



The Moral Imperative to Fight: Grievous and Combat-Driven Masculinities in the Syrian War

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For Peer Review

The Moral Imperative to Fight: Grievous and Combat-Driven Masculinities in the Syrian War

Abstract

Why do individuals join and persist in armed conflict even under conditions of extreme risk and loss? This article examines how political grievances are internalised through gendered identity to produce a moral imperative to fight in the Syrian war. Drawing on over 200 hours of interviews with Syrian fighters conducted between 2022 and 2024, including in-depth interviews with thirty-four Syrian National Army (SNA) fighters analysed in this article, and complemented by new follow-up fieldwork conducted in Syria in 2025 after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the article develops a relational framework linking structural grievance, emotional experience, and masculine subjectivity.

The study introduces two interrelated analytical typologies. *Grievous masculinity* describes a gendered response to humiliation, political dispossession, and moral injury that constructs violence as an obligation to restore dignity and honour. *Combat-driven masculinity* emerges through the embodied practices of fighting, where risk, sacrifice, and camaraderie consolidate masculine identity and sustain participation in violence. Integrating feminist security studies, just war theory, and critical masculinity scholarship, the article conceptualises the *moral imperative to fight* as a gendered logic that fuses emotional injury with ethical justification for armed mobilisation. By moving beyond material or ideological explanations, it demonstrates how masculine identities operate as affective and moral economies that sustain combatant persistence and reproduce militarised social orders. The findings advance theoretical and policy discussions on gender and armed mobilisation, offering insights for future research on military integration, combatant transitions, and violent behaviour in postwar Syria and comparable conflict contexts.

Keywords: Grievances, masculinity, Syria, fighters, armed groups.

Introduction

In the early days of the Syrian uprising, Daraa, a small city in southern Syria, became the crucible of resistance against the Assad regime. The initial spark was the arrest and brutal treatment of a group of young boys for spraying anti-regime graffiti on a school wall, with phrases such as “The people want the downfall of the regime” echoing wider Arab Spring sentiments. The situation escalated when rumours spread that women from the families of these detained youths were also arrested after demanding their sons’ release. The streets of Daraa soon filled with protesters chanting “Death rather than humiliation!” (*al-mawt wa-lā al-madhalla*) and “Our honor is more valuable than our lives” (*karāmatnā aghlā min ḥayātinā*), expressions reflecting the deep cultural significance of honour and masculinist protection. These slogans encapsulated the societal outrage and grievances that fuelled mass mobilisation.

While these early events reveal the centrality of honour and masculinity in shaping resistance, academic scholarship has yet to fully examine how such gendered motivations intersect with grievances in the Syrian conflict. In my encounters with fighters affiliated with Syrian National Army (SNA) groups, sentiments such as “our land is our honour” (*’ardna hiya al-’ird*) and “our revolution is our honour” (*thawratunā hiya sharafna*) were repeatedly articulated as guiding principles of continued commitment to violence. Fighters framed participation not merely as political duty but as integral to their identities as men. Concepts of honour, family, manliness, and protection were central to their narratives, revealing how grievances became embedded within masculine self-conceptions and sustained armed mobilisation up to the fall of Assad on 8 December 2024. These narratives of collective honour and humiliation expose what I conceptualise as a **moral imperative to fight**: a belief that taking up arms constitutes not simply a strategic choice but an ethical act to reclaim dignity and manhood.

This article advances the analysis of Syrian fighters’ masculinities beyond essentialist or static frameworks by examining how grievances are internalised through gendered identity. Traditional grievance theory, often structured around a greed–grievance binary, fails to capture this intersection of grievance and masculinity. While Gurr (1970) emphasised political exclusion and Stewart’s (2008, 2010) horizontal inequality framework highlighted identity-based inequality, these approaches do not adequately explain how grievances are experienced as threats to masculine

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3 identity that mobilise armed resistance (see also Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Humphreys and
4 Weinstein 2006). Although scholarship integrating masculinity into analyses of Syrian fighters
5 remains limited, studies of jihadi masculinities in other contexts provide useful insights. Atran
6 (2010), for example, traces how masculine ideals shape radical mobilisation, while Nilsson (2024)
7 demonstrates how notions of heroic hypermasculinity structured foreign fighters' recruitment and
8 battlefield experiences.
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10 Existing approaches to hegemonic and militarised masculinity explain how gender norms structure
11 behaviour but often overlook how emotional experiences of humiliation, loss, and moral violation
12 transform masculine identity into a perceived obligation to fight (Connell 1995; Durie-Smith 2018).
13 While Connell conceptualises masculinity primarily as a configuration of social practices
14 embedded within gender hierarchies, this article extends that framework by foregrounding the
15 emotional and moral processes through which individuals internalise gender norms in conflict
16 settings. Masculinity is therefore understood not only as enacted through practices but as
17 constituted through affective experiences of humiliation, moral injury, and identity disruption that
18 reshape subjectivity and orient individuals towards violent action. The typologies developed here
19 address this gap by tracing how experiences of grievance are internalised and converted into
20 gendered moral imperatives for violence.
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34 This conceptualisation resonates with debates within Feminist Critical Military Studies (FCMS),
35 which emphasise the relational and context-dependent nature of militarised masculinities. Henry
36 (2017) critiques how approaches that foreground identity categories can become descriptive
37 exercises that fail to interrogate the militarist and patriarchal structures sustaining male power, and
38 calls instead for analysis of how militarised masculinity is co-constituted through broader social
39 processes. Similarly, Higate (2012) pluralises military masculinities by demonstrating their
40 contested and fluid character, shaped through the interaction of gender norms, institutional
41 cultures, and political economies. This article follows these insights by treating masculinity as an
42 emotionally constituted and relational process rather than a stable attribute or social role. In doing
43 so, it builds on Chodorow's (1995) account of gendered subjectivity as an inextricable fusion of
44 cultural representation and personal emotional experience, an approach that differs from Connell's
45 (1995) emphasis on masculinity as configurations of social practice within institutional
46 hierarchies, and instead foregrounds the affective and moral mechanisms through which
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3 individuals internalise gendered obligations to fight. Building on FCMS scholarship and my
4 previous research on Syrian fighters, which demonstrates how emotional hardship, uncertainty,
5 and relational ties produce distinct political subjectivities (Aldoughli 2024a; 2024b; 2025a), I
6 conceptualise masculinity as a dynamic process shaped through affective experiences of conflict,
7 shared emotional bonds, and perceptions of grievance. The analytical focus here centres on the
8 gendered constitution of masculine identity in conflict; examining how these processes intersect
9 with class, sectarian, and regional identities constitutes an important avenue for future research.

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12 The article's core analysis draws on thirty-four in-depth interviews conducted between 2022 and
13 2024, complemented by follow-up fieldwork after Assad's fall. From these data, I develop two
14 overlapping analytical typologies: **grievous masculinity**, a masculine identity rooted in
15 humiliation and collective injustice, and **combat-driven masculinity**, a form tied to martial valor
16 and the embodied performance of violence. Fighters' narratives are infused with emotional
17 experiences of loss, betrayal, and fear of dishonour, which become enduring forces shaping
18 identity and action (Aldoughli 2024b, 1189–1193; Aldoughli 2024c, 3–6; Aldoughli 2025a).

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21 The moralised dimension of violence observed in these narratives resonates with Parsons' (2023)
22 critique of Just War Theory, which exposes how the notion of the "moral equality of combatants"
23 rests on a gendered ontology of manhood. Parsons shows how just war ethics historically
24 constructs men as naturally predisposed to sacrifice and protect, transforming violence into moral
25 duty. This moral imperative is not universal but socially produced through masculine ideals of
26 honour and protection. In Syria, such ideals are embedded within a political culture shaped by
27 Baathist authoritarianism, where belonging has long been tied to the willingness to die and kill for
28 the nation (Aldoughli 2019a, 2019b, 2020, 2021a, 2021b, 2024c). The fighters' narratives
29 documented here thus exemplify the internalisation of masculine moral duty as justification for
30 violence.

