Collective Agency and Structural Epistemic Injustice

Smith, Leonie (2024) Collective Agency and Structural Epistemic Injustice. In: Collective Responsibility : Perspectives on Political Philosophy from Social Ontology. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality (SIPS) . Springer, Cham, pp. 225-252. ISBN 9783031687174

Abstract

In some forms of epistemic injustice, the harm comes about because of systematic and pervasive background conditions of prejudice (Fricker, Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). The injustice is enabled by background structural injustices (BSIs). However, in addition to background structural injustices enabling numerous forms of epistemic injustice, there are also forms of epistemic injustice that simply are structural injustices in their own right. Rather than being enabled by the presence of BSIs, they are in themselves structural injustices that are best understood as structural epistemic injustices (SEIs). In this chapter, I suggest that, while it is already difficult to identify sources of collective responsibility for prevention and redress in the case of BSIs, either in terms of backward- or forward-looking duties, Iris Marion Young’s social connection model may nevertheless help us to do so. However, I further argue that there are additional epistemic complications around the identification and resolution of SEIs, which make it even more difficult to identify sources of responsibility for these forms of structural injustice, both ontologically and practically. I conclude that the social connection model may not always help with identifying responsibility for SEIs and that we may need to look more widely, to fully identify those who are responsible.