannot, be allowed to underpin oral and written communication. Much of the tension

⁵ Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982) 309-330.

between traditional speech act theory and deconstruction, between Derrida and John Searle, concerns the question of "ownership" of those acts, and the extent to which language can function as an intentional object for the user of it.⁶ Where traditional speech act theory wants to see the act as completed and fulfilled through successful communication, Derrida denies the possibility of this occurring for a mind which can never fully know itself, acting through a medium which exceeds it. In *Speech Acts in Literature*, Miller neatly pulls such ideas together:

the existence of each of these features [consciousness; intentionality; meaning and intentions] . . . is not denied. What is denied is the possibility of their pure unadulterated existence, as well as their status as original and originating stabilities . . . (86).

Where does deconstruction leave speech act theory, then? From one perspective, it assimilates it: deconstruction itself can be understood to function as a "performative interpretation . . . an interpretation that transforms the very thing it interprets".⁷ Just as speech act theory draws on the two poles of what is *said* (constative) and what that saying *does* (performative) so a deconstructive method of exploring language is concerned with the tensions between what the writer wants to say and what is communicated through his utterance, as well as with how what *is* being said is to be understood through the context of what is *not* being said, but already exists.⁸ More crucially for this paper, however, how do the kinds of speech act which occur on the *manuscript page*, differ from the speech act for a literary work of art, or speech acts in the world (and, consequently, how can we best interpret them?) This is not a question that any of the above commentators are concerned with.

⁶ The debate between John Searle and Derrida occurs in an exchange of papers, initiated by "Signature Event Context" in which Derrida engaged with Austin's work. Searle responded in an article entitled "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida," *Glyph: Johns Hopkins Textual Studies* 2 (1977): 198-208, which in turn caused Derrida to retaliate with "Limited Inc a b c," *Limited Inc.*, trans. Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988) 29-110. The argument is centred on the extent to which speech acts are intentional, or their meaning held within a determinable context.

⁷ Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994) 30-31. Quoted in Miller, 64.

⁸ In "Limited Inc. a b c," Derrida playfully enacts the problems involved in making any kind of distinction between "mention" and "use" or constative and performative speech acts. J. Hillis Miller states that: "Derrida wants 'Limited Inc' to do something with words . . . and he wants the reader to notice that this is happening . . . This double doing defines, for Derrida the work of so-called deconstruction" *Speech Acts in Literature* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) 76.

All speech act theories present language-use as doubled (a saying and an enacted doing) whether the focus lies upon the fulfilment of different performative acts or the impossibility of such fulfilment. If we apply this to the entry of words onto the blank page of the manuscript then I think it reveals a doubled doubling. There is, first, the direct performance of the writing body, which creates the manuscript object (an act which turns a blank book or piece of paper into "a manuscript" containing "hands"). This is purely performative – an action. Secondly, there is the semantic meaning produced by that action and held in the medium of the text, and then subsequent returns to that meaning by the writer over time (a sequence of acts). Finally, speech acts are potentially also brought into play at a *representational* level within the text, particularly by a writer such as Wordsworth, whose poetry shows a high level of awareness of the power of words to "do" things. In other words, the act of literary creation has both a performative and a constative element, as does the work produced. This allows us to develop a distinction between speech acts in process and speech acts in the final, stable version of a text. The former is a doing and a saying twice over, for the writer, writing, and in terms of the content produced in relation to the reader. For the purposes of exploring speech acts within draft materials, the crucial point to emerge is that, alongside the conscious speech acts of creative intention we need also to concern ourselves with all kinds of unconscious acts and related physical and material elements of the manuscript that form part of the process but are *not* part of the final product. In other words, one key way in which the speech act on the manuscript page differs from that of the literary work is in its insistent literalness and physicality (the doing of it), felt in the press of the pen, the colour of the ink, the blotches and marks, the misspelt words, the crossings-out, the squiggles, the doodles and so on. The instability and uncertainties of the text in a state of process also demand attention, so that we are compelled to recognise the problematic nature of "creative intention" for textual process as a multiple and changing state which generates speech acts expressive of the desire to make meaning but not necessarily achieving full communication, or expecting to do so.

Textual criticism and theories of editing may prove helpful here, since theoretical debate about the nature of speech acts and intention can be converted into text-critical terms quite easily with the help of Peter Shillingsburg's well-known distinction between

"intention to mean" and "intention to do". In *Scholarly Editing in the Computer Age*, Shillingsburg is concerned with defining the degree to which intention is recoverable for the editor and thus the extent to which issues of authorial intention should inform editing principles and practices. He asserts that individual, authorial intentions are problematic because they are far more changing and variable than is generally allowed: "Authorial intention is a term easy to misconceive, for it is used to denote various things".⁹

However, Shillingsburg does locate one stable level of intention:

An intention to record on paper, or in some other medium, a specific sequence of words and punctuation according to an acceptable or feasible grammar or relevant linguistic convention is specific and singular. Any alternative execution of words and punctuation (except perhaps those which correct scribal errors) represents an altered intention at that level. (36)

From this he concludes that "the intention to put down a particular sequence of words and punctuation is almost completely recoverable" (36). The only elements which hinder it are "scribal errors, 'Freudian Slips,' and shorthand elisions" (36).¹⁰ "Intention to mean" as non-recoverable meaning can only be fully experienced by the writer, insofar as he/she knows his/her own intentions whilst "intention to do" (recoverable meaning) is accessible to both writer and reader over time since it is present in embodied acts upon the page.¹¹

Shillingsburg's position seems to be situated somewhere between Searle and Derrida on the issue of intentional meaning and speech acts. He allows that language, and its embodiment as marks on the page, exists apart from, and prior to, the mind which produced it, but also that a *degree* of referential meaning is able to be deduced from those marks as acts of making on the manuscript page which follow a clear (reconstructable) sequence. Following Shillingsburg's position, I want to argue that acts of revision, redrafting, and the nature of entry within a notebook can be understood as a sequence of performative utterances concerned with the making of meaning and, furthermore, that

⁹ Peter Shillingsburg, *Scholarly Editing and the Computer Age* (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1986) 35.