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33 While engaging moral questions surrounding participation in war, this article does not adopt a
34 conventional Just War framework. Rather, drawing on feminist critiques (Wilcox 2010), it
35 examines how moral reasoning itself reproduces gendered hierarchies by framing war as the
36 natural domain of male duty and protection. Masculinity is analysed as a discursive justification
37 for participation in violence, shaping fighters' understandings of honour, protection, and righteous
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3 action. Although such moralised logics also inform women's participation in armed groups,
4 including female combatants in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (North Press Agency 2024),
5 the analysis here focuses on male fighters' narratives.
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9 Accordingly, the article does not seek to catalogue all forms of masculinity among Syrian armed
10 groups or reduce Syrian masculinism to wartime dynamics alone (Aldoughli 2019a; 2019b; 2021a;
11 2021b; 2024a). Rather, it examines how specific models of masculinity intersect with grievance
12 and combat, linking family honour, protection, and armed group affiliation. Drawing on
13 Aldoughli's (2024a, 34) conceptualisation of masculinity as expressive behaviour produced
14 through constant cultural repetition and experimentation, the article demonstrates that masculinity
15 is both a product and a driver of conflict.
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19 At the time of the article's initial drafting, Assad's regime remained in power; by the time of
20 revision, Syria had entered its post-Assad transition. My earlier research identified two key
21 patterns (grievous masculinity and combat-driven masculinity) among fighters operating under
22 Baathist authoritarianism. Following Assad's fall, however, these masculinities did not diminish.
23 Instead, as fighters transitioned into positions of authority and nation-building, they became
24 reconfigured through intensified grievances and sectarian victimhood.
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28 Recent work (Aldoughli 2025b; 2025c; forthcoming) demonstrates how emergent masculinities
29 under Ahmad al-Shar'a's leadership were implicated in violence in the coast and Sweida. The
30 tribal mobilisation in Sweida in July 2025, including practices such as moustache shaving (*qaṣ al-*
31 *shawārib*) targeting Druze civilians, illustrates how gendered symbolic violence operates to
32 reinforce sectarian antagonisms. These developments highlight the persistence and transformation
33 of wartime masculinities within post-conflict political orders.
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37 Such shifts carry implications for political settlements and Security Sector Reform (SSR). My
38 recent research shows that international stabilisation efforts, particularly those led by Western
39 donors, have largely neglected masculinity as a driver of conflict despite its relevance to
40 radicalisation and postwar violence. Consultations with British officials and representatives of EU-
41 backed programmes (conducted through semi-structured interviews and informal conversations
42 between 2023 and 2025) revealed that gendered dynamics of mobilisation remained largely
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3 unaddressed, raising concerns that ignoring militarised masculinities may undermine reform
4 efforts.
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8 Revisiting this paper in light of post-Assad developments, I therefore return to the typologies of
9 grievous and combat-driven masculinities as analytical tools for tracing evolving patterns of
10 masculine subjectivity. Drawing on three periods of follow-up fieldwork in Syria, including
11 interviews with former fighters who transitioned into administrative and military roles, I
12 demonstrate that these masculinities have been reconfigured rather than displaced. The typologies
13 developed here thus provide a framework for analysing transformations in masculine identity
14 across shifting political contexts and their implications for postwar governance and sectarian
15 mobilisation.
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19 The article proceeds as follows. It first provides background on SNA groups and the militarisation
20 of the Syrian conflict, followed by methodological and positionality considerations. It then
21 reconceptualises masculinity and grievance theory, problematising hegemonic masculinity as a
22 political structure and advancing a relational approach to gender and mobilisation. The empirical
23 analysis examines grievous and combat-driven masculinities among Syrian fighters before the
24 conclusion reflects on their persistence in Syria's fragile post-Assad transition.
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39 **Background of SNA and Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War**

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41 The Syrian Conflict, which began with hundreds of rival rebel groups have gradually narrowed to
42 include only a few major factions, with the role of the largest cohesive groups being occupied by
43 Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as one major group controlling Idlib, Syrian Democratic Forces
44 (SDF) that control north east Syria, and Syrian National Army (SNA) backed by Turkey
45 controlling northern Syria. Since 2017, SNA groups have witnessed significant restructuring of
46 their internal military organization and changes at the level of leaders' shifts in roles and the
47 formation of three Corps. These armed groups, operating inside the framework of the Syrian
48 National Army, exercise authority over opposition-held territories in the northwestern region of
49 Syria, particularly in the rural districts of the Aleppo Governorate. The factions, namely the Sham
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3 Front, Sultan Murad, Hamzat, and Amshat, exhibit unique attributes that collectively set them
4 apart from other Syrian factions. Their significant presence in northern Syria, close connections
5 with Turkey, control over crucial border areas, large number of fighters, and history of defections
6 and mergers make them suitable candidates for this study (Grinstead 2018). Significantly, these
7 specific groups are not classified as terrorist organizations and do not consist of foreign
8 combatants.
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13 This coalition (SNA) comprises a diverse array of factions, including three military corps
14 that exercise control over northern Aleppo. These corps are socially heterogeneous, drawing their
15 fighters from a wide range of class backgrounds, regional affiliations, and ethnic groups. Due to
16 the multifaceted nature of these groups, the changes that take place during conflict following
17 external states interventions, and the resulting shifts in internal structure and identity, the
18 motivations of fighters are unlikely to remain constant and can be influenced by various factors,
19 including the role of external actors and their financial support, illicit economies, and internal
20 conflicts within these groups, either due to ideological competition or utilitarian gains (Achcar
21 2016, 19–20).
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29 Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, the Syrian National Army (SNA)
30 entered a transitional phase marked by both institutional reconfiguration and geopolitical
31 recalibration. Under the emergent leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa, efforts were launched to
32 consolidate the remnants of opposition forces into a unified national defense framework. Within
33 this process, elements of the SNA were symbolically incorporated into the newly established
34 Ministry of Defense, signaling a formal, if partial, shift from their previous status as Turkey-
35 backed proxy forces toward nominal integration under central authority. Nonetheless, the SNA's
36 structural autonomy and its enduring logistical and financial dependence on Ankara reveal that
37 Turkey continues to preserve these formations as a strategic asset, particularly as a counterweight
38 to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the north. Thus, while al-Sharaa's consolidation has
39 reduced the SNA's direct political leverage, it has not fully severed Turkish tutelage. The SNA
40 today occupies a liminal position: subordinated to the new national order yet retained within
41 Turkey's regional security calculus. This ambivalent integration underscores the persistence of
42 militarized masculinities, factional loyalty networks, and the geopolitical instrumentalization of
43 armed groups in Syria's post-Assad landscape (New Lines 2025d; The World Today 2025e).
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Positionality, Methodology and Limitations

When I began researching fighters' motivations in 2020, my objective was to investigate the reasons for joining armed groups and the factors sustaining their continued participation in conflict. These drivers of violent behaviour combine emotional, psychological, and socio-political dynamics that shape decisions to persist in war (Aldoughli 2024c, 2024d, 2025a). Religious teachings enforced across SNA factions, ethnic and tribal affiliations, and variations in material incentives each played important roles in shaping loyalty and affiliation. For instance, fighters in the First and Third Corps typically received salaries as low as USD 20 per month, while those in the Second Corps were paid considerably higher amounts, up to USD 150.

While these disparities reflect differences in external resources, they were often downplayed by fighters themselves, who described economic motivations as secondary to their revolutionary self-perceptions (Aldoughli 2024b, 2024d, 2025a). Nonetheless, financial incentives were not irrelevant: many fighters justified recruitment into foreign deployments, such as Libya and Niger, in material terms. The interplay between material gains and ideological or gendered self-understandings therefore proved central to my inquiry. Over time, it became clear that these narratives were saturated with masculinist notions of grievance, protection, and sacrifice, and that my own gendered positionality shaped how such narratives were expressed.

