Performance Monitoring and the Incentives for Exertion of Effort

Mugerman, Yevgeny and Winter, Eyal and Yafeh, Tomer (2024) Performance Monitoring and the Incentives for Exertion of Effort. The Quarterly Journal of Finance, 14 (2): 2440005. ISSN 2010-1392

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Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of monitoring intensity on individuals’ motivation to exert effort. Using an experimental approach, we designed a test comprising six problems, with varied levels of monitoring and success criteria, to evaluate performance as an indicator of effort. The results reveal a nonlinear relationship between the stringency of monitoring criteria and worker performance. Interestingly, we found that optimal performance is attained when participants are required to answer correctly only one of the six problems. This study enhances our understanding of performance monitoring strategies and their effects in modern work settings.

Item Type:
Journal Article
Journal or Publication Title:
The Quarterly Journal of Finance
Uncontrolled Keywords:
/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2003
Subjects:
?? performance monitoringemployee motivationexperimental economicsincentive structuressuccess criteria in performance testsfinanceeconomics and econometricsstrategy and management ??
ID Code:
235692
Deposited By:
Deposited On:
25 Feb 2026 14:05
Refereed?:
Yes
Published?:
Published
Last Modified:
25 Feb 2026 14:05