Whose Gender Ideology Matters? A Dyadic Analysis of Gender Ideology and Housework Time in the United Kingdom

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Data statement

The data used in this research were made available through the UK Data Archive. The United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study is an initiative funded by the ESRC and various Government Departments, with scientific leadership by the Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, and survey delivery by NatCen Social Research and Kantar Public. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Archive bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

Ethics statement

The secondary data analyzed here were collected under a protocol compliant with the Helsinki Declaration on human subjects testing, with full ethical approval at the institution of the original data collector (i.e., the University of Essex), and with informed consent from all participants. The anonymized dataset was then released through the UK Data Archive (UKDA). Because we conducted only analysis of a fully anonymized secondary dataset and we had agreed to the relevant conditions of confidentiality and terms of use set out by the UKDA, further ethical approval from the authors' institutions was not required.

Conflict of interest

None.

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Abstract

Research on gender ideology and housework tends to treat gender ideology as an individual

characteristic but has paid less attention to the interactional process in which both spouses'

gender ideologies jointly shape their housework time. Analysing longitudinal dyadic data

from the United Kingdom (1993–2020) using the actor-partner interdependence model, we

examine the relationship between both spouses' gender ideologies and their housework time

and how the relationship varies with the spouses' relative income. The results show that

traditional gender ideology is associated with longer housework time for wives but shorter

housework time for husbands. While wives' gender ideologies are more closely associated

with their own housework time, husbands' ideologies are more closely associated with their

wives' housework time. Moreover, compared with the husband's housework time, the wife's

housework time is more susceptible to both spouses' ideologies, especially when both

spouses align in traditional ideology and when the husband's relative income is high. Our

findings highlight the value of a relational perspective and provide new insights into how

interactional dimensions of gender ideology intersect with relative resources to shape

spouses' gendered housework time in different-sex couples.

Keywords: Dyadic, gender ideology, housework time, relational, relative income.

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Introduction

Despite long-term progress towards gender equality in the public sphere, such as women's increased education and labour force participation, progress towards gender equality has been slow and limited in the domestic sphere, as reflected in an uneven and stalled gender revolution (England 2010; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015). As a result, the division of unpaid domestic labour remains gendered in many societies, with women carrying out a disproportionately large share of housework and care labour (Hu and Yucel 2018; Kan and Kolpashnikova 2021; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). Enduring gender inequalities in the domestic realm are attributable to various structural constraints.

Particularly, the persistence of traditional gender norms in society is frequently cited as a key factor that perpetuates the gender division of housework through enforcing and reinforcing gendered perceptions and responses to the structural conditions of family life (Kan and Kolpashnikova 2021).

To date, there has been a substantial body of research showing that traditional gender ideology is positively associated with women's and negatively associated with men's housework time (Aassve, Fuochi, and Mencarini 2014; Carlson and Lynch 2013; Kan and Kolpashnikova 2021; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010; Lewin-Epstein, Stier, and Braun 2006). As an important predictor of housework, gender ideology shapes what is considered acceptable for men and women in terms of domestic responsibilities and how individuals perceive and enact expected gender roles within the household (Carlson and Lynch 2013; Davis and Greenstein 2009). The formation of gender ideology and its manifestation in

domestic labour is closely embedded in and influenced by social structures through relational processes, including interactions between family members¹. However, most existing research tends to treat gender ideology as an individual characteristic, paying relatively scarce attention to interactional processes in which spouses' gender ideologies may interact with each other and jointly shape their housework participation.

This study adopts a relational perspective to study how both spouses' gender ideologies relate to their housework time and how the patterns vary with the spouses' relative income. Highlighting the impact of interactions within couple dyads on the formation and enactment of gender ideologies (Carlson and Lynch 2013; Greenstein 1996), the relational perspective emphasises the crucial role of social interactions in mediating and embodying the structural conditions of family life under which couples negotiate their housework division (Elder 1998; Wang and Li 2022). Relational interactions not only help communicate societal expectations regarding gender roles but also mediate the ways in which individuals internalise and enact these expectations in everyday family life. Within the context of housework, a person's willingness to engage in or delegate housework tasks can be influenced by their spouse's ideology, the distribution of power within the relationship, and mutual expectations based on societal norms (Evertsson 2014; Nisic and Trübner 2023). The negotiation of housework duties between spouses, therefore, reflects a complex interplay of individual gender ideologies shaped through relational interactions.

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¹ For simplicity, we use the term "spouse" to refer to both married spouses and cohabiting partners in this article.

To develop a systematic understanding of the relational dynamics between gender ideology and housework time, this study analyses longitudinal dyadic data from the United Kingdom, spanning 1993–2020, using the actor-partner interdependence model (APIM). The APIM is a statistical approach designed to explore how individuals within a dyadic relationship, such as couples, exert mutual influences on each other. Accounting for the interdependent nature of dyadic data, it facilitates the analysis of dynamics both within and between dyads (Kenny, Kashy, and Cook 2006). The APIM has enjoyed broad application in previous research on housework and working time (Nisic and Trübner 2023; Stertz, Grether, and Wiese 2017; Trübner 2022). In this study, we focus on housework (rather than childcare), which is widely recognised as a routine site of gender inequality regardless of parenthood status (Davis and Greenstein 2013).

We address three sets of research questions in this study. First, building on the APIM approach, we disentangle how individuals' housework time within couple dyads relate to their own ("actor effects") and their spouses' ("partner effects") gender ideologies, as well as how the strengths of these gender ideology—housework associations differ by gender². Second, given that housework allocation is a relational process, we further examine how both spouses' housework time relates to the interaction between their gender ideologies. Here, we pay particular attention to the scenarios in which spouses' gender ideologies (dis)align with each other. Third, we investigate how the relationship between both spouses' gender

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² In line with the APIM terminologies, "effect" in this paper is used to denote the association, but not causality, between predictor and dependent variables.

ideologies and their housework time varies with the spouses' relative income (Aassve et al. 2014; Brines 1994). In answering these questions, our analyses shed light on how the ideational and material configurations of couple relationships intersect to shape domestic gender inequality.

Theoretical Considerations and Literature Review

Gender Ideology and Housework Time

In different-sex couples, gender ideology has been widely recognised as a key factor shaping gendered housework participation. A key component of gender ideology is people's perceptions and expectations about the appropriate roles of men and women in the labour market and at home (Davis and Greenstein 2009). The development of gender ideology and its behavioural enactment in domestic labour are closely embedded in and shaped by social structures (Davis and Greenstein 2009; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010; Wang 2019). From an early age, individuals are socialised into gender-specific roles through family, education, and broader social interactions, which establish expectations for gender-appropriate behaviours in family life (Carlson and Lynch 2013). These ideologies are further consolidated by law, policies, and workplace practices that institutionalise gender norms. For example, economic structures, such as gender pay gaps and occupational gender segregation, help reinforce traditional gender ideology and buttress men's role as the breadwinner and women's role as the homemaker (Brinton and Lee 2016; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015).

Extensive empirical research shows that gender ideology not only affects people's

housework participation directly, but it also indirectly affects housework allocation through influencing their labour market status, income, and time availability (Carlson and Lynch 2013; Davis and Greenstein 2009). Across many countries, traditional gender ideology is associated with longer housework hours for women and shorter housework hours for men, whereas egalitarian gender ideology is associated with a more gender-equal division of domestic labour, whereby women spend less time and men spend more time on housework (Aassve et al. 2014; Kan and Kolpashnikova 2021; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). However, some studies reported a gender asymmetry in the relationship between gender ideology and housework. In Germany and Israel, for example, women with egalitarian gender ideology spend significantly less time on housework than their traditional counterparts, but gender ideology bears little association with men's housework (Lewin-Epstein et al. 2006). Similarly, in Canada, gender ideology is a more important predictor of women's than men's housework time (Gazso-Windle and McMullin 2003).

Despite a consensus that housework allocation is a relational process in which spouses negotiate their housework contribution (Daminger 2020; Nisic and Trübner 2023; Wang and Cheng 2023), most existing research tends to examine gender ideology as an individual characteristic, while paying insufficient attention to interactional processes within couple dyads (Greenstein 1996). Against this backdrop, individual-level analyses insufficiently consider couple-level dynamics in housework allocation. To remedy this limitation, we adopt a dyadic approach to understanding how spouses' housework participation is jointly configured by both spouses' gender ideologies, while accounting for the interrelations

between spouses' housework time as well as gender ideologies.

A Dyadic Approach: "Actor" and "Partner" Effects of Gender Ideology on Housework

Drawing on the "linked lives" perspective, this study departs from an individual-level focus
to adopt a dyadic approach, emphasising interactions and interdependence between spouses
(Elder 1998; Moen and Yu 2000). A dyadic approach underlines the embeddedness of an
individual's life within the lives of other family members and argues that the events and
experiences of one family member could immediately affect other family members and vice
versa (Elder 1998). Such cross-over effects may be particularly pronounced between spouses
who cooperate intensely in household tasks at close quarters. Indeed, research provides ample
evidence regarding how conjugal interactions and influences can shape both spouses'
outcomes (Daminger 2020; Minnotte et al. 2010; Nisic and Trübner 2023). This underscores
the need for a relational, dyadic approach that accounts for both spouses' gender ideologies
when examining their housework participation.