As a Syrian woman and academic, my presence shaped how participants framed their narratives. Many foregrounded heroic and patriarchal ideals in interviews with me, emphasising their roles as providers and protectors. This was reflected in their frequent use of explicitly gendered language, such as "as you know, you are a woman and know that we must protect women and the vulnerable" or "you are a woman, and you know that this is what should be done." I interpret these statements as shaped by the gendered dynamics of the interview setting, reflecting a performative articulation of masculine responsibility produced within the relational context of the research encounter (Pini 2005). In some cases, my interlocutors enacted traditional gender expectations toward me (arranging male escorts for travel or inviting me into their relatives' homes where women would cook), thus reproducing gendered hierarchies within the interview setting itself. These dynamics underscored how positionality is not incidental but constitutive of

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3 fieldwork: it shapes access, trust, and the narratives that emerge (Aldoughli 2023, 145, 147; Rowe
4 2014, 628).
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8 My origin as a Damascene, perceived Sunni background, and unveiled appearance further
9 complicated insider–outsider dynamics. Fighters often questioned whether my British citizenship
10 undermined my ability to grasp the depth of their grievances. As one interlocutor insisted,
11 “academics often analyse the Syrian revolution coldly and miss the real meanings of repression
12 and humiliation that led us to carry arms” (Interview 11). Another explained: “we are relegated to
13 being terrorists or jihadists, just because we chose to defend our families and dignity” (Interview
14 6). Such exchanges confirmed my choice to centre fighters’ narratives, recognising how their
15 grievances were mediated through gendered identities.
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23 Feminist scholarship has long highlighted how violence affects women and civilians (see
24 Gordon 2023; **Cockburn 2004**) and challenged the stereotype of women as natural peacebuilders
25 by documenting women’s participation in armed groups. My study, however, focuses on men’s
26 evolving identities as fighters, rather than on their domestic relationships. Specifically, it
27 interrogates how involvement in conflict reshaped their subjectivities, grievances, and masculine
28 self-perceptions.
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34 Methodologically, I conducted 34 in-depth interviews with SNA fighters between 2022
35 and 2024, amounting to over 200 hours of interviews. In addition, I conducted three follow-up
36 fieldwork visits to Syria after the fall of the Assad regime (2025), during which I re-interviewed
37 27 former fighters who had transitioned into administrative and military leadership roles within
38 emerging state structures.¹ These follow-up conversations are used to assess the transformation
39 and persistence of the masculinities identified in the earlier phase of the research.
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52 ¹ By the time of this article’s revision and publication, 27 of the 34 fighters interviewed had been
53 integrated into Syria’s emerging state apparatus, taking up positions within the Ministry of Defence (MOD)
54 or the Ministry of Interior (MOI). This re-integration of former SNA fighters into the state security
55 architecture is itself a salient illustration of the persistence and reconfiguration of militarised masculinities
56 discussed in this article.
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3 Participants, aged 24–63 and with diverse educational backgrounds, were recruited via a
4 gatekeeper and snowball sampling. Interviews lasted two to three hours and were semi-structured,
5 beginning with personal and familial histories before moving to political trajectories, protest
6 experiences, and decisions to join armed groups. Building rapport was time-intensive, but it
7 enabled fighters to speak openly about their emotional experiences and perceptions of masculinity.
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13 The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using long-interview methodology
14 (Brounéus 2011, 130; Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1278–1283). Coding was conducted in three
15 phases: initial thematic coding, axial coding to identify linkages, and selective coding to refine
16 emergent concepts. Triangulation with documents, news reports, and secondary scholarship
17 further strengthened validity. This iterative process was abductive: while inductively grounded in
18 narratives, it was also theoretically informed by feminist and critical masculinity studies, allowing
19 for the development of the typologies of “grievous” and “combat-driven” masculinities.
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26 Methodologically, the analysis follows an **abductive logic of inquiry** (Timmermans and
27 Tavory 2012), characteristic of interpretive and feminist research (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea
28 2014), allowing theoretical insights to emerge through recursive engagement between field
29 narratives and existing scholarship on gender and conflict. Ethics approval for this study was
30 obtained from King’s College London (project reference: LRS/DP-22/23-34063), and strict data
31 security protocols were observed. All participants gave informed consent, and pseudonyms are
32 used throughout. Recognising the risks to participants, interviews were anonymised, securely
33 stored, and shared only in aggregated form.
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41 Finally, limitations must be acknowledged. My focus on SNA fighters excludes other
42 groups (e.g., regime forces, Syrian Democratic Forces), and the study does not extend to private-
43 sphere impacts of fighters’ participation. However, by centring identity transformation across time,
44 this study illuminates how grievances, masculinity, and combat interact to shape Syrian fighters’
45 enduring political subjectivities.
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54 **Reconceptualizing Masculinity and Grievances in Civil War Contexts**