¹⁰ The interpretation of "Freudian Slips" will be returned to below.

¹¹ The Derridean concept of the "trace" or the "mark" at first sight seems to correspond to the "residue" that the manuscript object holds and thus to "intention to do" as reconstructed from marks on the page. However, it should be remembered that for Derrida the mark exists as a "non-present remaining" ("Signature Event Context" 318), which does not exist in any empirical sense and that, for him, there is no origin-point (all traces are the trace of another).

writer, writer-as-reader (re-engaging with his own prior acts) and critics as later readers can best understand the text in a state of process by reconstructing the small-scale changes of intention held in manuscripts and relating this dimension to other kinds of meaning.

What is the speech act "performing" for the text in a state of process? In draft materials the performative element of language is concerned not so much with a desire to communicate directly, as it is to bring meaning into being. It thus functions differently from a speech act in the world, or from a speech act within a completed literary work and this is why intention is so highly changeable, representing something very different from what we might understand by "authorial intention" in a published work. In the latter, intention must be conceptualised as an achieved "fixed" state (even if it can be subject to later change) whereas, within textual process, meaning is produced by a sequence of constantly refined intentions at multiple levels. The manuscript object retains the totality of all possible recorded meanings: those rejected and those taken forward, those accidental and those intended. Moreover, the original context of production is still present in a material sense.

The manuscript thus possesses three inter-related dimensions: it is a thing/ a physical object; it holds the making of meaning as a sequence of embodied acts within it; it is part of the creation of the literary work of art. These different dimensions, and the necessary relations between them, mean that the communication between writer and reader in draft materials is of a different order from that of the final published work and that the textual object is equally of a different order and requires different forms of interpretation. We can therefore divide speech acts within process into those capable of being understood as an intended teleological sequence (and thus retrospectively imbued with intended meaning) and those which are either entirely accidental or possess ambiguity concerning their intention. Both kinds of act (intended and unintended) I would argue are capable of interpretation, and both are essential and intrinsic to the unique nature of the literary text in its draft state.

Interpreting the Making of Meaning: Reconstructive Micro-analysis

I want now to turn from theoretical discussion of the nature of marks on the manuscript page to an exploration of them in relation to a particular text, Wordsworth's *Home at Grasmere*. If we are willing to allow that there *is* a reconstructive meaning capable of being generated from the page of the draft text, then an interpretative practice can emerge for the base materials of the draft text which values the sequence of acts upon the page both separately and in relation to the literary work of art. The term I have used elsewhere for such a practice at a localised level is "micro-analysis".¹² We need to turn to specific examples from Wordsworth's poem to consider such issues.

Home at Grasmere is a work concerned with Wordsworth's decision to settle in a particular place at a particular time. Although the poem is superficially a celebration of that choice, a hymn of gratitude to Grasmere itself, darker undercurrents run through it – in terms of uncertainties as to whether it was the right decision to make, the pressure it puts upon the Poet-narrator to write; the Poet's identity within the valley and the nature of his self-definition as Poet. The poem's complex articulations are matched by its own unstable status within Wordsworth's corpus and its "stop-start" compositional history. It was begun in 1800, at the moment when William and Dorothy first settled in Grasmere, and initially written directly out of the poet's mental, physical and domestic state at that time. However, the poem was then put aside and not returned to until 1806 when it was worked up into a full fair copy of 1048 lines (MS B). Between 1808 and 1810 sections of this version were removed and re-situated in *The Excursion* and in 1812-14 a second fair copy (MS D) was made, with final substantial revisions in 1832.¹³

Historically, *Home at Grasmere* has tended to be marginalised within the Wordsworth canon because of its identity as a "failed" or "fragmentary" text, the unpublished first book of the never-completed *Recluse* project. In the first editorial commentary on the poem, presented in *The Life of William Wordsworth*, (1889) William Knight describes the

¹² See "Wordsworthian Composition: The Micro-Prelude," *Studies in Romanticism* 44 (Fall 2005): 399-421.

¹³ There are four main manuscripts for *Home at Grasmere*: MS A (DC MS 58) which is probably a copied text from earlier 1800 material, now lost; MS R (DC MS 28) a rough draft; a first fair copy MS B (DC MS 59); a second fair copy MS D (DC MS 76). Although the poem was first begun in 1800, all surviving MSS except MS D probably date from 1806 when the first fair copy was made. The poem was left unpublished by the poet and first published by Macmillan in 1888.

decision not to publish it in 1850 as evidence of "true critical insight" and suggests that "It was probably a conviction of its inequality and inferiority that led Wordsworth to give selected extracts from this canto to the world in his own lifetime".¹⁴ Although Knight *did* reproduce MS D of the poem in full, he presented it apologetically and as a work not capable of standing alone: "Future editors may find it desirable to make 'selections' from this canto" (I, 231). In the earliest literary-critical response to the poem, also 1889, (responding to Knight's publication) William Minto entitled his piece "Wordsworth's Great Failure".¹⁵ In fact, Minto found *Home at Grasmere* itself to be verse "of the poet's prime" (439) and "crossed by no disturbing currents of regret or misgiving (439). Instead, the "Great Failure" was "The Recluse" as a whole, leading Minto to challenge an idealised Victorian view of Wordsworth's successful career and replace it with a model of a man "full of contradictions and uncertainties, often harassed by doubts and despondencies" (437); "a self-dissatisfied poet" (443). In the second half of the Twentieth Century, critical appreciation of *Home at Grasmere* has been revitalised by Beth Darlington's Cornell edition of the poem in parallel reading text versions (MS B and MS D).¹⁶ Nonetheless, responding to it as a distinct piece in its own right – rather than merely as the failed opening to "The Recluse" – still cannot undo the deep tensions between projected hope and fear of failure which fuel the poem.