Conceptually, the relational perspective is well grounded in gender theories, which have long emphasised the interactional construction of gender (Risman 2018) and argued that in couple relationships, spouses relationally negotiate their housework participation based on their economic resources, cultural beliefs, and time availability (Evertsson 2014; Greenstein 1996; Kan et al. 2022). In this relational framework, housework becomes not just a chore but also a means through which gender roles are fulfilled, contested, and potentially redefined. Each spouse's approach to household tasks is thus seen as an expression of their internalised

gender norms within the dynamics and structural conditions of their relationship. The relational perspective provides a valuable lens for understanding the (re)construction of gender in family life (Davis and Greenstein 2013; Nisic and Trübner 2023). It recognises that individuals' ideologies and behaviours are embedded within a web of social relationships and interactions. A dyadic approach, therefore, underscores the importance of considering both individual and interactive processes in addressing gender disparities in household labour (Stertz et al. 2017; Wang and Cheng 2023).

Empirically, to better understand the relational dynamics between gender ideology and housework time, this study analyses dyadic data using the APIM. This approach allows us to empirically investigate mutual influence processes, shedding light on the interplay between spouses' ideologies and behaviours. Going beyond individual-level analyses that treat each spouse as isolated, such an approach allows us to understand how societal expectations and norms are embraced or contested within couple relationships (Nisic and Trübner 2023; Wang and Cheng 2023). It thus promises to provide deeper insights into mechanisms such as crossover influences between spouses underlying their gendered housework participation and the role of their gender ideologies therein (Stertz et al. 2017).

To date, very few studies have explicitly distinguished between the gender ideologies of the husband and the wife, considered their interrelations, and examined how they interactively relate to each spouse's housework time. As one of the few exceptions, Greenstein's (1996) cross-sectional study analysed the interactive effects between the husband's and the wife's gender ideologies on housework allocation in the United States,

showing that husbands with traditional gender ideology undertook little housework regardless of their wives' gender ideology, and husbands only did more housework when both spouses held relatively egalitarian gender ideologies. More recently, Nitsche and Grunnow (2018) proposed the notion of ideology pairing to examine how spouses' gender ideology pairings within couples affect their division of childcare in Germany. They found that fathers' contribution to childcare is facilitated by spouses' alignment in egalitarian gender ideology and by the mother's large contribution to the couple's income. These findings highlight that a relational view of spouses' both ideological and economic pairings is crucial to understanding their childcare division. Their work provides a promising direction for studying the gender division of housework through a relational lens.

Given the very limited dyadic analysis in previous research, our study aims to disentangle the actor and partner effects of both spouses' gender ideologies on their housework time using the APIM (Gistelinck and Loeys 2019; Kenny et al. 2006; Vowels and Mark 2020). In the APIM, the actor effect refers to the effect of the husband's or the wife's gender ideology on their own housework time, and the partner effect refers to the effect of one's gender ideology on his or her spouse's housework time (Kenny and Ledermann 2010).

Traditional gender ideology obliges women rather than men to shoulder the lion's share of housework – a prediction that has received wide empirical support (Davis and Greenstein 2009; Evertsson 2014; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). According to the notion of "doing gender" (West and Zimmerman 1987), gender is (re)produced through the enactment of gendered behaviours (e.g., housework) that are socially constructed and deemed "gender-

appropriate". The feminisation of housework, especially routine chores such as cooking and cleaning, imposes the normative pressure on women to shoulder the lion's share of domestic responsibilities, while deterring men from such responsibilities in safeguarding their sense of masculinity (Quadlin and Doan 2018; Starrels 1994; Thébaud 2010). When an individual holds more traditional gender beliefs and expects their spouse to conform to traditional gender roles, it can create pressure on their spouse to fulfil the expectation (Li et al. 2020; Minnotte et al. 2010). We sum up these considerations in the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1A: Wives' traditional gender ideology has a positive actor effect on their own housework time and a negative partner effect on their husbands' housework time.
Hypothesis 1B: Husbands' traditional gender ideology has a negative actor effect on their own housework time and a positive partner effect on their wives' housework time.

We further expect to see gender differences in the susceptibility of individuals' housework time to their own and their spouses' gender ideologies. Despite the detraditionalisation of gender ideology throughout the gender revolution, men lag behind women in adapting their housework behaviours to the new norm of gender egalitarianism (Sullivan, Gershuny, and Robinson 2018). Indeed, long-term evidence shows a notable decrease in women's housework time but only a slight increase in men's housework time over the past decades (Altintas and Sullivan 2016). These insights suggest that progress towards egalitarian gender ideology has played a powerful role in reconfiguring women's rather than men's housework time. We thus expect that the wife's housework time is more susceptible to both spouses' gender ideologies than the husband's housework time, as specified in

Hypothesis 1C. As we unpack this gender difference, we argue that Hypothesis 1C is further grounded in the micro-foundation of power asymmetry between women and men in couple relationships. Given structural gender inequalities (e.g., more favourable labour market conditions for men) in the United Kingdom (Lu et al. 2023; Wang and Lu 2022), the husband tends to possess greater power than the wife. This may mean that a wife's gender ideology has a more limited influence on her husband's housework time than on her own housework time. Conversely, given men's advantageous power position, their traditional gender ideology may play a more prominent role in increasing their wives' housework time than reducing their already low housework contribution (Greenstein 1996). These considerations are summed up in Hypothesis 1D.

Hypothesis 1C: Compared with husbands' housework time, wives' housework time is more susceptible to both spouses' gender ideologies.

Hypothesis 1D: Wives' gender ideologies are more closely associated with their own than their husbands' housework time, whereas husbands' gender ideologies are more closely linked to their wives' than their own housework time.

(Dis)alignment in Spouses' Gender Ideologies and Housework Time

Given that housework allocation is a relational process involving both spouses, it is important to consider the interaction and particularly (dis)alignment between spouses' gender ideologies (Greenstein 1996; Kenny et al. 2006; Kenny and Ledermann 2010). When spouses similarly hold traditional or egalitarian gender ideology, the alignment enables them to validate each

other's ideology and support the translation of such ideology into housework behaviour more fully. For example, husbands with traditional gender ideology may expect their wives to take on the lion's share of housework, and wives subscribing to traditional gender ideology are likely to fulfil such expectations. By contrast, when spouses' gender ideologies disalign with each other, such disalignment may impede each other from fully realising their traditional or egalitarian gender ideology. For example, wives with egalitarian gender ideology may only be able to enact such ideology in behaviour if their husbands share the egalitarian ideology and step up with their housework contribution (Evertsson 2014; Greenstein 1996). In this case, spouses may compromise and meet in the middle, and their traditional and egalitarian ideologies may neutralise each other.

Building on "spousal reinforcement" in the case of ideological alignment, we expect to see interaction effects between both spouses' traditional gender ideologies on their housework time. Specifically, for spouses who share traditional gender ideology, wives tend to have multiplicatively longer housework hours and husbands have multiplicatively shorter housework hours compared to their counterparts who do not align with their spouse in traditional gender ideology. Conversely, when spouses share egalitarian gender ideology, the patterns would be reversed. However, should "spousal neutralisation" exist in the case of ideological disalignment, we expect that the husband and the wife will meet somewhere in between their respective ideals, with their housework hours falling between those of their counterparts aligned in egalitarian and in traditional gender ideologies. Using the APIM terms, we specify Hypotheses 2A and 2B as follows.

Hypothesis 2A: For wives, the positive actor effect and negative partner effect of their traditional gender ideology are more pronounced when their husbands share their traditional ideology compared to when their husbands have egalitarian ideology.

Hypothesis 2B: For husbands, the negative actor effect and positive partner effect of their traditional gender ideology are more pronounced when their wives share their traditional ideology compared to when their wives have egalitarian ideology.

Interactions between Gender Ideology and Relative Income

The translation of gender ideology into gendered housework behaviour may be further configured by relational dynamics in spouses' command of economic resources. Although Gupta's (2007) autonomy theory focuses on how individuals' economic resources (e.g., absolute income) directly influence their housework participation, we choose to focus on relative income given our primary interest in within-couple relational dynamics³ (Brines 1994; Kan 2008).

According to the economic dependence and relative resource perspectives, the relative income between spouses plays a key role in shaping their checks and balances of power, and the spouse making a greater contribution to the couple's income tends to command a greater amount of power (Brines 1994; Mannino and Deutsch 2007). A key premise of the relative resource perspective is that people tend to view housework as an unpleasant task and would prefer to avoid it (Kan 2008). Thus, one's greater relative contribution to the couple's income

 3 In supplementary tables, we present additional results on the moderating role of spouses' individual income.

may confer one with greater power to bargain or exchange their way out of housework (Aassve et al. 2014; Hu 2019). What is often overlooked in this economic model, however, is the implicit but untested assumption that power derived from relative income configures housework time by shaping each spouse's ability to translate their gender ideologies into housework behaviours.

For husbands, their high relative income may reflect and reinforce traditional gender roles (Aassve et al. 2014; Brines 1994), and the power conferred by their high relative income may bolster their ability to translate their traditional gender ideology into a reduction in their own and an increase in their wives' housework time. For wives, a low relative income and economic dependence on their husbands may undercut their bargaining power (Brines 1994; Bittman et al. 2003; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010), which in turn undermines their ability to translate their egalitarian gender ideology into a reduction in their own and an increase in their husbands' housework time. Building on these considerations, we expect husbands' larger rather than smaller contribution to the couple's income to bolster the effects of both spouses' traditional (vs. egalitarian) gender ideology on their own and their spouses' housework time, as in Hypothesis 3A.