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3 Since the 1980s, feminist scholars have demonstrated how war and militarism are sustained
4 through gendered logics of power, identity, and emotion (Bracewell 2000; Enloe 1990; Mayer
5 2000). Armed groups reproduce nationalist discourses centred on “brotherhood” and “honor,”
6 producing what Enloe (1990, 67) describes as “masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation,
7 and masculinized hopes.” In International Relations, feminist interventions challenged the gender-
8 blindness of security studies and established gender as an indispensable analytical lens for
9 understanding war and political violence (Sjoberg 2012; Peterson and Runyan 1993; Tickner
10 1992). Foundational works mapped how gendered imaginaries underpin conflict: Elshtain’s (1985)
11 archetypes of the “beautiful soul” and the “just warrior,” Enloe’s (1983) analysis of the
12 militarisation of everyday life, Reardon’s (1985) critique of the “war system,” and Ruddick’s
13 (1983) emphasis on women’s epistemologies of peace.
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29 -Building on these insights, this article conceptualises masculinity not simply as a configuration
30 of social practices or institutional roles, but as an emotionally constituted form of gendered
31 subjectivity produced through the interaction of structural conditions, cultural norms, and affective
32 experience. Drawing on psychoanalytic feminist theory, gender identity emerges through the
33 interplay between cultural representations and personally experienced emotional meaning. As
34 Nancy Chodorow argues, gendered subjectivity constitutes an “inextricable fusion” of cultural
35 representations and emotionally structured personal experience, through which individuals
36 internalise and reinterpret social expectations (1995, 517–518). Masculinity is therefore sustained
37 not only through institutional power but also through affective investments (including humiliation,
38 fear, shame, and moral aspiration) that shape how individuals experience and respond to political
39 violence. In this framework, masculine identity is understood as relational and affective, produced
40 through experiences of emotional hardship, dysphoric memories, and processes of identity
41 transformation in conflict settings, as demonstrated in my previous research on Syrian fighters
42 (Aldoughli 2024a, 1189–1193; Aldoughli 2024b; Aldoughli 2025a).
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3 Despite advances in feminist security studies, gender remains largely peripheral in civil war
4 research, particularly in explaining grievance formation and mobilisation. Prügl (2023, 1885) calls
5 for gender to be employed not as a secondary variable but as a foundational framework for
6 analysing how inequalities and gendered hierarchies catalyse violence. Dolan's (2011) analysis of
7 northern Uganda demonstrates how conflict collapses plural masculinities into singular,
8 militarised forms politicised by state, religious, and development actors. His notion of the "triple
9 bind" (the entanglement of militarisation, religiosity, and neo-colonial development agendas)
10 reveals how structural forces delimit the range of legitimate masculinities. Under such conditions,
11 men internalise hegemonic ideals of protection, endurance, and aggression as primary means
12 through which dignity and moral worth can be restored. The inability to fulfil socially recognised
13 roles generates humiliation and identity disruption, producing what Dolan describes as a crisis of
14 masculine selfhood.
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25 While Dolan foregrounds structural conditions that produce crises of masculine identity, his
26 analysis pays less attention to the emotional mechanisms through which such structural pressures
27 are interpreted as personal injury or moral obligation. Similarly, Duriesmith's work on "new war
28 masculinities" demonstrates how instability in gender orders and encounters between local and
29 global traditions of organised violence produce hybrid configurations of militant manhood
30 (Duriesmith 2018, 2–4). Both Dolan and Duriesmith prioritise macro-level structural
31 configurations, tending to underplay the subjective and affective processes through which
32 individuals internalise gendered obligations to fight. Cornwall et al. (2011) advance a
33 complementary argument, that masculinity must be understood as a political structure embedded
34 in economic and institutional systems, yet this emphasis similarly risks marginalising the
35 emotional dimensions of mobilisation. Theidon (2009), writing from post-conflict Colombia,
36 provides a closer account of how combatant identities are produced through the embodied fusion
37 of violence, camaraderie, and gendered performance, insights that resonate directly with the Syrian
38 material. Where this article extends Theidon is by foregrounding the prior phase of grievance
39 formation: how political dispossession and humiliation are first internalised as moral injury,
40 producing the conditions under which combat-driven masculinity later consolidates. The
41 framework thus bridges structural accounts (Dolan, Duriesmith, Cornwall) and embodied accounts
42 (Theidon) by examining the affective and moral processes through which structural grievance is
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3 converted into gendered obligation. By doing so, it complements this literature by examining the
4 affective and moral processes through which structural grievance is internalised as a gendered
5 obligation to fight. By foregrounding emotional experience, this article shifts attention from gender
6 norms or institutional structures alone to the constitution of masculine subjectivity in conflict.
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14 My previous research similarly demonstrates how emotional hardship, dysphoric memories, and
15 ritualised recollections of loss shape identity transformation among Syrian fighters, producing
16 forms of psychological kinship and collective belonging (Aldoughli 2024a, 1180–1184). These
17 processes generate identity fusion between personal and collective selves, transforming
18 participation in violence into a moral and relational commitment. Perceived political uncertainty
19 and emotional adversity produce distinct revolutionary subjectivities grounded in shared
20 experiences of loss and grievance (Aldoughli 2024b). These findings highlight the importance of
21 examining the emotional and relational processes through which grievance becomes politically
22 meaningful.
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31 Masculinity, however, operates not only at the level of identity but also as a political structure
32 embedded in economic and institutional systems (Cornwall et al. 2011). Conflict spaces are deeply
33 gender-coded, rendering men's dominance naturalised and often unexamined. A relational
34 perspective is therefore essential to recognise that masculinities are not merely reflective of
35 conflict dynamics but constitutive of them (Myrntinen et al. 2017; Myrntinen et al. 2025, 5–7). The
36 present analysis focuses on the gendered constitution of masculine identity in conflict; how these
37 dynamics are further shaped by class, age, ethno-religious identity, and sexuality constitutes an
38 important direction for future research. Within the gendered logics analysed here, the moral
39 imperative to fight functions as both justification and emotional grammar. Fighters' recourse to
40 honour, duty, and protection frames violence as an ethical necessity rather than a political choice.
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49 This moralised understanding of violence can be further illuminated through the concept of moral
50 injury, which refers to experiences that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and produce lasting
51 shame, guilt, and identity disruption (Litz et al. 2009, 696–699). Moral injury highlights how
52 violence may be experienced not only as strategic action but as a response to perceived violations
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3 of moral order that require repair. When interpreted through gendered norms of honour and
4 protection, such moral disruption may generate a perceived obligation to restore dignity through
5 violent action. This dynamic echoes Iris Marion Young's (2003) concept of masculinist protection,
6 where political legitimacy is secured through the willingness to defend feminised subjects, and
7 extends it by demonstrating how moral reasoning itself becomes gendered through experiences of
8 grievance.
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14 In the Syrian context, fighters' narratives reveal how political grievance is refracted through
15 gendered ideals of honour and protection. The recurring slogan "our land is our honour" illustrates
16 how political and material loss is experienced simultaneously as a crisis of manhood. Quest (2022)
17 similarly shows how violence-centred masculinities sustain antagonisms between men and
18 women, fighters and civilians, and perpetrators and victims. My interviews demonstrate how
19 protectionist rhetoric reinforced militarised masculinity, framing the revolutionary (thā'ir) man as
20 one who proves worth through the capacity to kill and die for honour. This parallels Theidon's
21 (2009) findings from Colombia, where militarised masculinity fuses weapons, violence, and
22 misogynist performances of power into enduring combatant identities that complicate
23 disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration processes.
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33 **These dynamics** highlight the persistent neglect of masculinity within disarmament,
34 demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes, where the symbolic and structural
35 dimensions of hegemonic masculinity remain largely unaddressed. In Syria, as in Colombia,
36 participation in armed groups is not simply an expression of grievance but a performative
37 enactment of masculine identity. Recognising the relational and emotionalised nature of these
38 identities is therefore critical for understanding how masculinity sustains conflict and for designing
39 DDR frameworks that move beyond technical disarmament toward transforming gendered power
40 relations.
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48 While feminist security studies have long examined women's roles and the gendered impacts of
49 war, significant gaps persist between analyses of gender ideologies in law and private life
50 (Kandiyoti 1998; Richter-Devroe 2011) and studies addressing masculinity, violence, and
51 authoritarianism (Haugbolle 2012; Hourani 2008). Turner (2019) further underscores how
52 humanitarian discourses frequently feminise vulnerability, rendering men's insecurities and
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3 emotional experiences politically invisible. Yet limited research examines how masculine
4 identities themselves are constructed, contested, and mobilised through wartime politics,
5 particularly in the context of civil war mobilisation.
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9 In Syria, processes of ‘othering’ are often mediated through military affiliation, yet identity and
10 belonging are premediated by an ethos of chivalric masculinity embedded in political culture and
11 historical narratives. Drawing on Homi Bhabha’s understanding of narration as a potent historical
12 force, I argue that traditions of political and literary expression entangle individual experience with
13 collective imaginaries, shaping how fighters narrate violence, honour, and belonging (Bhabha
14 1990, 1). Although personal narratives may distort empirical reality (Foster 1998, 38), they remain
15 formative in defining ‘proper behaviour’ and moral obligation (Rowbotham 1973, 11). Such
16 narratives provide the discursive terrain through which grievance becomes intelligible as a
17 gendered experience.
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26 This article does not present a monolithic model of masculinity (Aldoughli 2024a, 2019a, 2019b,
27 2024c). Masculine identities vary across race, sect, class, and sexuality and evolve through the
28 dynamics of war (Thompson and Pleck 1995; Connell 1995). Periods of violent conflict amplify
29 certain layers of identity over others (Ting-Toomey et al. 2000; Huddy 2001), while institutional
30 structures and local norms shape multiple and fluid masculinities (Myrttinen et al. 2017). Taken
31 together, structural constraints (Dolan), emotional processes of gender formation (Chodorow), and
32 moral responses to perceived violation (moral injury) provide the mechanism through which
33 grievance is transformed into gendered political subjectivity. This mechanism explains how
34 structural experiences of dispossession and violence are internalised through affective and moral
35 interpretation, producing gendered understandings of obligation, dignity, and political action.
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45 To capture this dynamic process, this article develops two analytical typologies that illuminate
46 distinct yet interconnected pathways of mobilisation: the grievance path and the combat path.
47 These typologies are not fixed categories or empirically bounded identities but heuristic tools
48 designed to trace evolving processes through which structural grievance becomes internalised as
49 gendered political action. Rather than classifying individuals into discrete types, they identify
50 recurring patterns in how fighters interpret experiences of humiliation, moral violation, and
51 collective belonging. The use of typologies is therefore methodological and analytical, enabling
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3 the study of fluid and relational processes of identity formation that cannot be reduced to static
4 models of hegemonic masculinity or structural grievance alone.
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8 The framework developed here identifies a sequential process through which structural conditions
9 of violence and dispossession are translated into gendered mobilisation. First, structural conditions
10 generate experiences of humiliation, loss, and identity disruption. Second, these experiences are
11 internalised through emotional and moral interpretation shaped by gendered norms of honour,
12 protection, and duty. Third, this emotional reconstruction of identity produces a perceived
13 obligation to restore dignity through violence. The typologies developed below capture distinct
14 moments within this process. Fighters following the grievance path are driven by deeply rooted
15 experiences of political humiliation and dispossession, where mobilisation is perceived
16 simultaneously as moral duty and political necessity.
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20 Grievous masculinity denotes an emotionally constituted form of gendered subjectivity that
21 emerges when experiences of humiliation, moral violation, and political dispossession are
22 internalised as threats to masculine identity. It emerges when men experience emasculation and
23 respond by reasserting manhood through protective violence. This is not a fleeting emotional
24 reaction but a structured gendered logic through which humiliation becomes politicised and
25 moralised. Distinct from protest masculinities (Connell 1995), which express marginalisation
26 through oppositional behaviour, and from thwarted masculinities, which frame failure primarily
27 as individual inadequacy, grievous masculinity transforms collective injury into moral entitlement
28 to violent redress. It manifests in narratives of lost *rujūlah* (virility), vows to reclaim *ʿird* and *sharaf*
29 (honour), and accounts of humiliation and revenge. It constructs feminised figures (women,
30 children, and the nation) as subjects requiring protection, while simultaneously emasculating
31 enemy masculinities. Violence thus becomes sanctified as duty: a moral imperative to fight that
32 promises the restoration of dignity and moral order.
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48 Combat-driven masculinity, by contrast, emerges within the battlefield as a transformative arena
49 in which masculine subjectivities are consolidated through risk, sacrifice, and collective violence.
50 While grievous masculinity originates in experiences of loss and dispossession, combat-driven
51 masculinity develops through the ritualised performance of violence, brotherhood, and
52 camaraderie. Participation in combat generates new forms of belonging and recognition that
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3 reinforce masculine identity through embodied practices of endurance and sacrifice. Together,
4 these typologies reveal how masculinity and grievance operate as mutually constitutive logics of
5 mobilisation, explaining both the decision to fight and the persistence of violence, while
6 marginalising alternative or non-hegemonic masculinities within the imagined revolutionary
7 community.
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13 As such, structural conditions of dispossession (Dolan 2011), emotional processes of gender
14 formation (Chodorow 1995), and moral responses to perceived violation (Litz et al. 2009) provide
15 the mechanism through which grievance is transformed into gendered political subjectivity. The
16 typologies developed below capture distinct moments within this process and provide an analytical
17 framework for examining how experiences of humiliation and moral disruption are translated into
18 gendered political action in civil war contexts.
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24 25 26 27 *Grievous Masculinity* 28