Excellent work has been undertaken on the poem in terms of exploring its contradictions and false self-justifications at a rhetorical level, by critics such as Kenneth Johnston and Bruce Clarke.¹⁷ My aim, however, is to explore the text from the perspective of the underlying manuscripts and in terms of analysis of acts on the page. In the case of *Home at Grasmere*, if we accept that the text in its stable (editorially-created) state is about the Poet's inability to situate himself, and subsequent anxiety concerning his role and abilities, then an exploration of the material through which he achieves this contradictory articulation ought to be highly rewarding. Indeed, the more self-conscious or anxious a literary work is, the more valuable the dimension offered by the

¹⁴ William Knight, *The Life of William Wordsworth*, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: William Paterson, 1889) I, 231.

¹⁵ William Minto, "Wordsworth's Great Failure," *Nineteenth Century* 26 (1889): 435-451.

¹⁶ Beth Darlington, ed. *Home at Grasmere: Part First, Book First of The Recluse by William Wordsworth* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).

¹⁷ Kenneth R. Johnston, "Home at Grasmere: Reclusive Song," *Studies in Romanticism* 14 (Winter, 1975): 1-20; Bruce Clark, "Wordsworth's Departed Swans: Sublimation and Sublimity in *Wordsworth's Home at Grasmere*," *Studies in Romanticism* 19 (Fall, 1980): 355-374.

at the start of a block). In this example, then, it appears that force of expression dominates the first entry – the short line is a strong self-rebuke by the poet, albeit one which allows the possibility that he is right (he only "seems" to wrong the valley). At a level of content it is significant that it draws attention to itself since it represents a mental act against the Valley and its community, a "discordant thought". At some point later Wordsworth returns to this section and, in much lighter ink, plays with half-line options in order to create a regular metrical line. He resolves things so that "To wrong it" is moved to the start of a new line and "by harbouring this thought" replaces it on the previous line. The poem is now metrically regular, but the force of the original utterance is partly lost in the parenthesis which breaks it up: "But that I seem, by harbouring this thought, / to wrong it". That parenthesis also works against itself in that the thought being "harboured" is a supposedly negative one, yet the image of "harbouring" is largely positive. So, here, changes to metre which superficially appear to be mere metrical expansion also subtly increase the level of openness and uncertainty in the poet's self-representation. The poem's forward development (its larger teleology) serves not to clarify the poet's attitude towards the valley but to render it more ambiguous.

The first example of half-line revision does not relate to a significant change of meaning. However, one can also, of course, locate points within the draft material where changes *do* bear significantly upon the meaning of the "final" work in terms of theme, voice, characterisation, narrative structure or poetic self-presentation. We can start with a simple example, relating to the poet's self-presentation in a characteristically Wordsworthian way. In the draft text of MS R, the poet turns to address "Emma" (a name Wordsworth uses for Dorothy within his poetry) and declares (see illustration):

I am

No {~~we are not alone we don~~

I

No I am not alone {[?] do not stand

My Emma far [?] ~~divided~~ & alone

(MS R, 141)

No I am not alone we do not stand

My Emma in a solitary world
(MS R, 141)

No, we are not alone; we do not stand,
My Emma, here misplaced and desolate,
Loving what no one cares for but ourselves.
(MS B Reading Text, 646-648)

There is a certain irony involved in a revision which deliberately changes "No we are not alone" to "No I am not alone", even if it changes it back again later. In the revised version of the passage entered at the bottom of the page, this phrase is written to incorporate both first person singular and second person plural: "'No I am not alone we do not stand / My Emma in a solitary world" as it is in MS B. Reading the changes across draft versions, however, and the repeated assertions of "No I am not alone", has the effect of drawing one's attention to the repetitions of "alone" and to the sense in which the poem, even in the last version, seems to protest too much. All of the images given are negative images, themselves negated, (e.g. "we do not stand . . . misplaced and desolate"). The change from "I" to "we" partakes of the slight desperation felt in the assertion here, and brings with it once again the strong suspicion that the poet is "divided" from those around him to a far greater extent than he is willing to admit. In the larger context of a poem concerned with social self-integration such changes become revealing.

Points of significant alteration of meaning within draft material can be identified in two ways: either by starting with the final text and identifying earlier versions of key passages within the manuscripts, (the most common way in which literary critics draw upon draft materials) or by visually registering areas of major re-working in the manuscripts across drafts, which suggest that a passage is in some way significant because the development of meaning within it is problematic. In such cases both the constative and the performative elements of speech acts in process build up in a dense cluster on the page, as the attempt to "say" is repeatedly "done" and "undone". The most obvious example of this for *Home at Grasmere* occurs in relation to the "traveller in the fog" image, which the poet uses to describe his position and sense of identity within the

valley. The passage is highly unstable across the three manuscripts of *Home at Grasmere* in which it occurs (MS R, MSB, MS D) remaining a consistent focus for redrafting.¹⁸ In the Cornell MS B Reading Text it reads as follows:

Fair proof of this, Newcomer though I be,
 Already I have seen; the inward frame,
 Though slowly opening, opens every day.
 Nor am I less delighted with the show
 As it unfolds itself, now here, now there,
 Than is the passing Traveller, when his way
 Lies through some region then first trod by him
 (Say this fair Valley's self), when low-hung mists
 Break up and are beginning to recede.
 How pleased he is to hear the murmuring stream,
 The many Voices, from he knows not where,
 To have about him, which way e'er he goes
 Something on every side concealed from view,
 In every quarter some thing visible,
 Half seen or wholly, lost and found again –
 Alternate progress and impediment,
 And yet a growing prospect in the main.
 Such pleasure now is mine . . .
 (MS B, 693-71)

In the context of the poem, the passage comes after various accounts of good acts and shared well-being in the valley, at which point the poet-narrator makes a comparison of his own state of enlarged being with that of a Traveller, moving through mists. Crucially, the image is centred upon an outsider, not knowing the way he follows well, at the moment when the mist lifts. Such "pleasure" as he feels must therefore be a state of relief and release from an uncertain and potentially threatening situation. The extended metaphor is linked directly back to the poet-narrator at the end, giving it further implicit

¹⁸ James A. Butler, in a paper exploring the roles of "tourist" and "traveller" in Wordsworth's poetry, also notes the changes to the passage across versions of the text. See "Tourist or Native Son: Wordsworth's Homecomings of 1799-1800," *Nineteenth Century Literature* 51 (1997-97): 1-15; 11-12.

extension: as the mist will eventually clear, (although it has not yet done so), so the poet's full sense of understanding, shared knowledge and connectedness with the community in which he has settled will be achieved. The metaphor is highly appropriate to the subject it describes, and highly characteristic of *Home at Grasmere* in its deliberate lack of resolution.

