Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds.
Cooper, R.V.
(2004)
Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55 (1).
pp. 73-85.
ISSN 0007-0882
![[thumbnail of cooper261.pdf]](https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/261/2.hassmallThumbnailVersion/cooper261.pdf)
Preview
Abstract
�Human kind� is a term introduced by Ian Hacking to refer to the kinds of people�child abusers, pregnant teenagers, the unemployed�studied by the human sciences. Hacking argues that classifying and describing human kinds results in feedback, which alters the very kinds under study. This feedback results in human kinds having histories totally unlike those of natural kinds (such as copper, tigers and dandelions) leading Hacking to conclude that human kinds are radically unlike natural kinds. Here I argue that Hacking�s argument fails and that he has not demonstrated that human kinds cannot be natural kinds.
Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Additional Information:
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Cooper, Rachel Why Hacking is Wrong about Human Kinds British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2004 55: 73-85 is available online at: http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/55/1/73
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1200/1207
Subjects:
?? history and philosophy of sciencehistoryphilosophyb philosophy (general) ??
Deposited On:
16 Aug 2006
Last Modified:
05 Sep 2024 00:12