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30 Building on the conceptual framework outlined above, I treat fighters' narratives as sites where
31 emotional injury becomes moralised through gendered norms of honour and protection,
32 transforming grievance into a masculine obligation to fight. The aim is to trace how the moral
33 imperative to fight (emerging at the intersection of grievance, humiliation, and masculine identity)
34 materialises in the lived narratives of Syrian National Army (SNA) fighters. Drawing on 34
35 interviews, I show how emotions such as anger, shame, and emasculation are not only personal
36 affective responses but also culturally mediated enactments of masculine honour. This section
37 therefore situates grievance theory (Gurr 1970; Stewart 2008, 2010; Keen 2012) within feminist
38 critiques of militarised masculinity (Dolan 2011; Theidon 2009; Cornwall et al. 2011),
39 demonstrating that grievances in the Syrian conflict are experienced through, and articulated as,
40 gendered moral claims.
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50 A substantial body of scholarship has identified ideological and identity-based conflicts as
51 fundamental drivers of violence in civil wars (Bensted 2011; Keen 2012). Additionally, other
52 scholars have underscored that conflict is inextricably linked to the presence of perceived group
53 differences or grievances, emphasizing that such conflicts cannot unfold without these underlying
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3 disparities (Murshed and Tadjoeeddin 2009; see also Gurr 1970; Stewart, 2008, 2010). However,
4 while these analyses have contributed significantly to our understanding of civil conflicts, they
5 often limit their focus to economic or culturally related inequalities, thereby overlooking the
6 gendered dimensions of grievances and their entanglement with masculinist perceptions.
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11 Furthermore, much of the existing research on armed groups has predominantly
12 concentrated on their involvement in human rights violations, looting, and acts of violence, with
13 media narratives frequently highlighting "tales of cruelty" (Ritholtz 2022, 2; Sky News 2022). Yet,
14 as Angela Lederach compellingly argues, "violence is never the whole story" (2023, 17). This
15 raises a critical question: what factors contribute to the emergence of such violent narratives?
16 Scholars have explored this issue by examining how grievances, when intertwined with other
17 experiences of conflict, shape fighters' perceptions of their identities, influence their reactions, and
18 inform their decisions between engaging in war or pursuing peace (Petersen 2011; Suny 2004;
19 Whitehouse 2018). These scholars argue that grievances, particularly those stemming from
20 personal experiences or the experiences of those close to an individual, play a crucial role in
21 motivating participation in armed rebellion. These grievances, often rooted in past injustices, tend
22 to create expectations of similar occurrences in the future, thereby perpetuating the cycle of
23 conflict.
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35 Grievances can be understood as the lingering impact of events, whether they occurred in
36 the past or are anticipated in the future, that significantly shape an individual's psychological and
37 perceptual state. Essentially, grievances represent the enduring effects that remain after an
38 experience. Petersen argues that these grievances leave behind traces that directly influence the
39 trajectory of conflicts (2011, 6). He suggests that grievances are a key driving force, shaping the
40 subjective motivations that lead individuals to engage in military actions. Petersen views
41 grievances not just as residues of lived experiences, but as "a collection of cognitive agents and
42 inclinations" that actively influence how individuals process information and form beliefs (ibid.,
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51 The experience of violence often includes individuals' responses to the loss of their group
52 members. While the importance of grievances arising from such violent experiences and losses is
53 undeniable, their impact is frequently overlooked in academic studies, which tend to focus on
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3 quantitative and statistical measures related to material factors. Petersen highlights that feelings of
4 anger and resentment are crucial in understanding the motivations behind participation in
5 hostilities, particularly in the context of conflicts like those in the Balkans. He identifies three key
6 determinants: first, the experience of being subjected to violence; second, the experience of stigma
7 and prejudice; and third, the experience of reversing that stigma (ibid., 11). The second determinant
8 refers to the societal stigma an individual faces when they are unable to protect themselves, their
9 family, or their group. This stigma can be countered by a perceived "reversal of status," achieved
10 by taking up arms in self-defense, which creates a sense of superiority (ibid., 14–19).
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18 The related question here is how do these negative emotions intertwine with fighters'
19 perceptions of their masculinity? According to my interlocutors, political grievances overwhelmed
20 them with 'intense emotions' (Interview 18), as their experiences of torture, repression, and direct
21 material violence not only deepened their trauma but also reinforced their willingness to join armed
22 groups. These grievances are not merely economic or culturally related but are deeply gendered,
23 as they intertwine with hierarchical notions of masculinity. Horizontal inequality within this
24 context has perpetuated feelings of political exclusion and emasculation, driving individuals to
25 seek reassertion of their masculinity through participation in armed groups.
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34 In conversations with current fighters among Syrian National Army (SNA) groups, their
35 narratives illustrate how experiences of humiliation are interpreted through gendered expectations
36 of masculine protection, producing what I conceptualise as grievous masculinity. One fighter
37 recounted, "The police marched into our house at 9 o'clock. I was hiding in the loft where they
38 wouldn't have found me, but I heard one security officer hitting my young sister, saying, 'If we
39 don't find your treacherous brother, it is better to take you instead...you will provide us leisure
40 while we find your brother' (Interview 1). This incident triggered profound feelings of
41 emasculation and helplessness, leading the fighter to surrender himself and later resolve to seek
42 revenge against the regime. Another fighter described witnessing security forces dragging a veiled
43 neighbor from her home in her nightgown, saying, "I felt pity for her father and brothers, seeing
44 their honor being trampled on. Her brothers, who were my friends, and I swore an oath to take
45 revenge" (Interview 2). As theorised in the previous section, such moments of humiliation mark
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3 the conversion of emotional injury into a moral imperative to fight, reframing vengeance as both
4 ethical and masculine duty.
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7 These wordings underscore the profound impact of this incident on his sense of
8 masculinity. This process of ‘emasculatation’ as a result of persistent shaming contributed to the
9 fighter's decision to surrender himself, which was driven by an urgent need to protect his sister and
10 reclaim his ‘honor’. The subsequent torture he endured, compounded by threats of his sister's rape,
11 deepened his resolve to seek revenge against the regime. This narrative reveals how the interplay
12 of personal and political grievances, coupled with deeply ingrained masculinist values, can drive
13 individuals to radicalize and take up arms. As Banerjee argues, masculinity “centers a gendered
14 binary—martial man versus chaste woman” (2016, 2).
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23 These accounts reveal how deeply personal experiences of emasculatation and the societal
24 expectation to protect women intersect with broader political grievances. The fighters' motivations
25 are not solely rooted in opposition to the regime but are also profoundly influenced by gendered
26 identities and roles. The interplay between personal grievances, gender expectations, and political
27 violence offers a nuanced understanding of how masculinist values drive and sustain combatant
28 behavior in the Syrian conflict. These findings empirically substantiate the theoretical claim
29 advanced earlier that grievance and masculinity are mutually constitutive logics of mobilisation
30 (Aldoughli 2024b, 2024d, 2025a; Dolan 2011; Theidon 2009).
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39 This is evidenced by the fighters' awareness of long-standing grievances, in which
40 experiences of grievances and political repression revealed the role of gendered identities in the
41 dynamics of the Syrian civil war. One fighter explained, “We know the regime very well...I was
42 22 when the revolution started and there is no one day that passed without feeling oppression and
43 fear” (Interview 3). Others mentioned the Hama Massacre as an “old living memory” and the
44 “persecution and enforced disappearance of relatives and close friends in the 1980s by the regime”
45 (Interview 4). Additional grievances cited included “lack of job opportunities” (Interview 5),
46 “confiscation of their houses by the regime in central Damascus” (Interview 6), and the regime’s
47 repressive measures to relocate people to rural Damascus. In another instance, one fighter
48 described the “excruciating pain felt after a policeman slapped him because he refused to give him
49 a bribe” (Interview 7).
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5 Social psychology views participation in combat as "a departure from the usual behavioral