Hypothesis 3A: The husband's greater relative contribution to the couple's income bolsters both the actor and partner effects of both spouses' traditional gender ideology on their housework time.

While Hypothesis 3A draws on the relative resource perspective, a counter-scenario, building on the "doing gender" perspective (West and Zimmerman 1987), may be possible.

Traditionally, a notable gender asymmetry exists in the economic roles of women and men, with the social construction of men's rather than women's gender identity being firmly anchored in their economic activities (Álvarez and Miles-Touya 2019). This gender asymmetry persists to date, given women's experiences of gender discrimination and wage penalties and men's comparative advantages in the labour market (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). Against this backdrop, "gender deviance neutralisation" theory posits that as men earn less than their wives, they tend to do less housework to neutralise their deviance from men's normative economic role. This means that when men have a lower rather than higher relative income, they may be more likely to stick to traditional gender ideology in housework to reclaim a sense of masculinity (Davis and Greenstein 2009; Kan 2008). Conversely, when women earn more than their husbands, they may increase their housework participation. This behaviour serves to counterbalance their deviance from gender norms and maintain their husbands' sense of masculinity (Greenstein 2000). However, it is important to note that previous research has reported mixed findings on gender deviance neutralisation, suggesting that the theory's validity depends on socio-economic and cultural contexts (Amarante, Rossel, and Scalese 2023; Hook 2017; Simister 2014; Sullivan 2011). Should gender deviance neutralisation play a more important role than resource bargaining/exchange in shaping how relative income moderates the actor and partner effects of both spouses' gender ideologies on their housework time, we expect Hypothesis 3B to hold.

Hypothesis 3B: The husband's lower relative contribution to the couple's income is associated with greater actor and partner effects of both spouses' traditional gender

ideology on their housework time.

Method

Data and Sample

The data analysed in this study are from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) waves 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17 and the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) waves 2, 4, and 10. The harmonised BHPS and UKHLS data cover the time span of 1993–2020⁴ and contain consistent measures of gender ideology and housework time. In its first wave in 1991, the BHPS surveyed a nationally representative sample of more than 10,000 individuals from around 5,500 households in Great Britain using a stratified and clustered sampling design. The BHPS interviewed the same households in each subsequent year and added an additional sample from Northern Ireland in 2001 (Institute for Social and Economic Research 2022). In 2009, the BHPS was replaced by the UKHLS, which is seen as a continuation of the BHPS. It has a similar design but a much larger sample size, including more than 50,000 individuals from around 30,000 households in its first wave (Institute for Social and Economic Research 2022). The University of Essex Ethics Committee has approved all data collection.

To construct our analytical sample, we first restricted the sample to cohabiting different-sex couples in a married or unmarried cohabiting relationship. We then reshaped the

⁴ The COVID-19 pandemic officially started in the United Kingdom in March 2020. In our analytical sample, only 125 were observed in 2020 and only 9 were observed after March 2020. Thus, our results are very unlikely affected by the pandemic.

data from a person—wave to a couple—wave format. Next, we restricted the sample to couples in which both spouses were aged between 25 and 59 (i.e., the active working age). As key information such as gender ideology was only collected in a self-completion questionnaire covering a representative subsample of respondents, we limited our sample to those who completed the self-completion questionnaire. After listwise-deleting a small number of observations with missing values (5.9% of the sample), the final analytical sample contains 36,137 couple—wave observations for 14,043 couples. See Supplementary Table S1 for further details about the analytical sample construction. The BHPS/UKHLS constructed weights to account for complex survey design, unequal attrition, and non-responses (Institute for Social and Economic Research 2022). Because the weights were constructed at the individual rather than the couple level, we conducted our analyses without weighting.

Measures

The dependent variable measures each spouse's weekly housework hours. The survey asked the question: "how many hours do you spend on housework in an average week, such as time spent cooking, cleaning and doing the laundry?". We top-coded the responses at the 99th percentile within gender to reduce the influence of outlier cases. While research has highlighted childcare as a key area where gender inequality persists, we emphasise the continuing importance of examining housework not only because it is a routine site of gender inequality regardless of parenthood status, but also because housework is essential to the everyday subsistence of home life (Davis and Greenstein 2013).

Our key explanatory variable is each spouse's gender ideology. The survey asked respondents the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: "a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works"; "all in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job"; and "a husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family". Responses were recorded using five-point Likert scales ranging from "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (5). Given the high internal consistency among the three items and that the items load more or less evenly on one factor (Cronbach's alpha = 0.80; eigenvalue of principal component analysis = 2.13), we reverse-coded the three items and calculated a standardised average score across the full sample of both wives and husbands to yield our gender ideology index, with a higher score indicating more traditional ideology. Standardising the index facilitates the interpretation and comparison of coefficients across models.

Our key moderating variable is spouses' relative income. We measured the husband's contribution to the couple's total income, calculated based on both spouses' monthly gross income before tax and other deductions. While net income tends to vary with people's pension and tax arrangements, gross income provides a good indicator of individuals' earning power (Hu 2019).

We controlled for a range of time-constant and time-varying socio-demographic variables that may confound the relationship between gender ideology and housework time (Hu 2019; Hu and Yucel 2018; Wang and Coulter 2019; Zhou 2017). Specifically, we included both spouses' age, longstanding illness (no vs. yes), race (white vs. non-white),

couple's marital status (married vs. unmarried cohabitation), age of the youngest child in the household (0 for those without children), and the number of residential children aged under 16 (no, one, two, and three or more). Given the well-documented role of socio-economic status and paid work in shaping both gender ideology and housework participation (Aassve et al. 2014; Hu 2019), we included both spouses' education (non-tertiary vs. tertiary), the total number of hours each spouse worked per week measured in a similar way as one's housework hours (top-coded at the 99th percentile within gender), couples' homeownership status (no vs. yes), and logged monthly gross household income. We also controlled for survey waves and the four nations of the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analysis.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

Analytic Strategy

We used the actor-partner interdependence model (APIM) to examine the dyadic dynamics between spouses' gender ideologies and housework time (Gistelinck and Loeys 2019; Kenny et al. 2006; Vowels and Mark 2020). The APIM considers within-couple correlations inherent in dyadic data, enabling analysis that captures dynamics both within and across dyads. This approach is especially valuable in research examining scenarios in which the ideology or behaviour of one partner can influence and be influenced by that of the other partner.

Specifically, the APIM estimates two types of effects. The actor effect captures the

relationship between an individual's characteristics (i.e., gender ideology) and their own outcome variable (i.e., housework time). The partner effect captures the relationship between one's partner's characteristics and one's outcome variable. The APIM also accounts for the correlations between two partners' predictor and outcome variables, which ensures the correct identification of actor and partner effects (Kenny et al. 2006).

To implement the APIM, we used Stata version 17 to estimate generalised structural equation models (GSEM) with random intercepts for each spouse's housework time and clustered standard errors at the couple level, which accounts for the panel data structure (i.e., couple—waves are nested within couples). As gender ideology varied little within individuals (coefficient of within-person variation = 0.15), we used a random-effects (rather than fixed-effects) specification. We fitted the models in three steps. First, we examined the actor and partner effects of both spouses' gender ideologies on their housework time and used Wald tests to compare the effect sizes of the actor and partner effects. Second, we estimated the interaction effects between spouses' gender ideologies to investigate the relationship between spouses' (dis)alignment in gender ideology and their housework time. Finally, we estimated the interaction effects between a couple's relative income and each spouse's gender ideology.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sub-samples of husbands and wives. Overall, we find that wives spend around 16 hours on housework per week, which is significantly

longer than their husbands' weekly housework time of around 6 hours (p < 0.001). In terms of individual characteristics, husbands are generally older, less likely to have a tertiary education degree, less likely to have any longstanding illness, but have a similar ethnic composition compared to their wives (p < 0.001 for gender differences for all these variables except ethnicity). Compared with their wives, the husbands spend around 10 hours more on paid work per week (p < 0.001). At the couple level, around 82% of the couple—wave observations are married as opposed to in an unmarried cohabiting relationship, and around 44% are childless. Approximately 80% of the observations own their dwellings. On average, the husbands make a greater contribution (i.e., 60%) to the couple's total income. Finally, most of the observations are from England (70%), with another 10%, 13%, and 7% from Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, respectively.

APIM Results

Figure 1 reports the average marginal effects from the APIMs examining the associations between both spouses' gender ideologies and their housework time, while considering the interdependence between spouses and controlling for all covariates presented in Table 1 (see Appendix Table A1 for full model results). The results show that the wife's traditional gender ideology has a positive actor effect on her own housework time (B = 0.64, p < 0.001) and a negative partner effect on her husband's housework time (B = -0.15, p < 0.001). Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increment in the wife's gender ideology from egalitarian to traditional is associated with a 38-minute increase in her own housework time and a 9-minute

decrease in her husband's housework time per week. Meanwhile, the husband's traditional gender ideology has a negative actor effect on his own housework time (B = -0.24, p < 0.001) and a positive partner effect on his wife's housework time (B = 0.64, p < 0.001). An increment of one standard deviation in the husband's gender ideology from egalitarian to traditional is associated with a 14-minute reduction in his own weekly housework time and a 38-minute increase in his wife's housework time. These results support Hypotheses 1A and 1B on how the wife's and the husband's gender ideologies relate to their own and spouse's housework time.