At its first appearance on MS R, 146, the passage occurs within one of the messiest sections of rapid drafting within the manuscript (see illustration), with Wordsworth writing between the lines of a Coleridge printed text which forms the base material, then rewriting the piece again on the next page.¹⁹ Since the content of the piece concerns the inability of the traveller to find his way forward, there is a clear correspondence between graphological and semantic meaning on the manuscript page. This in turn, suggests a possible further metaphor for the lost traveller, concerning not just the poet's future place within the community but also his ability to create. The metaphor concludes in a highly ambiguous way:

Such pleasure now is mine, and what if I –
 Herein less happy than the Traveller –
 Am sometimes forced to cast a painful look
 Upon unwelcome things, which unawares
 Reveal themselves? Not therefore is my mind
 Depressed; nor do I fear what is to come . . .
 (MS B, 710-715)

Comparison is made between Traveller and Poet – "Such pleasure now is mine" – only for its validity to be brought into question: "what if I . . . less happy". Unlike the Traveller in the lifting fog, the poet is not simply surrounded by pleasurable sights, yet the poem turns again to claim that he *does* enjoy what he looks upon "Not therefore is my mind / Depressed, nor do I fear" (714-715). The comparison is also highly ambiguous, since it places the poet at two steps removed from those around him (an outsider, and one who cannot see) and takes us back to the previous anxious doublings of "No – I am not alone", already discussed. Once again, there seems to be a degree of syntactical self-conviction at work here, as well as the possibility that the metaphor has extended to

¹⁹ The first entry will be analysed in detail in a discussion of "Meaningful Conjunction" later in this paper.

(MS B, 32r)

Perhaps the most telling changes here are those of "mind" to "heart" and "do I" to "does it" which remove the suggestion of a further metaphorical level.

Many years later Wordsworth undertook further heavy reworking to the Traveller passage in MS D in final revisions of 1831-32 where the page stands out as one of three major areas of reworking amidst what is otherwise a relatively clean fair copy.²⁰ In his final revisions to the extended metaphor on 21^v Wordsworth deliberately distances the entire image, replacing the word "Traveller" with "Stranger" and resituating the figure in Switzerland rather than Grasmere as "A pensive Stranger, journeying at his leisure / Through some Helvetian Dell"(MS D 21^va), in direct contrast to the MS B version which made an explicit connection to "this fair Valley's self". A pasted-on sheet on the page further enhances the Swiss context with descriptions of "dark pines thrusting forth their [?] { spiky heads" (MS D, 21^va). In other words, the Traveller is now emphatically *not* to be identified with the Poet or his problems with self-situating and creative confidence.

Approaching the fixed text from the perspective of the manuscript drafts rather than the other way around can cast fresh light upon the poem, as well as working to reinforce (or to force a re-evaluation of) a reading established on the basis of the final textual version. In this case it seems to me to draw greater attention to the poet-narrator's anxiety about belonging and to a genuine uncertainty about how to respond truly – which the Traveller metaphor exemplifies. The content of the text constantly seeks to reassure itself but cannot quite achieve such reassurance. In a larger sense this also relates to the dominant temporal mode of the poem – the poet as "Newcomer" (MS B, 693) – which means that this *has* to be the state and condition he finds himself in, even though he constantly seeks to move beyond it.

All of this activity, across the manuscript totality of the text strongly points towards the importance of this metaphor for *Home at Grasmere both* at a level of making and of final meaning. In fact its very instability serves to reveal its appropriateness for this text. It comes as no surprise then, that this image is also one which Kenneth Johnston, in his excellent article on the poem, comments upon as "the crucial central passage (427-501) of the lengthy argumentative body of the poem" (14) and as the poet's first attempt to "make

²⁰ Only three pages in MS D contain late revision with pasted-in slips: 19^f; 21^v; 26^f.

a definitive statement about human nature in Grasmere" (14). He points out that, in spite of its claims, "the passage records a process rather than a proof" (15). In this it is highly characteristic of *Home at Grasmere* as a poem that – like the Traveller – is compelled to recognise the value of a suspended state.²¹

I could go still further to suggest that an interpretation of *Home at Grasmere* which reads not backwards from the "final" text, but forwards from the draft materials, understanding the product *through* its process, reveals the extent to which this poem can be seen to be "about" contradictions between language and action, words and deeds and words as deeds, at every level, largely in terms of the poet's attempt to articulate his relationship to his new situation. Of course this is always true for any text in a state of process to some extent (since it struggles towards unified meaning) but what is remarkable in *Home at Grasmere* is that those anxieties are not written out of the later states but explicitly articulated. So, the poem, even in its final fair copy state, freely goes on voicing its inability to voice – "'Tis (but I cannot name it)" (MS D, 142) – or to ask unanswerable questions "Strange question, yet it answers not itself" (MS D, 682), causing the "final" text to retain an openness of exploration and uncertainty of expression more characteristic of an earlier stage of writing. Kenneth Johnston gestures towards this in *Wordsworth and The Recluse* when, in analysing Wordsworth's strange attempt to apologise to the dalesmen and the lack of a need to do so, he suggests that:

Wordsworth is denying the power of "performative verbs" to perform "speech acts" upon them. In a speech-act, to say is to do . . . it is thus one of the most powerfully self-sufficient uses of language, and its redundant uselessness in Wordsworth's Grasmere further highlights the radical uniqueness he attributes to the place.²²

On the one hand, it is as if Wordsworth seeks through articulation to bring things about, to make things be, but on the other the text resists its own acts just as the place resists the poet's attempts to represent it. In a sense then, an inability to inscribe active intention into meaning *is* the meaning that this text gropes towards.