6 patterns within a specific social context (Webber et al. 2018, 272). It occurs when an individual
7 undergoes an emotional event that triggers a sense of self-uncertainty. Murshed and Tadjoeeddin
8 (2009, 16) divided grievances into the components of relative deprivation, horizontal inequality,
9 and polarization. Relative deprivation was emphasized by Gurr (1970: 24–37), who defined it as
10 the discrepancy between what a group of people believe they deserve within society vs. the
11 conditions that they actually experience. Gurr concluded that such relative deprivation causes
12 intense discomfort and frustration among people who experience it, which builds up even further
13 the longer the relative deprivation continues, eventually leading to violent outcomes. Subsequent
14 empirical literature has found that perceptions of relative deprivation were extremely common in
15 civil conflict situations (Horowitz 1985), though some scholars have noted that perceived
16 deprivation does not always lead to war (Brush 1996). Here comes the construction of gendered
17 identities during times of war and how it eventually exacerbates perceived grievances turning them
18 into acts of violence.
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31 The way these fighters narrated their reasons encompassed feelings of emasculation and
32 helplessness. One fighter recounted: "The police marched into the mosque during a Friday
33 prayer...they started hitting us with their sticks calling us traitors and coward men...they implied
34 that we were receiving money for our protests and for demanding freedom and dignity' (Interview
35 8). The fighter continued, saying, "me and my friends felt humiliated...we are not men that can be
36 used as pawns...we have not sold our dignity (*karamah*)...yet...we are real men..we are men of
37 the revolution (*rijal al-thawra*)'. This perception is further embedded in how the fighter constructs
38 his identity as a heroic fighter who will protect the woman and the fatherland. This predominance
39 of 'heroism' coupled with feelings of grievances in the fighters' narratives reinforces models of
40 strong military men ready to sacrifice and kill for the 'revolution'. As one fighter insists:
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50 This revolution is about our honor...it is us...honor (*sharaf*) is about dignity and being
51 ready to protect those weak and helpless people specially women, children and elderly. Our
52 revolution is not only about changing the political system and overthrowing this oppressive
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3 regime...it is personal now...we can't go back in time and forget how the regime treated
4 us and treated my family (Interview 9).
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10 These manifestations of hegemonic masculinities as national exemplars constitute some of
11 the basic tenets that become markers of defining 'men of the revolution' (*rijal al-thawra*), as one
12 fighter insists (Interview 10). In this context, Hegemonic masculinity often includes a focus on
13 competition, hierarchical order, and power relations among men themselves. It highlights the
14 constructed boundaries between superior and inferior men based on physical strength. This version
15 of masculinity became complicated with its interaction among perceived notions of the
16 'revolution,' manhood and militarism constituting ethos of soldiery forms that reinforces
17 hegemonic masculinity. Hooper considers soldiering "characterized as a manly activity requiring
18 the 'masculine' traits of physical strength, action, toughness, [and] capacity for violence" (Hooper
19 2001, 47). Indeed, fighters' perceptions of these grievances have been intertwined with their
20 justification of using violence, as one fighter recounts the first time he carried a gun: 'I was a
21 university student studying civil engineering...never for a minute in my life I imagined myself
22 carrying a gun! As you know I am from the city so never in my family we even tried hunting! But
23 when I witnessed my girlfriend harassed by shabiha in one of the early peaceful protests in Rukn
24 el-Deen [district in Damascus], I told my friends that our peaceful approach won't work with this
25 violent regime!' (Interview 11).
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37 Another fighter laments how he was ashamed of himself for his inability to protect his
38 girlfriend during a protest and how he felt that he let down his girlfriend. He said:
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43 I know my girlfriend might understand that I can't protect her because the shabiha were all
44 holding arms, but I still felt helpless...this helplessness vanished when I decided to join
45 the Free Syrian Army in 2012 (Interview 12).
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51 While these wordings clearly emphasise masculinist protection, but also the fighter's perceptions
52 of his identity played a determining role in fashioning ideas of war (see Mosse 1993, 4). This
53 elevation of militarism, sacrifice and heroism are consistent with not only the rise of militarized
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3 masculinity, but also captures deep grievous perception of ‘lost virility (*rujulah*).’ This was
4 manifested in his wordings: ‘we lost our houses and everything...yet I will never accept to lose
5 my virility (*rujulti*).’
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10 This sense of lost virility was intertwined with experiences of physical torture. One fighter,
11 who was detained for seven months beginning in July 2011 in Tadmur prison, recalled his arrest
12 following his participation in a protest held on the 'Friday of Freedom for Detainees' (Asra al-
13 Hurriyah). After the beatings and abuse began... I was detained for 7 months...upon my
14 release...we, the revolution coordination committees held meetings and started coordinating with
15 armed groups...I will never forget the torture and the humiliation I endured’ (Interview 13). After
16 his release, the fighter expressed how his views changed regarding women’s participation in the
17 protests: ‘we started informing the women that it was difficult for them to join us and be with us...
18 We had women who were not veiled, and they were forced to veil themselves to hide their
19 identities... I felt that I had to protect them... They were not my sisters or close relatives, but they
20 were our honor. From there, we decided to carry sticks and set up burning tires to prevent the
21 shabiha and regime forces from reaching us’ (Interview 13). This sense of masculinist protection
22 was echoed by another fighter who expressed his emotions upon witnessing the physical torture
23 of one woman that
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36 I witnessed an incident where security forces were dragging a girl out of her house. She
37 was my neighbor's daughter, and she was veiled... The security forces pulled her out in her
38 nightgown... I felt pity for her father and brothers, seeing their honor being trampled on.
39 Her brothers, who were my friends, and I swore an oath to take revenge (Interview 14).
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45 While these experiences can be conceptualized as grievances, the decision to join armed
46 groups was more closely linked to how these individuals perceived their identities as men. The
47 interplay between political grievances and masculinist perceptions was extended not only to the
48 intersection of masculinity and grievances, but marks the evolutionary and transformational
49 ideational process at the micro-level mobilization of fighters, as one fighter explicitly stated: ‘I
50 will never forget the minute where a peaceful protest was attacked by security forces, saying: ‘I
51 did not care if I was to be detained by shabiha, but what scares me as a man belongs to the
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3 revolution that we are so weak and cannot defend ourselves' (Interview 15). For grievance
4 theorists, rivalry and perceptions of injustice between various social identity groups are regarded
5 as a central factor in the onset and especially the continuation of violent conflict. This was further
6 espoused by the feelings of despair and uncertainty engulfing the Syrian context as a result of
7 geopolitical stagnation and inaction from the international community:
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11 After 12 years of inaction..we must not wait for anyone to rescue us! We must not expect
12 protection from anyone or any state...then we are not men enough....at the beginning of
13 the militarization of the revolution, it was to protect my land and family; I felt that we were
14 forced! Now, I kept fighting because of the geopolitics of the region and inaction of this
15 world! Thow can we let down our people and our revolution... I personally and many men
16 like me...we must act as true men (Interview 16).
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24 In this context, feelings of relative deprivation emerged as much from perceived social
25 discrimination as from material conditions, and they were heightened when state authorities were
26 seen as disregarding or disparaging the group's identity; here it is identity of men (see Regan and
27 Norton 2005). In essence, the concept of "grievous masculinity" illuminates the profound ways in
28 which personal and collective grievances intertwine with masculine identities to drive the
29 motivations of Syrian fighters. These grievances, often rooted in experiences of emasculation,
30 political repression, and societal humiliation, are not merely emotional reactions but are deeply
31 embedded within the fighters' perceptions of their roles as protectors, avengers, and defenders of
32 honor.
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41 While *grievous masculinity* emerges from humiliation, loss, and emasculation, the
42 battlefield becomes the site where these emotions are reconstituted into solidarity and ritualised
43 violence: a process I conceptualise as *combat-driven masculinity*.
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47 *Combat-Driven Masculinity*