We conducted further analyses to compare the actor and partner effects of wives' vs. husbands' gender ideologies (see Supplementary Table S2 for full comparison results). The results support Hypothesis 1C that compared with the husband's housework time, the wife's housework time is more closely associated with and thus more susceptible to both spouses' gender ideologies (p < 0.001). Additionally, for the wife's gender ideology, the actor effect (on her own housework time) is larger than the partner effect (on her husband's housework time) (p < 0.001). By contrast, for the husband's gender ideology, the partner effect (on his wife's housework time) is larger than the actor effect (on his own housework time) (p < 0.001). The results thus support Hypothesis 1D, that wives' gender ideologies are more closely associated with their own than their spouses' housework time, whereas husbands' gender ideologies are more closely linked to their spouses' than their own housework time.

[Insert Figure 1 Here]

To explore variations in housework time across different scenarios of spouses'

ideological (dis)alignment, Table 2 presents the interaction effects between both spouses' gender ideologies on each spouse's housework time. The models show that for both wives and husbands, the interaction effects of spouses' gender ideologies on housework time are statistically significant, with a negative interaction effect for husbands (B = -0.08, p < 0.05) and a positive one for wives (B = 0.13, p < 0.05). Based on the interaction effects in Table 2, Figure 2 plots the predicted housework time for husbands and wives by distinct combinations of spouses' egalitarian (10th percentile⁵) and traditional (90th percentile) gender ideologies (see Supplementary Table S3 for detailed predictive margins). We find that husbands have the longest housework time in couples where spouses align in egalitarian gender ideology, followed by those in couples with disaligned traditional-egalitarian ideologies, and have the shortest housework time in couples who align in traditional ideology, but the magnitude of the variation is very small. Meanwhile, wives' housework time is the longest when spouses align in traditional gender ideology, followed by when spouses' traditional and egalitarian gender ideologies disalign. Wives' housework time is the shortest when spouses align in egalitarian gender ideology. Overall, these results support Hypotheses 2A and 2B regarding the implications of spouses' ideological (dis)alignment for housework time.

[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 Here]

When spouses' gender ideologies do not align, further tests show that the differences in spouses' predicted housework time between the two types of disalignment (i.e., "husband traditional + wife egalitarian" vs. "wife traditional + husband egalitarian") are not statistically

⁵ The 10th and 90th percentiles are based on within gender distributions.

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significant at the 5% level. However, it is worth noting that irrespective of the combination of spouses' gender ideologies, the gender gaps in housework time between the husband and the wife are consistently wide. Even when both spouses have egalitarian gender ideology, the wife's housework time is still around 8 hours longer per week than that of her husband.

[Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 Here]

Table 3 examines how the association between each spouse's gender ideology and housework time varies with the relative economic power between spouses measured by the husband's contribution to the couple's income. Specifically, for the husband's housework time, the interaction effect of neither spouse's gender ideology with the husband's relative income is statistically significant at the 5% level. By contrast, for the wife's housework time, the interactions of both the wife's (B = 0.84, p < 0.05) and the husband's gender ideologies (B = 1.22, p < 0.001) with relative income are statistically significant.

Drawing on the interaction effects in Table 3, Figure 3 illustrates how the marginal effects of husbands' and wives' gender ideologies (a higher score indicates more traditional ideology) on their own and their spouses' housework time vary across the distribution of the husband's relative income (see Supplementary Tables S4 for detailed marginal effects). The left panel of Figure 3 shows that the negative partner effect of wives' traditional gender ideology on their husbands' housework time remains consistently weak across the distribution of the husband's relative income. Similarly, there is no significant variation in the negative actor effect of husbands' traditional gender ideology across different levels of their relative income. These patterns, combined with the lack of statistically significant interaction

effects, indicate that the effects of husbands' and wives' gender ideologies on husbands' housework time remain similar regardless of the couple's relative income. Reporting the results for wives' housework time, the right panel of Figure 3 shows that as husbands' relative income increases, both the actor effect of the wife's traditional gender ideology and the partner effect of the husband's traditional gender ideology on the wife's housework time become stronger. These trends illustrate the statistically significant interaction effects between both spouses' gender ideology and relative income reported in Table 3. Overall, the results only support Hypothesis 3A, derived from the relative resource theory, for wives' but not husbands' housework time. The results do not support Hypothesis 3B derived from gender deviance neutralisation theory.

Robustness Checks

We conducted a series of supplementary analyses to ensure the robustness of our results. First, we tested whether our results may be driven by sample selection based on couples' gender ideology. As shown in Table S5, we conducted *t*-tests to compare gender ideology pairing between separated and ongoing couples but did not find any statistically significant differences. Moreover, the correlation between couples' gender ideology pairing and relationship duration is close to zero. In Tables S6 and S7, analyses show that our main results are robust to controlling for relationship duration and limiting the sample to only one randomly selected observation for each couple (to avoid over-sampling couples who stayed together for longer), respectively.

Second, we tested additional income measures. As previous research shows that the relationship between relative income and spouses' housework time may be non-linear (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994), we tested potential non-linearity by including the quadratic term of the husband's relative income in Table S8, which yielded results that are consistent with our main findings. Furthermore, autonomy theory suggests that women's housework time may be affected by their own absolute rather than the couple's relative income (Gupta 2007; Killewald and Gough 2010). Thus, we tested the interaction between gender ideology and each spouse's individual income in Table S9. The results suggest that individual income also plays a crucial role in moderating the actor effect of gender ideology on wives' housework time, which is not surprising as women's individual and relative earnings are closely correlated.

Third, we conducted two tests regarding the measure of gender ideology. As gender ideology is a multidimensional construct, we tested whether our main results would change had we used a single item ("a husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family"), which specifically captures ideology pertaining to the gender division of labour. As Table S10 shows, the results are substantively consistent with our main findings. In Table S11, we included lagged gender ideology measures (T-1) as the key predictors such that the temporal ordering of gender ideology precedes housework time, yielding largely consistent findings with those reported in the main article.

Fourth, we explored potential heterogeneities across distinct historical periods and key demographic groups. Table S12 shows that the associations between both spouses' gender

ideologies and their housework time are substantively consistent before (1993–2009) and under (2010–2020) the Coalition/Conservative regime. It is worth noting that the negative interaction between wives' gender ideology and the 2010–2020 period dummy is statistically significant (p < 0.01), indicating a reduced association between women's gender ideology and their housework time in this period compared to before. Next, Table S13 examines whether the actor and partner effects of gender ideology vary with spouses' parenthood status (Panel A) and the age of the youngest child in the household (Panel B). The results in both panels are substantively consistent with those from our main analyses, but the positive effects of both wives' and husbands' traditional gender ideologies on wives' housework time are stronger when the couples have young (0–11) children in the household.

Finally, as the random effects specification in the APIMs cannot distinguish between within- and between-couple variation, we estimated hybrid models to disentangle whether our results are driven by within- or between-couple differences in Tables S14 (main effects) and S15 (interaction effects). Both tables show that our main conclusions are driven primarily by between-couple differences, which is consistent with our expectation as gender ideology has relatively small within-couple variation. However, in Table S14, we do find that changes in housework time also varied with within-spouse changes in gender ideologies (apart from the within-effect of husbands' gender ideology on their own housework time) in the same directions as the main results.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study contributes to the literature by systematically conceptualising and investigating how both spouses' gender ideologies and their interplay with relative income shape gendered housework time in different-sex couples. Using dyadic data in the United Kingdom (1993–2020) and the APIM, our study has yielded three important findings.

First, by explicitly distinguishing and comparing actor and partner effects of each spouse's gender ideology, this study provides a nuanced understanding of the relative importance of both spouses' gender ideology in shaping their housework participation. The findings show that the wife's traditional gender ideology has a positive actor effect (on her own housework time) and a negative partner effect (on her husband's housework time), and the patterns are reversed for the husband's ideology. By going beyond an individual-centred focus and considering the cross-over effects between spouses, our findings reveal the intricate interdependencies between spouses' gender ideologies and housework participation within a couple, providing valuable insights into dyadic dynamics of gendered behaviours (Elder 1998; Moen and Yu 2000).

More specifically, our findings show that wives' gender ideologies are more closely associated with their own than with their husbands' housework time, whereas husbands' gender ideologies are more closely linked to their wives' than to their own housework time.

As a result, compared with the husband's housework time, the wife's housework time is much more closely related to both spouses' gender ideologies. These findings align with long-term evidence showing a notable decrease in women's housework time but only a slight increase in

men's housework time alongside an overall detraditionalisation of gender ideology over time (Altintas and Sullivan 2016). This may be because prevailing gender ideologies clearly inform and closely regulate women's housework behaviours, but they only loosely specify and regulate men's domestic responsibilities. The findings point towards a potential gender asymmetry in the construct of gender ideology pertaining to domestic labour and the importance of this asymmetry in understanding domestic gender inequality. Given that women's housework time is similarly influenced by both their own and their husbands' ideologies, it is crucial to focus on shifting men's gender ideology towards a more egalitarian direction, as promoting more egalitarian gender ideology among men could help alleviate women's housework burden. Nevertheless, as men's housework time is far less susceptible to variations in both spouses' gender ideologies compared to women's housework time, it is insufficient to just "detraditionalise" gender ideology as it is currently constructed to achieve domestic gender equality. Rather, we need structural changes in such ideologies to emphasise men's domestic responsibilities equally and clearly.