²¹ Johnston concludes of the mists that they are "vapours wherein one finds, not loses oneself, and this distinction between certain knowledge and uncertain or developing knowledge would seem to have been central in Wordsworth's thinking about *The Recluse* . . . as distinct from *The Prelude*" ("Home at Grasmere": Reclusive Song," 16).

²² Kenneth R. Johnston, *Wordsworth and The Recluse* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984) 91.

I hope I have shown, thus far, that micro-analysis of acts on the manuscript page and across the teleology of the developing work can be seen to work in a wide range of ways, relating to the nature of creative process and the construction of poetry, as well as bearing upon meaning and a full understanding of the nuances within a text. The way in which we interpret those acts, involves a highly distinctive kind of reconstructive "close reading" which is justifiable here when the focus of interpretation is on the development of meaning at a localised level. If we bear in mind that the apparently "stable" reading text of MS B or MS D is an editorial construction, then the question I am implicitly posing is whether this form of interpretation – out of the making of meaning – is to be viewed as a highly specialised approach, or whether it should in fact be more normative than it is. To put it another way, the creation of a stable textual state occurs in order to allow us to interpret and respond to the text in ways that are acceptable to literary criticism. I am not denying that we *need* such a state, (I have repeatedly drawn upon it here) but the effect it creates is to distort actual materials in order to enable established practices. Would it not be equally appropriate to respond to the texts in their full materiality, and to develop new ways of reading that value and acknowledge the true status of the materials?

Interpreting the Making of Meaning: Meaningful Conjunction

In the next part of this paper I want to turn from speech acts within process as sequences, capable of retrospective reconstruction and implying intention, to those speech acts on the manuscript page which may or may not possess intention. Austin's and Searle's accounts of speech act theory both articulate the concept of a successful or unsuccessful speech act the first of which depends upon the communication of a true intention on the part of the speaker. By contrast, a "failed" speech act (an "infelicity" for Austin [14] and a "defect" for Searle [54]) is one in which the speaker is insincere, conventions of the speech act are not fulfilled, or for which language misleads the listener. However, as Derrida neatly points out in his critique of speech act theory in "Limited Inc a b c", if the individual mind does not entirely know *itself* then it cannot have absolute control over its own

intentions.²³ This does away with the concept of a "successful" or "unsuccessful" communication but it also potentially brings into play the concept of "unintended" meaning. Of course, in a general sense, language as the medium for communication could be said always to contain "unintended" meaning (for the user) because of the way it exists as an autonomous system beyond individual control. For the manuscript, however, unintended meaning does not only occur in this larger sense, as part of the workings of language, but is also present physically upon the page.²⁴ Draft materials contain two main kinds of unintended meaning: one is concerned largely with material aspects of the manuscript which accidentally produce meaning when the "object" dimension is brought into conjunction with the meaningful content of the words; one concerns apparent "errors" relating to linguistic or semantic meaning or entry of words on the page, involving the unconscious mind. In both cases there is a degree of ambiguity over the extent to which conscious intention is present. The two examples from *Home at Grasmere* MS R (DC MS 28) I want to focus on here involve what I am going to call "meaningful conjunction" on the manuscript page. They occur where two dimensions of the manuscript – its materiality and its semantic content – appear to correlate, but without any apparent intention on the part of the writer.

Apart from the first two printed text pages, all of MS R (DCMS 28) is entered in the final section of an interleaved copy of Coleridge's *Poems* (1796) over and around the last, long poem in the collection, ("Religious Musings"), and the notes at the back of the book. In other words, the creation of Wordsworth's manuscript involves the reclamation or appropriation of Coleridge's printed book.²⁵ This may be accidental, but it is not without significance. "Religious Musings" was the poem of greatest importance to Coleridge in the collection. In letters written after publication it is for this poem that he most frequently requests a response, stating unequivocally that "I build all my poetic

²³ See "Limited Inc a b c," 74-75.

²⁴ In relation to authorial written acts, the concept of "unintended" meaning comes about in part as a by-product of "intended" meaning but each is partly defined by the other.

²⁵ The significance of such reclamation/ appropriation is considered in the second paper linked to this, in relation to "Michael" (entered on the "sister" manuscript to DC MS 28, DC MS 30). See also Andrew Bennett's interpretation of this manuscript in *Wordsworth Writing* (Cambridge: CUP 2007) where he gives a reading of the relationship between the two texts in terms of "scriptural or writerly violence" (93) and "defacement" (100).

pretensions on the Religious Musings".²⁶ It is worth noting that in *Coleridge and Wordsworth: A Lyrical Dialogue*, Paul Magnuson sees similarities between the structure of *Home at Grasmere* and of "Religious Musings" in terms of "an initial enthusiasm that permits extravagant speculation, which must be corrected by a return to the facts of historical and social realities".²⁷ It is the case, then, that the reflective nature and shape of Coleridge's poem, as well as its implicit concern with the role of the poet as one of the elect, allows the possibility of an intertextual relationship between the printed book and the draft text written across it.

Although a writer is unlikely to want to be *consciously* influenced by another, nonetheless, by choosing to write over another's words, or by entering the material in close proximity to other words at an early stage, the possibility of direct or indirect influence is allowed to exist. There is a far greater likelihood of meaningful conjunction where the nature of the material intertext is of a similar nature and tone – as with *Home at Grasmere* and "Religious Musings". The physical and spatial nature of entry of the handwritten text significantly affects the likelihood of intertextual influence in the draft material.