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49 There is a contentious debates surrounding the extent to which the saliency of group identities
50 correlates with the rise of civil conflicts (Stewart 2013; Huddy 2001). Other scholars have
51 importantly pointed out that without the felt affiliation and organizing principle of group identity,
52 the collective action necessary for factions to undertake a war would not be feasible (Sanín and
53 Wood 2014). In an empirical sense, it is incontrovertible that military factions participating in
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3 conflicts rely heavily on identity concepts and in-group formations to maintain participants'
4 motivation and loyalty (Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020). This form of brotherhood resonates with
5 Higate's (2003) notion of fratriarchy and the role of combat experience in shaping the identity of
6 warrior. This aligns with the theoretical framing of *combat-driven masculinity*, where the
7 experience of fighting and surviving together transforms the individual from a victim of
8 emasculation into an active bearer of masculine virtue and moral worth (Theidon 2009; Duriesmith
9 2015). Combat thus becomes both the arena and the ritual through which masculinity is
10 reconstituted and sanctified.

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18 In response to political grievances and the enforced demographic changes and
19 displacement (*nuzūh*), fighters often experience a profound loss of identity, which drives them to
20 affiliate with armed groups as a means of reclaiming this lost sense of self. War not only reshapes
21 identities and the boundaries between self and other but also introduces combat as a significant
22 motivator for joining these groups (King 2013). In such contexts, combat becomes a powerful
23 mobilizing tool, fostering familial bonds among fighters that mitigate feelings of identity loss. The
24 debate among scholars regarding whether fighters are primarily motivated by group loyalty or
25 ideological commitment remains unresolved (Pawiński and Chami 2019, 299). The Syrian
26 conflict, as illustrated by the sample in this study, offers a compelling example, particularly given
27 the protracted nature of the conflict. Fighters frequently cite both the revolutionary cause and the
28 protection of their comrades as equally important motivations. One fighter, for instance, explained:
29 "sometimes I think about how I am enduring all these traumas and loss! Our failure to overthrow
30 the regime and the continuity of injustice would have killed me if it was not for my comrades that
31 relieves me."
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43 Over the past two decades, a central debate among sociologists has focused on whether
44 war produces gendered identities or whether pre-existing gendered identities intensify violent
45 behavior. At the heart of this discussion lies the question of how combat experience reshapes
46 individuals' perceptions of themselves and others. The Syrian case is not an exceptional one, I
47 found parallels with the findings of Whitehouse and his colleagues regarding over 170 Libyan
48 fighters. Their study suggests that the "fighting together" hypothesis serves as a significant
49 motivator for individuals to continue their involvement. Scholars argue that battle experiences are
50 foundational for the social cohesion of a group triggered by the experience of fighting (Whitehouse
51 and Lanman 2014, 677). Such combat experiences generate a strong sense of unity that transcends
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3 racial and ethnic boundaries. One fighter, recounted a pivotal moment: "In a battle I will never
4 forget, I was notified of an impending attack on our base. I could have left, but if I did, I would
5 not have been able to warn my comrades. I felt that it was better to die knowing that I had not
6 betrayed them" (Interview 17). Moreover, the readiness for self-sacrifice establish bonds that
7 extend beyond familial and blood relationships, leading to a shared sense of destiny within the
8 group.
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15 The meaning of conflict often becomes crystallized within the boundaries of the battlefield,
16 where the symbolism of war, embodied in the notions of victory and defeat, has a profound
17 influence on the trajectory of the conflict (Larsen 2004, 473). The spaces delineated during battles
18 not only shape the course of war but also play a crucial role in shaping the identities of the fighters.
19 This creates a spatial-identity relationship that is intimately connected to the experience of combat.
20 Furthermore, the symbolic meanings of war, along with the resulting "mentality" and "behavior,"
21 are essential in the formation of a fighter's identity (Hedetoft 1993). However, while these insights
22 are valuable, they overlook how masculinity intersects with combat experiences and the
23 reformation of identity. The identity constructed through the experience of combat and war raises
24 critical questions: Does this newly constructed identity drive individuals to engage in combat, or
25 does the act of fighting itself reinforce masculinist attitudes, or perhaps both? The evidence
26 suggests that when ordinary individuals join military groups, many of whom had no prior military
27 affiliation before the 2011 revolution, their relationships with fellow fighters often take on familial
28 characteristics. Once the concept of "family" becomes entrenched in the fighter's mindset, it serves
29 as a powerful motivator, driving them to make significant sacrifices, including self-sacrifice, for
30 their group. These findings enhance our theoretical understanding of the "behavior" that emerges
31 from participation in military action.
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45 In asking the fighters about their bonds with their fellow fighters, they all narrated stories
46 related to how going to battles together have strengthened their familial and blood ties with their
47 comrades. These family ties contributed to gendering the nation as a 'brotherhood entity' that
48 defines relations among fighters in expressions of kinship and family: "They are like parents to
49 me... Better than my relationship with my own family" (Interview 18); "blood brothers" (Interview
50 19); "brotherly relationship" (Interview 20); "we are brothers" (Interview 21); "they are like
51 brothers, and our bond is stronger than family ties" (Interview 22); "they are like brothers to me, I
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3 would give up everything for them, even stronger than my relationship with my own parents"
4 (Interview 23); "brothers" (Interview 24); "our relationship is incredibly strong" (Interview 24);
5 Another fighter added, "My relationship with my fellow fighters is stronger than my connection
6 with my biological brothers and sisters. It's so strong that I've saved some of their names in my
7 phone as 'my brother so-and-so,' and I don't exaggerate when I say that I would sacrifice everything
8 for them" (Interview 25). One fighter reflected on the bond formed in the heat of battle, saying,
9 "The battlefield forges a brotherhood that is stronger than blood. I've lost count of how many times
10 we've pulled each other from the brink of death, and each time it happens, it solidifies our
11 commitment to the cause" (Interview 26).
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23 It is important to recognize that the images of sacrifice that occupy the fighter's mind during
24 battle function as mechanisms for memory formation. Although this memory may be inherently
25 militarized, it plays a crucial role in shaping their self-perception and identity. A different fighter
26 described how these experiences altered his sense of purpose: "Before the war, I fought for my
27 own survival. Now, I fight for the memories of those who are gone. Their sacrifice is what drives
28 me; it's what gives me the strength to keep going, even when it seems impossible" (Interview 27).
29 This process of memory creation through the experience of combat underpins the combatants'
30 understanding of their own roles and actions within the context of conflict. This manufactured
31 identity, constructed through the experience of battle, has been exacerbated through idealizing acts
32 of sacrifice and heroism that intersects with their perception of being 'revolutionary men'. One
33 fighter echoed this sentiment, stating, "Every battle etches new memories in my mind. Each time
34 I lose a comrade, it reinforces why I fight. Their sacrifices are a reminder that we must continue,
35 not just for ourselves, but for everyone who has fallen" (Interview 28).
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46 This experience of fighting together became synonymous with the male realization of
47 manhood and masculinity. One fighter illustrated this by stating, "in the heat of battle, I am not
48 just defending my land or my people; I am proving to myself and to others that I am a man, a
49 protector. The blood we shed binds us as brothers, and each sacrifice strengthens the memory of
50 who we are meant to be—warriors, not victims" (Interview 29). It is remarkable that many of the
51 incidents mentioned in the interviews focused on fighters risking their lives and sacrificing
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3 themselves to save others. As one fighter explained, "during battle, when the enemies are in front
4 of us, our thoughts are focused on one thing: advancing and achieving victory. We must protect
5 our comrades from death; it's either death or victory, with no other option" (Interview 30).
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7 Sometimes, these acts of solidarity extended to strangers, and at other times, to neighbors
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9 (Interview 31).
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13 This relationship of solidarity and sacrifice transcended even the differences that existed
14 before the revolution. One story illustrates this transformation: "In one of the battles I participated
15 in, the commander of the battalion I was fighting alongside was a young man from a clan different
16 from ours. Before the revolution, there was a history of bloodshed between us where 8 were dead
17 among us. Yet, in that battle, I found myself in a situation where I needed to survive, and he bravely
18 covered the fire to help me escape, even though he got shot in the process. During that battle, I
19 forgot all about revenge; everything changed. We had a common purpose and a shared enemy, and
20 our past tribal dispute no longer mattered" (Interview 32). The earlier quotes from the group of
21 fighters demonstrate a consensus that the process of "remembering" the battles in which they were
22 in danger of dying or witnessing one of their comrades die is a transformative and pivotal moment
23 in their decision to continue fighting (Interview 33). The nexus of masculine brotherhood and
24 violence become salient in fighters' performances of combat, which cannot be explained in purely
25 materialistic acts. Rather, this sense of brotherhood is grounded in a felt need to re-entrench and
26 affirm the gendered and politicized psychological identity matrixes interwoven with readiness to
27 die, an outlook that elevates the image and power of an active martial man. As one fighter
28 illustrated: 'I will never forget how my friend was killed in front of my eyes in the battle to liberate
29 Aleppo...I tried to shield him, but I could not...I lost my family in the early protests and these
30 fighters became my only family now...I will never forget...or stop fighting to avenge their death'
31 (Interview 34).
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47 Conclusion