Second, by exploring the implications of the interaction of spouses' gender ideologies, particularly spouses' ideological (dis)alignment, for their housework time, we find that wives tend to have the shortest housework time in couples who align in egalitarian gender ideology, followed by ideologically disaligned couples, and have the longest housework time in couples who align in traditional ideology; and the patterns are reversed for husbands. These results lend support to Risman's (2004) conceptualisation of gender as a relational construct by emphasising the interactive nature of gender ideologies. The findings demonstrate that

spouses' gender ideologies can reinforce or offset each other depending on the (dis)alignment of the ideologies (Aassve et al. 2014; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). Specifically, spouses' alignment in traditional or egalitarian gender ideology enables conjugal validation and support for translating such ideology into housework behaviour, whereas disalignment hinders the full translation of spouses' discrepant ideologies.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that husbands' housework time seems relatively inelastic across distinct ideology pairings. Even when both spouses align in egalitarian gender ideology, the wife's housework time is much longer than that of her husband, indicating a gender asymmetry in the translation of gender ideology into behaviour. This may reflect the inherently gendered construct of housework (Gershuny 1994) and a lack of behavioural enactment of expressed egalitarian gender ideology, particularly on the part of men. This ideology-behaviour gap could also reflect a discrepancy between men's inherent and often unconscious endorsement of traditional gender values regarding domestic labour and their expression of support for gender egalitarianism, possibly due to an increasing social pressure to support gender equality in public discourse (Davis and Greenstein 2009). In light of Daminger's (2020) findings, the lack of variation in men's housework time with both spouses' gender ideologies could also be because gender-egalitarian men adopt a "degendering" logic, whereby they focus on a gender-neutral process of dividing housework rather than equality as an outcome in the actual division of housework. Our findings thus suggest that to achieve domestic gender equality, we need men to not only "say" but also "do" gender egalitarianism and that process-focused gender equality, as observed by

Daminger (2020), is insufficient.

Third, building on and going beyond existing resource theories (Kan 2008; Nitsche and Grunow 2016), our findings show that spouses' relative income helps shape spouses' housework participation by configuring the translation of gender ideology into such participation. We find that the husband's high relative income bolsters the positive association between both spouses' traditional gender ideologies and the wife's housework time. This may be because husbands' high relative income reflects traditional economic arrangements in the family, which reinforces wives' adherence to traditional gender ideology in the enactment of housework behaviour (Aassve et al. 2014). Alternatively, husbands' high relative income may entail unequal power dynamics between spouses. In this case, men's monopoly of power derived from their relative resources may compel their wives to conform to traditional gender norms and spend more time on housework (Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). These potential mechanisms highlight the complex role played by material conditions in conveying gender structures and in preventing women from translating egalitarian gender ideology into gender-egalitarian housework participation. In this sense, we need to remove structural and economic barriers to enable women to "do" gender egalitarianism. Although previous research highlights men's economic hegemony underlying their lack of housework contribution (Aassve et al. 2014; Brines 1994), our findings show that the husband's relative income does not influence how gender ideology translates into men's housework behaviour. This may be due to the "structural double standards" that allow men to derive power both from economic resources when they have comparative economic advantages and from

(patriarchal) cultural norms to "do" masculinity by doing less housework when their relative income is low.

Our study has a few limitations, which could be potential directions for future research. First, whereas the APIM considers interdependent relationships between spouses, it does not readily allow for the identification of causal relationships. The relationship between gender ideology and housework time could potentially be bi-directional (Carlson and Lynch 2013). Whereas gender ideology could be an exogenous cultural trait influencing housework time, gendered housework participation may shape gender ideology. We encourage future research to delve deeper into potential causal mechanisms. Second, this study only focuses on housework time as the survey has not consistently collected time-use data on other types of household labour, especially childcare tasks such as feeding and supervising children's educational activities. Future research could collect and analyse data on a wider range of domestic activities to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the implications of gender ideology for domestic gender inequalities. Third, although work-family roles are a crucial component of gender ideology, different aspects of gender ideology exist (Knight and Brinton 2017). Future research employing more detailed measures of gender ideology can provide a more nuanced understanding of how different aspects of gender ideology relate to housework participation.

Despite these limitations, our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the value of considering interactional dimensions of gender ideology in couple relationships. Our findings facilitate a deeper understanding of the housework distribution process under distinct

conditions of gender ideology (dis)alignment and relative economic power between spouses.

They demonstrate that the translation of gender ideology into gendered housework behaviour is an interactional process and that this process is further configured by the material conditions in the family.

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Table 1: Sample characteristics (N = 36,137 couple—waves for 14,043 couples)

Variable	Husband	Wife	Minimum	Maximum	T/χ^2 tests
Housework hours per week ^a , M (SD)	5.73	15.98	0	56	p < 0.001
	(5.34)	(10.41)			
Standardised gender ideology (high =	-0.05	-0.24	-2.00	2.41	<i>p</i> < 0.001
traditional), $M(SD)$	(0.96)	(0.99)			
Age, M(SD)	42.95	40.97	25	59	<i>p</i> < 0.001
	(9.00)	(8.98)			
Marital status ^b , %					
Married	81.87	_			
Unmarried cohabitation	18.13	_			
Age of youngest child in household $^{b, c}$, M	6.00	_	0	15	
(SD)	(4.71)				
Number of children in household ^b , %					
No child	43.83	_			
One child	21.90	_			
Two children	24.37	_			
Three children or more	9.90	_			
Home ownership ^b , %	80.26	_			
Monthly gross household income/1000a,	4.85	_	0	14.60	
^b , <i>M (SD)</i>	(2.65)				
Husband's share of couple's income b , M	0.60	_	0.07	0.96	
(SD)	(0.17)				
Education, %					<i>p</i> < 0.001
Non-tertiary	65.75	62.40			
Tertiary	34.25	37.60			
Working hours per week ^a , M (SD)	33.93	24.21	0	101.44	<i>p</i> < 0.001
	(23.25)	(19.91)			
Longstanding illness, %	20.57	23.07			<i>p</i> < 0.001
Race/ethnicity, %					p = 0.073
White	92.90	92.55			
Non-white	7.10	7.45			
Nation ^b , %					
England	69.63	_			
Wales	10.09	_			
Scotland	12.82	_			
Northern Ireland	7.46	<u> </u>			

Note. M = Means, SD = Standard deviations, % = Percentage.

^a Top-coded at the 99th percentile to reduce the influence of outlier cases.

^b Couple-level variable.

^c Calculated based on couples with at least one child.

Table 2: Actor-partner interdependence models examining two-way interaction effects between the husband's and the wife's gender ideologies on housework time (results for Figure 2)

	Husband's	Wife's
	housework time	housework time
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.26***	0.66***
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.14***	0.64***
	(0.03)	(0.06)
Husband's gender ideology × wife's gender ideology	-0.08**	0.13*
	(0.03)	(0.05)
Constant	7.37***	9.76***
	(0.28)	(0.50)
Variance (housework hours)	13.97***	48.70***
	(0.27)	(0.82)
Covariance (wife's and husband's housework hours)	0.23	3
	(0.21	1)
Number of couples	14,043	
Number of couple—wave observations	36,137	
Log-likelihood	-234,167	
Akaike information criterion (AIC)	468,487	


^{***} p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.

Table 3: Actor-partner interdependence models examining two-way interaction effects of each spouse's gender ideology with the husband's relative income on housework time (results for Figure 3)

	Husband's	Wife's
	housework time	housework time
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.34**	0.13
	(0.13)	(0.20)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.02	-0.09
	(0.13)	(0.20)
Husband's share of couple's income	-4.57***	7.57***
	(0.24)	(0.40)
Husband's gender ideology × husband's income share	0.16	0.84*
	(0.19)	(0.33)
Wife's gender ideology × husband's income share	-0.20	1.22***
	(0.19)	(0.33)
Constant	7.35***	9.64***
	(0.28)	(0.50)
Variance (housework hours)	13.97***	48.66***
	(0.27)	(0.82)
Covariance (wife's and husband's housework hours)	0.3	24
	(0.:	21)
Number of couples	14,043	
Number of couple—wave observations	36,137	
Log-likelihood	-234,155	
Akaike information criterion (AIC)	468,465	

^{***} p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.


Figure 1: Relationships between gender ideology and housework time in different-sex couples.



Note. A higher gender ideology score indicates more traditional gender ideology. See Appendix Table A1 for full model results.


^{***} p < 0.001.

Figure 2: Predicted housework time (with 95% confidence intervals), by spouses' gender ideology (dis)alignment.



Note. Egalitarian and traditional gender ideology scores are predicted at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the distributions for husbands and wives, respectively. For APIM results with couple-level clustered standard errors, see Table 2.

Figure 3: Marginal effects of spouses' gender ideologies (with 95% confidence intervals) on housework time, by the husband's relative income.



Note. A higher gender ideology score indicates more traditional gender ideology. For APIM results with couple-level clustered standard errors, see Table 3.