On page 141 of DC MS 28 a stretch of material begins in which Wordsworth enters his draft text *between the lines* of the Coleridge printed text. This is not his standard practice. The block of entry starts on the first surviving page of full text for Coleridge's poem "Religious Musings", which corresponds to a block of philosophical reflection by the poet about Grasmere and its community. On page 141 there is a point of conjunction between the draft and printed text, which describes the moment of Christ's death upon the cross, and the text written between these lines. The Coleridge text reads (see illustration):

that dread hour
 When thy insulted Anguish wing'd the prayer
 Harp'd by Archangels, when they sing of Mercy!
 Which when th'ALMIGHTY heard, from forth his
 Throne

²⁶ Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *The Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge* ed. Earl Leslie Griggs, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956-71) I, 205.

²⁷ Paul Magnuson, *Coleridge and Wordsworth: A Lyrical Dialogue* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 243.

(*Poems*, p.142, 37-41).

Meanwhile the Wordsworth draft pulls towards its later shape and meaning:

Mortal though bright a dying dying joy
 {Lus
 {[?Lus]tre which we alone participate whose
 Whose lustre we alone participate
 That is dependent upon us alone
 Mortal though bright a dying dying [?joy]
 (MS R, 142).

What they present, together on the page, in alternating lines of handwritten and printed text, is an almost interchangeable passage in which both participate in a remarkably similar meaning. However, since Wordsworth's draft is entered fairly continuously across all the pages there is no sense in which the later author is deliberately choosing to enter his draft on this page, so that it does seem like a straightforward coincidence. Yet, at the same time, the texts are clearly somehow in dialogue with each other.²⁹

My second example of meaningful conjunction occurs a little further on, within the same block of work, on page 146 of the *Home at Grasmere* manuscript where the handwritten draft of Wordsworth, is entered messily as an extended metaphor entirely over the printed page of the Coleridge poem. It occurs at a point where the printed page, too, presents an extended metaphor, and one which is capable of direct comparison: the image of the Traveller in *Home at Grasmere*, (discussed in the first part of this paper). On the manuscript page of DC MS 28 the draft entry enacts its own meaning as it struggles, textually, to achieve clear expression (see earlier illustration). The first line entered at the very top of the page "alternate progress & impediment" (146) accurately encapsulates the nature of the draft below it, in which lines are repeated, crossed out, and the text cannot achieve fluency. This is conveniently exemplified in the attempt to describe the mists themselves:

²⁹ Again, see Andrew Bennett for an alternative interpretation which argues that Wordsworth's defacement of Coleridge involves a "willed noncoincidence of printed and handwritten poems" (93). Bennett then goes on to look at interplay between the two as "a form of aleatory or even 'unconscious' revision of Coleridge's poem" (97). The almost directly opposed nature of our two readings of the same material manuscript points to one of the problems with psychoanalytic readings of such material: the high level of indeterminacy in any conclusion reached.

Lies through some [?region] never [?trod]

~~This vale~~

~~When [?mists ?are] hu~~

~~This vale~~

f

Say this fair valley's sels }, ~~while mists~~

~~On all sides~~ are hun

~~On every side & yet on every side~~

[?Low] [?hu]

On every side [?plaintively] [? plaintive] [?murmuring]

streams

in time when mists

~~Low [?hung] are~~ [?or] [?] [?gazes] [?round]

break up & are beginning to recede

How please he is to

Something on every side conceald

from view

In evry quarter some [?thing] visible

(MS R, 146).

On the printed page below, in the context of "Religious Musings", Coleridge's extended metaphor occurs at the end of a passage which describes the blessedness of the Elect: "Who the Creator love, created might / Dread not" (*Poems*, p.144, l. 75-76). The passage portrays the wretched man who comes in fear to God and is "transfigured" (*Poems*, p. 145, 87). Fear is dissolved by faith. Worldly cares and self-centredness vanish or are themselves transformed. Coleridge's image of the Shepherd occurs at this point:

As when a Shepherd on a vernal morn

Thro' some thick fog creeps tim'rous with slow foot,

Darkling he fixes on th' immediate road

His downward eye: all else of fairest kind

Hid or deform'd. But lo! the bursting Sun!

Touch'd by th' enchantment of that sudden beam
 Strait the black vapour melteth . . .
 (*Poems*, p.146-147).

The Shepherd in the fog can focus only on his immediate surroundings until suddenly the sun reveals what is truly all around him. Just so it is with the effects of religious faith for those who are to be saved. The poem presents an externalised metaphor in which the dissolving of one state by another (within) is enacted around the human figure in the transformation of "black vapour" into light. What is more, that transformation is enriched by that which previously resisted it. This is made clear in an explanatory note Coleridge added to the poem at this point in 1797:

Our evil Passions under the influence of Religion, become innocent, and may be made to animate our virtue – in the same manner as the thick mist melted by the Sun, increases the light which it had before excluded.³⁰

In other words, not only does the sun break through the mist, but the act of doing so converts what was previously negative into something which aids its opposite.

The way in which one text is written between the lines of the other on the manuscript page allows the creation of a combined material intertext at this point which, for the most powerful section of meaningful conjunction between draft and printed text, would read as follows:

in time when mists

As when a Shepherd on a vernal morn
 Low [~~hung~~] are [?or] [?] [~~gazes~~] [~~round~~]
 Thro' some thick fog creeps tim'rous with slow foot,
 break up & are beginning to recede
 Darkling he fixes on th' immediate road
 How please he is to
 His downward eye: all else of fairest kind
 Hid or deform'd. But lo! the bursting Sun!
 Something on every side conceald

³⁰ Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Poems by S. T. Coleridge, Second Edition. To which are now added Poems by Charles Lamb and Charles Lloyd*, (Printed by N. Biggs for J. Cottle, Bristol and Messrs Robinsons, London: 1797) 125.

from view

In evry quarter some [?thing] visible

(Created Intertext: MS R, 146).

Creating such a text is not mere gimmickry. It may not read entirely fluently but it serves to show how close the two texts are, not only in terms of content but also in terms of mood and imagery. Of particular interest is the detail of the juxtaposition towards the bottom of the page, where the contrast between the state of each individual traveller and the final outcome, for each text, runs in parallel (Coleridge's printed text in bold):

break up & are beginning to recede

Darkling he fixes on th' immediate road

How please he is to

His downward eye: all else of fairest kind

Hid or deform'd. But lo! the bursting Sun!