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50 This article has examined how masculinities shape Syrian fighters' participation in armed
51 mobilisation by conceptualising grievance as a gendered and emotionally constituted process. By
52 centring fighters' narratives, it demonstrates that participation in violence cannot be fully
53 understood through material or ideological explanations alone, but must be analysed through the
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3 relational and affective processes through which experiences of humiliation, loss, and moral
4 violation become internalised as threats to masculine identity. In this framework, masculinity is
5 understood as an emotionally constituted form of gendered subjectivity expressed through
6 practices of protection, sacrifice, and violence, rather than as a fixed social role or stable identity.
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11 Building on this conceptualisation, the article developed two analytical typologies (**grievous**
12 **masculinity** and **combat-driven masculinity**) as heuristic tools for tracing distinct yet
13 interconnected processes of mobilisation. Grievous masculinity captures how experiences of
14 collective humiliation and dispossession are internalised as moral injury, producing a perceived
15 obligation to restore dignity through violence. Combat-driven masculinity, by contrast, emerges
16 through participation in warfare itself, where masculine subjectivities are consolidated through
17 embodied practices of risk, sacrifice, and brotherhood. These typologies are not fixed categories
18 but relational processes that illuminate how structural conditions, emotional experience, and
19 gendered norms interact to produce political subjectivities oriented toward violence. By
20 identifying these processes, the article contributes to debates in the masculinities literature by
21 specifying how emotional and moral dynamics mediate the relationship between structural
22 grievance and armed mobilisation.
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33 The findings also extend existing scholarship on masculinities in armed conflict. While dominant
34 approaches emphasise gender norms, institutional structures, or hegemonic configurations of
35 masculinity, this study highlights the central role of emotional experience in transforming
36 grievance into gendered political action. It therefore bridges feminist security studies, civil war
37 scholarship, and critical masculinity studies by demonstrating how masculine identities operate as
38 affective and moral economies that sustain both the decision to fight and the persistence of
39 violence.
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46 Empirically, the analysis draws primarily on thirty-four interviews conducted between 2022 and
47 2024 with Syrian National Army fighters, capturing wartime processes of mobilisation and identity
48 formation. These findings are complemented by follow-up fieldwork conducted in Syria after the
49 fall of Bashar al-Assad in 2025, including re-interviews with former fighters who had transitioned
50 into administrative and military roles. These follow-up observations indicate that the masculinities
51 identified in the earlier phase of the research have not dissipated but have been reconfigured within
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3 Syria's post-Assad political order. The distinction between these empirical phases clarifies the
4 temporal scope of the study while illustrating the persistence and transformation of militarised
5 masculinities across political transition.
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9 Following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, these dynamics entered a new
10 historical phase. Efforts by Interim President Ahmad al-Shar'a to transform revolutionary fighters
11 into state actors sought to redirect the energies of struggle toward governance and reconstruction.
12 Yet the emotional and social infrastructures of grievance and combat proved resistant to
13 institutional transformation. Subsequent violence in the coastal region and mass mobilisation in
14 Sweida illustrate how grievous masculinity, once directed against the regime, has been
15 reconfigured into sectarianised forms of vengeance, while combat-driven masculinity has been
16 reactivated through renewed mobilisation and collective defence. These developments
17 demonstrate that the moral imperative to fight remains embedded in Syria's political and emotional
18 landscape, persisting even as fighters assume positions within state institutions.
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28 The persistence of these masculinities underscores the importance of examining the gendered
29 legacies of conflict beyond the battlefield. Rather than disappearing with political transition,
30 militarised masculinities may be reconstituted within postwar governance, shaping authority,
31 legitimacy, and patterns of violence. The trajectories of Syrian fighters (from revolutionaries to
32 state actors and, in some cases, to renewed combatants) reveal how masculinities are historically
33 contingent yet durable frameworks through which political belonging, protection, and domination
34 are negotiated.
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41 These findings carry broader implications for post-conflict reconstruction and security sector
42 reform. International stabilisation initiatives have largely prioritised institutional restructuring
43 while neglecting the gendered logics that sustain armed mobilisation. By demonstrating how
44 masculinities function as drivers of mobilisation and political authority, this study suggests that
45 postwar reform efforts must engage not only with organisational structures but also with the
46 emotional and symbolic dimensions of identity, grievance, and belonging.
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52 More broadly, the framework developed here offers a basis for analysing how gendered
53 subjectivities shape mobilisation in other conflict contexts characterised by experiences of
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3 humiliation, dispossession, and political transition. Future research could further examine how
4 these processes intersect with class, sectarian, and regional identities, and how militarised
5 masculinities evolve across different armed groups and post-conflict settings.
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9 By conceptualising masculinity as an affective and relational process through which grievance
10 becomes moralised and politicised, this article advances theoretical debates on gender and political
11 violence while providing an empirically grounded account of the mechanisms linking emotional
12 experience, identity formation, and armed mobilisation. Understanding these processes remains
13 essential for analysing both the dynamics of war and the challenges of building durable peace in
14 post-conflict societies.
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