Appendix

Table A1: Actor-partner interdependence models examining the relationships between gender ideology and housework time (results for Figure 1)

	Husband's	Wife's
	housework time	housework time
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.24***	0.64***
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.15***	0.64***
	(0.03)	(0.06)
Husband's age	0.06***	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wife's age	-0.03***	0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Marital status (ref. = married)		
Unmarried cohabitation	0.28**	-0.49***
	(0.09)	(0.14)
Age of youngest child	-0.03***	-0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Number of children (ref. = no children)		
One child	0.72***	3.45***
	(0.10)	(0.18)
Two children	1.08***	5.09***
	(0.10)	(0.18)
Three children or more	1.48***	8.39***
	(0.13)	(0.26)
Home ownership (ref. = no)		
Yes	-0.41***	-0.65***
	(0.09)	(0.16)
Logged household monthly income	-0.03*	-0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Husband's share of couple's income	-4.53***	7.33***
	(0.23)	(0.39)
Husband's education (ref. = non-tertiary)		
Tertiary	0.25**	-1.15***
	(0.08)	(0.14)
Wife's education (ref. = non-tertiary)		
Tertiary	0.10	-0.97***
	(0.09)	(0.14)
Husband's working hours per week	-0.02***	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Wife's working hours per week	0.01***	-0.07***

	(0.00)	(0.00)
Husband's longstanding illness (ref. = no)		
Yes	0.30***	0.39**
	(0.08)	(0.13)
Wife's longstanding illness (ref. = no)		
Yes	0.66***	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.13)
Husband's race/ethnicity (ref. = white)		
Non-white	0.09	1.47***
	(0.20)	(0.32)
Wife's race (ref. = white)		
Non-white	-0.07	0.86**
	(0.19)	(0.31)
Nations (ref. = England)		
Scotland	0.24	0.94***
	(0.14)	(0.23)
Wales	0.24	0.31
	(0.12)	(0.20)
Northern Ireland	-0.46**	2.54***
	(0.15)	(0.28)
Control of wave dummies	Yes	Yes
Constant	7.33***	9.82***
	(0.28)	(0.50)
Variance (housework hours)	13.97***	48.70***
	(0.27)	(0.82)
Random intercepts (housework hours)	12.72***	31.21***
	(0.35)	(0.87)
Covariance (wife's and husband's housework hours)	0.23	3
	(0.2	1)
Number of couples	14,043	
Number of couple-wave observations	36,137	
Log-likelihood	-234,175	
Akaike information criterion	468,499	

Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

^{***} p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.

Online Supplementary Materials

for

Whose Gender Ideology Matters? A Dyadic Analysis of Gender Ideology and Housework Time in the United Kingdom

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Table S1: Steps of analytic sample construction

Steps	Sample restriction	Sample
0	Original sample of BHPS (waves 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17) and UKHLS (waves 2, 4, 10)	SN = 359,257 person—waves
1	Restrict the sample to different-sex couples who are married or cohabiting with an unmarried partner and reshape the data from person-waves to couple-waves format	N = 70,142 couple—waves
2	Restrict the sample to couples in which both the husband and wife completed the self-completion questionnaire (only a representative subsample participated in the self-completion module).	N = 59,925 couple—waves
3	Restrict the sample to couples in which both the husband and wife are aged between 25 and 59 (active working age).	N = 38,411 couple—waves
4	Listwise delete couples with missing values for the variables used (5.92% of the original sample).	N = 36,137 couple—waves or 14,043 couples (final analytic sample)

Note. BHPS = British Household Panel Survey. UKHLS = United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study.

Table S2: Comparisons of actor and partner effects of spouses' gender ideologies (results for Figure 1)

	Marginal effects	Difference in marginal effects compared with the		
		reference in the column		
Husband's actor effect	-0.24 (0.04) ***	Reference		
Husband's partner effect	-0.15 (0.03) ***	p = 0.091	Reference	
Wife's actor effect	0.64 (0.06) ***	p < 0.001	p < 0.001	Reference
Wife's partner effect	0.64 (0.06) ***	p < 0.001	p < 0.001	p = 0.975

^{***} *p* < 0.001

Table S3: Comparisons of predicted housework hours by spouses' gender ideology pairings (results for Figure 2)

	Predictive margins	Difference in predictive margins compared		
		with the	reference in the	column
Panel A. Predicted husband's housewood	rk			
hours				
Both egalitarian	6.11 (0.08) ***	Reference		
Husband egalitarian + wife traditional	6.00 (0.09) ***	p = 0.406	Reference	
Wife traditional + husband egalitarian	5.79 (0.11) ***	p = 0.027	p = 0.147	Reference
Both traditional	5.15 (0.07) ***	<i>p</i> < 0.001	<i>p</i> < 0.001	<i>p</i> < 0.001
Panel B. Predicted wife's housework hours				
Both egalitarian	14.38 (0.13) ***	Reference		
Husband egalitarian + wife traditional	15.61 (0.17) ***	<i>p</i> < 0.001	Reference	
Wife traditional + husband egalitarian	15.55 (0.19) ***	<i>p</i> < 0.001	p = 0.810	Reference
Both traditional	17.61 (0.14) ***	<i>p</i> < 0.001	<i>p</i> < 0.001	<i>p</i> < 0.001

^{***} *p* < 0.001

Table S4: Average marginal effects of spouses' gender ideologies on housework time by the husband's relative income (results for Figure 3)

	Husband's share of the couple's income		
	30%	50%	70%
Panel A. Marginal effects on husband's housework time			
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.29***	-0.26***	-0.22***
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.09	-0.13**	-0.17***
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel B. Marginal effects on wife's housework time			
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	0.39***	0.55***	0.72***
	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	0.28**	0.52***	0.76***
	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)

^{***} p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01.

Table S5: Differences in gender ideology pairing between ongoing and disrupted/separated relationships

Panel A. Relationship between differences in couples' traditional gender ideology (husband - wife) and couples' separation risk

Separated/divorced couples Ongoing couples

Difference in couples' traditional Mean = 0.17 Mean = 0.18

gender ideology (husband - wife) Standard deviation = 0.01 Standard deviation = 0.03

N = 777 couples N = 13,266 couples

Independent sample T-test: p = 0.810

Panel B. Relationship between differences in couples' traditional gender ideology (husband - wife) and duration of couple relationship

Unstandardised coefficient = 0.002 (p = 0.035)

Standard coefficient (Pearson's r) = 0.02

N = 14,019 couples

Note. Standardised score of gender ideology is used with a higher score indicating more traditional ideology.

Table S6: APIMs examining the effects of spouses' gender ideologies and interactions with husband's income share on housework time controlling for relationship duration

	Husband's	Wife's
	housework time	housework time
Panel A. Main effects of couples' gender ideology		
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.24***	0.64***
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.15***	0.64***
	(0.03)	(0.06)
Panel B. Interaction between both spouses' gender ideologies		
Husband's gender ideology × wife's gender ideology	-0.08**	0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.05)
Panel C. Interaction between each spouse's gender ideology		
and husband's income share		
Husband's gender ideology × husband's income share	0.15	0.82*
	(0.19)	(0.33)
Wife's gender ideology × husband's income share	-0.21	1.19***
	(0.19)	(0.33)
Number of couples	14,	,019
Number of couple—wave observations	36,	,094

^{***} p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.

Table S7: APIMs examining the effects of spouses' gender ideologies and interactions with husband's relative income on housework time among couples where each couple has one random couple—wave observation

	Husband's	Wife's
	housework time	housework time
Panel A. Main effects of couples' gender ideology		
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.41***	0.78***
	(0.05)	(0.09)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.11*	0.62***
	-0.41***	0.78***
Panel B. Interaction between both spouses' gender ideologies		
Husband's gender ideology × wife's gender ideology	-0.05	0.24***
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Panel C. Interaction between each spouse's gender ideology		
and husband's income share		
Husband's gender ideology × husband's income share	-0.07	1.08*
	(0.28)	(0.48)
Wife's gender ideology × husband's income share	0.05	0.92*
	(0.27)	(0.45)
Number of couples	14	,043

Note. All models include all the control variables reported in Table 1 as well as survey wave dummies. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

^{***} *p* < 0.001, * *p* < 0.05.

Table S8: APIMs examining the interaction effects of each spouse's gender ideology with the squared term of the husband's relative income on housework time

	Husband's	Wife's
	housework time	housework time
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.39	0.09
	(0.31)	(0.40)
Husband's share of couple's income	-7.45***	-2.51
	(1.09)	(1.61)
Husband's gender ideology × husband's income share	0.45	1.25
	(1.03)	(1.48)
Husband's income share × husband's income share	2.64**	8.93***
	(0.89)	(1.42)
Husband's gender ideology × squared husband's income share	-0.31	-0.53
	(0.84)	(1.33)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.21	1.25**
	(0.30)	(0.41)
Wife's gender ideology × husband's income share	0.64	-3.76*
	(1.01)	(1.49)
Wife's gender ideology × squared husband's income share	-0.83	4.21**
	(0.82)	(1.32)
Number of couples	14,043	
Number of couple—wave observations	36,137	

^{***} p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.

Table S9: APIMs examining the interaction effects of each spouse's gender ideology with his or her monthly absolute income on housework time

	Husband's	Wife's
	housework time	housework time
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.28***	0.53***
	(0.06)	(0.10)
Husband's monthly income / 1000	-0.06	-0.91***
	(0.04)	(0.08)
Husband's gender ideology × husband's monthly income / 1000	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.03)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.15**	1.05***
	(0.05)	(0.10)
Wife's monthly income / 1000	-0.17**	-1.24***
	(0.06)	(0.10)
Wife's gender ideology × wife's monthly income / 1000	0.00	-0.28***
	(0.02)	(0.04)
Number of couples	14,043	
Number of couple—wave observations	36	,137

Note. All models include all the control variables reported in Table 1 (except household income), survey wave dummies, and random intercepts for both spouses' housework time. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01.