Something on every side conceald

from view

In evry quarter some [?thing] visible

(Created Intertext: MS R, 146).

In both texts the metaphor functions as an externalisation of an inner process (fear dissolved by faith; understanding enlarged by community). However, Wordsworth's metaphor does not end with the clear light of the sun breaking through, it dwells upon an intermediate state, and one which the poem does not resolve. There is even a sense in which such a state is preferable, in its semi-obscure and half-concealment, to the full melting away of the mist. In Coleridge's metaphor, by contrast, one state is radically consumed by and transformed into another. For the religious text, revelation is all-important, ("but lo! the bursting Sun!") but for *Home at Grasmere* it is perhaps the very fact that the poet places himself in a "half seen" condition that characterises this work. On the manuscript page, then, in terms of the inner state, one text only anticipates what the other joyously affirms.

Wordsworth's Freudian Slips

I want to conclude with a return to "unintended" meaning functioning at a linguistic or semantic, rather than material level, and to the well-known concept of the "Freudian slip" – the breaking through of the unconscious mind into communication, causing a person to reveal accidentally what was otherwise being suppressed – in relation to the making of meaning. In *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* Sigmund Freud explores both "slips of the tongue" and "slips of the pen", presenting an argument against a mechanistic, or purely associational, account of such slips and in favour of a psychological explanation for them.³¹ Freud argues that "slips of the pen" are in fact more common than "slips of the tongue", because in speech the will inhibits underlying impulses more successfully than in writing (131). Written slips thus include: omissions in writing; repetitions of words in writing and copying; and compositors' misprints, for all of which Freud suggests that "there is nothing to prevent our . . . regarding them as being in a very great measure [psychologically] motivated" (129).

In his account of "intention to do" as a form of intention capable of reconstruction, considered above, Peter Shillingsburg made it clear that "Freudian slips" on the part of the writer were outside the area of recoverable meaning. Certainly they are problematic. What are we to do with the fact that the extent to which such meaning is intended, or even noticed, by the creative agent cannot be verified? However, I want to suggest that these kinds of errors do, in fact, remain capable of interpretation and that unintended meaning, as a by-product of "intention to do" (the performative speech acts of the making of meaning), is an important element of creative process.

In one of his examples for "slips of the tongue" Freud describes a professor giving a lecture in French to a group of interned French prisoners of war and being careful to avoid the controversial use of the word "boche" to describe the Germans. However, in telling a story about a German schoolmaster, who urged his pupils whilst working in the garden to "imagine that with every clod of earth that they broke up they were breaking a

³¹ Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume VI. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, (1901), trans. James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud (London: Vintage, The Hogarth Press, 2001).

French skull" (72), the professor accidentally used the word "moche" in French, instead of "motte", for "clod". Freud concludes his re-told account:

Professor N. did not notice his slip: at least he did not correct it, which is something one usually does quite automatically. On the other hand the slip was received by the mainly French audience with real satisfaction and its effect was exactly as though it had been an intentional play upon words. (73)

There are two important points made here about the nature of unintended meaning. Firstly, a slip made in speech is often immediately registered as such by the speaker. This is significant. For the most part, we don't simply make accidental errors, we make them, recognise them and attempt to undo the error by signalling such recognition to the addressee. Secondly, if the error is *not* recognised and acknowledged by the speaker, then it is liable to be misunderstood by the audience and interpreted as being deliberate. More complex issues arise, however, when such "slips" occur in a *written* text where the error cannot immediately be identified and corrected, by the writer, for the reader. This is what makes unintended meaning so ambiguous on the manuscript page and creates uncertainty as to whether it is actually present or not.

Wordsworth's manuscript for *Home at Grasmere* MS A (DC MS 58) is a first fair copy manuscript with text in both William's and Mary Wordsworth's hands (although Mary's section only represents 1/6th of the total). Whilst Mary as copyist makes a number of straightforward copying errors, she does not make any errors of the sort that clearly could bear a psychological interpretation. We might speculate that the reason Mary does not make such mistakes is because she has nothing invested in the content and is not directly engaged with it. She is therefore far more able to focus upon the practicalities of copying. Wordsworth, however, makes seven such errors. I want to conclude by looking at three of them.³²

The first "slip" is a short, but telling one in the context of *Home at Grasmere*. As already discussed, uncertainties within the poem can also be found to be self-referentially present within the speech acts which determine its process. Thus, they function as

³² Wordsworth makes a far greater total number of accidental errors in copying, but these are the ones that seemed to me to be capable of bearing psychological explanation: line 208, "praise/prize"; line 213, "Soul/Sould"; line 218, "Bleak/Bleank"; line 243, "Yieldeded"; line 329, "by by day"; line 385, "Float/Float"; line 430, "Bred/Bread").

rhetorical structures and contradictions within the literary work, but they also appear as "errors" within the draft material which potentially bear upon interpretation of the work of art. In MS A the poet writes, of his decision to move to the valley:

I came not dreaming of unruffled life
Untainted manners: born among the hills

{d

Bre{ad also there I wanted not a scale
To regulate my hopes . . .

(MS A, Column 6a)

In this example, the poet compares himself to the shepherds, earning a living around him. He wants to express his closeness to them – "born among the hills/Bred also there" – but his accidental use of "bread" draws attention to the fact that although he may be "bred" amongst the same hills as the shepherds, he does not work upon the hills as they do to "earn his daily bread". In a classically Freudian way then, the suppressed unconscious could be said to reveal the exact opposite of what the writer wanted to suggest.

A second possible Freudian slip occurs in MS A at a point when the Poet-narrator describes his first journey to Grasmere with his sister, as they walk to their new home from Yorkshire in December, 1800. On the way, between Richmond and Askrigg, they pause at a spot called "Hart-Leap Well". The legend attached to this place concerns the hunting of a deer to its death, marked by the upwelling of a spring at the spot where it breathed its last and a monument in this place. The "slip" within the manuscript relates directly to the core of the legend:

Among the records of that doleful place
By
~~With~~ sorrow for the hunted Beast who there
Had yieldedded up his breath the awful trance
That vision of humanity . . .