Table S10: APIMs examining the effects of spouses' gender ideologies and interactions with the husband's relative income on housework time using the item ('a husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family') as the key predictor

	Husband's housework	Wife's
	time	housework time
Panel A. Main effects of couples' gender ideology		
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.28***	0.55***
	(0.03)	(0.06)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.17***	0.54***
	(0.03)	(0.06)
Panel B. Interaction between both spouses' gender ideologies		
Husband's gender ideology × wife's gender ideology	0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.05)
Panel C. Interaction between each spouse's gender ideology		
and husband's income share		
Husband's gender ideology × husband's income share	0.34*	0.37
	(0.18)	(0.30)
Wife's gender ideology × husband's income share	-0.22	0.82**
	(0.18)	(0.32)
Number of couples	14,043	
Number of couple—wave observations	36,137	

^{***} p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.

Table S11: APIMs examining the lagged effects of spouses' gender ideologies and interactions with husband's income share on housework time

	Husband's	Wife's
	housework time	housework time
Panel A. Main effects of couples' gender ideology		
Lagged husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.23***	0.59***
	(0.04)	(0.08)
Lagged wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.08	0.65***
	(0.04)	(0.08)
Panel B. Interaction between both spouses' gender ideologies		
Lagged husband's gender ideology × lagged wife's gender	-0.04	0.14
ideology	(0.04)	(0.07)
Panel C. Interaction between each spouse's gender ideology		
and husband's income share		
Lagged husband's gender ideology × husband's income share	0.60*	0.81
	(0.25)	(0.43)
Lagged wife's gender ideology × husband's income share	-0.13	1.16**
	(0.26)	(0.43)
Number of couples	8,17	72
Number of couple–wave observations	21,01	10

^{***} p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.

Table S12: APIMs examining the interaction effects of each spouse's gender ideology with time periods on housework time

	Husband's	Wife's	
	housework time	housework time	
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.22***	0.77***	
	(0.05)	(0.09)	
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.17***	0.83***	
	(0.05)	(0.09)	
Time periods (ref. = 1993–2009)			
2010–2020	0.10	-6.65***	
	(0.16)	(0.29)	
Gender ideology \times Time periods			
Husband's gender ideology × 2010–2020	-0.03	-0.23	
	(0.06)	(0.12)	
Wife's gender ideology \times 2010–2020	0.05	-0.36**	
	(0.06)	(0.11)	
Number of couples	14,043		
Number of couple—wave observations	36,137		

^{***} *p* < 0.001, ** *p* < 0.01.

Table S13: APIMs examining the interaction effects of each spouse's gender ideology with the presence of coresident children under 16 and age of the youngest child on housework time

	Husband's	Wife's
	housework time	housework time
Panel A.		
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.20***	1.13***
	(0.05)	(0.08)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.16***	1.14***
	(0.05)	(0.09)
Presence of children (ref. = no)	0.31***	4.20***
	(0.06)	(0.12)
Husband's gender ideology × presence of children	-0.17**	0.40***
	(0.06)	(0.12)
Wife's gender ideology × presence of children	-0.11	0.38**
	(0.06)	(0.12)
Panel B.		
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.16***	0.33***
	(0.05)	(0.08)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology	-0.08	0.38***
	(0.05)	(0.08)
Youngest child's age (ref. = no children)		
Child aged 0-11	0.56**	1.16**
	(0.20)	(0.40)
Child aged 12–15	0.56*	1.81***
	(0.25)	(0.49)
Gender ideology × Youngest child's age		
Husband's gender ideology × child aged 0-11	-0.10	0.47***
	(0.07)	(0.12)
Husband's gender ideology × child aged 12-15	-0.27**	0.72***
	(0.10)	(0.18)
Wife's gender ideology × child aged 0–11	-0.13*	0.55***
	(0.06)	(0.12)
Wife's gender ideology × child aged 12–15	-0.07	-0.03
	(0.10)	(0.18)
Number of couples	14,043	
Number of couple—wave observations	36,1	137

^{***} p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.

Table S14: Within-between hybrid APIMs examining the relationships between gender ideology and housework time

ideology and nousework time	Husband's	Wife's
		housework time
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology (within effect)	-0.04	0.29**
Trasound's (traditional) gender racology (wrann cricce)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Husband's (traditional) gender ideology (between effect)	-0.46***	0.88***
Trasound 5 (traditional) gender racology (sectives)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology (within effect)	-0.11*	0.43***
	(0.05)	(0.09)
Wife's (traditional) gender ideology (between effect)	-0.13*	0.62***
()	(0.05)	(0.08)
Husband's age (within effect)	0.08	0.34*
	(0.08)	(0.16)
Husband's age (between effect)	0.06***	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wife's age (within effect)	-0.04	-0.12
	(0.08)	(0.16)
Wife's age (between effect)	-0.03***	0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unmarried cohabitation (within effect)	0.22	-0.31
	(0.15)	(0.27)
Unmarried cohabitation (between effect)	0.32**	-0.37*
	(0.11)	(0.17)
Age of youngest child (within effect)	-0.04***	-0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Age of youngest child (between effect)	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Have one child (within effect)	0.66***	3.52***
	(0.13)	(0.24)
Have one child (between effect)	0.69***	3.33***
	(0.17)	(0.28)
Have two children (within effect)	0.91***	5.07***
	(0.13)	(0.24)
Have two children (between effect)	1.27***	4.87***
	(0.16)	(0.26)
Have three or more children (within effect)	1.17***	7.32***
	(0.18)	(0.36)
Have three or more children (between effect)	1.71***	9.31***
	(0.20)	(0.35)
Have homeownership (within effect)	0.11	0.14
	(0.17)	(0.33)

Have homeownership (between effect)			
Household monthly income (within effect)	Have homeownership (between effect)		
Household monthly income (between effect)			
Household monthly income (between effect)	Household monthly income (within effect)	-0.00	-0.10**
Husband's share of couple's income (within effect) Husband's share of couple's income (between effect) Husband's share of couple's income (between effect) Husband's share of couple's income (between effect) Husband's tertiary education (within effect) Husband's tertiary education (between effect) Husband's tertiary education (between effect) Husband's tertiary education (between effect) Husband's tertiary education (within effect) Husband's working hours per week (within effect) Husband's working hours per week (within effect) Husband's working hours per week (between effect) Husband's working hours per week (between effect) Husband's working hours per week (within effect) Husband's working hours per week (between effect) Husband's longstanding illness (within effect) Husband's l		(0.02)	(0.03)
Husband's share of couple's income (within effect)	Household monthly income (between effect)	-0.06**	-0.18***
Husband's share of couple's income (between effect)		(0.02)	(0.03)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Husband's share of couple's income (within effect)	-3.46***	5.38***
Husband's tertiary education (within effect) Husband's tertiary education (between effect) Husband's tertiary education (between effect) Wife's tertiary education (between effect) Wife's tertiary education (within effect) Wife's tertiary education (within effect) Wife's tertiary education (between effect) Wife's working hours per week (within effect) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) Wife's working hours per week (within effect) Wife's working hours per week (within effect) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) Wife's longstanding illness (b		(0.30)	(0.53)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Husband's share of couple's income (between effect)	-5.89***	9.59***
Husband's tertiary education (between effect) $0.39^{***} -1.11^{***} \\ (0.09) (0.14)$ Wife's tertiary education (within effect) $0.20 -0.12$ $0.34 \\ (0.49)$ Wife's tertiary education (between effect) $0.09 -0.63^{***} \\ (0.09) \\ (0.15)$ Husband's working hours per week (within effect) $0.09 \\ (0.00) \\ ($		(0.37)	(0.57)
Husband's tertiary education (between effect) 0.39^{***} -1.11^{***} Wife's tertiary education (within effect) 0.20 -0.12 (0.34) (0.49) Wife's tertiary education (between effect) 0.09 -0.63^{***} (0.09) (0.15) Husband's working hours per week (within effect) -0.02^{***} 0.01^{*} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Husband's working hours per week (between effect) -0.01^{***} -0.01^{*} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.02^{***} -0.06^{***} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.01^{**} -0.07^{***} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.19^{*} 0.39^{*} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.19^{*} 0.39^{*} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.09^{*} (0.17) <t< td=""><td>Husband's tertiary education (within effect)</td><td>0.19</td><td>-0.26</td></t<>	Husband's tertiary education (within effect)	0.19	-0.26
Wife's tertiary education (within effect) 0.20		(0.32)	(0.51)
Wife's tertiary education (within effect) 0.20 −0.12 (0.34) (0.49) Wife's tertiary education (between effect) 0.09 −0.63*** (0.09) (0.15) Husband's working hours per week (within effect) −0.02*** 0.01* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Husband's working hours per week (between effect) −0.01*** −0.01* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (within effect) 0.02*** −0.06*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.01* −0.07*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.19* 0.39* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.19* 0.39* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.19* 0.39* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) 0.40*** 0.35* (0.12) (0.10) <td>Husband's tertiary education (between effect)</td> <td>0.39***</td> <td>-1.11***</td>	Husband's tertiary education (between effect)	0.39***	-1.11***
Wife's tertiary education (between effect) (0.34) (0.49) Wife's tertiary education (between effect) 0.09 $-0.63***$ (0.09) (0.15) Husband's working hours per week (within effect) $-0.02***$ $-0.01*$ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (within effect) $0.02***$ $-0.06***$ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) $0.01*$ $-0.07***$ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Husband's longstanding illness (within effect) $0.19*$ $0.39*$ (0.09) (0.17) Husband's longstanding illness (between effect) $0.40**$ 0.35 (0.12) (0.19) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) $0.22*$ 0.03 (0.09) (0.16) Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) $1.35***$ 0.04 (0.12) (0.12) (0.20) Husband's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 $1.30***$ (0.20) (0.32) Wife's non-white race (between effect)		(0.09)	(0.14)
Wife's tertiary education (between effect) 0.09 $-0.63***$ (0.09) (0.15) Husband's working hours per week (within effect) $-0.02***$ $0.01*$ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Husband's working hours per week (between effect) $-0.01***$ $-0.01*$ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) $0.02***$ $-0.06***$ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) $0.01*$ $-0.07****$ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Husband's longstanding illness (within effect) $0.19*$ $0.39*$ Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) $0.40**$ $0.35*$ Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) $0.22*$ 0.03 Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.02 0.02 Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 $1.35***$ 0.02 $0.76*$ 0.02 $0.76*$ 0.02 $0.76*$ 0.02 $0.76*$ 0.02 $0.76*$ 0.02 </td <td>Wife's tertiary education (within effect)</td> <td>0.20</td> <td>-0.12</td>	Wife's tertiary education (within effect)	0.20	-0.12
Husband's working hours per week (within effect) (0.09) (0.15) Husband's working hours per week (between effect) -0.02^{***} 0.00 Husband's working hours per week (between effect) -0.01^{***} -0.01^{*} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.01^{**} -0.07^{***} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Husband's longstanding illness (within effect) 0.19^{**} 0.39^{**} (0.09) (0.17) Husband's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.40^{**} 0.35 (0.12) (0.19) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) 0.22^{**} 0.03 (0.09) (0.16) Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) 1.35^{***} 0.04 (0.09) (0.16) Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.02 (0.20) Husband's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 1.30^{***} (0.20) (0.32) Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 0.76^{**} (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) <td></td> <td>(0.34)</td> <td>(0.49)</td>		(0.34)	(0.49)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Wife's tertiary education (between effect)	0.09	-0.63***
Husband's working hours per week (between effect)		(0.09)	(0.15)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Husband's working hours per week (within effect)	-0.02***	0.01*
Wife's working hours per week (within effect) (0.00) (0.17) Husband's longstanding illness (between effect) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.16) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.12) (0.00) (0.16) Husband's non-white race (between effect) (0.10) (0.10) (0.20) (0.32) Wife's non-white race (between effect) (0.20) (0.32) Wife's non-white race (between effect)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Wife's working hours per week (within effect) 0.02^{***} -0.06^{***} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.01^* -0.07^{***} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Husband's longstanding illness (within effect) 0.19^* 0.39^* Husband's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.40^{**} 0.35 (0.12) (0.19) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) 0.22^* 0.03 (0.09) (0.16) Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) 1.35^{***} 0.04 (0.12) (0.20) Husband's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 1.30^{***} (0.20) (0.32) Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 0.76^* (0.19) (0.31) Nations (ref. = England) (between effect)	Husband's working hours per week (between effect)	-0.01***	-0.01*
Wife's working hours per week (between effect) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.17) (0.09) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.19) (0.16) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.16) (0.12) (0.16) (0.12)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Wife's working hours per week (between effect) 0.01^* -0.07^{***} (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Husband's longstanding illness (within effect) 0.19^* 0.39^* Husband's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.40^{**} 0.35 (0.12) (0.19) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) 0.22^* 0.03 (0.09) (0.16) Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) 1.35^{***} 0.04 (0.12) (0.20) Husband's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 1.30^{***} (0.20) (0.32) Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 0.76^* (0.19) (0.31) Nations (ref. = England) (between effect)	Wife's working hours per week (within effect)	0.02***	-0.06***
Husband's longstanding illness (within effect) (0.00) (0.09) (0.17) Husband's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.40^{**} 0.35 Husband's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.40^{**} 0.35 (0.12) (0.19) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) 0.22^{*} 0.03 (0.09) (0.16) Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) 1.35^{***} 0.04 (0.12) (0.20) Husband's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 1.30^{***} (0.20) (0.32) Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 0.76^{*} (0.19) (0.31) Nations (ref. = England) (between effect) 0.02 0.76^{*}		(0.00)	(0.00)
Husband's longstanding illness (within effect) $0.19*$ $0.39*$ Husband's longstanding illness (between effect) $0.40**$ 0.35 Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) $0.22*$ 0.03 Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.09 0.16 Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) $1.35***$ 0.04 Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 $1.30***$ Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 $0.76*$ Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 $0.76*$ Nations (ref. = England) (between effect) 0.19 0.31	Wife's working hours per week (between effect)	0.01*	-0.07***
Husband's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.40^{**} 0.35 (0.12) (0.19) Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) 0.22^{*} 0.03 (0.09) (0.16) Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.135^{***} 0.04 (0.12) (0.20) Husband's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 0.10 0.30^{***} 0.30^{***} 0.30 Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 0.30^{***} 0.30 0.30 Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 0.76^{*} 0.09 0.31		(0.00)	(0.00)
Husband's longstanding illness (between effect) 0.40^{**} 0.35 Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) 0.22^* 0.03 Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) 1.35^{***} 0.04 Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) 1.35^{***} 0.04 Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 1.30^{***} Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 0.76^* Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 0.76^* Nations (ref. = England) (between effect) 0.02 0.31)	Husband's longstanding illness (within effect)	0.19*	0.39*
Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) $0.22* 0.03$ 0.09 0.16 Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) $1.35*** 0.04$ 0.12 0.20 Husband's non-white race (between effect) $0.10 1.30*** 0.20$ Wife's non-white race (between effect) $0.02 0.76*$ 0.02 $0.76*$ 0.19 0.19 0.21		(0.09)	(0.17)
Wife's longstanding illness (within effect) $0.22*$ 0.03 Wife's longstanding illness (between effect) $1.35***$ 0.04 Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 $1.30***$ Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 $0.76*$ Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 $0.76*$ Nations (ref. = England) (between effect) 0.02 0.31)	Husband's longstanding illness (between effect)	0.40**	0.35
Wife's longstanding illness (between effect)		(0.12)	(0.19)
Wife's longstanding illness (between effect)	Wife's longstanding illness (within effect)	0.22*	0.03
Husband's non-white race (between effect) $0.10 1.30*** (0.20)$ Wife's non-white race (between effect) $0.02 0.76* (0.19)$ (0.31) Nations (ref. = England) (between effect)		(0.09)	(0.16)
Husband's non-white race (between effect) 0.10 $1.30***$ (0.20) (0.32) Wife's non-white race (between effect) 0.02 $0.76*$ (0.19) Nations (ref. = England) (between effect)	Wife's longstanding illness (between effect)	1.35***	0.04
Wife's non-white race (between effect)		(0.12)	(0.20)
Wife's non-white race (between effect) $0.02 0.76*$ (0.19) (0.31) Nations (ref. = England) (between effect)	Husband's non-white race (between effect)	0.10	1.30***
(0.19) (0.31) Nations (ref. = England) (between effect)		(0.20)	(0.32)
Nations (ref. = England) (between effect)	Wife's non-white race (between effect)	0.02	0.76*
		(0.19)	(0.31)
	Nations (ref. = England) (between effect)		
Scotland 0.16 0.91***	Scotland	0.16	0.91***
(0.14) (0.23)			
Wales 0.19 0.28	Wales		

	(0.12)	(0.20)
Northern Ireland	-0.43**	2.52***
	(0.15)	(0.27)
Control of wave dummies	Yes	Yes
Number of couples	14,043	
Number of couple—wave observations	36,137	

Note. Between standard deviation (husband's housework time): 0.91, within standard deviation (husband's housework time): 0.44, between standard deviation (wife's housework time): 0.95, within standard deviation (wife's housework time): 0.45. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

^{***} p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.

Table S15: Within-between hybrid APIMs examining the effects of spouses' gender ideologies and interactions with husband's income share on housework time

	Husband's	Wife's
	housework	housework
	time	time
Panel A. Interaction between both spouses' gender ideologies		
Husband's gender ideology (within effect) × wife's gender ideology (within	-0.08	0.11
effect)		
	(0.11)	(0.20)
Husband's gender ideology (between effect) \times wife's gender ideology (between	-0.09*	0.26***
effect)		
	(0.04)	(0.08)
Panel B. Interaction between each spouse's gender ideology and husband's		
income share		
Husband's gender ideology (within effect) × husband's income share (within	0.79	-0.01
effect)		
	(0.62)	(0.99)
Wife's gender ideology (within effect) × husband's income share (within effect)	0.22	0.61
	(0.69)	(1.10)
Husband's gender ideology (between effect) \times husband's income share (between	0.08	1.30*
effect)		
	(0.34)	(0.51)
Wife's gender ideology (between effect) × husband's income share (between	0.01	1.01
effect)		
	(0.32)	(0.52)
Number of couples	14,	043
Number of couple—wave observations	36,	137

Note. Between standard deviation (husband's housework time): 0.91, within standard deviation (husband's housework time): 0.44, between standard deviation (wife's housework time): 0.95, within standard deviation (wife's housework time): 0.45. All models include all the control variables reported in Table 1, survey wave dummies, and random intercepts for both spouses' housework time. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, * p < 0.05.