(MS A, Col 2a)

"Yieldded" at first appears to be nothing more than an accidental copying error, creating a non-existent word. But the immediate context around the accidental error offers an alternative reading. The error encapsulates a soundplay of "ded"/"dead" which is

remarkably appropriate to the line in which it occurs, describing as it does the death of the animal. Does Wordsworth's unconscious mind demand that he states by means of a copying error what the poem otherwise avoids stating directly? How significant is this, in a poem which deliberately avoids any direct mention of death, whilst at the same time constantly alluding to the possibility of it?

A final possible example occurs in the Poet's analogy between of a pair of swans who have been nesting on the island and his own and his sister's decision to settle in the valley. The speaker in the poem is describing the birds, and their daily awareness of them. At line 329 Wordsworth writes:

{ day
we saw them {by by day
(MS A, Column 4a)

In the poem, the birds are significant because of the poet's uncertainty about what has happened to them later, when they are no longer there – which has implications for the human parallel that has been made so explicitly. In the light of this, the error could appear to be more than a mere accident, anticipating the loss of the bird if "by by" can be understood as "bye bye". In fact, though, micro-analysis of the sequence of acts made here suggests that the repetition of "by" is deliberate, caused by a copying error. Originally on the page Wordsworth probably first entered "we saw them by", perhaps because he was about to write "we saw them by day" which would make grammatical sense. However, he was *supposed* to be entering "we saw them day by day". He therefore wrote "day" over the first "by" and then added a second "by day" at the end of the line.

The final example, in particular, raises two issues concerning a Freudian reading of errors on the manuscript page. Firstly, such "psychological" readings of "slips of the pen" within the *literary* text do not operate exactly in the way that Freud suggests for the personal texts he tends to draw upon (the letter; the diary). That is, we do not only locate in these examples biographical or personal meanings, but artistic ones, relating to the content of the poem as a literary work. The "welling up" of underlying thoughts thus seems to be as much an effect of Wordsworth's awareness of the poem's meaningful content breaking through into a mechanical act of copying as it is his concern with

personal issues that break into the text. A second point raised by the final example is whether, if the "slip" is known, or brought about by a deliberate revisionary act, it can still bear such interpretation. This also naturally returns us to the all-important question of how the critic can ever be sure that the slip was known when all that he/she is doing is reconstructing someone else's intentional sequence on the page.


I do not believe that every mistake on the manuscript page is psychologically motivated: sometimes a copying error is just a copying error. In fact, even in the examples considered above, which *do* bear such interpretation in terms of a creative unconscious I would be wary of making great claims for them. However, at the same time, this *is* clearly a point where the unique nature of speech acts within process emerges. The manuscript bears marks which proceed directly from the writing hand as well as marks as communicative acts concerning intended meaning. This allows for the physical expression of a far larger range of meanings than we might expect to interpret, including: marks with no semantic meaning; physical marks which possibly contain intentional meaning; marks containing unconscious and half-conscious meaning; marks to which intention can clearly be attributed. As we have also seen, the nature of the manuscript as object, as well as vessel for meaning, allows for a degree of interplay between its material/physical dimension and its meaningful one which creates a highly dynamic cross-interpretative arena.

Ultimately, the question to be asked is whether, and to what extent, all of these accidental or unintended meanings are a suitable subject for interpretation. Is the interpretation of process-as-speech-act only concerned with "successful" communication – that is with interpreting those acts which are clearly intended and form a teleological part of the making of meaning for the creative agent? Or, is our interest in draft materials able to extend to, and include, the manuscript object in its full materiality, embracing both unconscious meanings on the page and accidental ones? In the end it seems to me to come back to the nature of the object of study. The text in a state of process is of value as a receptacle of developing meaning; in terms of the emerging work of art *and* for its physical and material presence. It is the co-existence of all of these elements that makes both it, and the forms of intention it presents, unique and which therefore demands our full critical attention.

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When all of Self regardless the scourg'd Saint
 Mourns for th' Oppressor. O thou meekest Man! 25
 Meek Man and lowliest of the Sons of Men!
 Who thee beheld thy imag'd Father saw
 His Power and Wisdom from thy awful eye
 Blended their beams, and loftier Love fate there
 Musing on human weal, and that dread hour 30
 When thy insulted Anguish wing'd the prayer
 Harp'd by Archangels, when they sing of Mercy!
 Which when th' ALMIGHTY heard, from forth his
 Throne
 Diviner light flash'd extacy o'er Heaven!
 Heav'n's hymnings paus'd: and Hell her yawning
 mouth 35
 Clos'd a brief moment.
 We do not scatter through the fields of mercy
 Of this fair vale of peace and happiness
 Unprofitable humbles but birds

MS R, 141




MS R, 142

142

MS R, 142

Lovely was the Death
 Of Him, whose Life was Love! Holy with power
 Lie on the thought-benighted Sceptic beam'd
 Manifest Godhead, melting into day 40
 What Mists dim-floating of Idolatry
 Split and mishap'd the Omnipresent Sire :
 And first by TERROR, Mercy's startling prelude,
 Uncharm'd the Spirit spell-bound with earthy lusts
 Till of it's nobler Nature it 'gan feel 45
 Dim recollections ; and thence soar'd to HOPE,
 Strong to believe whate'er of mystic good
 Th' ETERNAL dooms for his IMMORTAL SONS.
 From HOPE and stronger FAITH to perfect LOVE
 Attracted and absorb'd : and center'd there 50
 God only to behold, and know, and feel,
 Till by exclusive Conscioufness of God

*We do not believe
 if we were not to be do not lend a hand
 whose hands we alone have to support
 it is not dependent upon us alone
 that it is not a dying dying God*



MS R, 146